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THE NEW YORK TIMES AND CREDIT RATING AGENCIES:




Much has been said about the importance of the First Amendment
to our society. This very first amendment o our Constitution may be the
most significant piece of legislation ever written by our legislators. The
First Amendment not only shapes the political discourse in our country,
it informs who we are as citizens of a democracy. The First Amendment
is the foundation of a society in which freedom of speech and of the
press are fundamental rights. Yet, the safeguards of the First Amendment
have, in some cases, been misapplied. Rather than simply protecting the
right to freely express honestly believed opinions, the First Amendment
has been used as a shield against liability for falsity. In particular, the
credit rating agencies have used the First Amendment to avoid liability
for false or misleading credit ratings. Hence, this Article will question
the theoretical underpinnings of applying the protections of the First
Amendment in the context of the credit rating agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
If one were to ask the public which two are analogous-the New
York Times, a credit rating agency, or an auditor-I venture most people
would believe the credit rating agency and the auditor are the apples, and
the newspaper is the orange. Yet, according to the courts, those people
would be mistaken. Under First Amendment jurisprudence as applied by
the lower courts, credit rating agencies are indistinguishable from the
New York Times.'
Credit rating agencies are bond market professionals paid to provide
an assessment regarding the creditworthiness of a debt security, or the
issuer of a debt security, based on factual information.2 Nevertheless,
both the judiciary and the regulatory branches of our government have
afforded the credit rating agencies protections from liability. 3 The judici-
ary has considered credit ratings to be pure statements of opinion and
1. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (observing that some courts have characterized credit rating
agencies as "publishers or journalists" and provided the rating agencies with protection under the
First Amendment); Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-57 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1999) (considering Standard & Poor's to be a "financial publisher" and applying the protections of
the First Amendment); Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 161 B.R. 577,
586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the credit rating agency functioned as a publisher of
publicly disseminated ratings and, thus, "as a matter of law," should be afforded "the full breadth of
First Amendment safeguards").
2. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that a "[credit] rating agency ... analyze[s] data, conduct[s] an assess-
ment, and [provides] a fact-based conclusion as to creditworthiness"); Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc.
v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, I10 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (finding that the rating agencies
provided their opinions regarding the creditworthiness of the plaintiffs bonds "as professionals
being paid to provide their opinions to a client"); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE
ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES
MARKETS 5 (2003) [hereinafter ROLE & FUNCTION] ("For almost a century, credit rating agencies
have been providing opinions on the creditworthiness of issuers of [debt] securities and their finan-
cial obligations.").
3. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., REP. ON FINANCIAL
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 96-98 (Comm. Print 2002)
[hereinafter PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS] (noting the courts have shielded the credit rating agen-
cies from legal accountability by affording the agencies with protections under the First Amendment
and that the Securities and Exchange Commission has permitted the credit rating agencies to "es-
cape[] regulation").
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provided the rating agencies with First Amendment protections. These
protections are the same First Amendment protections provided to jour-
nalists. In the words of the credit rating agencies, a credit rating has
been deemed "the world's shortest editorial" and, thus, entitled to First
Amendment protection. However, credit rating agencies should not be
viewed as journalists impartially reporting the news or providing an ob-
jective opinion regarding the current issues of our society. Credit ratings
are not pure statements of opinion akin to a statement of opinion regard-
ing a social or political matter. Moreover, the issuer of a security hires
and pays the rating agencies to assign a credit rating.7 Thus, credit rating
agencies function very differently than newspapers. Furthermore, in the
years preceding the recent financial crisis, the credit rating agencies were
significantly involved in structuring mortgage-backed securities, "plac-
ing the [a]gencies in the [conflicting] position of 'rating their own
work.' 8
Simply stated, credit ratings are not editorials. Rather, credit ratings
are "fact-based opinions" made by professionals.9 Thus, as providers of a
commercial service, credit rating agencies should be subject to the same
liability as other businesses. For example, security analysts that evaluate
equity securities and auditors that provide opinions concerning financial
4. See Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Serys., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 855-
56 (10th Cit. 1999) (holding that a credit rating agency's article regarding the creditworthiness of an
issuer of bonds "constitutes a protected expression of opinion" under the First Amendment); Enron
Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 816-17 (finding that the courts generally have afforded the credit rating
agencies protection under the First Amendment in cases of alleged fraud or professional negligence);
Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 586 (holding that the rating agency functioned as a publisher of credit
ratings that are publicly disseminated and, thus, should receive the full protections of the First
Amendment "as a matter of law").
5. See Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (noting that some courts have viewed the credit
rating agencies as "publishers orjournalists" and provided the rating agencies with First Amendment
protection); Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 154-57 (referring to Standard & Poor's as a "financial
publisher" and applying the safeguards of the First Amendment); Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 581-82
(finding a credit rating agency "functions as a journalist when gathering information in connection
with its rating process . . . with the intent to use the material to disseminate information to the pub-
lic").
6. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96 (quoting Statements of Charles
Brown, Fitch General Counsel).
7. Commercial Fin. Serys., Inc., 94 P.3d at 110 (finding that the credit rating agencies as-
signed a rating concerning the creditworthiness of the bonds "as professionals being paid to provide
their opinions to a client"); see also infra notes 577-78 and accompanying text.
8. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829,
833-34 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Complaint para. 80, Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard &
Poor's Fin. Serys., LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 871 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (No. 2:09-cv-1054)) ("[T]o attract
the significant rating fees paid by [mortgage-backed securities] arrangers, the [a]gencies 'became
intimately involved in the issuance of [mortgage-backed securities]' by assisting arrangers in struc-
turing their securities to achieve certain credit ratings, turning the process into a form of negotiation
and placing the [a]gencies in the position of 'rating their own work."' (quoting Complaint, supra,
paras. 56, 80)).
9. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (emphasis omitted) ("Ratings should best be understood as fact-based opinions.
When a rating agency issues a rating, it is not merely a statement of that agency's unsupported
belief, but rather a statement that the rating agency has analyzed data, conducted an assessment, and
reached afact-based conclusion as to creditworthiness.").
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statements are held liable for any damages.o Why should the credit
rating agencies, which occupy a role analogous to security analysts and
auditors," be regarded in a different light? Yet, the misapplication of
First Amendment protections by the courts has shielded the credit rating
agencies from liability in actions for fraudulent or negligently prepared
ratings.12
Moreover, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commis-
sion) has provided the credit rating agencies with regulatory protections
by exempting the rating agencies from liability for false or misleading
statements in a registration statement.'3 These protections afforded to the
credit rating agencies are even more incongruous when one considers the
conflicts of interest inherent in the "issuer-pays" model of the credit rat-
ing agencies. 14 In response to this issue and many others that ultimately
culminated in the financial crisis, 15 Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank
Act).16 The Dodd-Frank Act was intended "[t]o promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transpar-
ency."'7 However, despite the express intention of Congress to hold the
credit rating agencies accountable,'8 the Commission has, to a large ex-
tent, nullified those intentions.19
Accordingly, this Article will argue that the legal and regulatory
protections provided to the credit rating agencies are misguided. As we
consider the factors that contributed to the financial crisis, the evidence is
clear that the credit rating agencies inaccurately rated "tens of billions"
of structured securities, such as mortgage-backed securities.2 0 Many in-
10. See infra notes 387-88, 483 and accompanying text.
I. See infra notes 332, 498-502 and accompanying text.
12. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 815-18 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining that "while there is no automatic, blanket, abso-
lute First Amendment protection" for publications issued by the credit rating agencies, the majority
of courts have historically shielded the rating agencies from liability for the allegedly fraudulent or
negligent ratings disseminated in those publications); see also PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra
note 3, at 96 (finding that courts have shielded the credit rating agencies from liability by affording
the rating agencies protection under the First Amendment).
13. See SEC Written Consents Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2015) (providing the credit
rating agencies with an exemption from liability under Section II of the Securities Act of 1933 for
false or misleading statements in a registration statement).
14. See infra Section III.A.
15. See John Rogers, A New Era of Fiduciary Capitalism? Let's Hope So, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
May/June 2014, at 6 ("[T]he causes of the... financial crisis were many and complex.").
16. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank ) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
17. Id. pmbl.
18. See id. § 939G (repealing the Commission's Rule 436(g) exemption from Section II
liability for credit rating agencies); see also 17 C.F.R. § 2 30.436(g)(1) (2015).
19. See Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 2882538, at *1-2
(Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter SEC No-Action Letter] (reestablishing the credit rating agencies' ex-
emption from Section II liability).
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank ) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, title IX, § 931(5), 124 Stat. 1872 ("In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on struc-
tured financial products have proven to be inaccurate."); Martin Pfinsgraff, Deputy Comptroller for
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vestors relied upon these inaccurate ratings, which ultimately contributed
to substantial losses.2 ' Yet, the misapplication of the First Amendment
has provided the credit rating agencies with "absolute immunity" from
22
legal actions. Moreover, the regulatory protections provided by the
Commission23 have further shielded the credit rating agencies from lia-
bility. Instead, the courts should hold credit rating agencies liable for
fraudulent or negligently prepared credit ratings that are false or mislead-
ing. Similarly, the Commission should respect the express intentions of
Congress and eliminate the exemption from liability provided to the
credit rating agencies for false or misleading statements in a registration
statement. Finally, while Congress has attempted to address the conflicts
involved in the credit rating agencies, the recently issued Credit Rating
Agency Reform Rules of 201424 fail to eliminate the inherent conflicts of
interest in a business model in which the issuer of the security hires and
pays the fee of the agency that determines the rating of the security.
This Article will begin by exploring some of the basic protections of
the freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment. Part I will first
discuss the protections afforded to the press, including the "journalist's
privilege" and the extension of this privilege to the credit rating agencies.
This Article will then explore the protections provided to fully protected
speech, as compared to commercial speech, and consider the level of
protection that courts should afford to speech by a credit rating agency.
Next, this Article will discuss the contours of protection provided to
statements of opinion, including the actual malice standard, and the con-
text in which the actual malice standard has been applied to the credit
rating agencies. This part will then examine statements of opinion by
professionals and the application of this concept to cases involving the
credit rating agencies. Finally, this part will consider whether the First
Amendment protections afforded to the credit rating agencies are justi-
fied and conclude that the First Amendment should not shield the credit
rating agencies.
Credit and Market Risk, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Risk Maga-
zine Credit Risk Conference 2 (May 22, 2012), http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2012/pub-speech-2012-81 .pdf (stating the proposition that credit rating agencies
"mis-rate[d] tens of billions of subprime securitizations and their derivative [collateralized debt
obligations]").
21. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, TESTIMONY OF JOHN WALSli
ACTING COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND




written.pdf ("Issues surrounding credit ratings were a significant factor in market overconfidence
that contributed to subsequent losses in the markets for mortgage-backed securities in 2008-2009.").
22. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC, 813 F. Supp.
2d 871, 877 & n.1 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (noting the rating agencies' argument that credit "ratings enjoy
absolute immunity under the First Amendment" and explaining that "[c]ourts have traditionally
extended First Amendment protection to credit ratings").
23. See, e.g., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2.
24. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 55,078, 55,078
(Sept. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249 & 249b).
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In Part II, this Article will examine the regulatory protections pro-
vided to the credit rating agencies. This part will argue that, despite the
attempts of Congress to hold the credit rating agencies accountable for
false or misleading statements in a registration statement, the Commis-
sion has persisted in shielding the agencies from liability. Finally, in
Part III, this Article will discuss the conflicts of interest inherent in the
issuer-pays model and the minimal reforms implemented to address this
significant issue.
I. THE JUDICIARY PROTECTIONS
The freedom of speech, established by the First Amendment,2 5 is a
right that many may take for granted, but few may realize the extent of
its use in protecting the credit rating agencies. The following part will
explore the doctrine of free speech in the context of the credit rating
agencies.
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the free-
,,26dom of speech, or of the press. Thus, in its simplest form, the First
Amendment protects the right of citizens and of the press to free
speech.2 7 However, this right to free speech is not absolute.28 For exam-
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances.").
26. Id.
27. See id.; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759
(1985) ("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government." (alteration in original) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)));
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("The general proposition that freedom of
expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our
decisions."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (noting
that the Supreme Court has considered free speech and a free press to be "fundamental personal
rights and liberties").
28. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 233 (1985) (White, J., concurring) ("Not all restrictions on
speech are impermissible."); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967) ("Federal securi-
ties regulation, mail fraud statutes, and common-law actions for deceit and misrepresentation are
only some examples of our understanding that the right to communicate information of public inter-
est is not 'unconditional."' (footnotes omitted)); Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708
(1931) ("Liberty of speech and of the press is also not an absolute right, and the state may punish its
abuse."); see also WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 614 (8th ed. 1996) ("Laws
forbidding speech . . . are commonplace."). But see Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be
no abridgment of the rights of free speech... shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did
all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field. . . . [T]he very object of adopting the First
Amendment . . . was to put the freedoms protected there completely out of the area of any congres-
sional control . . , .").
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ple, a citizen is "not free to yell 'fire' falsely in a crowded theater."2 9
Likewise, laws against fraud effectively limit free speech.30 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has noted that the constitutionality of laws that pro-
hibit fraud is "beyond question."31 Notwithstanding the qualified nature
of the right to free speech, the credit rating agencies have successfully
used the First Amendment as a shield against liability for issuing what
many would consider fraudulent or, at the very least, negligent credit
32
ratings.
The First Amendment protection of credit rating agencies emanates
from the "freedom of . .. the press"3 3 clause. This clause was intended
"to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public infor-
mation."34 While a credit rating agency does not issue a daily newspaper
reporting on a wide variety of information ranging from world news to
sports, the Supreme Court has found that "[t]he liberty of the press is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals . . . [t]he press in its historic con-
notation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle
of information and opinion. "3 Courts have found that the role of a credit
rating agency is to gather information and to use that information to pub-
36lish a credit rating. Thus, some courts have characterized credit rating
29. LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 28, at 614 (explaining that notwithstanding the freedom of
speech protections of the first amendment, citizens are not "free to say anything, anywhere, at any
time"); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.").
30. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) ("Where false claims are
made to effect a fraud . . . it is well established that the Government may restrict speech without
affronting the First Amendment." (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (noting that the government may prohibit misleading or
deceptive speech))); see also LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 28, at 614 (noting that laws prohibiting
fraud restrict free speech).
31. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2561 ("Laws prohibiting fraud . . . were in existence when the First
Amendment was adopted, and their constitutionality is now beyond question." (citing Donaldson v.
Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) (explaining that the power of the government "to
protect people against fraud . . . has always been recognized in this country and is firmly estab-
lished"))).
32. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 815-18 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("[T]his Court finds that generally the courts have not held
credit rating agencies accountable for alleged professional negligence or fraud and that plaintiffs
have not prevailed in litigation against them."); see also PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note
3, at 96 ("[C]ourts have extended First Amendment protections to credit ratings, shielding the agen-
cies from liability.").
33. See U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
34. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (holding that a license tax im-
posed upon the press is unconstitutional); see also Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713
(1931) (Butler, J., dissenting) (explaining the "chief purpose" of the constitutional guarantee of
"liberty of the press" is "to prevent previous restraints upon publication"); von Bulow ex rel. Auer-
sperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting "the strong public policy supporting
the unfettered communication of information by the journalist to the public").
35. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (holding a city ordinance prohibiting
the distribution of handbooks, circulars, literature, or advertising without a permit to be void on its
face).
36. Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 161 B.R. 577, 581-82
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing Standard & Poor's "gathering of a wide range of information
from a variety of sources . . . for the purpose and with the intent of publishing a [credit] rating").
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agencies as "publishers or journalists" and provided the rating agencies
with First Amendment protection37
However, the First Amendment does not provide publishers with
automatic protection from liability when there is a violation of laws gen-
erally.38 The Supreme Court has found that "[a] business 'is not immune
from regulation' simply because it is a member of the press.39 "The pub-
lisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws."40 Moreover, the "enforcement of . .. general laws against
the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than [what] would be applied
to . .. other [entities]."41 Thus, a publisher must abide by "nondiscrimi-
natory, neutral laws" that do not have an impact on the "impartial distri-
bution of news."42 For example, a publisher has no First Amendment
protection for libel.4 3 A publisher also may be subject to penalties for
contempt of court."4 Therefore, "[t]he First Amendment does not grant
the press . . . limitless protection."45 Similarly, a credit rating agency is
not entitled to protection under the First Amendment simply because of
its "status as a financial publisher."4 6 Thus, a publisher's First Amend-
ment protection is qualified.47
37. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (citing Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 581-82 (finding
that a credit rating agency "functions as a journalist when gathering information in connection with
its rating process .. . with the intent to use the material to disseminate information to the public"));
Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-56 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) (referring to
Standard & Poor's as a "financial publisher" and applying the protections of the First Amendment).
38. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967); see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment does not
'belong' to any definable category of persons or entities . . . .").
39. Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 150 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132
(1937) ("[T]he Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the
press.")).
40. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting Associated Press, 301
U.S. at 132-33 ("[The publisher of a newspaper] has no special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others.")).
41. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670).
42. Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 154 (citing Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670 (holding that newspaper
publishers must abide by general laws)); Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 130-33 (holding that pub-
lishers are subject to the National Labor Relations Act).
43. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132-33 (noting that a newspaper publisher "must answer for
libel"); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) ("[T]he freedom of speech and of the press
... does not permit the publication of libels. . . .").
44. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132-33 (noting that a newspaper publisher "may be pun-
ished for contempt of court").
45. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665, 671 (finding that the First Amendment does not protect a news-
paper from liability for "breach of a promise of confidentiality").
46. Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 154 ("[T]he question is not whether the defendant is a pub-
lisher but whether the cause of action impacts expression." (quoting Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-hill
Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), 245 B.R. 138, 144 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997))).
47. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("The journalist privilege is a qualified one." (quoting Am. Say.
Bank, FSB v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., No. M8-85, 2002 WL 31833223, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2002))); Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 161 B.R. 577, 584 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding "the journalist's privilege [to be] a qualified one"); In re Scott Paper Co.
Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("The journalist privilege is a qualified one. . . .").
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1. The Journalist's Privilege
One example of a qualified privilege is the journalist's privilege to
withhold "confidential sources and information in judicial proceed-
ings."48 The qualified First Amendment right to engage in the "process of
newsgathering" forms the basis of the journalist's privilege.4 9 The intent
of the person or entity at the very beginning of the "information-
gathering process" determines whether that person or entity is considered
a journalist and, therefore, entitled to the protection of the journalist's
privilege.50 In particular, the ability to invoke the journalist's privilege is
based on the established intent to gather information and material for
public dissemination, and that specific intent must be present from the
start of the "newsgathering process."5' Thus, at the point when the in-
formation is received, the person or entity must be "professionally en-
gaged in newsgathering."52 Moreover, the journalist's privilege may be
available if the individual or entity is engaged in traditional newsgather-
ing and dissemination functions even if the individual or entity is not
usually considered a part of the "institutionalized press.,5 3
Credit rating agencies generally have been afforded the journalist's
privilege in cases concerning the subpoena of information.54 For exam-
ple, in In re Pan Am Corp.,55 the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that Standard & Poor's was entitled to invoke
the journalist's privilege to withhold information sought through a sub-
48. von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987); see also
Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 584 ("[T]he journalist's privilege is a qualified one and may be over-
come by a showing of need by the party seeking disclosure.").
49. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 142 ("[T]he process of newsgathering is a protected right under
the First Amendment, albeit a qualified one. This qualified right, which results in the journalist's
privilege, emanates from the strong public policy supporting the unfettered communication of in-
formation by the journalist to the public."); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)
(acknowledging that "without some protection for seeking out he news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated").
50. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 142 (explaining the standards of the journalist's privilege).
51. Id. at 144 ("We hold that the individual claiming the privilege must demonstrate ... the
intent to use material-sought, gathered or eceived-to disseminate information to the public and
that such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering process.").
52. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 580 (quoting Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 131 F.R.D.
421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
53. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 142. But cf Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. (In re
Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (finding that a credit rating agency was
not acting in the role of "professional journalist" engaged in "newsgathering activities" when it
gathered information used to publish ratings and, thus, was not entitled to assert the journalist's
privilege and not addressing the question of whether a credit rating agency "could ever be" afforded
the journalist's privilege).
54. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96-97 ("Courts have even refused to
require that credit rating agencies produce records in connection with their work, citing the 'journal-
ist's' privilege."); see, e.g., Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 582, 586 (finding "the journalist's privilege
to be applicable" in quashing a subpoena seeking information from Standard & Poor's in connection
with its credit rating of Pan Am).
55. 161 B.R. 577 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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poena.5 6 The court found that Standard & Poor's gathered information
and communicated it to the public by means of several periodicals that
were circulated on a regular basis to the general public." Standard &
Poor's included in its publications not only information provided by the
issuers of securities rated by Standard & Poor's but also information
based on the agency's own research with the intention of publishing "ob-
jective ratings for the [public's] benefit."58 Thus, the court found that
Standard & Poor's possessed the "requisite newsgathering intent" from
the inception of the process; therefore, the agency should be accorded the
journalist's privilege.5 9 The fact that some of the information sought
through the subpoena was gathered on a confidential basis and, thus,
without the intent to disseminate to the public, did not eviscerate the ap-
plicability of the journalist's privilege.60 The privilege extends to confi-
dential information as well as to other nonpublished information that is
used for resource purposes.
Moreover, the district court rejected the bankruptcy court's conclu-
sion that Standard & Poor's issues credit ratings primarily for economic
gain and, thus, was not entitled to "heightened First Amendment protec-
tion." 62 The district court found that Standard & Poor's does not issue
56. Id. at 581-82, 586; accord In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 367-71 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (finding the journalist's privilege applicable to Standard & Poor's with respect to docu-
ments associated with Standard & Poor's credit rating of Scott Paper Co.'s debt securities).
57. Pan Am Corp., 161 BR. at 579, 584 ("[S&P] publishes its ratings and other financial
information in periodicals like CreditWeek, High Yield Quarterly, and Ratings Handbook. ... S&P
... regularly publishes [these] periodicals containing subjective financial analysis and commentary
for widespread distribution to the public at large."); see also Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 370
("S&P publishes periodicals with a regular circulation to a general population.").
58. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 583 ("S&P does not merely depend on information provided
by issuers to fill its publications, but rather conducts its own independent research with an eye to-
ward publishing objective ratings for the benefit of the public."); see also Scott Paper Co., 145
F.R.D. at 370 ("S&P publishes information for the benefit of the general public.").
59. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 581-83, 586 ("As a publisher of publicly distributed financial
ratings, analysis and commentary, S&P is, as a matter of law, deserving of the full breadth of First
Amendment safeguards."); see also Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 370 ("S&P falls within [the First
Amendment's] umbrella of protection.").
60. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 582-83 ("Thus, the fact that S&P may not have accepted all of
the information Pan Am seeks with specific intent to disclose that particular information does not
render the privilege inapplicable because . . . the information sought by the subpoena was received
as part of S&P's newsgathering process with the intent to disseminate information to the public.").
61. von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Jour-
nalists who seek to guard information that has not been published likewise have been accorded the
protective shroud. 'Like the compelled disclosure of confidential sources, [the compelled production
of a reporter's resource materials] may substantially undercut the public policy favoring the free
flow of information to the public that is the foundation of the privilege."' (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980))); see also Am. Say. Bank,
FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(noting that the journalist's privilege prevents the discovery of confidential information and "un-
published nonconfidential information" (citing Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 32 (2d
Cir. 1998) (agreeing that he journalist's privilege "applies to nonconfidential as well as to confiden-
tial materials"))).
62. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 583 ("[T]he Bankruptcy Court's findings ... that S&P re-
ceives a fee for its ratings activity and its conclusion that economic factors predominate in its ratings
activities are clearly erroneous.").
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ratings only when requested by an issuer for a fee; rather, the rating
agency typically provides unsolicited ratings without any fee.63 For ex-
ample, Standard & Poor's assigns credit ratings to nearly all issues of
preferred stock and debt securities regardless of whether the rating agen-
cy has been hired to do so and irrespective of receiving a fee. Moreo-
ver, the court found that the journalist's privilege is fully applicable to
publications of a financial nature.65 Thus, the court held that Standard &
Poor's acted in the role of a journalist when it gathered information to
produce its ratings with the specific intent to use that material to circulate
information to the general public and, thus, was entitled to invoke the
journalist's privilege to withhold information sought by a subpoena.
66
However, some courts have declined to extend the journalist's privi-
67lege to the credit rating agencies. For example, the Second Circuit has
held that the journalist's privilege is inapplicable when the credit rating
agency is unable to demonstrate that it gathered the subpoenaed infor-
mation as part of the "newsgathering activities of a professional journal-
ist.",
6 In re Fitch, Inc.,69 provides a case in point concerning the "outer
boundaries" of the journalist's privilege and the limits to asserting the
privilege by an entity that is not regarded as part of the traditional me-
dia.70
In examining the nature of the information gathering activities at is-
sue, the Second Circuit found that Fitch gathered information to publish
ratings based on the needs of its clients rather than on the basis of the
63. Id. ("The record is uncontradicted that S&P does not merely provide ratings to issuers
who pay a fee.").
64. Id. ("Similarly, even without a request or fee from an issuer, S&P revises, updates and
reviews a prior rating or analysis of an issuer or debt instrument on S&P's determination that such
information is important to its readers or subscribers.").
65. Id. at 584 ("[S]ubstantial authority [has held] that the financial press is fully shielded by
the umbrella of the First Amendment." (citing McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Arizona (In re Petroleum Prods.
Antitrust Litig.), 680 F.2d 5, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding the journalist's privilege applicable to a
division of McGraw-Hill, Inc. with respect to documents regarding the "names of confidential
sources of information"))); see also In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 369-71 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (finding the journalist's privilege applicable to Standard & Poor's with respect to docu-
ments associated with Standard & Poor's credit rating of Scott Paper Co.'s debt securities).
66. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 581-86. The court also found that Pan Am was unable to
"pierce the journalist's privilege" because Pan Am failed to show that the information it sought was
unavailable through other sources. Id at 586.
67. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (noting that other courts "have questioned in particular the
extension of the 'journalist's privilege' recognized by some courts to extend to credit rating agen-
cies").
68. Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, Ill (2d
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that the journalist's privilege is inapplicable to quash a subpoena
against a credit rating agency where the agency failed to show that it gathered the requested infor-
mation "pursuant to the newsgathering activities of a professional journalist").
69. 330 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
70. Id. at 105 (noting that the court was deciding the "outer boundaries" of the journalist's
privilege "and the extent to which information-gathering organizations that are not traditionally
considered part of the media may claim that privilege").
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"newsworthiness" of the information. Distinguishing the Pan Am case,
in which Standard & Poor's published ratings for "virtually all public
debt financing and preferred stock issues" regardless of whether or not
the issuers were clients, the court found that "Fitch only 'covers' its own
clients."72
Moreover, the court found that Fitch was actively engaged in help-
73
ing the client structure the relevant transaction. For example, an em-
ployee of Fitch offered suggestions to the client regarding changes to the
transaction that would be necessary to obtain the ratings desired by the
client.74 The Second Circuit concluded that the "level of involvement"
Fitch displayed with respect to its client's transaction was not character-
istic of the relationship normally observed between a "professional jour-
nalist" and the news reported by the journalist.75
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Second Circuit held that Fitch
failed to establish that it functioned in the role of a professional journalist
engaged in "newsgathering activities" when it gathered the requested
material, and thus, the rating agency could not use the journalist's privi-
lege to prevent the discovery of the information.7 6 Additionally, the Se-
cond Circuit explained that it was not determining whether, as a general
matter, the journalist's privilege is applicable to a credit rating agency
under New York law.n As the court stated, the question of whether a
credit rating agency "could ever be entitled to assert the . . . privilege" in
New York is yet to be determined. While the Second Circuit expressly
maintained that it was not deciding the larger question of whether the
journalist's privilege is generally applicable to a credit rating agency
under New York law, the emphasis of the word "ever" in the court's
71. Id. at 109-10 ("Fitch's information-disseminating activity does not seem to be based on a
judgment about newsworthiness, but rather on client needs.").
72. Id. (noting the lack of evidence "to support Fitch's claim that it regularly analyzes or
publishes a rating for a transaction it is not paid to rate" and contrasting "Standard & Poor's practice
... of rating nearly all public debt issuances regardless of whether it was hired to do so or not"); see
also Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 161 B.R. 577, 583 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining that Standard & Poor's regularly publishes ratings regardless of whether
it receives a fee).
73. Fitch, 330 F.3d at 110-11 ("Fitch played an active role in helping (the client] decide how
to structure the transaction.").
74. Id. (noting that a Fitch employee commented on the potential transactions and offered
"suggestions about how to model the transactions to reach the desired ratings").
75. Id. ("Fitch has an extremely close relationship with the companies it rates.... [Its] level
of involvement with the client's transactions . . . is not typical of the relationship between a journal-
ist and the activities upon which the journalist reports.").
76. Id. at 111 (concluding that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Fitch was not entitled to assert the journalist's privilege" for the subpoenaed information).
77. Id. ("For the sake of clarity, we note that we are not deciding the general status of a credit
rating agency like Fitch under New York's [journalist's privilege] . . . .").
78. Id. ("Whether Fitch, or one of its rivals, could ever be entitled to assert the newsgathering
privilege is a question we leave for another day.").
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statement appears to imply that the ability of a credit rating agency to
assert the privilege in the future may be somewhat limited."
The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether it would con-
sider credit rating agencies to be members of the press and, therefore,
entitled to the same protections under the First Amendment.80
2. Fully Protected Speech v. Commercial Speech
As noted in Section I.A. 1, the First Amendment protects publica-
tions specifically concerning economic or business matters.8 1 However,
the courts have recognized that the First Amendment does not fully pro-
82
tect every type of publication. For example, the Supreme Court has
distinguished commercial speech from other types of speech and found
that commercial speech is deserving of a different level of protection
under the First Amendment.8  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has de-
veloped two canons of law in this area, namely the doctrine of fully pro-
tected speech and the commercial speech doctrine.84 A restriction on
fully protected speech may be permitted "only if the government can
show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compel-
ling state interest."8 5
79. See id. (emphasizing the word "ever" in its statement regarding whether a credit rating
agency would be able to assert the journalist's privilege in the future).
80. In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (noting that the
Supreme Court has yet to analyze whether the credit rating agencies "constitute the press under the
First Amendment").
81. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (finding that "commercial speech . . . is protected"); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron
Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 810 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("First
Amendment protections reach publications related to business or economic issues."); Scott Paper
Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369 ("[D]isseminators of corporate financial information should . . . have as
strong a claim to First Amendment protection as do disseminators of other kinds of information....
Economic ... information, for example, has as great a claim to First Amendment protection as does
political discourse."); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
82. Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72
& n.24 (finding that commercial speech is not fully protected by the First Amendment)) ("[N]ot
every publication which purports to disclose information automatically qualifies as the press with
full First Amendment protection."); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) ("[N]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.").
83. Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369 ("[T]he Supreme Court has held that commercial
speech is only afforded limited First Amendment protection." (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 771-72 & n.24 (clarifying that while "commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protec-
tion ... it is [not] wholly undifferentiable from other forms" of speech))).
84. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 233-35 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (acknowledging
the doctrine of fully protected speech and the commercial speech doctrine); see also Va. State Bd of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24 (discussing commercial speech).
85. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 540
(1980); see, e.g., People v. Foley, 257 A.D.2d 243, 246, 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that a
statute prohibiting dissemination of "indecent material to minors" over the Internet "is a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling [state] interest" and "is thus constitutional under the First
Amendment"); cf Consol. Edison Co. of N Y., 447 U.S. at 540, 544 (holding that a government
proscription of "bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy" is not "a narrowly
drawn prohibition justified by a compelling state interest" and, thus, "directly infringes the freedom
of speech protected by the First . . .Amendment[]").
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Under the commercial speech doctrine, the government may prevent
commercial speech when it is "false, deceptive, or misleading,"86 or
when it "proposes an illegal transaction."87 In the case of commercial
speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading and does not involve an
unlawful transaction, the government may still restrict such speech but
only when "a substantial governmental interest" exists and the re-
strictions "directly advance that interest,,8 8 Thus, the First Amendment
protects commercial speech; however, the protections afforded to such
speech are relatively less than the safeguards provided for fully protected
or noncommercial speech.8 9 Accordingly, the government may regulate
commercial speech by means that might not be deemed tolerable in the
context of noncommercial speech.90
The commercial speech doctrine was developed in the context of
advertisements in that such communications suggest a commercial trans-
action between the receiver of the communication and the speaker.9 1
86. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
638 (1985); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (noting that the government may prohibit commercial speech "likely to deceive the
public"); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (noting that restrictions on deceptive, misleading,
or false commercial speech are permissible); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977)
("[T]he public and private benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy
and reliability. Thus, the leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in
other contexts has little force in the commercial arena."); Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771
("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.... [Mjuch
commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We
foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this problem." (citations omitted)).
87. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) ("Any First Amendment interest which might be served by
advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental
interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal
and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.")); see also
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563-64 (noting the government may prohibit "com-
mercial speech related to illegal activity").
88. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638; Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233 (White, J., concurring) ("Under the
commercial speech doctrine, restrictions on commercial speech that directly advance a substantial
governmental interest may be upheld."); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564
("The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech...
[T]he restriction must directly advance [that] . . . interest . . .. ").
89. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 ("There is no longer any room to doubt that what has come to
be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, albeit to
protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded 'noncommercial speech."'); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985) (noting that "[i]n the area
of protected speech," commercial speech is deserving of "reduced protection" because "[s]uch
speech . . . occupies a 'subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values' (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233-34 (White, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that commercial speech is afforded less protection than fully protected
speech); Va. State Bd ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-71 & n.24 (explaining that commercial speech
is protected under the First Amendment but is afforded a "different degree of protection" than other
forms of speech).
90. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. at 758 n.5 (explaining that commercial speech "may be
regulated in ways that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression" (citing
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456)).
91. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561, 563 (defining commercial speech
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience" and finding
that "promotional advertising" constitutes commercial speech (citing Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425
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However, the commercial speech doctrine has been considered in other
contexts as well.92 For example, in Lowe v. SEC,93 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the question of whether a securities newslet-
ter containing commentary and investment advice constituted protected
speech under the First Amendment.94 The majority of the Court decided
the case on statutory grounds95 and, thus, did not squarely address the
constitutional question. However, the majority noted that the newsletter
and a securities chart service offered by the petitioner would constitute
protected communications under the First Amendment to the extent that
the publications contained "factual information" and commentary regard-
ing the securities market.9 7 Thus, without directly deciding the issue, the
majority indicated that a financial newsletter may constitute an "expres-
sion of opinion" that should be protected under the First Amendment.98
The Court's use of the language "expression of opinion" appears to im-
ply that, if squarely addressing the issue, the Court would consider a fi-
nancial newsletter containing commentary regarding the securities mar-
ket to be fully protected speech under the First Amendment.9 9
U.S. at 761-62 (finding that "speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction"'
is commercial speech protected under the First Amendment and, thus, an advertisement containing
the prices of prescription drugs is considered commercial speech (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co., 413
U.S. at 385)))); see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-64, 384 (noting that commercial speech should not
be excluded from protection under the First Amendment "merely because it propose[s] a mundane
commercial transaction [and] . . . the speaker's interest is largely economic"; therefore, advertising
by attorneys is commercial speech protected by the First Amendment).
92. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233-35 (White, J., concurring) (discussing the commercial speech
doctrine in the context of financial newsletters); see also In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145
F.R.D. 366, 369-70 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (discussing the commercial speech doctrine in the context of the
journalist's privilege).
93. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
94. Id. at 185, 188-89 ("A typical issue of the [newsletter] . . . contained general commentary
about the securities ... market[], reviews of market indicators and investment strategies, and specific
recommendations for buying, selling, or holding stocks .... .").
95. Id. at 183, 211 (concluding that the "publications fall within the statutory exclusion for
bona fide publications" under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940; thus, the petitioners were not
"investment adviser[s]" under the Act, and the newsletters could not be enjoined for failure to regis-
ter as investment advisers); see also Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369-70 (discussing Lowe and
explaining that "[t]he majority of the court, as a matter of statutory interpretation, held that an in-
vestment newsletter was not subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission under
the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940").
96. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211 (stating that the Court "need not specifically address the constitu-
tional question"); see also Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369-70 (discussing Lowe and noting that
"the Supreme Court considered, but declined to determine, whether investment newsletters fell
within the definition of the press for First Amendment purposes").
97. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 210 ("To the extent that the chart service contains factual information
about past transactions and market trends, and the newsletters contain commentary on general mar-
ket conditions, there can be no doubt about the protected character of the communications . . .. ").
98. Id. at 210 n.58 ("[W]e have squarely held that the expression of opinion about a commer-
cial product such as a loudspeaker is protected by the First Amendment; [therefore,] it is difficult to
see why the expression of an opinion about a marketable security should not also be protected."
(citation omitted) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984))).
99. See Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 370 ("[T]he Supreme Court would be likely to hold, if
squarely faced with the issue, that he investment newsletters . . . would . . . be protected by the free
press clause of the First Amendment."); see also Lowe, 472 U.S. at 210 & n.58; R&W Tech. Servs.
Ltd. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 205 F.3d 165, 175 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he publication
290 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:2
The concurring opinion authored by Justice White, and joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, directly considered the con-
stitutional issue of whether the financial newsletters were protected
speech under the First Amendment.'" Justice White sidestepped the
more narrow issue of whether the newsletters contained commercial
speech or fully protected speech maintaining that it was unnecessary to
determine the specific type of speech in order to resolve the primary is-
sue of whether the First Amendment protected the newsletters.10 If the
newsletters contained fully protected speech, then the government prohi-
bition, which extended not only to deceptive, manipulative, or fraudulent
speech but also to "legitimate, disinterested advice," is "presumptively
invalid" as a "flat prohibition or prior restraint on speech."l02 Alterna-
tively, if the newsletters were commercial speech, then any restrictions
on such speech must be "narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest."0 3 While the interest in this case was legitimate in
that the government desired to protect investors from unscrupulous indi-
viduals that may publish misleading or fraudulent advice, the means used
by the government to achieve its objective were "extreme."'1 The gov-
ernment restriction was intended to prevent the petitioner from publish-
ing advice altogether, irrespective of whether or not the advice was mis-
leading or fraudulent.05 Even with the "reduced level of scrutiny" em-
ployed with restrictions concerning commercial speech, Justice White
of impersonal advice about specific investments is fully protected speech under the First Amend-
ment.").
100. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211 (White, J., concurring) ("I concur in the judgment ... because to
prevent petitioner from publishing at all is inconsistent with the First Amendment.").
101. Id. at 234 (maintaining that the determination of whether financial newsletters constitute
commercial speech or fully protected speech is unnecessary).
102. Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring) ("Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must
be left free to publish news . . . without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.")) (finding that a
ban on "legitimate, disinterested advice" is "a flat prohibition or prior restraint on speech" and, "as
applied to fully protected speech, [is] presumptively invalid and may be sustained only under the
most extraordinary circumstances"); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) ("To re-
quire a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of
pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees."); Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (noting that the "chief purpose" of the "constitutional protection" is "to
prevent previous restraints upon publication").
103. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234 (White, J., concurring) ("[E]ven where mere 'commercial speech'
is concerned, the First Amendment permits restraints on speech only when they are narrowly tailored
to advance a legitimate governmental interest."); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980) (recognizing that the First Amendment requires
restrictions on speech to be "narrowly drawn" (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978))).
104. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234-35 (White, J., concurring) (finding a legitimate government inter-
est in desiring "to prevent investors from falling into the hands of scoundrels and swindlers" while
also finding "[t]he means chosen [to be] extreme").
105. Id. ("Based on petitioner's past misconduct, the Government fears that he may in the
future publish advice that is fraudulent or misleading; and it therefore seeks to prevent him from
publishing any advice, regardless of whether it is actually objectionable.").
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found the government's prohibition to be "too blunt an instrument to
survive" constitutional scrutiny.106
Similarly, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,107
the Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of whether a credit
report issued by a credit reporting agency would be considered fully pro-
tected speech or commercial speech.108 However, the Court appeared to
imply that it would deem such speech to be commercial speech.109 The
Court explained that, similar to advertising, a credit report that provides
subscribers with financial information regarding businesses "is hardy and
unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation."10 Moreover, such
speech is "motivated by the desire for profit" and, therefore, is not as
easily deterred as other forms of speech.' The Court also explained that
the market creates a strong incentive for a credit reporting agency to is-
sue an accurate report because an inaccurate report would have no val-
ue.112 Therefore, the possibility of an "incremental 'chilling' effect" on
such speech because of the potential for a lawsuit merits a reduced level
of concern.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether speech
by a credit rating agency regarding the credit rating of an issuer or issue
of securities is fully protected speech or commercial speech. Notably, in
Lowe, the majority's use of the language "expression of opinion" when
referring to a financial newsletter containing commentary regarding se-
curities may imply that the Court would consider credit ratings to be ful-
ly protected speech under the First Amendment.114 Conversely, in
Greenmoss Builders, the Court's comparison of a credit report issued by
a credit reporting agency to commercial advertising may imply that the
Court would view a credit rating issued by a credit rating agency as
106. Id. at 235 (reasoning that "less drastic remedies than outright suppression . . . are [likely]
available to achieve the Government's asserted purpose of protecting investors").
107. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
108. See id. at 762-63.
109. See id (explaining how the speech at issue is similar to advertising); see also Oberman v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381, 1384 (7th Cir. 1972) (expressing a lack of acceptance of the
proposition that a "credit rating . . . was entitled to the same treatment that he Supreme Court has
afforded newspapers and magazines").
110. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762-63 (1985) (citing
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24
(1976) ("[T]he greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech[] may make it less necessary
to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.")).
111. Id. at 762-63 (citing Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24 (noting that
since commercial speech is inextricably linked to "commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its
being chilled by proper regulation and foregone ntirely")).
112. Id. ("[Tlhe market provides a powerful incentive to a credit reporting agency to be accu-
rate, since false credit reporting is of no use to creditors.").
113. Id. at 763 (noting that "any incremental 'chilling' effect of libel suits would be of de-
creased significance" with respect to speech contained in a credit report).
114. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 & n.58 (1985) (referring to the commentary con-
tained in a financial newsletter as an "expression of opinion").
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commercial speech.115 A financial newsletter and a credit report issued
by a credit reporting agency are substantially similar in that they both
provide an assessment of creditworthiness. However, a credit report,
such as that provided by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) in Greenmoss Build-
ers,116 contains not only financial information but also a rating that pro-
vides an "indicator of financial strength and viability" of a business"'
similar to a credit rating issued by a credit rating agency."' The D&B
Rating provides a "composite credit appraisal" of the credit risk of a
business.'l9 Moreover, D&B provides "predictive scores" of the future
financial health of a business.120 Thus, the speech contained in a credit
rating assigned by a credit reporting agency, such as D&B, and the
speech included in a credit rating issued by a credit rating agency, such
as Standard & Poor's, appear to be strikingly similar if not virtually the
same. Therefore, courts should treat the speech of a credit rating agency
the same as the speech of a credit reporting agency: as commercial
speech.
Although a credit rating does not propose a commercial transaction
between the credit rating agency (as the speaker) and its audience (the
investing public), a credit rating, in effect, proposes a commercial trans-
action between the issuer of the security and the investing public. As the
issuer of the rating, the credit rating agency is, effectively, the speaker.
Thus, a credit rating could certainly be considered a form of commercial
speech. Moreover, credit ratings assigned for a fee paid by the issuer of
the security contain the attributes of commercial speech. A credit rating
issued for a fee is clearly "motivated by the desire for profit." 2 1
Furthermore, when the issuer of the security pays the fee, an inherent
conflict of interest is present,122 which defies the concept of a pure ex-
pression of opinion.
115. See Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762-63 (comparing a credit report to advertis-
ing).
116. See id. at 751 (explaining the general information contained in a credit report).
117. Samples and Descriptions, DUN & BRADSTREET, INC.,
https://www.dnb.com/product/availrpt.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (explaining that the "D&B
Rating" is a "widely-used indicator of financial strength and viability" of a company).
118. See infra notes 145, 303 and accompanying text.
119. Samples and Descriptions, supra note 117 (noting that the "D&B Rating" is "[a] powerful
indicator of a firm's . .. composite credit appraisal that can help assess credit risk quickly and effec-
tively").
120. Id ("Predictive scores [are] based on statistically proven mathematical models that indi-
cate the likelihood of a firm paying in a severely delinquent manner . . . and the likelihood of a
company experiencing financial stress within an 18 month period . . . .").
121. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762-63 (noting that commercial speech "is hardy
and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation" and that "[i]t is solely motivated by the
desire for profit, which . . . is a force less likely to be deterred than others").
122. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 823 & n.81 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("[T]here is a potential conflict of interest created by
compensation of credit rating agencies."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets:
The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15 (noting the "conflict of interest inherent" in
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Nevertheless, as discussed in Section I.A.3.b, many courts have
treated the credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies as opin-
ions, and as such, fully protected by the First Amendment.1 23 However,
the classification of credit ratings as statements of opinion by the lower
courts should not end the analysis. If the Supreme Court ultimately de-
termines that credit ratings are fully protected speech, then a government
prohibition extending only to false, deceptive, or misleading speech
would not be analogous to any kind of "flat prohibition or prior restraint
on speech" that would be "presumptively invalid" in the context of fully
protected speech.124 In contrast, such a prohibition on fully protected
speech would appear to be "a precisely drawn means of serving a com-
pelling [state] interest"1 25: the protection of investors.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether it
considers the protection of investors a compelling state interest in the
context of fully protected speech. However, in the Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress determined that credit ratings have "systemic importance."1 26
Congress further found that the appropriate functioning and accuracy of
the credit rating agencies "are matters of national public interest." 27
Thus, the Supreme Court may determine that the protection of investors
may be reasonably considered a compelling state interest. Moreover, the
means used would be precisely drawn in that the restriction would pro-
hibit only those credit ratings that are false, deceptive, or misleading.'28
Therefore, a prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading credit
ratings would not infringe the safeguards of the First Amendment.
the fact that credit rating agencies are "virtually always paid their fee by the issuer of securities");
see also infra Section III.A.
123. See, e.g., Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848,
855-56 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a credit rating agency's article regarding the creditworthiness
of an issuer of bonds "constitutes a protected expression of opinion" under the First Amendment); In
re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (asserting that the credit
rating issued by Standard & Poor's is not commercial speech; yet, finding that "the importance of S
& P's ratings to an issuer's ability to market its commercial paper and debt instruments suggests that
the possibility of disclosure may not chill the continued flow of financial information" and, thus,
"the danger to the First Amendment. . . may be less than in other situations").
124. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 234 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)) (finding that a ban extending not only to
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative speech" but also to "legitimate, disinterested advice" is "a
flat prohibition or prior restraint on speech" and, "as applied to fully protected speech, [is] presump-
tively invalid and may be sustained only under the most extraordinary circumstances"); see also
supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., People v. Foley, 257 A.D.2d 243, 246, 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that
a statute prohibiting dissemination of "indecent material to minors" over the Internet "is a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling [state] interest" and "is thus constitutional under the First
Amendment"); cf Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 540, 544 (1980)
(holding that a government proscription of "bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public
policy" is not "a narrowly drawn prohibition justified by a compelling state interest" and, thus,
"directly infringes the freedom of speech protected by the First . . . Amendment[]").
126. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, title IX, § 931(1), 124 Stat. 1872 (2010).
127. Id. ("[C]redit rating agencies are central to capital formation, investor confidence, and the
efficient performance of the United States economy.").
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, if the Supreme Court determines that credit ratings
are commercial speech, then the restrictions on such speech must be
"narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate governmental interest.",2 9 As
the concurring opinion found in Lowe, the protection of investors is a
legitimate governmental interest. 130 Thus, with respect to credit ratings,
the interest may be considered legitimate in that the government desires
to protect investors from false, deceptive, or misleading credit ratings in
a registration statement. Moreover, the means used would be narrowly
tailored since the restriction would prohibit only those credit ratings that
are false, deceptive, or misleading.'3 '
One of the rationales for affording commercial speech a lower level
of protection under the First Amendment is that such speech is less likely
to be "chilled" by appropriate regulation because advertising is consid-
ered closely associated with profits.' 3 2 Thus, disseminators of commer-
cial speech have a financial incentive to continue to advertise even
though subject to restrictions. Moreover, as the issuers of the infor-
mation, disseminators of commercial speech will be knowledgeable as to
the truth of such speech.
In the context of credit rating agencies, the necessity of obtaining a
credit rating in order to issue debt securitiesl34 suggests that restrictions
on the journalist's privilege that may result in disclosure of financial
information will not chill the issuer's provision of that information to the
rating agency.135 Likewise, the necessity of earning a profit by the credit
rating agencies suggests that regulation prohibiting the issuance of false,
deceptive, or misleading ratings will not chill the assignment of credit
ratings. In Part II, the issues confronting this assertion will be discussed.
Moreover, even though the credit rating agencies obtain financial
information from the issuers of the securities, the agencies are certainly
129. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234 (White, J., concurring) ("[E]ven where mere 'commercial speech'
is concerned, the First Amendment permits restraints on speech only when they are narrowly tailored
to advance a legitimate governmental interest."); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980) (recognizing that the First Amendment requires
restrictions on speech to be "narrowly drawn" (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978))).
130. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234 (White, J., concurring) (finding a legitimate government interest in
desiring "to prevent investors from falling into the hands of scoundrels and swindlers").
131. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
132. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976) ("[A]dvertising is the [s]ine qua non of commercial profits, [thus,] there is little likeli-
hood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely.")
133. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977) ("Since advertising is linked to
commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being
crushed by overbroad regulation."); see also Va. State Bd ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (noting
that "commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds" due to the associated profits and,
thus, proper regulations are less likely to "silenc[e] the speaker").
134. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 2007)
("Often, a company seeking to borrow funds must, as part of the loan process, ask Moody's, or a
similar company, to publish its credit rating.")
135. In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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knowledgeable as to whether the provided information represents credit-
worthiness of a stronger or a weaker character. For example, a debt secu-
rity, such as a mortgage-backed security,'36 with an underlying cash flow
derived from subprime mortgages would appear to have a much weaker
level of creditworthiness than a corporate bond issued by a Fortune 500
company such as Johnson & Johnson.!37 Individuals who received sub-
prime mortgage loans generally had "impaired or limited credit histories,
or high debt relative to their income."' 8 A layering of risk, including a
weak borrower, a high loan-to-value, and inadequate structuring of the
security,139 should not result in a credit rating of AAA.140 Yet, the as-
signment of the highest credit rating to a corporate bond issued by John-
son & Johnson and to a mortgage-backed security secured by subprime
debt141 appears to indicate a false, or at the very least misleading, credit
136. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254,
258 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining mortgage-backed securities as securities whose cash flow is de-
rived from underlying mortgage loans that are "pooled together" in the form of a security and subse-
quently sold on the secondary market to investors).
137. Fortune 500 2014, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/2014/Johnson-johnson-39/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2015) (listing Johnson & Johnson as thirty-ninth on the list of Fortune 500
companies).
138. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., JOINT REPORT ON
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 26 (2000),
http://archives.hud.gov/reports/treasrpt.pdf; see also Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 471
(2004) (explaining that subprime loans are made "to borrowers with poor credit ratings"); N.J.
Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 260 (noting that subprime loans involved "a higher
risk of default based on weak credit history and personal finances, or fraud because borrowers either
self-reported their income or were allowed to provide less information than in a typical loan").
139. Many mortgage-backed securities suffered from inadequate subordination in the structure
ofthe security. These securities failed to have a sufficiently large enough subordinate (i.e., lowest or
most junior) tranche, which would absorb the first defaults that occurred in the pool of mortgages.
This subordination was intended to insulate the highest or most senior tranches of the security from
default. However, the level of subordination in these structured securities was clearly inadequate.
See generally ADAM ASHCRAFT ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., MBS RATINGS AND THE
MORTGAGE CREDIT BooM 2-3, 6 (2010) (noting subordination "declines significantly between the
start of 2005 and mid-2007" and "[d]uring this ... period, the average riskiness of new [mortgage-
backed security] deals increases significantly").
140. AAA is the highest credit rating that Standard & Poor's may assign to a financial obliga-
tion. Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS SERVS. (Nov. 20, 2014,
6:46 AM), https://www.standardandpoors.com/en US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceld/504352.
According to Standard & Poor's, when an obligation is assigned a credit rating of AAA, the capacity
of the issuer to satisfy its "financial commitment" on the security is "extremely strong." Id Similar-
ly, AAA is the highest credit rating that Moody's may assign to a financial obligation. MOODY'S
INV. SERV., RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 5 (2016),
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC79004. According to
Moody's, obligations that are assigned a credit rating of AAA are considered to be the "highest
quality" obligations with the "lowest level of credit risk" or risk of default d.
141. See John Morgan, Path to Extinction: Only 3 US Companies Still Have AAA Credit Rat-
ings, NEWSMAX (Apr. 15, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://www.moneynews.com/EconomylS-P-rating-
companies-Moodys/2014/04/15/id/565714/ (noting that Johnson & Johnson is one of only three
companies that Standard & Poor's still rates as "AAA, which is reserved for companies with the
unassailable financial strength and discipline"); Patrick Kingsley, How Credit Ratings Agencies Rule
the World, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2012, 3:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/15/credit-ratings-agencies-moodys ("In the run-up to
2008, a staggering proportion of mortgage-based debts were rated AAA, when in fact they were
junk."); Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Remarks Before the American Securitization Forum 2 (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www2.occ.gov/news-
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rating in the case of the mortgage-backed security backed by subprime
debt. Such speech, whether ultimately deemed commercial speech or not,
should be subject to regulation restricting the issuance of false, decep-
tive, or misleading ratings.
3. Statements of Opinion
As noted by Justice Brennan, ever since the Supreme Court "first
hinted that the First Amendment provides some manner of protection for
statements of opinion . .. courts and commentators have struggled with
the contours of this protection. . . within our First Amendment jurispru-
dence."I42 This part will explore the relevant standards established by the
Supreme Court in the context of statements of opinion and the applica-
tion of those standards to the credit rating agencies.
a. The Actual Malice Standard
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,14 3 the Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the issue of whether the First Amendment protections of freedom
of speech and of the press restrict the power of a state to provide damag-
es in an action for libel against critics of a public official with respect to
his official conduct.1" The New York Times printed allegedly false
statements in an advertisement.145 Upon review of the evidence, the
Court determined that some of the statements printed in the newspaper
were not accurate portrayals of certain events occurring in Montgomery,
Alabama, during the civil rights movement.146
issuances/speeches/2013/pub-speech-2013-19.pdf (noting that the "flawed credit ratings" assigned to
mortgage-backed securities "suggest[ed] that the mortgage securities in question were as safe as
investment-grade corporate bonds").
142. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974) ("[The] Court has struggled
for nearly a decade to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the
freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment."). Milkovich held that state libel
laws are not prohibited by the First Amendment in a case where a newspaper article implied that the
coach of a high school wrestling team lied while under oath in the course of a judicial proceeding.
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 3.
143. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
144. Id. at 256 (noting that this case is the first time the Court will determine "the extent to
which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a
libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct"); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S 749, 755 (1985) (stating that the N. Y Times
case was the first time the Supreme Court "held that the First Amendment limits the reach of state
defamation laws").
145. N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256, 258 (discussing a libel complaint by a city Commissioner
of Montgomery, Alabama, based on statements in an advertisement published by the New York
Times); see also Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 755 (describing the N. Y. Times case in which
a public official sought "damages for the publication of an advertisement criticizing police conduct
in a civil rights demonstration"); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334 ("The Times ran a political advertisement
endorsing civil rights demonstrations by black students in Alabama and impliedly condemning the
performance of local law-enforcement officials.").
146. N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 258-59 ("It is uncontroverted that some of the statements
contained in the [advertisement] . . . were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in
Montgomery. . . . [For example,] [a]lthough nine students were expelled by the State Board of Edu-
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Nevertheless, the Court held that the Constitution prohibits award-
ing damages to a public official for defamatory statements concerning his
official conduct even when those statements are shown to be false unless
the public official can prove that the false statements were "made with
'actual malice.'1 4 7 The Supreme Court defined "actual malice" as mak-
ing a statement with knowledge that he statement is false or with reck-
less disregard concerning whether or not the statement is false. 148 Apply-
ing the actual malice standard, the Court held that the New York Times
did not publish the false statements with actual malice.149 The Court
found that even if the defamatory statements were not shown to be "sub-
stantially correct," the contrary opinion held by one of the newspaper's
employees "was at least a reasonable one."i50
Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the statements do not lose
constitutional protection because they were contained in a "paid adver-
tisement." 15 1 As the Court noted, the advertisement contained expres-
sions of opinion and provided information concerning the civil rights
movement, the "existence and objectives [of which] are matters of the
highest public interest and concern."152 Furthermore, the fact that the
cation, this was not for leading [a] demonstration at the Capitol [as the advertisement stated], but for
demanding service at a lunch counter in the Montgomery County Courthouse on another day.").
147. Id. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that he statement was made with 'actual malice' . . . ."); see also Cty. of Orange v.
McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-55 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that a publisher will not
be liable for printing false statements unless those statements were "made with 'actual malice"'
(quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (concluding that "public figures
and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress . . .
without showing .. . that the publication contains a false statement of fact that was made with 'actual
malice'))).
148. N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280 (defining actual malice); see also Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990); Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 328;
Compuware Corp. v. Moody's lnv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2007); Jefferson Cty.
Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 857 (10th Cir. 1999); Cty. of
Orange, 245 B.R. at 155.
149. N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 286-88 ("[T]he facts do not support a finding of actual mal-
ice. . . . [T]he evidence against the Times supports at most a finding of negligence in failing to dis-
cover the misstatements, and is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is required
for a finding of actual malice.").
150. Id. at 286 (noting that the Times' Secretary stated that "he thought the advertisement was
'substantially correct"'); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (noting that "utter-
ances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth").
151. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 266 (holding that "allegedly libelous statements" do not
sacrifice First Amendment protections simply due to the statements being disseminated in a "paid
advertisement"); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) ("That books,
newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a
form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment."); Cty. of Orange v.
McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), 245 B.R. 138, 143 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting the
protections of the First Amendment are "not diminished when the expression at issue is published
and sold for profit" (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967))).
152. N. Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 266 (citingNAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29, 433-36
(1963) (holding "that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff ... are modes of
expression and association protected by the First . . . Amendment[]" and, therefore, striking down a
state statute that prohibits advising individuals that their rights have been infringed and referring
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newspaper eceived a payment to publish the advertisement is no differ-
ent than the payments received when selling newspapers and books, and
thus, the payment is similarly "immaterial" to whether the statements
contained therein are deserving of constitutional protection.
Thus, the actual malice standard protects false statements unless it
can be proven that the speaker made those statements with knowledge of
the falsity of the statements or with a reckless disregard concerning
whether or not the statements were accurate.154 Notably, the Supreme
Court has plainly stated that false statements concerning factual matters
are bereft of any value under the Constitution.155 Such false statements
"interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas."'56
However, the Court has also recognized that, despite the lack of value in
false statements, such statements are "inevitable in free debate."'5 ' Thus,
the Court was concerned that a strict liability standard for publishers of
false factual statements would likely have the unwanted effect of
"chilling" speech that possessed "constitutional value."'58 As expressed
by the Court, "Freedoms of expression require 'breathing space."'l
59
them to a specific attorney for representation because such a statute "could well freeze out of exist-
ence" all activities in support of the civil rights movement)).
153. Id. at 266 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (noting that it is "no
matter that he dissemination [of books and other forms of the printed word) takes place under com-
mercial auspices")).
154. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (explaining that recovery is permit-
ted under the actual malice standard only when the plaintiff can "prove that the publication involved
was deliberately falsified, or published recklessly despite the publisher's awareness of probably
falsity" (citing N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80 (finding that the constitution protects false state-
ments unless the petitioner can prove that the statements were "made with 'actual malice' in that
the speaker made the statements knowing they were false or with a reckless disregard concerning the
falsity of the statements))).
155. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("False statements of fact are
particularly valueless .... ); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (find-
ing "no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
156. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ("[False statements]
belong to that category of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."' (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (noting that, inter alia, obscene, profane, and libelous speech are not
protected under the First Amendment)))) (finding that false statements "cause damage to an individ-
ual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech").
157. Id. at 52 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ("Although the erroneous statement of fact is not
worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate.")); see also Curtis
Publ g Co., 388 U.S. at 152 (stating that the Court has "recognized 'the inevitability of some error in
the situation presented in free debate' (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967))); N.Y
Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271-72 (acknowledging that false speech is "inevitable in free debate").
158. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52 ("[A] rule that would impose strict liability on a
publisher for false factual assertions would have an undoubted 'chilling' effect on speech relating to
public figures that does have constitutional value."); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (explaining that the actual malice standard was grounded on the concern that a
state law requiring the speaker to warrant that all factual statements were true would have the effect
of deterring speech deserving of First Amendment protection (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334)).
159. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376
U.S. at 271-72 (recognizing that false statements are "inevitable in free debate" and that such state-
ments "must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
'need . . . to survive"' (alteration in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
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Thus, the Supreme Court established the actual malice standard to avoid
chilling valuable speech.'" Accordingly, the actual malice rule provides
publishers with protection from liability for innocent misstatements as
well as for negligent falsehoods. 161
Although the Supreme Court has observed that both the "intentional
lie" and the "careless error" lack constitutional value,'62 the Court has
defined the reckless disregard prong of the actual malice rule to require
more than simply a "failure to investigate."6 3 Reckless disregard under
the actual malice standard means the publisher has a "high degree of
awareness" that the statements are likely false.16" For example, in New
York Times, the evidence did not support a finding that the publisher was
"aware of the likelihood" that the information was false; thus, the plain-
tiff failed to prove reckless disregard. 165 Reckless disregard of the truth
433(1963)))); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 ("The First Amendment requires that we protect some
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 822 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (observing the need "to
preserve the 'breathing space' essential for freedom of expression" (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
485 U.S. at 52)).
160. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52 (explaining that the needed "breathing space is
provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only
when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the
requisite level of culpability"); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 14 (noting that this rule was based on
a concern that constitutionally protected speech regarding public officials would be deterred if the
speaker was required to certify the truth of every statement of fact (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334));
Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-55 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) ("To accom-
modate the 'breathing-space' the First Amendment requires, a publisher will not incur liability for a
false statement unless the statement was made with 'actual malice' . (quoting Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52)).
161. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 811 (explaining that the actual malice rule "protects
publishers from liability for 'either innocent or negligent misstatement' so as not to chill the press'
exercise of constitutional guarantees" (quoting Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 389)).
162. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ("Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues." (quoting
N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270)); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) ("Nei-
ther lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment . . . ."); Time, Inc., 385
U.S. at 390 ("[T]he knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard
of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection." (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75
(1964))).
163. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) ("[F]ailure to
investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not
sufficient to establish reckless disregard."); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332 ("[M]ere proof of failure to inves-
tigate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for the truth."); see also St. Amant, 390 U.S.
at 733 ("Failure to investigate does not in itself establish bad faith." (citing N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S.
at 287-88 ("[N]egligence in failing to discover the misstatements . . . is constitutionally insufficient
to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice."))); Curtis Publ'g Co. v.
Associated Press, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (noting that "[i]nvestigatory failures alone" are not
sufficient to meet the actual malice standard); Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499
F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[A] defendant's failure to investigate, without more, does not estab-
lish a reckless disregard of the truth.").
164. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332 (noting reckless disregard requires that "the publisher must act
with a 'high degree of awareness of. . . probable falsity' (alteration in original) (quoting St. Amant,
390 U.S. at 731)); see also Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74 ("[O]nly those false statements made with [a]
high degree of awareness of their probable falsity . . . may be the subject of either civil or criminal
sanctions.").
165. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 (citing N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 287 ("The mere presence of
... stories in the files does not ... establish that the Times 'knew' the advertisement was false."))
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or falsity of a statement is a "subjective standard."166 As expressed by the
Supreme Court, the measure of reckless behavior is not founded on the
"reasonably prudent man" standard.16 7 Whether or not a reasonably pru-
dent man would have investigated or would have decided to publish is
not the touchstone applied when determining reckless disregard.168 Ra-
ther, to prove reckless disregard, "more than a departure from reasonably
prudent conduct" is needed.'69 Reckless disregard requires proof that the
publisher "entertained serious doubts" regarding the truth of the infor-
mation.o70 If a publisher ignores these doubts and nevertheless publishes
the information, then the plaintiff can show a reckless disregard for
whether the information was true or false, and prove actual malice.'7 '
Moreover, if a publisher purposely avoids the truth, this "may be suffi-
cient" to show actual malice. 172 However, it is not necessary for a pub-
lisher to "include every relevant and potentially positive detail" to pre-
vent liability.1 73
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the high bar of the reck-
less disregard standard may prove insurmountable for many plaintiffs.174
However, the overriding interest in protecting freedom of expression
concerning public matters against the possibility of self-censorship
necessitates a rejection of the reasonably prudent man standard.175 Thus,
the First Amendment inevitably will protect some false publications in
(explaining that the plaintiff in the N. Y. Times case "did not satisfy his burden because the record
failed to show that the publisher was aware of the likelihood that he was circulating false infor-
mation").
166. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 526 (citing Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at
688).
167. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
168. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 526 (citing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 ("[R]eckless con-
duct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have
investigated before publishing.")).
169. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at 688 (citing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731).
170. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 526 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 ("There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication.")).
171. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 (noting that publishing with "serious doubts" regarding wheth-
er or not the information is true "shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual
malice").
172. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 526 (citing Harte-Hanks Commc ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at 692
(noting that "purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category" than a "failure to investi-
gate")).
173. Id. at 527 (citing Perk v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 931 F.2d 408, 412 (6th Cir. 1991) (ob-
serving that a publisher does not have a "legal obligation to present a balanced view")).
174. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 ("Concededly the reckless disregard standard may permit
recovery in fewer situations than would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reason-
able man or the prudent publisher."); see also PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96
(observing that the actual malice rule "poses such a high barrier that it virtually insulates the speaker
from liability").
175. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731-32 ("[T]he stake of the people in public business and the
conduct of public officials is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary
care would protect against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First Amendment poli-
cies.").
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order to guarantee the protection of truthful publications regarding mat-
ters of public interest. 176
However, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that a statement
that may be characterized as an opinion automatically deserves full con-
stitutional protection.'77 The Court has recognized that "expressions of
'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact."'7 8 For exam-
ple, suppose a newspaper article makes the following assertion: "In my
opinion, the Governor is a liar." This statement implies knowledge of
certain facts, which led to the conclusion that the Governor is a liar.179 If
the statement is based on incomplete or inaccurate facts, or if the article's
evaluation of the facts is incorrect, then the statement may imply an as-
sertion of fact that is false.80 Moreover, expressing the statement in
words that appear to indicate that an opinion is being proffered, such as
using the words "in my opinion" or "I think," does not negate the possi-
bility that "the statement may . . . imply a false assertion of fact."' For
example, the fact that a credit rating agency refers to its evaluation of a
bond issue as an opinion does not, in and of itself, establish that the rat-
ing agency's statements are entitled to constitutional protection.182 If the
credit rating agency's statements were proven to have "materially false
components," the rating agency would not be protected from liability
simply by using the word "opinion." 83
176. Id. at 732 ("[T]o insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs,
it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.").
177. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (explaining that the Court did not
intend "to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion"');
see also Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 852 (10th
Cir. 1999); Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), No. SA CV 96-0765-GLT,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at * 12 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997).
178. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19 (rejecting "the creation of an artificial dichotomy between
'opinion' and fact"); see also Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 852; Newby v. Enron Corp. (in re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 819 (S.D. Tex. 2005);
McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at * 12-13 ("[T]he threshold question is whether a
'reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the statement implies an assertion of objective fact."'
(quoting Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990))).
179. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.
180. Id. ("Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are
either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still
imply a false assertion of fact.").
181. Id. (explaining that "[s]imply couching ... statements in terms of opinion does not dispel"
the implication of "a false assertion of fact"); Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 854 ("[C]ourts
have . . . applied Milkovich to conclude that certain statements, even though couched as expressions
of opinion, are provably false and therefore are not protected from defamation claims by the First
Amendment.").
182. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 856 ("[T]he fact that Moody's article describes its
evaluation as an opinion is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish that Moody's statements are
protected."); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
183. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 856 (noting that if a statement expressed as "an
opinion were shown to have materially false components, the issuer should not be shielded from
liability by raising the word 'opinion' as a shibboleth"); Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 822 ("[A]
publisher may be liable for a statement of opinion if that statement reasonably implies false facts or
relies on stated facts that are provably false."); McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at
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However, the statement "in my opinion, the Governor is making a
mistake by painting the Governor's mansion orange," would be fully
protected.18 4 Thus, a "statement of opinion" concerning public matters,
which does not imply an assertion of fact that may be proven as false,
will be fully protected under the First Amendment.'8 5 In contrast, a
statement of opinion regarding a matter of public concern, which implies
an assertion of fact that may be proven as false or depends on stated facts
that may be proven as false, may be subject to liability under the actual
malice standard.186
As intimated above, the actual malice standard is generally applied
to false statements regarding "matters of public concern."8 7 As stated by
the Supreme Court, the First Amendment protects "the free flow of ideas
and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."188 Thus, in New
York Times, the Court applied the actual malice rule to false statements
against a public official.189 Shortly thereafter, in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts,'90 the Supreme Court first considered whether the actual malice
standard should be extended to defamatory statements against individuals
who are not public officials but nevertheless are considered public fig-
ures because these individuals have some type of involvement in a matter
of public interest.'9' As an initial matter, the Court explained the need to
consider "the factors which arise in the particular context" rather than
engage in a "blind application" of the New York Times actual malice
*12-13 (explaining that a statement of opinion is actionable if the statement contains a factual asser-
tion that may be proven as false).
184. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
185. Id. (discussing Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986) (holding
that "where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover
damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false")); Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d
at 819 ("[IJf a statement 'cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts,' it is shielded by
the First Amendment." (alteration in original) (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20)).
186. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 ("[W]here a statement of 'opinion' on a matter of public con-
cern reasonably implies false and defamatory facts . . . [the plaintiff] must show that such statements
were made with knowledge of their false implications or with reckless disregard of their truth.").
187. Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 155 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281-82 (1964)); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755 (1985) (explaining that the advertisement in N.Y Times
"concerned 'one of the major public issues of our time' and, thus, the Court in that case applied the
actual malice standard to the issue of whether a public official may recover damages for false state-
ments contained in the advertisement (quoting N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271)).
188. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) ("At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions
on matters of public interest and concem."); see also Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 755
(explaining "that 'freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment,'
and that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' (citation omitted)
(quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269-70)); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 264-66 (finding that an
advertisement containing expressions of opinion and information concerning the civil rights move-
ment, "whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern," was
protected under the First Amendment).
189. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
190. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
191. Id. at 134.
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standard.192 In reviewing the circumstances of this case, the Court found
that the individuals involved had a sufficient degree of "continuing pub-
lic interest" as a result of their position or activities as well as "sufficient
access to the [channels] of counterargument" to have the ability to
expose the falsity of the defamatory assertions.'9 Therefore, the Court
considered the individuals to be "public figures."19 As expressed by
Chief Justice Warren in concurrence, the importance of permitting "un-
inhibited debate" concerning the involvement of such individuals in pub-
lic matters "is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials."'l 95 Thus,
"a majority of the Court" agreed to apply the actual malice standard to
defamatory actions brought by public figures.196 Hence, the actual malice
rule has been applied to false statements against public officials as well
as to falsehoods against public figures.'97 Moreover, both a public offi-
cial and a public figure must show actual malice by "a clear and convinc-
ing standard of proof." 98
However, the Supreme Court has found that the actual malice
standard is inappropriate in the case of a defamatory false statement that
causes injury to a private person even when the statement concerns a
192. Id at 148 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1967) (applying the actual
malice standard "not through blind application" of N. Y. Times, but upon considering "the factors
which arise in the particular context of the application of the New York [Right to Privacy] statute in
cases involving private individuals")).
193. Id. at 135, 140, 154-55 (explaining that one of the consolidated cases involved the Uni-
versity of Georgia athletic director who was accused "of conspiring to 'fix' a football game" and the
other involved "a man of some political prominence" who had been present at the University of
Mississippi during a "massive riot").
194. Id. at 154 (noting that both individuals "commanded a substantial amount of independent
public interest at the time of the publications" and, therefore, would be considered "public figures").
195. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial
interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate
about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public offi-
cials."').
196. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (stating that in Curtis, "a majority
of the Court" concluded that he actual malice standard should be applied in defamatory actions
brought by public figures); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (as-
serting that since the decision in N. Y. Times, the Court has "consistently ruled that a public figure
may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory false-
hood, but only if' the plaintiff can show that the statement was made with actual malice); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 & n.7 (1974) ("[A] majority of the [Curtis] Court agreed ...
that the New York Times test should apply to criticism of 'public figures' as well as 'public offi-
cials."').
197. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56-57 (applying the actual malice standard to false
statements against a public figure); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (ap-
plying the actual malice rule to false statements against a public official); Jefferson Cry. Sch. Dist.
No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he First Amend-
ment prohibits public officials and public figures from recovering damages for false and defamatory
statements unless they demonstrate that the statement was made with actual malice.").
198. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 15, 20 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342) (explaining that "where a
statement of 'opinion' on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and defamatory facts
regarding public figures or officials, those individuals must show that such statements were made
with" actual malice and the showing of actual "malice is subject to a clear and convincing standard
of proof"); Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 525 (6th Cir. 2007) ("A
plaintiff who qualifies as a public official or public figure may recover for defamation only if he
produces clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice.").
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public matter.199 For example, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,200 the Su-
preme Court held that a publisher of false defamatory statements con-
cerning a private individual was not entitled to a constitutional privilege
to avoid liability for any harm caused by the false statements.2 01 The
Court overturned its earlier ruling in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,202
in which the Court extended the actual malice standard to false defama-
tory statements against a private individual concerning a matter of public
interest.203
In Gertz, the Court reasoned that the actual malice standard is a very
high bar to overcome, and a private individual normally would not have
the same opportunity as a public official or public figure to correct a de-
famatory falsehood.20 Moreover, the Court acknowledged the normative
concern that, in contrast to a public official or a public figure, a private
individual has not voluntarily exposed himself or herself to public scruti-
ny and to the corresponding enhanced risk of a false defamatory state-
ment injurious to that individual.205 Thus, weighing the competing inter-
ests between freedom of speech and of the press, on the one hand, and
the legitimate state interest in compensating a private individual who is
harmed by a defamatory falsehood, on the other hand, the Court held that
the New York Times actual malice standard does not apply to false de-
famatory statements that cause injury to private individuals.206 The fact
199. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 15 (noting the actual malice rule "was inappropriate for a private
person attempting to prove he was defamed on matters of public interest" (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345-47 (finding the actual malice standard inapplicable in cases concerning a defamatory falsehood
injurious to a private individual despite the statement concerning a matter of public interest))).
200. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
201. Id. at 326-27, 345-46 (concluding "that the States should retain substantial latitude in
their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to . . . a private individu-
al").
202. 403 U.S. 29 (1971), abrogatedby Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
203. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337, 345-46 (explaining the reasoning of the plurality of the Court
in the Rosenbloom decision and finding "unacceptable" the extension of the actual malice standard
to defamatory false statements that harm a private person's reputation); see also Rosenbloom, 403
U.S. at 43-44.
204. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-44 ("[M]any deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test. . . . Public
officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements then [sic]
private individuals normally enjoy."); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985) (explaining that private individuals "generally lack effective opportunities
for rebutting" defamatory statements).
205. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45 (distinguishing between public and private individuals and
noting "the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and
public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory
falsehood[s]" whereas the same assumption does not obtain in the case of private individuals); see
also Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 756 (explaining that private individuals "have not volun-
tarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory statements").
206. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-49 (holding that the States are free to determine the "appropriate
standard of liability" to be applied in the case of a publisher of a false defamatory statement that
causes harm to a private individual); see also Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 756 (explaining
that the state's interest in compensating a private individual for an injurious falsehood is stronger
than the First Amendment interest in protecting free speech (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49)).
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that a statement concerns a public matter, in and of itself, is not sufficient
to justify the application of the actual malice standard to a private per-
207son.
However, the Court limited the recovery to compensatory damages
for injury actually suffered and did not provide for recovery of presumed
or punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice.208 Moreover, the
state may not hold a defendant liable absent some fault.209 Thus, the
states may not impose a strict liability standard.210 Further, the Supreme
Court has held that in the case of a public matter concerning a private
person, the plaintiff also must prove the statements are false, at least
when a media defendant is implicated.2 11 Hence, a plaintiff must show
both falsity and fault in order to recover damages.212
Later, in Greenmoss Builders, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the actual malice standard applies to false statements
213
injurious to a private person in a private matter. The Court employed
the balancing approach of Gertz and found that the state's legitimate
interest in providing compensation to a private person who is harmed by
a defamatory falsehood is stronger than the constitutional interest in pro-
207. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 756 (noting that speech regarding "a public issue
[does] not by itself entitle the libel defendant to the constitutional protections of New York Times"
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 (explaining that a test which bases the application of the actual malice
standard solely on whether the statement concerns a public matter does not adequately address the
competing concerns))).
208. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (noting that "recovery of pre-
sumed or punitive damages [was not permitted] on less than a showing of New York Times malice"
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50 (finding a plaintiff may be compensated only for "actual injury"
when actual malice is not shown))).
209. Id. at 20 (noting that where a statement of opinion implies facts that are defamatory and
false and such statement "involves a private figure on a matter of public concern, a plaintiff must
show that the false connotations were made with some level of fault"); Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. at 766 (White, J., concurring) (explaining that in Gertz, the Court "for the first time [held]
that [private individuals in defamation actions] could no longer recover by proving a false statement
.... They must, in addition, prove some 'fault,' at least negligence" (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347
("[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher . . . of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual"))).
210. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48 ("This approach . . . recognizes the strength of the legitimate
state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the
press . . . from the rigors of strict liability for defamation.").
211. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768"9 (1986); see also Milkovich, 497
U.S. at 19-20 ("Hepps stands for the proposition that a statement on matters of public concern must
be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations ...
where a media defendant is involved."); Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs.,
Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[I]n defamation actions against media defendants, the
First Amendment requires that a plaintiff bear the burden of proving that the statement in question
was false . . . .").
212. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776 ("We believe that the common law's rule on falsity-that the
defendant must bear the burden of proving truth-must . . . fall here to a constitutional requirement
that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.").
213. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 751.
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214
tecting speech concerning private matters. The Court explained that
"not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance."215 Speech con-
cerning public matters is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tion." 2 16 Such speech inhabits "the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values."2 17 Accordingly, speech regarding matters of public
concern is due "special protection."218 In contrast, speech concerning
private matters is less important, and thus, its protections are not as
strict.219 Permitting state law remedies for such speech does not interfere
with the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" discussion and "debate on
public issues" nor is there any concern that possible liability might cause
the press to engage in self-censorship.220 Thus, balancing the state's sub-
stantial interest in awarding damages for a defamatory falsehood com-
pared to the reduced First Amendment value of speech concerning purely
private matters, the Supreme Court held that presumed and punitive
damages may be awarded even though actual malice is not shown.221
The question then becomes whether the statements concern a public
or a private matter. As the Supreme Court has held, in order to determine
the type of speech involved, the court must review "the content, form,
and context" of the speech as shown by the entire record before the
222court. Applying these factors to the case of Greenmoss Builders, the
Court found that the credit report did not concern a public matter.223 The
214. Id. at 757-58 (finding the constitutional interest in protecting speech regarding private
matters "is less important than" the interest in protecting speech concerning public matters (citing
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348)).
215. Id. at 758 & n.5 ("[The Supreme] Court on many occasions has recognized that certain
kinds of speech are less central to the interests of the First Amendment than others.. . . In the area of
protected speech, the most prominent example of reduced protection for certain kinds of speech
concerns commercial speech." (citations omitted)); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (noting certain types of speech are not deserving of absolute protection under the
First Amendment (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978))).
216. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) ("[F]reedom of speech and
of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces .. . the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
all matters of public concern ..... (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940))).
217. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
218. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 759 (citing Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913).
219. Id. at 759-60 (noting speech regarding private matters is less of a constitutional concern
and even though "such speech is not totally unprotected by the First Amendment, its protections are
less stringent" (citation omitted)); see also Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381, 1384
(7th Cir. 1972) (finding a lack of justification for providing First Amendment protection in a libel
action brought by a private individual on a private matter).
220. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 760-62 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (finding the State's interest in providing presumed and punitive damages is
substantial compared to the "incidental effect" such remedies might have on speech conceming
private matters which is of "significantly less" First Amendment interest).
221. Id. at 760-61 ("[T]he reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of
public concern . . . adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a
showing of 'actual malice."').
222. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) ("Whether ... speech addresses a matter
of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.").
223. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761-62 (finding the form, content, and context of
the speech show that the "credit report concerns no public issue").
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credit report contained speech that was in the specific interest of D&B,
the commercial speaker, and a particular business audience.2 24 The credit
report was provided to five subscribers who were not permitted to further
disseminate the information.225 The Court found that the credit report did
not involve any matter of public concern; there was no "strong interest in
the free flow of commercial information."226 Thus, the actual malice
standard did not apply.227
Similarly, in Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,228 the Seventh
Circuit found that First Amendment protection was not justified in a pri-
vate matter concerning a private person.229 Notably, the Seventh Circuit
initially expressed its lack of acceptance of the notion that a credit rating
is due the same protection that the Supreme Court has provided to news-
papers.230 However, assuming so for the sake of argument, the Seventh
Circuit found that the private nature of this case did not justify the pro-
tection. The Seventh Circuit further explained that under Illinois law, if a
"publisher does not believe in the truth of the . . . [statement], or has no
reasonable grounds for believing it to be true," then the publisher's
"qualified . . . privilege was abused," and the publisher may be liable.231
A court may infer such abuse based on a lack of appropriate investiga-
232
tion. Thus, D&B may incur liability if it failed to properly investigate
before issuing its credit rating.2 33
The Oberman case exemplifies the divergence in viewpoints among
the lower courts. Here, the Seventh Circuit did not accept the idea that a
credit rating should receive the same First Amendment protection afford-
ed to newspapers.234 This case also illustrates the high bar of the Su-
224. Id. at 762 (finding the speech at issue was "solely in the individual interest of the speaker
and its specific business audience"); see also Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1384 (observing that the plain-
tiffs financial affairs delineated in the credit report were not "of any interest" to anyone other than
those involved in the specific business transaction at issue, those who provide credit to his business,
or those who receive "his trade paper").
225. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762 ("[T]he credit report was made available to
only five subscribers, who, under the terms of the subscription agreement, could not disseminate it
further."); see also Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.),
511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 819 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining the credit report in Greenmoss "was sent to
only five subscribers who were under agreement o keep the information confidential").
226. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
227. Id at 761-63; see also Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1382-85 (finding the actual malice standard
inapplicable in a libel case brought by a private person concerning a private matter).
228. 460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1972).
229. Id at 1384 (finding First Amendment protection in a "case brought by a private person
upon a matter not of public interest can[not] be justified").
230. Id. (stating that the court was "not persuaded that the credit rating of [a] business was
entitled to the same treatment that the Supreme Court has afforded newspapers and magazines").
231. Id. at 1385.
232. Id; see also Cook v. E. Shore Newspapers, Inc., 64 N.E.2d 751, 765 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945)
("All circumstances surrounding the transaction are proper for consideration, including the failure to
make a proper investigation.").
233. See Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1385.
234. Id. at 1384.
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preme Court's actual malice standard235 relative to the "less rigorous"
state law.236 As discussed earlier in this section, the Supreme Court has
stated that a "failure to investigate" is insufficient to prove reckless dis-
regard under the actual malice standard.237 Yet, under Illinois law, liabil-
ity may be inferred from a "failure to make a proper investigation."
238
The actual malice standard emanated from the laws of defamation
and libel. 2 39 The defamation laws serve to protect an individual's reputa-
tion and provide for a cause of action when false statements have caused
damage to that reputation.24 0 The libel laws similarly provide for com-
pensation when a published defamatory false statement has injured an
individual.2 4 1 The actual malice standard also has been applied in other
types of actions for compensatory damages resulting from false state-
242ments. In particular, many courts have applied the actual malice stand-
ard in various causes of action against the credit rating agencies.243 The
next section will explore the application of the actual malice standard to
actions involving the credit rating agencies.
235. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337, 342 (1974) (acknowledging that
"many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to sur-
mount the barrier of the New York Times test"); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968) ("Concededly the reckless disregard standard may permit recovery in fewer situations than
would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the prudent publish-
er.").
236. See Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1382-85.
237. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332 ("[M]ere proof of failure to investigate, without more, cannot
establish reckless disregard for the truth."); see also St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733 ("Failure to investi-
gate does not in itself establish bad faith." (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88
(1964) ("[N]egligence in failing to discover the misstatements ... is constitutionally insufficient to
show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice."))).
238. Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1385 (quoting Cook v. E. Shore Newspapers, 64 N.E.2d 751, 765
(1ll. App. Ct. 1945)).
239. See generally Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 155 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1999) (noting that issues regarding false statements "traditionally arise" in actions for defamation or
libel).
240. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1990) ("Defamation law devel-
oped not only as a means of allowing an individual to vindicate his good name, but also for the
purpose of obtaining redress for harm caused by such statements.")).
241. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341-42 ("The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the
compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. . . . '[L]ibel
remains premised on the content of speech and limits the freedom of the publisher to express certain
sentiments, at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their substantial accuracy."' (quoting Curtis
Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967))).
242. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 811 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining the actual malice rule has been applied to causes of
action beyond defamation, slander, and libel, such as breach of contract and negligent misrepresenta-
tion); Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 155 (noting the actual malice standard has been applied to causes
of action other than defamation and libel (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988) (applying the actual malice standard in cause of action regarding intentional infliction of
emotional distress))).
243. See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 525-29 (6th
Cir. 2007) (applying the actual malice standard in a case involving a publicly held corporation);
Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (concluding the actual malice rule applies "because the nation-
ally published credit ratings focus upon matters of public concern, a top Fortune 500 company's
creditworthiness"); Cty. ofOrange, 245 B.R. at 156-57 (finding the actual malice standard applies to
a breach of contract action and a professional negligence action against a credit rating agency).
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b. Application of the Actual Malice Standard to Credit Rating
Agencies
The lower courts generally have treated the credit rating agencies as
publishers and their credit ratings as statements of opinion entitled to full
First Amendment protection.244 For example, in Jefferson County School
District Number R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Services, Inc.,245 the Tenth
Circuit employed a First Amendment analysis in reviewing claims
against Moody's arising from its unsolicited article referring to the "neg-
ative outlook" of bonds issued by a school district and the district's "on-
going financial pressures."246 According to the school district, the article
falsely implied that it was not a creditworthy issuer, and this "implied
assertion" may be proven as false; thus, the article was not a protected
expression of opinion.2 47
According to the Tenth Circuit, neither the implied assertion that the
school district was not creditworthy, nor the express statements regarding
the negative outlook of the bonds and the school district's ongoing finan-
cial pressures, was sufficiently specific to be provable as false.2 48 Never-
theless, the court "emphasize[d] that the phrases [such as] 'negative out-
look' [and] 'ongoing financial pressures' are not necessarily too indefi-
nite to imply a false statement of fact." 24 9 If those phrases were combined
with "specific factual assertions," then those statements may not be enti-
tled to constitutional protection.2 50 However, based on the school dis-
trict's inability to identify a "specific false statement" that could be "rea-
sonably implied" from the article and the indefiniteness of the express
"phrases 'negative outlook,' and 'ongoing financial pressures,"' the cred-
it rating agency's article was deemed "a protected expression of opin-
11251
ion.
244. See, e.g., Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 522 ("Moody's is a financial publisher ... [and
its] rating is a predictive opinion of a company's future creditworthiness."); Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist.,
175 F.3d at 855-56 (holding that a credit rating agency's article regarding the creditworthiness of an
issuer of bonds "constitutes a protected expression of opinion" under the First Amendment); Cty. of
Orange, 245 B.R. at 154 (referring to Standard & Poor's as a "financial publisher").
245. 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
246. Id. at 850 (noting the rating agency "had not been asked to rate the bonds" and was not
paid a fee); see also Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2004) (discussing Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. and explaining that "[t]he article gave the
bonds and the school district's financial condition negative evaluations").
247. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 850, 854.
248. Id. at 855 ("Like the statement of a product's value, a statement regarding the creditwor-
thiness of a bond issuer could well depend on a myriad of factors, many of them not provably true or
false.").
249. Id. at 856.
250. Id ("If coupled with specific factual assertions, such statements might not be immunized
from defamation claims by the First Amendment.").
251. Id; see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (finding a "statement
of 'opinion' concerning public matters which does not imply an assertion of fact that may be prov-
en as false will be fully protected under the First Amendment).
309
DENVER LAW REVIEW
As the lower courts generally consider credit rating agencies to be
publishers and their ratings to be statements of opinion, these courts gen-
erally have applied the actual malice standard in actions against the rat-
- 21ing agencies.252 The bankruptcy case of County of Orange v. McGraw
Hill Cos., Inc. ,253 provides an example of the application of the actual
malice rule in both a professional negligence action and a breach of con-
tract action against Standard & Poor's. 254 As an initial matter, the district
court accepted, without discussion, that Standard & Poor's merits the
status of a "publisher" under First Amendment jurisprudence.255 Howev-
er, the district court acknowledged that an entity's "status as a financial
publisher" does not automatically provide that entity with heightened
First Amendment protection in the form of the actual malice standard.256
The County argued that a breach of contract action falls under the
rubric of a "law of general applicability," and thus, the general laws of
contract should govern this action.257 Moreover, the County argued that
the rating agency was subject to an implied duty under contract law to
competently perform the analytical services upon which the rating is
based and, thus, breached the agreement by providing an inaccurate rat-
ing.258 Despite these arguments, the district court employed a First
Amendment analysis in considering the breach of contract claim.259 The
court found that the debt securities were matters of "public concern"
because either party was free to make the rating public. 260 As a result, the
court concluded that the actual malice rule applies to the breach of con-
tract action unless a "special circumstance" was present, that is, if the
rating agency "voluntarily waived" the protections of the First Amend-
261ment. Upon reviewing the agreements, the court found no evidence
that the rating agency expressly waived its constitutional protections.
2 62
252. See supra Section 1.A.3.b.
253. 245 B.R. 151 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999).
254. Id. at 156-57 ("The actual malice standard will apply to the County's breach of contract
claim . . . unless the Court finds S&P voluntarily waived its First Amendment protection. . . . [Tihe
actual malice standard applies to any professional negligence claim concerning S&P's protected
speech.").
255. Id. at 154 (referring to Standard & Poor's as a "financial publisher").
256. Id. at 154-55; see also First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment does not 'belong' to any definable category of
persons or entities . . . .").
257. Cty of Orange, 245 B.R. at 156 (citing the standard of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501
U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (holding "that 'the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the
application of general laws' (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937)))).
258. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2007)
(citing Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 154 (noting the County's argument that Standard & Poor's "as-
sumed a duty to adequately perform the services called for in the contract")).
259. Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 155-56 (noting the ability of either party to "publicize the
rating" and, thus, finding the rating to be a matter of public concern potentially subject to the actual
malice rule).
260. Id at 155.
261. Id. at 156.
262. Id ("A waiver of a constitutional right 'is not to be implied and is not lightly to be
found."' (quoting Gete v. INS, 121 F.3d 1285, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997))); see also Marilyn Manson, Inc.
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The court noted that if the rating agency had expressly agreed to provide
the County with analytical services, separate from the rating itself, such
an undertaking would be viewed as a special circumstance that "might
have avoided" the application of the actual malice rule.263 However, in
this case, there was no separate agreement to provide financial services;
there was only an agreement to provide the rating.264 Thus, the court held
that the actual malice standard applied to the County's breach of contract
claim because the rating was a matter of public concern and no special
circumstances were present.265
Additionally, the district court held that the actual malice standard
applied to the County's claim for professional negligence.266 The court
found that the County's injury resulted from the rating agency's "expres-
sive activity"; therefore, the professional negligence action also was sub-
ject to the actual malice rule.
26 7
Similarly, in Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Services,
Inc.,268 the Sixth Circuit stated, without analysis, that "Moody's is a fi-
nancial publisher."269 The court further stated that Compuware is a public
corporation and, thus, would be considered a "public figure" under a
First Amendment analysis.27 0 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit applied the
actual malice rule in a defamation action against Moody's concerning
statements in its rating report.27 1 The court also noted that, in contrast to
the rating report, a defamation claim could not even be recognized with
respect to the actual rating.272 As expressed by the Sixth Circuit, a "credit
rating is a predictive opinion" regarding the expected creditworthiness of
a company and is based upon "a subjective and discretionary weighing of
complex factors."273 As a result, the court found that the credit rating
v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 971 F. Supp. 875, 889 (D.N.J. 1997) (explaining the waiver of a
constitutional right needs to be "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" (quoting Erie Telecomms., Inc.
v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1094 (3d Cir. 1988))).
263. Cly. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 156.
264. Id. ("Since there is no claim or showing S&P undertook a separate duty to provide a
competent rating, the only element of the County's breach of contract claim is the providing of the
rating itself Any duty to perform competently would be part of the Constitutionally-protected
rendering of a rating, not a separate obligation.").
265. Id. ("A claim that S&P breached its duty to provide a rating in a competent manner is
subject to the actual malice standard.").
266. Id. at 157.
267. Id.
268. 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007).
269. See id. at 522.
270. Id. at 525.
271. Id. at 525-26.
272. Id. at 529 ("To the extent Compuware alleges that the credit rating itself was defamatory,
as opposed to the facts or implications in the report, Compuware has failed to assert a cognizable
defamation claim.").
273. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829,
842 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 529) (dismissing claims against credit
rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation because credit ratings do not communicate a factual




does not imply any factual assertions that could be proven as false.2 74
The court stated that even if the rating conveyed a factual implication,
the "inherently subjective nature of Moody's ratings" determination
makes it impossible to prove as false any such factual inference.2 75
The Sixth Circuit also considered a breach of contract claim in
which Compuware alleged that Moody's breached the implied duty un-
der contract law to perform the agreement in a skillful, diligent, and
276workmanlike manner. As an initial matter, the court noted that
"[o]rdinarily, 'enforcement of... general laws against the press is not
subject to stricter scrutiny than [what] would be applied [in the case of
other entities]."' 277 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit observed that the
Supreme Court has never applied the actual malice rule to a breach of
contract action, nor has any circuit court.278 The only precedent in which
a court applied the actual malice standard to a breach of contract claim
was the California bankruptcy case of County of Orange v. McGraw Hill
Co., discussed earlier in this section.279 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit
held that the actual malice rule applied to the breach of contract action in
the instant case.
280
The Sixth Circuit found that the contract at issue involved matters
that concern the First Amendment.281 The parties contracted for Moody's
to evaluate Compuware's creditworthiness and to issue a credit rating
282
and a rating report. The Sixth Circuit considered the credit rating and
the contents of the rating report to be Moody's opinion. 283 Thus, the court
found that the "very subject matter and corresponding duties" of the
agreement implicate speech that is protected by the First Amendment.284
Moreover, the court found the parties contracted for Moody's to provide
274. Id. (citing Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 529 (finding "no basis . .. [to] conclude that the
credit rating itself communicates any provably false factual connotation")); see also Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
275. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 529 ("Even if [the court] could draw any fact-based infer-
ences from this rating, such inferences could not be proven false because of the inherently subjective
nature of Moody's ratings calculation.").
276. Id. at 531 ("Compuware contends that Moody's breached this contract by incompetently
compiling, investigating, and evaluating Compuware's credit position, and by publishing an errone-
ous report.").
277. Id. at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670
(1991)).
278. Id. at 530.
279. See id.; Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-56 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1999) (applying the actual malice standard to a breach of contract claim).
280. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 531.
281. Id. ("Moody's contracted to publish a credit rating for Compuware, which ... involves
activities protected by the First Amendment.").
282. Id.
283. Id. (finding the agreement "consists of Moody's promise to provide its opinion of Com-
puware's creditworthiness and to publish a report of that opinion").
284. Id. ("Moody's opinion and its publication are matters protected by the First Amendment;
thus the whole of this agreement-the very subject matter and corresponding duties-is intimately
tied to speech, expression, and publication.").
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"a credit rating;" the agreement did not expressly state that Moody's
would provide an accurate credit rating.285
The Sixth Circuit found Compuware's argument, that Moody's
breached the implied duty under contract law to competently perform
286under the contract, based in negligence. As a result, the court consid-
ered this breach of contract claim to be a claim for negligence and, as
such, to be essentially the same as a tort claim for defamation.28 The
Sixth Circuit further found that the harm suffered was an injury to the
reputation of Compuware rather than an injury due to a lack of perfor-
mance of the contract.288 Ultimately, the court viewed Compuware's
breach of contract claim as a defamation claim and held that the actual
malice rule applied.289
The Sixth Circuit emphasized that its holding was limited to the cir-
cumstances of this case.290 In contrast to the instant case, if the agreement
provided that the parties were to perform an obligation that did not
implicate protected speech, then the actual malice rule would not
apply.2 91 Similarly, if Compuware had alleged that he credit rating agen-
cy failed to perform an express provision of the agreement, then the ac-
tual malice rule would not be applicable.292
In this author's opinion, the extension of the actual malice rule to
breach of contract actions against the credit rating agencies is completely
unjustified and inappropriate.293 The application of the actual malice
standard in Compuware was "entirely unprecedented" with the exception
of the County of Orange bankruptcy case.294 Moreover, requiring a pub-
lic figure plaintiff to show actual malice to recover on a breach of con-
tract claim effectively eliminates the ability of that plaintiff to contract
for a credit rating agency to provide an accurate evaluation of that plain-
285. Id. at 531-32 ("Moody's agreed only to publish a credit rating; it did not agree to publish
a ... correctly appraised rating.").
286. Id. (arguing that "Moody's breached an implied contractual covenant to perform skillfully
and diligently"); see also Nash v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 174 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Mich. 1970) (noting
the implied duty in all contracts for services to perform the obligations "skillfully, carefully, diligent-
ly, and in a workmanlike manner").
287. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 532 (seeing "no material difference between" Compu-
ware's claim for breach of contract and a tort claim for defamation).
288. Id. at 532-33.
289. Id. at 533 (concluding Compuware's "only injuries are defamation-type harm resulting
from Moody's publication of protected speech, and application of the actual-malice standard to [the]
breach of contract claim is appropriate").
290. Id
291. Id. at 533-34 ("[T]his holding would not apply to any breach of contract claim where ...
the parties [were required] to do something other than publish protected expression.").
292. Id at 534 (explaining that this holding would not be applicable "if Compuware alleged
that Moody's breached the express terms of the contract by, for example, failing to provide a rating
at all").
293. See id. at 535 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The extension of
First Amendment tort law principles to contract cases is unwarranted . . . .").
294. Id at 535; see also Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1999).
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tiff's creditworthiness.29 5 Instead, the actual malice standard grants the
credit rating agency the right to breach the agreement so long as the rat-
ing agency did not act with malice.296
The Sixth Circuit noted that the actual malice standard would not
apply if the credit rating agency failed to perform an express provision of
the agreement and stated that "failing to provide a rating at all" would be
an example of such a breach.297 Moreover, the court stated that a party
could contract for a specific result (for example, a positive result), and a
breach of that express obligation would not require the application of the
actual malice rule.298 However, this line of reasoning is not relevant to
agreements with credit rating agencies. A credit rating agency is not in
the business of providing a specific result. Instead, a credit rating agency
is in the business of evaluating the financial condition of a business and
its debt securities and providing a rating that conveys the agency's as-
sessment of the creditworthiness of that business and its debt securi-
ties.29 9 Thus, following the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, the only rele-
vant circumstance in which a credit rating agency could be found to have
breached an agreement o provide a credit rating, free of the actual mal-
ice standard, is if the agency failed to provide the rating at all; the stand-
ard contract law principle of an implied duty to use reasonable care in
performing an agreement is not applicable to credit rating agencies.300
Instead, in stark contrast o other businesses, credit rating agencies may
act negligently in performing agreements without the fear of any liabil-
ity. 30t The fact that a credit rating agency's business is to publish a rating
295. See Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 535 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Requiring a showing of actual malice to prevail on a contract claim ... effectively destroys
the ability of public figures to ... contract [for the other party to make accurate statements about the
public figure].").
296. See id. (arguing that the actual malice requirement imposes into "such contract[s] the right
to violate the contractual obligation as long as there is no malice").
297. Id. at 534 (majority opinion).
298. Id.
299. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 5 ("For almost a century, credit rating agencies have
been providing opinions on the creditworthiness of issuers of [debt] securities and their financial
obligations."); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that a credit rating agency "analyze[s] data, conduct[s] an assessment,
and [provides] a fact-based conclusion as to creditworthiness"); Commercial Fin. Sers., Inc. v.
Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (finding the rating agencies provid-
ed their opinions regarding the creditworthiness of the plaintiffs bonds "as professionals being paid
to provide their opinions to a client").
300. See Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 535-37 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting the "implied term" to perform an agreement with reasonable care and asserting that
"it is not clear why the First Amendment should . . . deprive parties of the ability to contract that a
certain standard of care be exercised").
301. See id. at 537 ("[R]equiring malice to recover for breach of contract in this case elevates
the protection Moody's enjoys against breach of contract claims above what other contracting parties
... would enjoy.... Under the majority's reasoning, Moody's is free to assign ratings based solely
on any nonmalicious basis, and a customer would have no recourse against the company at all. Such
freedom from contractual obligation is not provided generally to contracting parties.").
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should not eviscerate contractual obligations that are owed to the other
party and that other businesses must observe.302
Moreover, as the dissent noted, it does not follow that a claim for
breach of the implied duty to perform a contract using reasonable care is
the same as a tort claim for negligence.303 In a tort case, the obligation to
use reasonable care derives from a government-imposed duty to act in a
reasonable manner.304 in a contract case, the duty to use reasonable care
is derived from the contract itself and is a duty that the parties voluntarily
undertake.30 5 Thus, the difference between a tort action and a breach of
contract action is the source of the parties' obligations.30 6 The fact that a
contractual obligation uses the same terms as a duty in tort should not
preclude the validity of that contractual obligation.307
In County of Orange, the court found that the actual malice standard
applied to the breach of contract claim unless the plaintiff could show the
presence of a special circumstance such as if the rating agency expressly
waived the protections of the First Amendment.308 One may query why
the tort protections of the First Amendment are inherent in a contract and
must be expressly waived; yet, the established contractual duty to per-
form obligations with reasonable care is completely disregarded.3 09
The freedom to contract is a fundamental legal principle. In express-
ing the value of the freedom to enter into contracts, Professor Farnsworth
has noted, "From a utilitarian point of view, freedom to contract maxim-
izes the welfare of the parties and therefore the good of society . . . .
From a libertarian point of view, it accords to individuals a sphere of
influence in which they can act freely.,310 As the Supreme Court has
noted, "The parties themselves . .. determine the scope of their legal
obligations" in the context of a contract.3 1 If the parties did not wish to
undertake the established duty under contract law to perform their obli-
gations with reasonable care, then the parties were free to explicitly agree
302. See id. at 537 ("The fact that Moody's is in the business of publishing does not eliminate
any and all contractual obligations the company has towards those paying real money for its ser-
vices.").
303. Id. at 536 ("The fact that a contract requires 'reasonable care' does not mean that a claim
for breach of contract is the equivalent of a tort claim for negligence.").
304. Id. ("In tort cases the obligation comes from a duty imposed by the government to act
reasonably on pain of paying the costs of acting unreasonably.").
305. Id. ("In contract cases the obligation comes from a voluntarily entered-into undertaking.").
306. Id.
307. Id. ("Contracting parties should not be precluded from entering into ... contracts merely
because the obligation is stated in terms that the tort law also uses.").
308. Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999).
309. See Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 535 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 156.
310. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.7, at 25 (1990) (discussing
the value of the freedom to contract).
311. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991) (holding that where a reporter
promised not to reveal the identity of a source and then revealed that source's identity, the First
Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel claim).
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that the implied contractual provision would not be applicable.3 12 Yet, the
fundamental freedom to contract has been virtually eliminated in the case
of contracts with credit rating agencies.
The professional negligence case of In re Enron Corp. Secs. De-
rivative & "ERISA " Litig.3 14 provides a further example of the misguided
protections afforded by the lower courts. In this action against Standard
& Poor's and Moody's for negligently assigning false and misleading
credit ratings to Enron's debt securities, the court initially found the
speech of a credit rating agency to be the same type of speech as that of a
credit reporting agency: commercial speech.3 15 The court then distin-
guished credit rating agencies by finding that rating agencies "do not
profit from the sale of the bonds" of companies that are rated. 16 Howev-
er, the court did not consider that the profit derives not from the actual
sale of the bonds but instead from the fees paid to provide the rating.317
Moreover, whether the profit is made from the sale of the bonds or from
the assignment of a rating is immaterial to whether the credit rating
agencies should be held liable for negligently prepared credit ratings that
are false or misleading.
The court further found that the actual malice rule applied because
Enron was a Fortune 500 company, and thus, the ratings involved "mat-
ters of public concern."318 Moreover, the credit ratings were publicly
distributed.31 9 Despite acknowledging that protections under the First
Amendment have not been universally applied to the credit rating agen-
cies, the court applied "what appears to be a policy of heightened protec-
tion for credit reports under the First Amendment. . . even if negligently
prepared."3 20 Although the court found the credit rating reports to be "a
combination of subjective, nonactionable evaluation and verifiable
facts," the court determined that the plaintiff did not identify any factual
statements that could be proven as false and did not show that the agen-
312. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 537 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that "[t]he parties could have explicitly contracted away [the] implied term" to perform the
agreement with reasonable care).
313. See id. (arguing that the court should not apply "a newly created legal doctrine that effec-
tively makes unenforceable a wide swath of perfectly legitimate contracts").
314. 511 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
315. Id. at 820 (noting "the long established reduced protection for commercial speech"); see
also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762-63 (1985).
316. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
317. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 372-73 (4th ed. 2009) ("Most credit rating agencies, particularly Moody's, Standard
& Poor's . . . and Fitch, earn money by charging issuers a fee in exchange for assigning a credit
rating to the debt obligations marketed by the issuer.").
318. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (asserting that the creditworthiness of a "top Fortune
500 company" is a "matter[] of public concern").
319. Id. at 820, 825 (explaining the credit rating reports "were not private or confidential,"
rather the reports were "nationally published").
320. Id. at 825 ("First Amendment protection for credit rating agencies as members of the
'financial press' performing 'traditional journalistic functions' is not universally acknowledged
...1)
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cies "knew or had significant suspicions" regarding the truth of their
statements; thus, the plaintiff failed to prove actual malice.321 The court
further noted that under the actual malice rule, the reasonable person
standard does not apply; thus, the credit rating agencies did not have a
duty to investigate.322
Given the lack of a duty to investigate under the actual malice
rule,323 whether the credit rating agencies would have uncovered the
fraud occurring at Enron324 had the rating agencies investigated will nev-
er be known. Yet, these circumstances further belie the judicial wisdom
of applying the actual malice rule to the credit rating agencies. Had the
rating agencies been required to investigate, there is a possibility that the
agencies would have uncovered the fraud at Enron, and many investors
would have avoided significant losses.325
Moreover, even if the plaintiff was able to show that the rating re-
ports contained false factual statements made with actual malice and,
thus, that the credit rating agencies were not deserving of First Amend-
ment protection, the plaintiff would face another stumbling block: the
court would need to find, as a matter of law, the existence of a duty of
care owed by the rating agencies to the plaintiff.32 6 While acknowledging
that the plaintiffs harm was a foreseeable consequence of the allegedly
misleading rating reports, the court found the relationship between the
rating agencies' alleged negligent misrepresentation and the harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff was "too remote, as a matter of public policy, to
impose a duty." 32 7 The court did not address the plaintiffs claim that it
had specifically hired Standard & Poor's and Moody's to rate the bonds;
instead, the court focused on the fact that the credit reports were publicly
distributed.328 The court also appeared to find it significant that the plain-
tiff did not purchase the bonds; rather, the plaintiff loaned money to En-
321. Id.
322. Id. at 825-26 (noting credit rating "[a]gencies are not held to a reasonable person standard
that might require investigation"); see also supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
324. Alexei Barrionuevo, Enron Chiefs Guilty of Fraud and Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES (May 25,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/business/25cnd-enron.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0
(reporting that Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, chief executives of Enron, were found guilty of
fraud and conspiracy following the company's "sudden collapse ... and revelation as little more
than a house of cards").
325. See id. (noting losses associated with the fraud at Enron resulted in "billions of dollars" in
civil suits).
326. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 826 ("[A] crucial prerequisite for stating a negligent
misrepresentation claim is a court determination that under the facts and circumstances alleged, there
exists a duty of care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant."); see also Gomes v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 783 A.2d 462,469-70 (Conn. 2001).
327. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27 (explaining that imposing a duty of care requires
the court to find that the harm was foreseeable and that, on the basis of public policy, "the defend-
ant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particu-
lar plaintiff in [the] case" (quoting Games, 783 A.2d at 470)).
328. See id. at 827 ("The credit reports were distributed to the world at large.").
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ron separate from the issuance of the bonds.3 29 While the court acknowl-
edged that new regulation of the credit rating agencies may be appropri-
ate to protect market participants, the court determined that it would not
be "beneficial to society" to permit anyone who claimed reliance on rat-
ing reports and suffered a loss "in any endeavor" to recover from the
credit rating agencies.330
However, many ancillary credit decisions are made based upon the
credit rating assigned by a rating agency to a particular issuer of debt
securities.3  Whether the plaintiff purchased the bonds is immaterial to
the fact that the plaintiff justifiably relied upon the credit rating in its
decision to make Enron a loan to the plaintiffs foreseeable detriment.33 2
Moreover, the plaintiff in this case is not just "anyone" who relied on the
rating reports and incurred a loss; the plaintiff in this case specifically
hired the rating agencies to provide a credit rating for the bonds issued
by Enron.3 33 Thus, it would appear that the plaintiff in this case had a
"relationship of privity" with the credit rating agencies and, therefore,
was owed a duty of care.334
As demonstrated above, "while there is no automatic, blanket, abso-
lute First Amendment protection" for publications issued by the credit
rating agencies, the majority of courts have historically shielded the rat-
ing agencies from liability for the allegedly fraudulent or negligent rat-
ings disseminated in those publications.335
329. Id
330. Id. ("While new regulation of the agencies may well be in order to '[protect] the safety of
the participants,' allowing anyone to sue credit rating agencies who had read the credit rating reports
and claimed to have relied upon them and lost money in any endeavor that person undertook would
be far more deleterious than beneficial to society as a whole." (alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 337 (Conn. 1997))).
331. Many loan contracts include triggers based on debt ratings assigned by the credit rating
agencies. Pepa Kraft, Do Rating Agencies Cater? Evidence from Rating-Based Contracts 2 (May 3,
2011) (unpublished manuscript),
https://business.nd.eduluploadedFiles/AcademicCenters/StudyofFinancialRegulation/pdf and
ocuments/201 I _confPepa Kraft.pdf ("Private loan agreements increasingly use public debt ratings
as manifestations of a borrower's credit risk in order to calibrate pricing."), reprinted in 59 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 264 (2015).
332. See Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 809, 827 (noting the plaintiff relied on the credit
information published by the rating agencies in deciding to make a loan to Enron and that the harm
to the plaintiff could be considered foreseeable).
333. Id. at 824 (acknowledging that the plaintiff claims to have "specifically retained" the
credit rating agencies to assign a rating to Enron's bond issue).
334. See id. at 824-25 (noting the question of whether there is a "relationship of privity" that
would limit or bar the protections of the First Amendment but failing to specifically address the
issue); see also Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2004) (noting the plaintiff had asked the rating agencies to rate the bonds and had paid the
agencies for the rating and, thus, were in privity with the rating agencies and owed a duty of care).
335. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 815-17; see also PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra
note 3, at 96 (finding courts have shielded the credit rating agencies from liability by affording the
rating agencies protection under the First Amendment).
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c. When the Actual Malice Standard Does Not Apply
While the majority of courts have applied the heightened First
Amendment protections of the actual malice standard in actions involv-
ing the credit rating agencies, 336 there are some cases in which the courts
have rejected the actual malice rule. For example, in Commercial Finan-
cial Services, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 337 the court found that the
First Amendment protections reserved for journalists did not apply to
claims against the credit rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation
338and negligence. According to the court, credit ratings "fall somewhere
between" opinions that are entitled to First Amendment protection and
opinions that do not deserve protection.3 39 The court distinguished be-
tween an editorial writer, who is entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion with respect to speech concerning the conduct of public officials,
and an attorney providing title opinions, who is "not automatically ex-
empt" when there is a claim of negligence just because the attorney is
340
issuing an opinion.
Following this line of reasoning, the court made a "crucial distinc-
tion" between the instant case and Jefferson County, in which the credit
rating agency was not asked to assign a rating to the bonds and was not
paid a fee to rate the bonds.4 In contrast, the plaintiff in this case had
requested the credit rating agencies to provide a bond rating and had paid
342
a fee to the rating agencies for that bond rating. Thus, the court found
that the rating agencies provided their opinions regarding the creditwor-
thiness of the plaintiffs bonds "as professionals being paid to provide
their opinions to a client."343 As a result, the plaintiff and the credit rating
agencies are considered to be "in privity" based on an agreement en-
forceable by both parties. As expressed by the court, the relationship
336. See supra Section I.A.3.b.
337. 94 P.3d 106 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
338. Id. at 110 (finding the First Amendment does not "shield[] the agencies from potential
liability").
339. Id. at 109.
340. Id at 109-10.
341. Id. at I10; see also Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175
F.3d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting Moody's "had not been asked to rate the bonds" and had not
been paid a fee).
342. Commercial Fin. Servs., 94 P.3d at 110 ("[Ijn the instant case the Rating Agencies [i.e.,
S&P, Moody's, and Fitch] had been asked to rate the bonds, at CFS's request and at CFS's ex-
pense.").
343. Id. ("If a journalist wrote an article for a newspaper about the bonds, the First Amendment
would presumably apply. But if CFS hired that journalist to write a company report about the bonds,
a different standard would apply.").
344. Id; cf Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d
829, 840-42 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding purchasers of mortgage-backed securities rated by the credit
rating agencies failed to show a "special relationship" with the agencies necessary to be in privity
and, thus, were not owed a duty of care); Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 690 F.3d 98, 114-
15 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the purchaser of securities rated by the credit rating agencies failed to
state a claim for negligent misrepresentation against the credit rating agency because the purchaser




between the plaintiff and the credit rating agencies "goes beyond a rela-
tionship between a journalist and subject, and is more analogous to that
of a client and the client's certified public accountant."3 45 Therefore, the
court found that the credit rating agencies are not shielded from liability
by the First Amendment.3 46
The court further found that the credit rating agencies, "having
agreed to rate the bonds for a fee," owed a duty of care to the plaintiff,
"the entity paying for the rating." 347 Thus, although the rating agencies
did not agree to provide a particular rating, "it is implicit" in the "busi-
ness relationship" of the parties that the agencies would determine the
rating "in a non-negligent" manner.348 The court found that the parties
had "a special relationship" as delineated in dealings and communica-
tions between the parties, including a letter outlining the rights and obli-
gations of the parties.34 9 Thus, the court reasoned that, unlike the readers
of a general interest newspaper or the subscribers of a financial newslet-
ter, the rating agencies owed a duty to the plaintiff.350
Notably, even though the securities were issued in a private place-
ment, the credit rating agencies had the right to disseminate the rating to
the public.35 1 Thus, the rating could be circulated to "a potentially limit-
less audience."352 Nonetheless, the Restatement's requirement that the
negligent misrepresentation must be intended for "a limited group of
persons" does not bar the plaintiffs recovery.353 As expressed by the
court, "[N]o matter who else might eventually learn of the rating, the
rating was clearly intended for [the plaintiff]."354 The credit rating agen-
345. Commercial Fin. Servs., 94 P.3d at 110. But cf First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard &
Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting a credit rating agency that issues a securities
newsletter falls "somewhere between" a newspaper publisher and an accountant and finding the First
Amendment protections of a newspaper publisher should apply).
346. Commercial Fin. Serys., 94 P.3d at 110 ("We do not believe the First Amendment shields
the agencies from potential liability.").
347. Id. (noting the court "cannot accept the argument that having agreed to rate the bonds for
a fee, the Rating Agencies owed no duty of care to CFS, the entity paying for the rating").
348. Id. at 111.
349. Id. at 110-12 ("A typical letter from a rating agency to CFS outlines the parties' relation-
ship. It states that the rating of the certificates was being made pursuant to a request by CFS; . . . that
the rating could be disseminated to interested parties[;] . . . that the agency retained the right to
advise the public of the rating; . . . and that a bill for the agency's work would be sent to CFS.").
350. Id. at 112 ("The Rating Agencies cannot be said to have no greater duty than that owed to
a reader of a general interest newspaper or a subscriber of a specialist newsletter."); see also Newby
v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 824
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (discussing Commercial Financial and explaining "the special relationship of
privity between the parties ... created a duty of care not owed to a general reader or a subscriber"
(citing Commercial Fin. Servs., 94 P.3d at 112)).
351. Commercial Fin. Serys., 94 P.3d at 111 (explaining that "(though the certificates were to
be placed privately) . .. the agency retained the right to advise the public of the rating").
352. Id. at 113.
353. Id. (explaining the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 provides that "the tort of
negligent misrepresentation is limited . .. to losses suffered 'by the person or one of a limited group
of persons' who the supplier of the false information intends to supply" (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977))).
354. Id.
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cies prepared the rating at the request of the plaintiff and provided the
information regarding the rating to the plaintiff.3 55 Moreover, the plaintiff
hired the agencies to provide the rating and paid the agencies a consider-
ation for the rating.356 Thus, the Restatement's tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation is applicable to the credit rating agencies.
This court did not squarely address the belief held by other courts
that the rating agencies' right to disseminate the rating to the public
caused the rating to be a matter of public concern and, thus, appropriate
for the application of the actual malice rule.3 5 8 Rather, this court
acknowledged the possible dissemination of the rating to the public and
nevertheless found that the First Amendment did not shield the rating
agencies from potential liability.359
The court observed that the rating agencies, by providing a rating,
"also serve the public interest."360 Moreover, the court acknowledged the
public policy concern that the use of a negligence standard may cause the
agencies to provide ratings designed to avoid lawsuits.3 61 Nevertheless,
the court rejected the notion that an exception should be made to the tra-
ditional law of negligence in order to shield the credit rating agencies
from liability and held that the credit rating agencies owed a duty to the
plaintiff to provide an accurate rating for the securities.362
355. Id. ("[T]he communications between the parties unquestionably show the rating was done
at CFS's request, and the information concerning the rating was communicated by the agencies to
CFS.").
356. Id. (noting comment g to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 provides that
"[t]he person for whose guidance the information is supplied is often the person who has employed
the supplier to furnish it, in which case, if it is supplied for a consideration paid by that person, he
has at his election either a right of action under the rule stated in this Section [552] or a right of
action upon the contract under which the information is supplied" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552 CMT. g (AM. LAW INST. 1977))).
357. See id at 113-14 (rejecting the argument that the Restatement is not applicable); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) ("One who, in the course of his
business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.").
358. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.),
511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 820, 825 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (applying the actual malice rule because, among
other things, the credit rating reports "were not private or confidential," rather the reports were
"nationally published"); Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 155-56 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1999) (finding the debt securities were "matters of public concern" because either party was
free to make the rating public and, thus, the actual malice rule applies).
359. Commercial Fin. Serys., 94 P.3d at 110-12 (finding the First Amendment does not shield
the credit rating agencies from liability).
360. Id at 111.
361. Id at 112 ("A legitimate concern exists that applying the negligence standard may pres-
sure the agencies into issuing a more favorable rating than is deserved . . . out of fear of a lawsuit
brought by the security's issuer.").
362. Id. (finding the rating agencies owed a duty to CFS "to issue the rating the securities
deserved"); see also Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 822-23 (discussing the holding in Commercial
Financial Services "that the First Amendment does not protect rating agencies from liability for
alleged inaccuracies where they were asked to rate [securities] ... by a ... company,... were paid a
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Although the court in Commercial Financial found that the actual
malice rule did not apply despite the rating agencies' right to disseminate
the rating to the public, other cases in which courts found the actual mal-
ice rule to be inapplicable are limited to circumstances in which the
issuer of the securities is not a public figure and the securities are intend-
ed to be sold to a limited group of purchasers.36 3 In re National Century
Financial Enterprises, Inc.364 provides such an example of a district
court's rejection of the actual malice rule.36 5 The securities in this case
were not issued by a public company and were sold to a targeted group
of investors in a private placement.36 6 Moreover, the ratings were listed
only in the offering documents that were provided to the particular group
of investors.367 Thus, the ratings did not involve a matter of public con-
cern, and the actual malice rule did not apply.368
In considering a claim for negligent misrepresentation alleged by
the purchaser of the securities, the Southern District of Ohio also rejected
the rating agency's argument that a duty does not exist unless there is a
special relationship.36 9 The district court explained that a special relation-
ship is not "a formal element" of a claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion.3 70 Rather, a special relationship is more aptly a characterization of
the necessary requirements of negligent misrepresentation; that is, the
defendant has given "false information in a business transaction for
plaintiffs guidance" and the plaintiff is a member "of a limited class for
whom defendant intended to supply the information."371 In this case, the
plaintiff sufficiently pled that it was a member of a limited group of pur-
chasers who foreseeably relied on the credit ratings.3 72 The rating agency
fee by that company, were therefore in privity with that company, and thus owed a duty of care to
that company to provide accurate ratings" (footnote omitted)).
363. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC, 813 F. Supp.
2d 871, 877 n.l (S.D. Ohio 2011) ("Recently, courts have declined to extend [First Amendment]
protection at the motion to dismiss stage where the rating is allegedly the product of the issuer pays
model and is meant only for a select few investors." (citing In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc.,
Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639-40 (S.D. Ohio 2008); and Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))); see also Anschutz Corp. v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 830-32 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
364. 580 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
365. See id. at 639-40 (finding the actual malice rule does not apply where the securities were
not "a matter of public concern"); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (holding that a credit report provided to five subscribers did not concern a
public matter because it was intended for a particular business audience).
366. Nat '1 Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d at 634, 639-40 (finding the securities "were
issued by a privately-held company, and ... targeted to a select class of institutional investors").
367. Id. at 640 ("[T]he only place that the ratings are alleged to have appeared were in the
offering materials given to the select class of investors.").
368. Id. at 639-40 (noting the complaint does not characterize the ratings "as a matter of public
concern").
369. Id. at 646-48.
370. Id. at 647 (quoting Nat'l Mulch & Seed, Inc. v. Rexius Forest By-Prods., Inc., 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24904, at *29-30 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007)).
371. Id. ("[M]isrepresentations to a person or limited category of people whom the speaker or
supplier intends to benefit or guide are actionable.").
372. Id. at 648.
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issued the credit ratings with the knowledge that the ratings would be
viewed on the offering documents provided to a limited group of inves-
tors.373
Moreover, the district court rejected the rating agency's argument
that there was no basis for justifiable reliance because the credit ratings
were "predictive opinions."3 74 As the Sixth Circuit has determined, opin-
ions can be actionable if "the opinion is not factually well-grounded."3 75
The National Century court found that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged
that the credit rating agency failed to exercise reasonable care in deter-
mining whether its ratings were factually well-grounded and, thus, failed
to exercise reasonable care in providing information to the plaintiff for
its guidance in determining whether to purchase the securities.376 It is
important to note that under the actual malice standard applied in other
cases, the credit rating agencies do not have a duty to exercise reasonable
377
care.
Similarly, in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., 378 the Southern District of New York rejected the argument of
Moody's and Standard & Poor's that the First Amendment provides the
agencies with absolute immunity.379 This case concerned an action for
common law fraud alleged by the purchasers of the securities.38 0 The
court found that the ratings were provided only to a "select group of in-
vestors" as part of a private placement; thus, the ratings were not a matter
of public concern, and the First Amendment did not shield the agencies
from liability.38 '
373. Id. ("Moody's prepared the bond ratings knowing that its ratings would be seen on the
offering materials given to only a select class of qualified investors, of whom [the plaintiff] was
one.").
374. Id.
375. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[S]tatements which contain the
speaker's opinion are actionable . .. if the speaker does not believe the opinion and the opinion is not
factually well-grounded.").
376. Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (finding the plaintiff sufficiently pled
that Moody's failed to exercise reasonable care because "if Moody's [had] used reasonable care in
assigning its ratings, it would have discovered multiple violations of the Master Indenture and could
not have legitimately given the [securities] the favorable ratings that it did").
377. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.),
511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 825-26 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (observing that credit rating "[a]gencies are not held
to a reasonable person standard"); see also supra note 300 and accompanying text.
378. 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
379. Id. at 175-76.
380. Id. at 163-64 (noting that plaintiffs are institutional investors that purchased the securities
at issue).
381. Id. at 175-76 ("[W]here a rating agency has disseminated their ratings to a select group of
investors rather than to the public at large, the rating agency is not afforded [First Amendment]
protection." (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-62
(1985) (holding that a credit report provided to five subscribers did not concern a public matter
because it was intended for a particular business audience); and In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters.,
Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (finding the actual malice rule did not
apply where the securities were "targeted to a select class of institutional investors"))).
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Addressing the fraud claim in a separate proceeding, the district
court considered whether credit ratings are statements of fact or opin-
ions.3 82 The court found that although credit "ratings are not objectively
measurable statements of fact, neither are they mere puffery or unsup-
portable statements of belief."383 As expressed by the court, credit ratings
are "fact-based opinions."384 A credit rating is a statement that the credit
rating agency has performed an analysis and assessment of the data and
made a "fact-based" determination regarding the issuer's creditworthi-
ness.385 If a credit rating agency assigns a credit rating that it knows is
either not based on a "reasoned analysis" or lacks a factual basis, then the
agency has "stat[ed] a fact-based opinion that it does not believe" is ac-
curate.386 Thus, the court found that the rating agencies may be held lia-
ble for common law fraud if the credit ratings were false or misleading
regarding the subject matter at issue and the ratings did not accurately
state the beliefs or opinions of the credit rating agency.3 87 As found by
the court, the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence to permit a jury to
infer that the credit ratings were both "misleading and disbelieved" by
the credit rating agencies at the time they were assigned and, thus, may
be found to be "actionable misstatements."
Moreover, the district court found that the plaintiffs provided suffi-
cient evidence to permit a jury to infer scienter.389 The plaintiffs' evi-
dence permitted an inference that the individuals on the rating commit-
tees assigned the credit ratings in a reckless manner or did not believe the
assigned ratings were correct.390 For example, recklessness could be in-
382. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
383. Id at 454-55 (footnotes omitted).
384. Id at 455 (emphasis removed) ("Ratings should best be understood as fact-based opin-
ions.").
385. Id. (emphasis removed) ("When a rating agency issues a rating, it is not merely a state-
ment of that agency's unsupported belief, but rather a statement that the rating agency has analyzed
data, conducted an assessment, and reached a fact-based conclusion as to creditworthiness.").
386. Id ("If a rating agency knowingly issues a rating that is either unsupported by reasoned
analysis or without a factual foundation, it is stating a fact-based opinion that it does not believe to
be true.").
387. Id at 456; cf Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991) (finding
statements of belief or opinion can be the basis for a federal securities fraud action); Mayer v.
Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding in a securities fraud action that "statements which
contain the speaker's opinion are actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act if
the speaker does not believe the opinion and the opinion is not factually well-grounded").
388. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 456-58 (noting that plaintiffs had sub-
mitted "expert testimony that the ratings were not justified by the underlying facts when they were
issued," statements from rating agency employees explaining how the ratings should be determined
and the how the practices of the agencies did not meet the stated standard, and other statements from
rating agency employees indicating concern with the "paucity of data and the adequacy of the mod-
els used to rate" the securities at issue).
389. See id. at 458-62 (noting the scienter requirement may be satisfied with evidence of
recklessness or conscious misbehavior); see also Gould v. Winstar Commc'ns, Inc., 692 F.3d 148,
158 (2d Cir. 2012).
390. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60 ("Plaintiffs have offered exten-
sive evidence from which a jury could infer that the ratings were either disbelieved when made or
issued in a manner that was 'highly unreasonable and which represent[ed] an extreme departure from
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ferred from expert testimony indicating that the credit "ratings were
highly unreasonable when made" and from an e-mail by a Moody's ana-
lyst stating that the model assumptions for the securities were not sup-
ported by actual data.39 1 Furthermore, while a plaintiff is not required to
demonstrate motive in order to prove scienter, there is evidence that the
rating agencies had a monetary incentive to provide high ratings irrespec-
tive of whether those ratings were warranted.392 Thus, the evidence indi-
cated that the credit rating agencies "compromised the quality of their
ratings in pursuit of profits." 39 3 In addition, as noted in the court's earlier
decision, the plaintiffs sufficiently pled reasonable reliance on the credit
ratings because the rating agencies were privy to information that was
not publicly available.394
Although these courts did not apply the actual malice rule in actions
against the rating agencies, none of these cases involved a public figure
or the public dissemination of a credit rating; thus, these cases were gen-
erally consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence among the lower
courts with respect to credit rating agencies. However, a divergence from
other courts is seen in Commercial Financial where the rating agencies
had the right to disseminate the rating to the public, and the court never-
theless found the actual malice rule to be inapplicable.
d. Statements of Opinion by Professionals
Another series of cases addresses statements of opinion by profes-
sionals. As recognized by the Supreme Court, certain statements of opin-
ion are actionable when made by professionals.395 In Virginia Bank-
shares, Inc. v. Sandberg,396 the Supreme Court found that certain state-
ments, in particular those that are commercial in nature, "are reasonably
understood to rest on a factual basis that justifies them as accurate."397
Hence, if such statements were issued without a factual basis, the state-
the standards of ordinary care . . . to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or
so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it."' (alterations in original) (quoting Chill v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 1996))).
391. Id. at 459.
392. Id. at 460-61 (noting the issuer could take its business to another agency if it did not
receive the desired high rating, the fees earned by the rating agencies would be substantially less if
the securities did not issue, and a statement by a Moody's analyst that "ratings on structured finan-
cial products ... were 'cash cows."').
393. Id. at 461.
394. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[T]he market at large, including sophisticated investors, have come to rely on the
accuracy of credit ratings and the independence of rating agencies because of their NRSRO status
and, at least in this case, the [riating [a]gencies' access to non-public information that even sophisti-
cated investors cannot obtain.").
395. See Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), No. SA CV 96-0765-
GLT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997) ("[F]ederal and California state
courts recognized certain statements of opinion made by professionals are actionable.").
396. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
397. Id. at 1093; see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *13.
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ments would be considered misleading.39 8 According to the Supreme
Court, certain statements of opinion may be considered factual based on
the context of the statements.399 For instance, the context may include the
subject of the statement, the speaker's identity, and the likely audience of
the statement.400 As acknowledged by the Supreme Court, "An opinion is
a fact . . .. When the parties are so situated that the buyer may reasona-
bly rely upon the expression of the seller's opinion, [thus,] it is no excuse
to give a false one."401
Consistent with Supreme Court doctrine, California federal district
courts have found that where a speaker is "specially qualified" and the
audience may be such to have reasonably relied on the speaker's "supe-
rior knowledge," a statement of opinion made by that speaker may be
actionable fraud or misrepresentation.402 For example, California federal
district courts have found statements of opinion made by financial advi-
sors and auditors to be actionable.403 In Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,404
the court found an auditor who prepared an audit and audit opinion of a
corporation's financial statements liable to third-party investors for neg-
ligent misrepresentation.405 The elements of a claim of negligent misrep-
resentation are (i) the assertion of a fact (ii) which is false (iii) by a per-
son who does not have a reasonable basis for believing the assertion to
be true.406 The Bily court noted that in certain cases, a statement of "pro-
fessional opinion" is treated as a statement of fact.407 For example, if a
statement, even if couched "in the [guise] of an opinion, is 'not a casual
expression of belief' but [instead] 'a deliberate affirmation of the matters
stated,"' then such statement may be viewed as a factual assertion.408
Additionally, if a person has or professes to have "superior knowledge or
special information or expertise" concerning the subject of the statement
and a plaintiff is such that it "may reasonably rely" on the defendant's
398. Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1093 ("[Tlhe absence [of a factual basis] renders [cer-
tain statements made by professionals] misleading.").
399. Id.; see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14 ("Virginia Bank-
shares indicates the context of certain statements . . . renders some statements of opinion essentially
'factual."').
400. See Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1091-94; see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14
401. Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1094 (first alteration in original) (quoting Vulcan Metals
Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918)).
402. Moore v. Jogert, Inc. (In re Jogert, Inc.), 950 F.2d 1498, 1507 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Borba v. Thomas, 138 Cal. Rptr. 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)); see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14 (noting this exception to the general rule in California that opinions and
future predictions are not actionable as fraud or misrepresentation).
403. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14-15.
404. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
405. Id. at 747, 768-770.
406. Id. at 768.
407. Id. ("Under certain circumstances, expressions of professional opinion are treated as
representations of fact.").
408. Id. (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (Cal. 1954)).
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expertise, information, or knowledge, then the defendant's statement of
professional opinion may be regarded as an assertion of fact.409
Although the Bily case is instructive regarding whether a statement
of professional opinion should be considered an assertion of fact, this
case did not involve a First Amendment issue because the corporation
was a private company at the time the audit opinion was issued.4 10 Nev-
ertheless, a California federal district court found the reasoning underly-
ing the professional opinion cases regarding financial advisors and audi-
tors, such as Bily, is similarly applicable to the cases concerning credit
ratings.411 Accordingly, the federal district court found that credit "rat-
ings do imply statements of fact even" when First Amendment issues are
implicated.4 12
The Ninth Circuit's First Amendment analysis employed in Unelko
Corp. v. Rooney413 provides further enlightenment regarding whether a
statement implies a factual assertion.414 The three-part test under Unelko
requires an assessment of whether (i) the "general tenor of the [entire
work]" indicates the assertion was not one of "objective fact;" (ii) the use
of "figurative or hyperbolic language" indicates the statement was not an
assertion of objective fact; and (iii) the statement is provably false or
true.415 Moreover, in assessing the "general tenor" of the work, the court
must evaluate the subject of the statement, the speaker's identity, and the
audience of the statement;416 these same factors are considered in the
417 i
professional opinion cases along with the professional status of the
speaker and the relationship of the speaker to its audience.
418
In Unelko, the Ninth Circuit held that a statement made by Andy
Rooney on the television show 60 Minutes was not protected opinion
409. Id. (citing Gagne, 275 P.2d at 21); see also Ashley v. Church (In re Ashley), 903 F.2d
599, 604 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding a defendant who professed to have financial knowledge made
statements of fact rather than opinion).
410. See Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), No. SA CV 96-0765-
GLT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *15-16 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997); Bily, 834 P.2d at 747.
411. See McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *16; see also Bily, 834 P.2d at
768-73.
412. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *16 ("[For reasons similar to those
developed in the professional opinion cases, it is reasonable to conclude the [credit] ratings do imply
statements of fact even under the First Amendment cases.").
413. 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990).
414. See id. at 1053-55 (finding a statement made by Andy Rooney on the television show "60
Minutes" was not protected under the First Amendment).
415. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *1617; see also Unelko Corp. v.
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990).
416. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *17.
417. See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091-96 (1991); see also McGraw-
Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14.
418. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *17; see also Va. Bankshares, Inc.,
501 U.S. at 1094.
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under the First Amendment.4 19 The Ninth Circuit found Mr. Rooney's
statement that a particular item of merchandise "didn't work" may be
regarded "as implying an assertion of objective fact" based on the speak-
er's identity, the likely audience reactions, and the content of the speech
even though the general tenor of the segment was set in a humorous or
satirical context.420
In County of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos.,421 a federal district court
applied the Unelko framework in a case concerning a credit rating agen-
cy.422 The federal district court found the subject of the credit ratings was
the "likely creditworthiness of [particular issues] of debt [securities],"
and the audience for these credit ratings was comprised of the "issuers
and potential investors" in the securities who are respectively deciding
whether or not to offer the debt securities or purchase them.4 23 The dis-
trict court noted that when courts found similar circumstances in the pro-
fessional opinion cases, the courts held the statements of opinion in those
424cases to be actionable. Moreover, based on the Unelko framework,
"the professional opinion cases imply the general tenor of opinions such
as [Standard & Poor's] ratings is to support, not negate, the impression
the rating is an assertion of fact, or at least substantially based on facts
assessed by [Standard & Poor's]."42 5 The rating agency requested that the
County provide specific information and then employed a particular
methodology to establish the credit rating; thus, the general tenor of the
credit rating "implies statements of objective fact."4 26
The court noted the lack of hyperbolic or figurative language that
would otherwise indicate the credit rating was not a factual assertion.427
Finally, in assessing whether the credit ratings, which "were predictions
of creditworthiness," could be proven false, the federal district court con-
sidered Standard & Poor's professional status in the municipal bond in-
dustry, the County's allegations of reasonable reliance on the credit rat-
ings, and the professional opinion cases (including the Supreme Court's
419. Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1054-55 (finding "the statement 'It didn't work' is not shielded from
liability" because the statement "is essentially factual"); see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22459, at *18.
420. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *18 (quoting Unelko, 912 F.2d at
1054).
421. No. SA CV 96-0765-GLT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997).
422. See id. at *18 (alleging Standard & Poor's to be "an expert" in rating municipal bonds).
423. Id. at *18-19.
424. Id. at *18-19; see also Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1093-94; Bily v. Arthur Young
& Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768-72 (Cal. 1992).
425. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *19 (noting the County's allegation
that "S&P knew or could reasonably anticipate reliance on the ratings it prepared" because of
"S&P's superior knowledge and expertise in evaluating the creditworthiness of the proposed debt
offerings"); see also Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1054-55.
426. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *19-20 & n.5 (noting the County
retained Standard & Poor's to issue a credit rating).
427. Id. at *21 (noting the second prong of the Unelko test); see also Unelko, 912 F.2d at
1053-54.
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Virginia Bankshares), and concluded that "the predictive nature of the
ratings does not, as a matter of law, permit S&P to escape liability."428
429
Thus, the credit ratings were actionable.
Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc.30 provides another ex-
ample of a professional opinion case in which a federal district court
found the First Amendment protections, including the actual malice rule,
did not bar claims against the credit rating agencies for negligent misrep-
resentation.431 This case concerned unregistered securities that could be
sold only to a circumscribed group of investors.432 The credit rating
agencies argued that credit ratings are statements of opinion, and thus,
the agencies cannot be liable for common law claims for negligent mis-
representation.433 However, the Northern District of California noted that
in certain cases, "expressions of professional opinion are treated as rep-
resentations of fact."4 34 For example, if the defendant has superior
knowledge or special information or expertise concerning the matters at
issue and the plaintiff is deemed to "reasonably rely" on the defendant's
expertise, information, or knowledge, then the alleged misrepresentation,
albeit in the form of an opinion, "may be treated as one of material
fact."435 Moreover, if the defendant does not honestly believe the state-
ment of opinion, then such statement is actionable.43 6 Thus, if the rating
agencies "helped structure the securities" and, therefore, possessed
superior knowledge of the securities, then the agencies' representations
concerning those securities are actionable.437 Additionally, if the rating
agencies did not honestly believe the credit ratings when the agencies
assigned them, then the agencies may be liable for negligent misrepre-
sentation.
428. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *21 (noting the third prong of the
Unelko test); see also Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1093-94; Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1054-55.
429. See McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *21.
430. 785 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
431. Id. at 824-25, 830-32.
432. Id. at 807 ("[The securities] at issue were not available to the public in general. Instead,
because these securities were unregistered, they were available only to a limited group of'qualified
institutional buyers."').
433. Id. at 823 ("The Rating Agencies' overriding argument is that their ratings cannot be
subject to a common law negligent misrepresentation claim because the ratings are opinions and not
statements of fact.").
434. Id at 823-24 (quoting Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768 (Cal. 1992)).
435. Id at 824 (quoting Bily, 834 P.2d at 768).
436. Id at 824 (quoting Ogier v. Pac. Oil & Gas Dev. Corp., 282 P.2d 574, 580-81 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1955)).
437. Id. at 825 (citing Bily, 834 P.2d at 768); see also Ogier, 282 P.2d at 581.
438. Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
("[Plaintiff] may bring negligent misrepresentation claims against the [r]ating [a]gencies if plaintiff
alleges that the [a]gencies did not honestly entertain the opinions about the ratings at the time they
were issued."); cf Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec.
Litig.), No. 09 MD 2030, 2011 WL 536437, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011) (dismissing negligent
misrepresentation claims against credit rating agencies because plaintiff did not make a factual
allegation that the credit ratings were inaccurate when they were offered).
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Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff sufficiently pled that the
credit rating agencies had a duty to the purchasers of the securities.4 39
The rating agencies allegedly assisted in structuring the particular securi-
ties, knew that these securities needed to be "investment-grade" in order
to be sold to the intended group of purchasers, and knew that sale of the
securities was limited solely to that select group of purchasers.40 Thus,
the credit rating agencies specifically undertook the responsibility to
provide information and guidance to the intended group of purchasers
concerning the purchase of the particular securities and, therefore, may
be subject to liability."' Further, as the rating agencies were allegedly
privy to information that was not made available to the public, the plain-
tiff's reliance on the credit ratings could be considered to be reasona-
ble.442
The district court also found that the First Amendment does not
shield the rating agencies from liability.44 3 In contrast to Compuware,
Jefferson Cnty., and In re Enron, the plaintiff in this case "specifically
identified" the allegedly negligent misstatements, and there is no indica-
tion that the credit ratings are predictive opinions that are "too indefinite"
to connote a statement of fact that may be proven as false.4" Moreover,
the district court rejected the rating agencies' argument that the actual
malice standard applies." Here, private figures issued the securities and
distributed them only to a select class of investors; thus, the ratings were
not a matter of public concern."4 Notably, the court considered the credit
ratings to be a form of commercial speech."
439. Anschulz Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 825-26 ("[A] defendant may be held liable for negli-
gent misrepresentation 'in the dissemination of commercial information to persons who were "in-
tended beneficiaries" of the information."' (quoting Bily, 834 P.2d at 770)).
440. Id. at 826 (noting the securities could be marketed and sold only to "the select group of
[qualified institutional buyers]").
441. Id. at 825-26 ("[If] a supplier of information has [specifically] undertaken to inform and
guide a third party with respect to an identified transaction . . . [then] liability is imposed on the
supplier." (quoting Glenn K. Jackson Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1200 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001))); see also
Bily, 834 P.2d at 769-70.
442. Anschutz Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27.
443. Id. at 830-32.
444. Id. at 830-31 ("[P]laintiff has specifically identified the alleged misstatements at issue,
and nothing in the record at this stage suggests that the structured [securities] ratings at issue are, in
fact, predictive opinions by their nature 'too indefinite' to imply a false statement of fact."); cf
Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs. Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 522, 528-29 (6th Cir. 2007) (find-
ing the credit rating did not imply any factual statement that may be proven as false); Jefferson Cty.
Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 855 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding the
credit rating agency article not sufficiently specific to be proven as false); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In
re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 825 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(finding the plaintiff did not identify any factual statements that could be proven as false).
445. Anschutz Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
446. Id. at 831-32 (citing Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F.
Supp. 2d 155, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding the actual malice standard did not apply to credit
ratings for a structured security that was available only to a select group of purchasers)); see also In
re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639-40 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (find-
ing the actual malice rule did not apply where the securities were "issued by a privately-held compa-
ny, and . . . targeted to a select class of institutional investors"); cf Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at
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Nevertheless, while the professional opinion cases and Unelko indi-
cate that a credit rating agency does not have absolute immunity under
the First Amendment for its ratings, if those ratings are disseminated to
the public, then the rating agency's expression will have the First
Amendment protection of the actual malice rule.48
B. Are the First Amendment Protections Justified?
As discussed in Section I.A.3.b, the credit rating agencies generally
have been afforded protection under the First Amendment for the credit
ratings assigned to debt securities.4"9 While the credit rating agencies
have maintained that a credit rating is "the world's shortest editorial"
450and, thus, entitled to First Amendment protection, one may query
whether this protection is warranted. For example, a report issued by the
staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs has questioned
whether credit ratings are truly "the equivalent of editorials" printed in a
newspaper.451 The staff found that the market appears to use credit rat-
ings primarily as a certification of whether or not a particular security is
investment grade rather than as a form of information.452 Thus, the staff
asserted that the use of credit ratings as certifications indicates that the
"ratings are not the equivalent of editorials" published in a newspaper.453
Further, as maintained by the staff, the First Amendment protections
provided to the credit rating agencies "should not preclude greater ac-
countability."454
Moreover, the case law has held that when the credit rating agency
steps outside the traditional newsgathering activities of a journalist and
instead "plays an active role in structuring" a security that it rates, then
the credit rating agency is not entitled to the protections of the journal-
825 (applying the actual malice standard because Enron was a Fortune 500 company and, thus, the
ratings concerned a public matter).
447. See Anschutz Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 822 (noting that, in a case against the credit rating
agencies for negligent misrepresentation, "California has a strong interest ... in deterring miscon-
duct with respect to commercial speech").
448. Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), No. SA CV 96-0765-GLT,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *21-22 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997) (noting S&P "is a publisher
which renders opinions about certain debt issues and disseminates those opinions to the public[;
thus,] S&P's expression is entitled to protection under the First Amendment" and the actual malice
rule will apply); see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1093-94 (1991); Unelko
Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1990).
449. See discussion supra Section I.A.
450. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96 (quoting Statements of Charles
Brown, Fitch General Counsel).
451. Id. at 97 ("[T]he fact that the market seems to value the agencies' ratings mostly as a
certification [of whether the security is investment grade] . . . and not as information . .. seems to
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ist's privilege.4 55 Yet, in the case of structured securities in the recent
financial crisis, such as mortgage-backed securities,456 the credit rating
agencies "stepped outside" the role of a newsgatherer and instead
"played a[n] . . . [active] role in . . . structuring" those securities.457 The
issuers worked with the credit rating agencies in order "to ensure" that
the securities were structured in a manner that would result in high rat-
ings.458 Inevitably, the credit rating agencies' high level of involvement
in structuring mortgage-backed securities resulted in the agencies being
in the incongruous "position of 'rating their own work."'4 9 While it is
455. Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 110-11
(2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (concluding the journalist's privilege is not applicable when the credit
rating agency issues ratings based on "client needs" rather than as part of the traditional activities of
a newsgatherer and the "level of involvement with the client's transactions . . . is not typical of the
relationship between a journalist and the activities upon which the journalist reports"); cf Compu-
ware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (finding the
journalist's privilege is applicable when the credit rating agency "did not participate in the structur-
ing of the debt it was rating" and, thus, did not "step[] outside its role as an information gatherer").
456. See N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d
254, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining mortgage-backed securities as securities whose cash flow is
derived from underlying mortgage loans that are "pooled together" in the form of a security and
subsequently sold on the secondary market to investors (quoting Consolidated First Amended Secu-
rities Class Action Complaint at para. 40, N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortg. Loan
Trust, No. 08-CV-5093, 2009 WL 1455319 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009))).
457. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 166
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Although a rating agency's role as an unbiased reporter of information typically
requires the rating agency to remain independent of the issuers for which it rates notes, the [r]ating
[a]gencies played a more integral role in the structuring and issuing of [structured securities].");
Compuware, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 862; accord Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's
Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 2012) (alleging that the credit rating agencies "as-
sistled] arrangers in structuring their securities to achieve certain credit ratings"); Wyo. State Treas-
urer v. Moody's Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167,
172 (2d Cir. 2011) (alleging that the credit rating agencies "exceeded their traditional roles by ac-
tively aiding in the structuring and securitization process"); N.J Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F.
Supp. 2d at 259 (alleging the credit rating agencies "played a substantial role in the securitization
process" by assisting in the decision of which "loans were to be included in the mortgage pools
underlying the [securities] and thereafter [in] the structure of [those securities]"); In re Nat'l Century
Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 644 (S.D. Ohio 2008) ("[W]ith asset-backed
securities, rating agencies commonly instruct how the [securities] . . . should be structured in order to
get the desired bond rating."); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 317, at 374 ( "Rating agencies began to
participate in an unprecedented way in the actual structuring of financings."); see also Fitch, 330
F.3d at 110-11 (finding the credit rating agency was not entitled to the journalist's privilege because
the agency was not engaged in traditional newsgathering activities and instead was actively involved
in structuring the security); cf Compuware, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (finding the credit rating agency
was entitled to the journalist's privilege because the agency was not involved in structuring the
security and, therefore, did not step outside the role of newsgatherer).
458. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 317, at 374 ("[Clredit rating agencies helped issuers decide
how many layers of rated debt and how much of an equity cushion would be best, and, most im-
portant what sort of steps should be taken (called 'credit enhancement') to improve the rating, and
hence the marketability of a particular issue. Issuers might, for example, purchase insurance, in-
crease the size of the equity cushion, or provide more than 100% collateral . . . ."); see also Morgan
Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (noting credit rating agencies "worked directly" with the
investment bank "to structure the [securities] in such a way that they could qualify for the [r]ating
[a]gencies' highest ratings").
459. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 834 ("[T]o attract the significant rating
fees paid by [mortgage-backed securities] arrangers, the [a]gencies 'became intimately involved in
the issuance of [mortgage-backed securities]' by assisting arrangers in structuring their securities to
achieve certain credit ratings, turning the process into a form of negotiation and placing the
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unlikely that the journalist's privilege to withhold information requested
by a subpoena would be available to the rating agencies under these cir-
cumstances, the lower courts have still shielded the rating agencies from
liability for fraudulent or negligent credit ratings under the guise that the
ratings are opinions and, thus, fully protected speech under the First
Amendment.4 60
However, the tower courts have misapplied this First Amendment
protection. The lower courts have employed the New York Times case
and its progeny to shield the credit rating agencies from liability in cases
where the rating is disseminated to the public unless the plaintiff can
prove actual malice.461 One of the primary rationales for the Supreme
Court's rulings was that the press will be "unduly chilled" if it has to
worry about liability for damages caused by defamatory statements even
if the damages were limited to actual damages.462 However, as Justice
White has stated, "[O]ther commercial enterprises in this country not in
the business of disseminating information must pay for the damage they
cause as a cost of doing business .... "4 6 3 As noted by the Supreme
Court, "The fact that dissemination of information and opinion on ques-
tions of public concern is ordinarily a legitimate, protected ... activity
does not mean, however, that one may in all respects carry on that
activity exempt from sanctions designed to safeguard the legitimate
interests of others."464 Moreover, the necessity of the New York Times
actual malice rule is debatable since the press was certainly "free and
vigorous" before that decision was laid down.465 Furthermore, "[n]othing
in the central rationale behind New York Times demands an absolute im-
munity from suits ... where the plaintiff cannot make out a jury case of
actual malice."4 66
These arguments ring exceedingly true in the case of the credit
rating agencies. As one scholar has maintained, "If the agencies truly are
private entities . . . they should be susceptible to the same sorts of
[a]gencies in the position of 'rating their own work."' (quoting Complaint, supra note 8, at paras. 56,
80)).
460. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
461. See discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
462. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 771-72 (1985)
(White, J., concurring) (explaining that "the New York Times standard was formulated to protect the
press from the chilling danger of numerous large damages awards" and noting the proposition "that
even without the threat of large presumed and punitive damages awards, press defendants' commu-
nication will be unduly chilled by having to pay for the actual damages caused" by their defamatory
statements).
463. Id. at 772.
464. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967).
465. See Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 772 (White, J., concurring) ("[I]t is difficult to
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lawsuits any similarly-situated private entity would be."4 67 For example,
auditors that prepare and provide opinions with respect to financial
statements and security analysts that evaluate equity securities must pay
for damages they cause.468 Why should the credit rating agencies, which
occupy a role very similar to auditors and security analysts,469 be treated
any differently? While the credit rating agencies have argued in recent
times that holding the agencies liable for their credit ratings would have a
470chilling effect on the dissemination of financial information, can an
independent, credible argument be made that the credit rating agencies
were even slightly chilled by the threat of liability prior to the New York
Times decision? Further, when New York Times itself does not demand
an absolute immunity in defamation cases where actual malice is not
shown,4 71 why do the lower courts feel obliged to provide an absolute
immunity to the credit rating agencies?472
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that newspapers and
magazines are profit-making enterprises.473 Thus, similar to other
businesses that cause damage, newspapers and magazines must pay for
such injury, and the injured party should not be forced to accept remedies
that are "difficult or impossible" to attain "unless strong policy consider-
ations demand."4 74 While many arguments have been made regarding the
important public policy concerns involved in the protection of a free
press,4 7 5 the same cannot be said regarding protection of the credit rating
agencies. What exactly is the policy consideration in providing absolute
467. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U.L.Q. 619, 711 (1999) ("[A]gencies should not simultaneously
benefit from ratings-dependent regulation and be insulated from lawsuits alleging negligence or
misrepresentation.").
468. See supra notes 387-388 and accompanying text; see also infra note 523 and accompany-
ing text.
469. See supra note 345 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 518-522 and accompany-
ing text.
470. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639 (S.D.
Ohio 2008) ("Moody's argues that holding a credit rating agency liable for its bond ratings would
have an oppressive effect on the publication of important financial information to the public.").
471. See Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 772 (White, J., concurring).
472. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC, 813 F. Supp.
2d 871, 877 & n.l (S.D. Ohio 2011) (noting the rating agencies' argument that credit "ratings enjoy
absolute immunity under the First Amendment" and explaining that "[c]ourts have traditionally
extended First Amendment protection to credit ratings of publicly-held companies, where the ratings
were offered to the investing public at large as an informational service" (citing Compuware Corp. v.
Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2007); and Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 826-27 (S.D. Tex. 2005))),
off d, 700 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2012).
473. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) ("Newspapers, magazines, and
broadcasting companies are businesses conducted for profit and often make very large ones." (quot-
ing Buckley v. N.Y. Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1967))).
474. Id. ("Like other enterprises that inflict damage in the course of performing a service
highly useful to the public . . . [newspapers and magazines] must pay the freight; and injured persons
should not be relegated (to remedies which) make collection of their claims difficult or impossible
unless strong policy considerations demand." (first alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 373 F.2d
at 182)).
475. See supra notes 27, 34 and accompanying text.
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immunity to the credit rating agencies? As the cases indicate, the credit
rating agencies have cloaked themselves in the blanket of First Amend-
ment protection by claiming they are publishers providing opinions of
public interest.476 However, the issuer of a security hires and pays the
credit rating agencies to provide a credit rating.477 This is a very different
function than that of a newspaper. Moreover, why is the public interest in
a credit rating regarding a debt security any different than the public
interest regarding the evaluation of an equity security? I would argue that
there is no difference. Yet, security analysts and auditors are subject to
liability while the credit rating agencies are not.478
One commentator has argued against extending the tort of negligent
misrepresentation to the credit rating agencies based on the concern that
"any showing less than recklessness" would have a "potential chilling
effect" on the publication of credit ratings.47 9 This commentator argues
that "the state's interest in compensating relying investors must give way
to the first amendment's concern for the free flow of commercial infor-
mation."480 Thus, this commentator believes that our "[s]ociety must rely
on the market and competition to keep rating agencies operating at their
negligence threshold, not on courts and juries."481 This contention echoes
that of the credit rating agencies that have argued that "the market should
be the appropriate means for ensuring the reliability of credit opinions
and of rating agencies."482 Even the courts have defended the position of
the credit rating agencies by acknowledging the public policy interest in
the efficient operation of the capital markets and the "significant role"
played by the credit rating agencies in those markets, which at least one
court believed "would be chilled by unlimited potential liability" from
483
assigning credit ratings.
However, the financial crisis has proven that the market and compe-
tition are not suitable adversaries for an oligopolistic industry484 in which
the players have been permitted to play with no rules and no conse-
476. See discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
477. Commercial Fin. Serys., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ. App.
2004) (finding the credit rating agencies issued a rating regarding the creditworthiness of bonds "as
professionals being paid to provide their opinions to a client"); see also infra notes 577-78 and
accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 12, 402-03 and accompanying text; see also infra note 503.
479. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856 n.3
(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gregory Husisian, Note, What Standard of Care Should Govern the
World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability?, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
411, 460 (1990)).
480. Husisian, supra note 479.
481. Id.
482. Newby v. Enron Corp (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 814-15 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
483. Id. at 827.
484. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REP. TO CONGRESS ON ASSIGNED CREDIT RATINGS 8
(2012) (estimating "that, as of December 31, 2011, approximately 91% of the outstanding credit
ratings for structured finance products were determined by the three largest" credit rating agencies,
Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch).
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quences. Moreover, the credit rating industry is not the press. The consti-
tutional amendment to protect a free press could not have been intended
to protect an industry in which the information that is being publicly dis-
seminated is plagued by inherent conflicts of interest as discussed in Part
III.485 The notion that credit ratings are pure expressions of opinion akin
to speech regarding political matters,4 86 such as the civil rights move-
ment,487 is clearly misguided. The state's interest in protecting relying
investors (and our society's interest in protecting the economy) is strong-
er than the constitutional concern in protecting this type of speech.
It is not in the best interests of our society to provide credit rating
agencies with First Amendment protection in the form of the actual
malice rule-a standard that "poses such a high barrier that it virtually
insulates the speaker from liability." 488 Even the Supreme Court has
cautioned "against 'blind application' of the actual malice rule.489 Yet,
the lower courts have engaged in such blind application of the actual
malice standard490 and, thus, inappropriately shielded the credit rating
agencies from liability.
In sum, credit rating agencies should not be treated as journalists
entitled to the heightened protection of the actual malice standard when
hired to provide a rating even if that rating is disseminated to the public.
Credit ratings are not pure statements of opinion entitled to full constitu-
tional protection. Rather, credit ratings are a form of commercial speech
that expresses a fact-based opinion; credit ratings are based on factual
information and convey a factual assertion regarding the creditworthiness
of the subject of the rating whether a particular security issue or a specif-
ic company. Moreover, credit ratings are statements of fact-based
opinion made by professionals. Thus, credit rating agencies should be
subject to liability for fraudulent or negligently prepared credit ratings
that are false or misleading.
485. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also infra Part 111.
486. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.").
487. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 (1974) ("The Times ran a politi-
cal advertisement endorsing civil rights demonstrations by black students in Alabama and impliedly
condemning the performance of local law-enforcement officials." (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (finding the advertisement contained expressions of opinion and
provided information concerning the civil rights movement, "whose existence and objectives are
matters of the highest public interest and concern"))).
488. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96.
489. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967) (noting the Court has "counseled
against 'blind application of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' and considered 'the factors which arise
in the particular context"' (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967))).
490. See discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
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II.THE REGULATORY PROTECTIONS
This part will first explain the business model of the credit rating
agencies and the regulatory designation of certain rating agencies. This
part will then examine the regulatory protections afforded to the credit
rating agencies.
A. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
Credit rating agencies have been providing ratings regarding the
creditworthiness of debt securities and the issuers of those securities for
close to a century.491 Prior to 1975, credit rating agencies gathered and
employed information that was publicly available to provide unsolicited
credit ratings regarding the creditworthiness of various corporations, and
the agencies charged a fee to investors who wished to receive the rat-
i492ing. Then, in 1975, the Commission designated specific redit rating
agencies as "nationally recognized statistical rating organization[s]" also
known as "NRSROs."49 3 For example, the Commission has designated
Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Services, Inc., and Fitch, Inc. as
NRSROs.49 4 Among other requirements, the credit rating agency must be
"nationally recognized" in order to obtain the NRSRO designation.495 As
explained by the Commission, this requirement was intended to ensure
that the agency's ratings "were credible and reasonably relied upon by
the marketplace."4 96 Thereafter, the credit rating agencies began working
directly for the issuers of the securities; thus, the rating agencies were
491. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 5 ("For almost a century, credit rating agencies have
been providing opinions on the creditworthiness of issuers of securities and their financial obliga-
tions.").
492. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 164
(S.D.N.Y 2009) (noting the information was obtained from publicly available sources such as filings
with the Commission).
493. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 817 n.77 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (quoting PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at
105) ("[I]n 1975 . . . the SEC developed an informal procedure for designating certain rating agen-
cies as NRSROs."); accord ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 5 (explaining the Commission used
the "no-action letter process" to recognize certain credit rating agencies as "'nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations,' or 'NRSROs.'); PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 79
(explaining that, in 1975, the SEC promulgated Rule 15c3-1 requiring the securities held by broker-
dealers to be rated by NRSROs); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012) (providing for formal registra-
tion of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1 (2015) (discuss-
ing application procedures for registration as a nationally recognized statistical rating organization).
494. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 5; see also Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWeb-
ber, Inc. (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that the Commission has desig-
nated Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Services, Inc., and Fitch, Inc. as NRSROs).
495. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 6.
496. Id. at 6; see also Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 164 ("[T]he SEC created a
special status to distinguish the most credible and reliable rating agencies . . . to help ensure the
integrity of the ratings process.").
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able to obtain nonpublic information to be employed in the ratings as-
sessment and were paid directly by the issuer of the securities.497
The Second Circuit has observed that issuers will obtain ratings for
their securities because investors rely on the assessment of creditworthi-
ness made by the rating agency, and thus, the sale of the security will be
498easier if the security receives a favorable rating. Moreover, the ratings
assigned by the NRSROs had "regulatory significance" because, prior to
the Dodd-Frank Act, many regulated institutional investors were limited
in the choice of investment securities based on the ratings assigned by
the NRSROs.4 99
B. Statutory Liability and Regulatory Exemption
In Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, Congress provided for
civil liability for false or misleading statements of material fact in a
registration statement.500 Specifically, Section 11 prohibits making "an
untrue statement of a material fact" in a registration statement or
"omitt[ing] to state a material fact" that is required to be included in the
registration statement or otherwise necessary in order to make the infor-
mation included in the registration statement "not misleading."50 1
Purchasers of securities issued under such false or misleading registra-
tion statements may bring a private action against certain categories of
potential defendants, including anyone who was a signer of the registra-
tion statement, any director or partner of the issuer, any underwriter of
the security, and certain experts.502
With respect to experts, the statute expressly provides for liability
for accountants, appraisers, and engineers, as well as any other profes-
sional who has given consent to be named as a preparer or certifier of
any portion of the registration statement or of "any report or valuation
which is used in connection with the registration statement."503 Based on
the statute, a credit rating agency had potential expert liability under
497. See Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 164 (noting that after 1975, issuers began
hiring the credit rating agencies to rate their securities and provided nonpublic information to the
rating agencies); see also infra notes 577-78 and accompanying text.
498. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Fitch, 330 F.3d at 106).
499. Fitch, 330 F.3d at 106 ("[M]any regulated institutional investors are limited in what types
of securities they may invest based on the securities' NRSRO ratings."). Notably, the Dodd-Frank
Act has required the removal of reliance on credit ratings from federal statutes and regulations, such
as banking regulations. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1887
(2010).
500. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (codifying Section II of the Securities Act of 1933); see also
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
44 BRANDEIS L.J. 549, 549 (2006) (explaining Section II civil liability and the due diligence de-
fense); Krista L. Turnquist, Note, Pleading Under Section II of the Securities Act of 1933, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2395, 2395 (2000) (discussing Section I I pleading requirements).
501. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
502. Id. § 77k(a); Sjostrom, supra note 500, at 549; Turnquist, supra note 500, at 2395.
503. Id. § 77k(a)(4).
338 [Vol. 93:2
2016] THE N.Y. TIMES AND CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
Section 11 for false or misleading credit ratings that were contained in a
registration statement provided the agency gave "consent [to be] named"
in the registration statement as an expert.50
However, in 1981, the Commission issued a "new policy" in order
to encourage credit ratings to be disclosed in registration statements.505
To facilitate this policy, the Commission promulgated Rule 436(g)(1)
which provided the credit rating agencies with an exemption from liabil-
ity for Section 11 claims.s06 The rule provides that the credit rating for
certain securities, including debt securities, assigned by an NRSRO
"shall not be considered a part of the registration statement prepared or
certified by a person within the meaning of [S]ection[] ... 11 of the [Se-
curities] Act of 1933."sm The Commission expressly stated that the pur-
pose of the new rule was to exclude from Section 11 civil liability "any
nationally recognized statistical rating organization whose security rating
is disclosed in a registration statement."50 8 Thus, Rule 436(g)(1) ex-
empted these credit rating agencies from liability for false or misleading
credit ratings listed in a registration statement.509
Even the courts have expressly acknowledged the Rule 43 6(g)(1)
exemption from liability for the credit rating agencies.51o For example,
the district court in In re Enron cited to the exemption in analyzing
whether the credit rating agencies were generally subject to liability
either under the case law or by federal regulation.5 t ' The court concluded
that the Rule 436(g)(1) exemption was a further indication of the lack of
authority to hold the credit rating agencies liable.512 Moreover, in a 2002
report issued by the staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Af-
504. See id.
505. Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed
Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 183 n.11 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Disclosure of Security Ratings in Regis-
tration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,024, 42,024 (proposed Aug. 18, 1981) (issuing a policy state-
ment and proposals "to permit the voluntary disclosure of security ratings assigned by nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations . . . in registration statements").
506. See Wyo. State Treasurer, 650 F.3d at 183 n.11 (citing SEC Written Consents Rule, 17
C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2015)); Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed.
Reg. at 42,028 (explaining that under Rule 436(g), "the rating organization would not be subject to
civil liability as an expert pursuant to Section II of the Securities Act").
507. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1).
508. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. at 42,024.
509. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012); see also PRIVATE-SECTOR
WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 82 ("SEC Rule 436, promulgated under the Securities Act, expressly
shields NRSROs from liability under Section II of the Securities Act in connection with an offering
of securities.").
510. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.),
511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 816-17 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("[T]here is even a statutory exemption under the
Securities Act of 1933 for Section 11 claims against credit rating agencies .. . that have been desig-
nated 'nationally recognized statistical rating agencies' or 'NRSROs."'); see also id. at 817 n.77
(explaining that "[r]ule 436(g)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) provides
for exemption of liability" with respect to the credit ratings issued by an NRSRO included in a
registration statement).
511. Id at 815-17 & n.77.




fairs, the staff noted that the liability of the credit rating agencies "tradi-
tionally has been limited both by regulatory exemptions and First
Amendment protections" provided by reviewing courts.'13
C. Accountability and Elimination of the Regulatory Exemption
However, in the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress found that credit
ratings have "systemic importance."5 14 The investing public, including
both institutional and individual investors as well as financial regulators,
515rely on credit ratings. Moreover, the credit rating agencies occupy a
significant role in the capital markets by promoting confidence in the
markets, facilitating the growth in capital, and furthering economic
516efficiency. Thus, the functioning and accuracy of the rating agencies
"are matters of national public interest."517
Congress further found that credit rating agencies occupy "a critical
'gatekeeper' role" in the market for debt securities. This role is "func-
tionally similar" to the role of other "financial 'gatekeepers"' that include
the auditors who prepare a company's financial statements and the secu-
rity analysts who occupy a role in the equity markets that is very compa-
rable to the role of the rating agencies in the debt markets.519 Credit
rating agencies and security analysts analyze and evaluate the relative
quality of the securities in their respective markets for the benefit of
clients.52 0 Thus, the issuance of a credit rating is "fundamentally com-
mercial in character" akin to the services other "financial 'gatekeepers'".
provide.52 1 Accordingly, Congress found that credit rating agencies,
including NRSROs, "should be subject to the same standards of liability
and oversight" that are applicable to securities analysts, investment
bankers, and auditors.522
In particular, Congress found that the credit ratings assigned to
structured securities, such as collateralized debt obligations, were "inac-
curate."523 Moreover, the "inaccuracy" of these credit ratings "contribut-
513. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 17-18 (citing PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra
note 3, at 90 ("It is difficult not to wonder whether lack of accountability-the agencies' practical
immunity to lawsuits and non-existent regulatory oversight-is a major problem.")).
514. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010).
515. Id
516. Id. ("[C]redit rating agencies are central to capital formation, investor confidence, and the
efficient performance of the United States economy.").
517. Id.
518. Id § 931(2).
519. Id. § 931(2)-(3).
520. Id.
521. Id. § 931(3)
522. Id. (emphasis added).
523. Id. § 93 1(5) ("In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial products
have proven to be inaccurate."); see also Curry, Remarks Before the American Securitization Forum,
supra note 141, at 2 (noting the "flawed credit ratings" assigned to mortgage-backed securities
"suggest[ed] that the mortgage securities in question were as safe as investment-grade corporate
bonds"); Pfinsgraff, Remarks Before the Risk Magazine Credit Risk Conference, supra note 20, at 2
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ed significantly" to the failure of investors to appropriately manage the
risks of these highly complex structured securities; these investors in-
cluded financial institutions such as banks that relied on these inaccurate
524
ratings in their investment decisions. Thus, Congress determined that
the credit rating agencies should be subject to "increased accountabil-
ity."525
In accordance with its mandate, Congress attempted to increase the
accountability of the credit rating agencies by providing that, in a private
action, "[t]he enforcement and penalty provisions of [the securities laws]
shall apply to statements made by a credit rating agency in the same
manner and to the same extent as such provisions apply to . . . a regis-
tered public accounting firm or a securities analyst."526 Thus, Congress
determined that credit rating agencies should be held accountable for
their statements to the same extent, and in the same manner, as account-
527
ants and securities analysts. Moreover, any such statements made by a
credit rating agency will not be considered "forward-looking statements"
under the safe harbor rules of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange
Act.528 Thus, the credit rating agencies cannot use this safe harbor to
avoid liability for false or misleading statements.52 9
With the intention of providing meaningful reform, Congress
concluded that Rule 436(g), which shielded the credit rating agencies
(stating the proposition that credit rating agencies "mis-rate[d] tens of billions of subprime securiti-
zations and their derivative [collateralized debt obligations]").
524. See Dodd-Frank Act § 931(5) ("[T]he mismanagement of risks by financial institutions
and investors . . . in turn adversely impacted the health of the economy in the United States and
around the world."); see also TESTIMONY OF JOHN WALSH, supra note 21, at attachment A, 2 ("Is-
sues surrounding credit ratings were a significant factor in market overconfidence that contributed to
subsequent losses in the markets for mortgage-backed securities in 2008-2009."); Curry, Remarks
Before the American Securitization Forum, supra note 141, at 2 ("[I]nvestors . . . placed undue
reliance on flawed credit ratings . . .. "); Letter from Mary Frances Monroe, Vice President, Office of
Regulatory Policy, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., at 1 (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2010/November/20101104/R-1391/R-
1391 102510 54036 533969644112_1.pdf (recognizing "that inadequacies in the issuance and use
of credit ratings contributed to recent financial disruptions in the U.S. markets").
525. Dodd-Frank Act § 931(5).
526. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(1) (2012). The Dodd-Frank Act further provides that, with respect
to any state of mind that is required in a particular action, it is sufficient to plead facts that provide "a
strong inference" that the rating agency "knowingly or recklessly failed" to perform a "reasonable
investigation" of the facts that it relied upon in evaluating the credit risk of the security or to obtain
from other sources a "reasonable verification" of the facts. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A)-(B). Thus, in a
private suit against a credit rating agency, a plaintiff will not need to plead scienter in any cause of
action under the securities laws that otherwise would require this higher level of pleading, such as a
fraud action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lob-5. See Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (finding an allegation of scienter is required in a private
cause of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 and
defining scienter as the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
527. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(1).
528. See id.; see also id. § 78u-5(c), (i)(1)(C) (providing a safe harbor for "forward-looking
statement" defined inter alia as "a statement of future economic performance").
529. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(1); see also id § 78u-5(c)(1).
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from liability, would no longer have any "force or effect."530 By repeal-
ing the Rule 436(g) exemption, Congress provided authority to hold the
credit rating agencies liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 for false or misleading credit ratings contained in a registration
statement.531 Congress's repeal of Rule 436(g) became effective July 22,
20 10.532
D. Reestablishment ofthe Regulatory Shield
On the same day that the repeal of Rule 436(g) went into effect, the
Commission's Division of Corporation Finance issued a no-action let-
ter533 regarding the disclosure requirements in a prospectus that forms
part of a registration statement for the offering of asset-backed securi-
ties.53 4 The Commission's asset-backed securities rule known as Regula-
tion AB requires the issuer of asset-backed securities to disclose whether
a sale or issuance of such "securities is conditioned on the assignment of
a rating by one or more rating agencies."535 If the sale or issuance of an
asset-backed security is conditioned on such assignment of a credit rat-
ing, then Regulation AB requires the issuer to disclose the identity of
every credit rating agency that has provided a rating as well as the mini-
mum credit rating necessary for the sale or issuance of the asset-backed
536securities. Regulation AB also requires the issuer to explain any ar-
rangements for the credit rating to be monitored during the period in
which the securities are outstanding.537
530. Dodd-Frank Act § 939(G) ("Rule 436(g), promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Act of 1933, shall have no force or effect."); see also Wyo. State
Treasurer v. Moody's Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d
167, 183 n. I1 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting the Dodd-Frank Act "recently nullified" Rule 436(g)).
531. See Act § 939(G); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); see also Letter from Martha Coakley, Mass. Att'y
Gen., to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n I (Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Coakley
Letter], http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2011/2011-03-07-sec-letter-attachmenti.pdf ("We
believe that Congress rescinded the rating agencies' exemption from liability with the expectation
that this would result in rating agency liability.").
532. Dodd-Frank Act § 4 ("Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act or the
amendments made by this Act, . . . this Act and such amendments shall take effect I day after the
date of enactment of this Act."). The date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act was July 21, 2010;
thus, the effective date of the repeal of Rule 436(g) was July 22, 2010. See Dodd-Frank Act pmbl..
533. No-Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm ("An individual or entity who is not certain whether a
particular product, service, or action would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may
request a 'no-action' letter from the SEC staff. Most no-action letters describe the request, analyze
the particular facts and circumstances involved, discuss applicable laws and rules, and, if the staff
grants the request for no action, conclude[] that the SEC staff would not recommend that the Com-
mission take enforcement action . . . "); see also Coakley Letter, supra note 531, at 1-2 ("Legally,
no-action letters are expressions of enforcement policy. In practice, they are public statements by
SEC staff often taken to imply legal interpretations and administrative action they do not contain.").
534. SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *2.
535. SEC Asset-Back Securities Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1103(a)(9) (2015); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.1120 (mandating this disclosure requirement is applicable "whether or not" the rating agencies
are NRSROs); SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *2.
536. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1103(a)(9); 17 C.F.R. § 229.1120; SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19,
at *1-2.
537. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1120; SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2.
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The repeal of Rule 436(g) results in the need to obtain the consent
of the credit rating agency to list its name "as an expert" in order to
disclose the agency's credit rating in the registration statement.
However, the credit rating agencies refused to provide the necessary
consent.3  In response, the Division of Corporation Finance issued the
July 22, 2010, no-action letter indicating that it "will not recommend"
bringing an enforcement action against an issuer of asset-backed securi-
ties if the disclosure regarding credit ratings required under Regulation
AB is not included in the registration statement.540 This no-action letter
was issued for the purpose of "facilitat[ing] a transition for asset-backed
issuers" and was initially scheduled to expire on January 24, 2011.541
Nevertheless, on November 23, 2010, the Division of Corporation
Finance issued a second no-action letter regarding the disclosure
requirements under Regulation AB with respect to credit ratings.542 In
this second no-action letter, the Division of Corporation Finance extend-
ed the no-action status regarding the omission of credit rating disclosures
required under Regulation AB indefinitely.543 The Division of Corpora-
tion Finance cited to the continued unwillingness of the credit rating
agencies to provide the needed consent and stated that an extension of
the initial no-action letter is necessary in order to permit asset-backed
securities to continue to be offered as registered securities. In balanc-
ing the benefits to investors achieved through the registration of asset-
backed securities under the Securities Act with the omission of the credit
rating information required under Regulation AB, the Division of Corpo-
ration Finance decided to extend the initial no-action letter and permit
registered offerings of asset-backed securities without the required
538. SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2; see also Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's
Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 183 n. I1 (2d Cir.
2011) ("[A]ny potential 'expert' liability requires satisfaction of the naming and consent require-
ments." (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (2012))).
539. See SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2.
540. Id. at *2; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.1103(a)(9) (providing disclosure requirements required
under Regulation AB with respect to credit ratings); 17 C.F.R. § 229.1120 (providing additional
disclosure requirements required under Regulation AB regarding credit ratings).
541. SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *2 ("This no-action position will expire with
respect to any registered offerings of asset-backed securities commencing with an initial bona fide
offer on or after January 24, 2011.").
542. Id. at *I.
543. Id. at *I ("Pending further notice, ... [an enforcement action will not be recommended] if
an asset-backed issuer . . . omits the ratings disclosure required by Item I 103(a)(9) and 1102 of
Regulation AB from a prospectus that is part of a registration statement relating to an offering of
asset-backed securities."); see also Coakley Letter, supra note 531, at 6 (referring to the Nov. 23,
2010 No-Action Letter extending "the no-action position indefinitely").
544. SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *I ("[W]ithout an extension of our no-action
position, offerings of asset-backed securities would not be able to be conducted on a registered
basis."). The Division of Corporation Finance also stated that its decision to extend the initial no-
action letter was further necessitated by the time needed to accomplish the regulatory initiatives
mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. Id.
343
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545disclosures with respect to credit ratings. Thus, with the use of an
informal no-action letter,546 the Commission continued to shield the cred-
it rating agencies from liability in direct contravention of the express
intent of Congress and the reforms enacted under the Dodd-Frank
Act.5 47
In the statute, Congress clearly expressed its intent to subject the
credit rating agencies to the penalty and enforcement provisions of the
securities laws to the same extent and in the same manner as accountants
and securities analysts.548 Pursuant to this statutory provision and the
repeal of Rule 436(g), credit rating agencies would be subject to
Section 11 liability. 549 However, as a result of the no-action letter issued
by the Commission, credit rating agencies are not subject to Section 11
liability, and therefore, rating agencies are not subject to the enforcement
and penalty provisions of the securities laws to the same extent and in the
same manner as accountants and securities analysts.5 50 Thus, with the
issuance of the no-action letter, the Commission has nullified the express
intent of Congress.
The credit rating agencies should be subject to Section 11 civil lia-
bility for false or misleading statements in a prospectus. As noted by the
courts, experts under Section 11 may be found "liable for mere negli-
gence."55' However, the currently in force no-action letter continues the
545. See id. ("Given the . . . benefits to investor protection resulting from Securities Act regis-
tration, the Division is extending the relief issued . .. by letter dated July 22, 2010."). The Division
of Corporation Finance also referred to the "current state of uncertainty" in the market for asset-
backed securities as an additional reason for extending the initial no-action letter. Id.
546. See Procedures Utilized by the Division of Corp. Fin. for Rendering Informal Advice,
Securities Act Release No. 6235, 21 SEC Docket 315, 320-21 & n.4 (Nov. 11, 1980),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-6253.pdf (explaining that the Division of Corporation Finance
may issue no-action letters in response "to requests for informal advice concerning the application of
the federal securities laws administered by it. . . . [M]any members of the public have come to rely
on the informal advice provided in this manner. . . . Such letters, however, set forth staff positions
only and do not constitute an official expression of the Commission's views." (quoting 17 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(d) (2015))).
547. See SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at * 1-2; Coakley Letter, supra note 531, at 1,
10 ("[W]e believe the SEC's decision to take no action in this area undermines recent Congressional
reform and is inconsistent with Congressional intent. . . . In the Dodd-Frank Act, the clear intent of
Congress was to provide investors with a much-needed requirement of rating agency competence.
We are concerned that the SEC has defeated this intent."); see also Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 931(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010) (finding the credit rating agencies should be held to
the same standards of accountability and liability as other "financial 'gatekeepers"'); Dodd-Frank
Act § 939(G) (repealing the Commission's Rule 436(g) exemption from Section II liability for
credit rating agencies).
548. See 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(m) (2012).
549. Id.; Id. § 77k(a) (providing for liability for accountants, appraisers, and engineers as well
as any other professional who has given consent to be named as a preparer or certifier of any portion
of the registration statement or of "any report or valuation which is used in connection with the
registration statement"); Dodd-Frank Act § 939(G).
550. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2.
551. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Lindsay v. Morgan Stanley (In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec.
Litig.), 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that with the exception of issuers, "potential
defendants under section[] I I . .. may be held liable for mere negligence.")).
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practice of "officially shield[ing]" the credit rating agencies from all
liability under the securities laws except for fraud.552 Therefore, con-
sistent with the First Amendment protections provided by the courts, this
regulatory exemption continues to provide the credit rating agencies with
the ability to avoid liability for negligently prepared credit ratings.553
E. Credit Ratings and Section 11
Alas, even if the Commission were to rescind its no-action letter,554
and even if a credit rating agency were to provide the necessary consent
to list its name as an expert in the registration statement,5 5 the likelihood
of liability under Section 11 is uncertain. At least one court has stated
that a credit rating would not be actionable under Section 11.556 Accord-
ing to the Southern District of New York, "credit ratings . . . are state-
ments of opinion, as they are predictions of future value."557 In dismiss-
ing claims against the credit rating agencies for underwriter liability, the
court found that such statements of opinion are not actionable under Sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Act.558 However, "the Supreme Court has 're-
jected the argument that statements containing . . . opinions or be-
liefs . . . could not be a basis for' an action for securities fraud."55 9 As
acknowledged by the Southern District of New York, a statement of
opinion is actionable if the opinion is "objectively untrue" and "not be-
lieved by the speaker."560 Other courts have similarly found that state-
552. See PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 82; SEC No-Action Letter, supra
note 19, at *1-2; see also Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's lnv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros.
Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 185 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that plaintiffs "may bring
securities fraud claims against the [r]ating [a]gencies pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 . . . although liability under that section is . . . subject to scienter, reliance, and loss
causation requirements not applicable to § II claims"). Notably, the Dodd-Frank Act permits plain-
tiffs to avoid pleading scienter in any action that has a state of mind requirement, such as a fraud
action under Section 10(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
553. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 82 (noting the regulatory exemption
"means that NRSROs are not held even to a negligence standard of care for their work"); see also
discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
554. See supra Section II.D.
555. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
556. See N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72.
557. Id. at 271; see also Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs.
LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 842 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that credit ratings are "predictive opinion[s]" (quot-
ing Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007))).
558. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (."[A]ccurate statements of histor-
ical fact and statements of opinion, including statements of hope, opinion, or belief about . .. future
performance . . . are non-actionable' under Section I1" (first and second alterations in original)
(quoting Panther Partners, Inc. v. Ikanos Commc'ns, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 662, 668 (S.D.N.Y.
2008))); see also Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 842 (dismissing claims against
credit rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation because credit ratings are opinions about the
future and, thus, "are not actionable misrepresentations"); Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
(In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig.), No. 09 MD 2030, 2011 WL 536437, at *12-13
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011) (dismissing negligent misrepresentation claims against credit rating agen-
cies because "[c]redit ratings are statements of opinion" and, therefore, not actionable).
559. In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639 (S.D. Ohio
2008) (quoting Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)).
560. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72 (quoting In re AOL Time
Warner, Inc. Sec. & "ERISA" Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)); see also Ohio
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ments of opinion are actionable under the securities laws "if the speaker
does not believe the opinion and the opinion is not factually well-
grounded."5 6' The Southern District of New York did not address wheth-
er the agencies believed the ratings; thus, it appears the court assumed
that credit ratings could not be "objectively untrue." 62
According to the same court in a separate case, "[T]he fact that the
[r]ating [a]gencies may have given higher-but not untruthful-ratings
to retain business does not render the opinions of the [r]ating [a]gencies
actionable."56 3 This statement simply defies logic. If a credit rating agen-
cy gave a higher rating in order to retain business, then the rating cannot
be truthful because it was not the rating the agency would have given in
the absence of the monetary incentive to retain the business. Therefore,
such a rating is not only "objectively untrue" but also "not believed by
the speaker."6 Such higher rating was not factually well-grounded, and
the rating agency did not truly believe the rating when the agency issued
565
It is uncertain whether courts would take a different view if viola-
tions of the expert prong of Section 11 (rather than the underwriter
prong) were alleged against the credit rating agencies.566 Notably, the
Second Circuit has stated that the rating issued by a credit rating agency
"is the sort of expert opinion classically evaluated under the 'expert'
provision of [Section] 11.,,567 Moreover, in a case involving Section 11
claims against the underwriters of mortgage-backed securities, the
Northern District of California found that statements made by executives
of Moody's and Standard & Poor's-admitting "they were aware at the
time the subject ratings were made that the agencies' rating models were
outdated"-were sufficient to find an "actionable misstatement" con-
Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 843 (dismissing negligent misrepresentation claims be-
cause the plaintiff "fail[ed] to allege that the . .. [rating] [algencies did not believe their ratings"
(first and second alterations in original) (quoting Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard &
Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 871, 883 (S.D. Ohio 2011))); Merrill Lynch & Co., 2011
WL 536437, at *12 ("There is an exception to the non-actionable opinion rule in cases where the
opinion holder knew the opinion was false or did not hold the opinion expressed at the time it was
expressed.").
561. Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (quoting Mayer, 988 F.2d at 639
("[S]tatements which contain the speaker's opinion are actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act if the speaker does not believe the opinion and the opinion is not factually well-
grounded.")).
562. See N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72 (quoting AOL Time Warn-
er, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 243).
563. Merrill Lynch & Co., 2011 WL 536437, at *12 (dismissing claims for negligent misrepre-
sentation).
564. See supra note 560 and accompanying text.
565. Cf Mayer, 988 F.2d at 639 ("Material statements which contain the speaker's opinion are
actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act if the speaker does not believe the
opinion and the opinion is not factually well-grounded.").
566. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
567. Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's lnv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed
Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 183 & n. 11 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)) ("[T]he issuance of
a credit rating ostensibly falls within the 'expert' category of potential liability under § I.").
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cerning the process of rating the securities.568 Furthermore, in a case con-
cerning alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, the Southern District of Ohio found that credit ratings can be con-
sidered "not factually well-grounded."5 69
If credit ratings were not actionable, as the Southern District of New
York found,7 o then there would be no basis for the Second Circuit's ob-
servation regarding the applicability of the expert provision of Section 11
specifically to credit ratings.s7 1 Moreover, there would be no reason for
the Commission to have issued the no-action letter permitting the contin-
ued omission of required credit rating disclosures in a registration state-
ment involving asset-backed securities.572 Significantly, the Dodd-Frank
Act provides that any statements made by a credit rating agency will not
be considered "forward-looking statements" under the safe harbor rules
of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act.573 Therefore, Congress
has determined that statements made by a credit rating agency should not
be shielded from liability based on the notion that such statements are
"predictions of future value" and, thus, non-actionable statements of
- * 574opinion.
In any event, since the Commission has not made any indication
that its no-action letter will be rescinded, and (without a change in the
law) a credit rating agency will likely never provide the necessary con-
sent to list its name as an expert in the registration statement, we will
perhaps never know whether the courts would ultimately find the credit
rating agencies liable for false or misleading statements under the expert
prong of Section 11 of the Securities Act.
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
This part will examine the conflicts of interest inherent in the issuer-
pays model of the credit rating agencies as well as the reforms provided
by the Dodd-Frank Act and the Commission's implementing rules. This
part will then consider whether these reforms effect any real change.
568. See In re Wells Fargo Mortg.-Backed Certificates Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (N.D.
Cal. 2010).
569. In re Nat'1 Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639 (S.D. Ohio
2008) (finding the plaintiff sufficiently pled that the ratings issued by the agencies "were not factual-
ly well-grounded").
570. See supra notes 556-58 and accompanying text.
571. See supra note 567 and accompanying text.
572. See discussion supra Section II.D.
573. See 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(m) (2012); see also id. § 78u-5(c)(1), (i)(1)(C) (2012) (providing a
safe harbor for "forward-looking statement" defined inter alia as "a statement of future economic
performance").
574. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254,
271 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(1).
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A. Issuer-Pays Rating Agency Model
The credit rating agencies have been blamed for being a major
cause of the financial crisis by assigning inaccurate ratings to structured
securities such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations.5 75 Conflicts of interest that are inherent in the "issuer-pays"
rating agency model appear to have precipitated these inaccurate rat-
ings. 57 6 Under the issuer-pays model, the rating agencies have a financial
relationship with the investment banks that were the issuers of these
structured securities.5 77 As part of this relationship, the issuers directly
paid the credit rating agencies to assign a credit rating to the debt
issue. As a result, monetary incentives and "pressure to improve the
rating" plague the issuer-pays model.579
In addition, many investment banks would shop around for a rat-
ing.580 Thus, if a credit rating agency failed to provide a rating that was
high enough, then that rating agency would not receive the business.'8 1
As a result, the rating agencies would begin with the intention to assign a
575. See supra notes 20-21, 523-24 and accompanying text.
576. See Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 15 (noting the "conflict of interest inherent in the way
that rating agencies are paid"); see also Patrick Kingsley, How Credit Ratings Agencies Rule the
World, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2012, 3:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/15/credit-ratings-agencies-moodys (explaining that
if a company wishes to be rated, it "must pay an agency between $1,500 and $2,500,000 for the
privilege . . . [and] [iun theory, this creates a conflict of interest, because it gives the agency an
incentive to give the companies the rating they want"); Timothy W. Martin, SEC Is Gearing Up to
Focus on Ratings Firms, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2014, 1:29 P.M.), http://online.wsj.com/articles/sec-
is-gearing-up-to-focus-on-ratings-firms-1403651968 (noting Senator Al Franken and others have
stated that the issuer-pays model "gives [credit rating] firms an incentive to compromise their criteria
in order to win business").
577. See Martin, supra note 576 (explaining that under the business model employed by the
credit rating agencies "[i]ssuers of bond deals pay ratings firms to grade their deals").
578. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 317, at 372-73 ("Most credit rating agencies, particularly
Moody's, Standard & Poor's . . . and Fitch, earn money by charging issuers a fee in exchange for
assigning a credit rating to the debt obligations marketed by the issuer."); Schwarcz, supra note 122,
at 15 ("Rating agencies are virtually always paid their fee by the issuer of securities applying for the
rating."); see also N.J Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 272 ("[T]he rating agencies
were paid by the [issuing] investment banks that hired them . . . .").
579. Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 15 (noting the issuer-pays model "raises the possibility that
the issuer will use, or the rating agency will perceive, monetary pressure to improve the rating"); see
also Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 834 (6th
Cir. 2012) (alleging that "between 2005 and 2008, this 'issuer pays' system compromised the integ-
rity of the credit rating process"); N.J Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 259 ("[T]he
shopping process allowed [issuers] to pressure rating agencies to provide high ratings . . . in order to
receive the profitable rating business.").
580. See Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-
Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[l]ssuing banks engaged particular [r]ating
[a]gencies through a 'ratings shopping' process, whereby the [r]ating [a]gencies reviewed loan-level
data for a mortgage pool and provided preliminary ratings. The banks then negotiated with the
[r]ating [a]gencies regarding the . . . percentage of AAA [securities] for each mortgage pool." (cita-
tion omitted)); N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (alleging the issuer "en-
gage[d] in 'ratings shopping' between the rating agencies").
581. Wyo. State Treasurer, 650 F.3d at 172 (noting the issuer would "choos[e] the agency
offering the highest percentage of AAA certificates"); N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp.
2d at 259 (explaining the issuer "would ultimately select the agency who provided the highest rat-
ing").
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high rating to the security and work with the investment bank to achieve
a structure that would seemingly support that rating.582 Moreover, the
credit rating agency would receive its fee only "if the desired rating
issued."583 Thus, under the issuer-pays model, the rating agencies had a
patent monetary incentive to provide high ratings in order to earn their
fees.5" Presumably, a higher rating also would have a greater likelihood
of ensuring that the investment bank would ask the rating agency to per-
form additional ratings work.
Notably, Standard and Poor's recently settled a lawsuit with the Jus-
tice Department based on allegations that "the rating [agency] had de-
frauded investors by issuing inflated ratings in the years preceding the
financial crisis."585 Moreover, the Government alleged that the rating
agency "falsely represented" that the ratings it issued were "objective
and uninfluenced by the firm's relationship with investment banks" when
in fact the rating agency was influenced by the "desire to boost revenue
and profits by winning business."5 86
Moreover, the rating agencies were using "flawed models" to assign
ratings to structured securities, including subprime mortgage-backed
securities and collateralized debt obligations.587 According to the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency-the regulator of national banks and
582. See Wyo. State Treasurer, 650 F.3d at 172 (noting the process described by an officer of
Moody's as first "start[ing] with a rating and build[ing] a deal around a rating").
583. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 834, 836 ("[T]he [credit rating agencies']
entitlement to a fee vested when their ratings i sued."); see also Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (alleging "that the securities could not issue and the
credit rating agencies would not get paid unless the [a]gencies provided a pre-determined AAA
rating for the securities"); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d
155, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining that compensation of the credit rating agencies "was contin-
gent upon the receipt of desired ratings for the [securities], and only in the event that the transaction
closed with those ratings").
584. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 834 ("At any point in this process, the
arranger could reject the [credit rating] [a]gency's proposed rating."); Anschutz Corp., 785 F. Supp.
2d at 809 ("[A]n alleged conflict of interest developed such that the [r]ating [a]gencies abandoned
their independence and relaxed their rating criteria and procedures in order to secure the business of
the investment banks in rating [highly lucrative structured] securities."); see also supra notes 576-79
and accompanying text.
585. John Kell, S&P Will Pay Nearly $1.4 Billion to Settle Financial Crisis Litigation,
FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2015, 8:48 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/02/03/standard-poors-financial-crisis/
(explaining the settlement will be paid to the Justice Department as well as to nineteen states and the
District of Columbia).
586. Id.
587. Pfinsgraff, Remarks Before the Risk Magazine Credit Risk Conference, supra note 20, at
2 (explaining the view that rating agencies were using "flawed models" to rate mortgage-backed
securities and collateralized debt obligations backed by subprime debt); see also In re Wells Fargo
Mortg.-Backed Certificates Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding the statements
made by executives of Moody's and Standard & Poor's admitting "they were aware at the time the
subject ratings were made that the agencies' rating models were outdated" was sufficient to find an
"actionable misstatement" conceming the process of rating the mortgage-backed securities); N.J.
Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254, 270-71
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[T]he models relied on to rate the [mortgage-backed securities] were outdated
and unable to accurately assess their risk . . . .").
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federal thrifts588-the credit rating agencies' excessive reliance on the
fees earned through ratings of securitized products may have played a
decisive role in the agencies' continued employment of these "funda-
mentally flawed credit models."5 8 9 Thus, conflicts of interest led the
credit rating agencies to turn a blind eye to the sustained use of flawed
credit models and ultimately resulted in the assignment of inaccurate
ratings for "tens of billions" of mortgage-backed securities and collat-
eralized debt obligations secured by subprime debt.590
B. Dodd-Frank Act Reforms
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress addressed certain conflicts of in-
terest with respect to credit rating agencies.591 For example, the statute
grants the Commission the authority to suspend or revoke an NRSRO's
registration with regard to a particular class of securities if the Commis-
sion determines that the NRSRO "does not have adequate financial and
managerial resources to consistently produce credit ratings with integri-
ty.,
5 92
The statute also requires the Commission to issue rules "to prevent
the sales and marketing considerations .. . from influencing the produc-
tion of ratings" issued by the NRSRO.593 The statute further provides for
the suspension or revocation of an NRSRO's registration if the Commis-
sion determines that the NRSRO has violated a rule issued pursuant to
"this subsection" and that violation affected a credit rating.594
Additionally, the statute contains a "[1]ook-back requirement"
whereby an NRSRO is required to establish policies and procedures to
ensure that, if any employee of an entity that is the subject of a credit
rating had been employed by the NRSRO and participated in the deter-
mination of the entity's credit rating during the one-year period prior to
the date when any action was taken regarding the credit rating, then the
588. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012) (granting the Comptroller of the Currency the authority to
regulate national banks); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5412(b)(2)(B) (granting the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency the authority to regulate federal savings associations).
589. Pfinsgraff, Remarks Before the Risk Magazine Credit Risk Conference, supra note 20, at
2 ("Rating agencies had become overly reliant on securitization fees which may have, in part, con-
tributed to their failure to more quickly correct fundamentally flawed credit models."); see also Ohio
Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 834 (alleging that "the desire to attract business led the
[algencies to lower their rating standards [by using] ... older, more forgiving debt models over more
up-to-date ones that might result in the rejection of an arranger's proposed capital structure" (citation
omitted)).
590. Pfinsgraff, Remarks Before the Risk Magazine Credit Risk Conference, supra note 20, at
2 (noting the proposition that credit rating agencies "mis-rate[d] tens of billions of subprime securiti-
zations and their derivative [collateralized debt obligations]").
591. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(d)(2), (h)(3)-(4), (t)(2).
592. Id. § 78o-7(d)(2).
593. Id. § 78o-7(h)(3).
594. Id.
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NRSRO must determine whether the employee had any conflicts of in-
terest that influenced the rating and revise the rating if necessary.595
C. Credit Rating Agency Reform Rules of 2014
The Commission then issued rules to implement the conflicts of in-
terest provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act regarding credit rating agen-
cies.596 For example, with respect to the sales and marketing conflict, the
Commission's rule prohibits an NRSRO from assigning a credit rating
when an employee who is involved in monitoring or determining the
credit rating, or approving or developing methodologies or procedures
for assigning the credit rating, also participates in the marketing or sales
of the NRSRO (or an affiliate) or is influenced by marketing or sales
factors.59 7 As stated by the Commission, this provision is an "absolute
prohibition" of individuals involved in the sales and marketing efforts of
a rating agency from also participating in any aspect of the credit rating
function and vice versa.598 Moreover, with respect to the Commission's
authority to suspend or revoke an NRSRO's registration if the Commis-
sion determines the NRSRO has violated a rule issued pursuant to "this
subsection" and that violation affected a credit rating,599 the Commission
interpreted the phrase "this subsection" to include any rules issued under
Section 15E(h) of the Securities Exchange Act.60 This section of the
Securities Exchange Act concerns the management of conflicts of inter-
est involving NRSROs. 
60
With respect to the "look-back requirement," the Commission's rule
requires an NRSRO to "promptly determine" if any credit ratings identi-
fied in a "look-back review" to include the influence of a conflict of in-
terest involving a former employee of the NRSRO need to be modified
so that the rating "is solely a product of the documented procedures and
methodologies" that the NRSRO uses to assign credit ratings and "is no
longer influenced by a conflict of interest."602 Once the determination is
made, the NRSRO must "[p]romptly publish" either a modified credit
595. Id. § 78o-7(h)(4). The statute further provides for a board of directors in which at least one
half of the directors are independent of the NRSRO. Id. § 78o-7(t)(2).
596. See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 55,078, 55,108
(Sept. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249 & 249b).
597. Id. (codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(8)).
598. Id. ("In practice, the Commission believes the amendment will require an NRSRO to
prohibit personnel that have any role in the determination of credit ratings or the development or
modification of rating procedures or methodologies from having any role in sales and marketing
activities. It also will require an NRSRO to prohibit personnel that have any role in sales and market-
ing activities from having any role in the determination of credit ratings or the development or
modification of rating procedures or methodologies.").
599. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3).
600. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. at 55,114 (codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(g)).
601. See 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(h).
602. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. at 55,117-21 (codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-8(c)(1)).
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rating or an affirmation of the existing credit rating.603 In addition, the
NRSRO must provide the users of its credit ratings with information
concerning the reasons for its decision.6m Moreover, as the "look-back
requirement" is contained in Section 15E(h) of the Securities Exchange
Act, the Commission has the authority to suspend or revoke an NRSRO's
registration if the Commission determines that the NRSRO has violated
this requirement.605
D. Do the Reforms Effect Any Real Change?
The reforms enacted by Congress and implemented by the Commis-
sion are certainly a step in the direction of reducing conflicts of interest
in the business of a credit rating agency. However, while it is important
to separate the marketing and sales function from the credit rating func-
tion 606 to avoid a direct conflict of interest for individual employees, such
separation is not enough to eliminate the conflicts of interest inherent in
the issuer-pays model607 of the credit rating agencies. Although an indi-
vidual employee who participates in determining the credit rating of a
security will not be involved in the sales and marketing function of the
rating agency, that individual is still an employee of the credit rating
agency, which is hired and paid by the issuer of the security. While a
direct conflict of interest may no longer be present, the inherent conflicts
of interest cannot be avoided.
Prior to the financial crisis, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
of 2006 provided the Commission the statutory authority to issue rules
"to prohibit, or require the management and disclosure of, any conflicts
of interest," including those conflicts of interest associated with the prac-
tice of the issuer of the security compensating the NRSRO for the as-
signment of a credit rating.60 8 However, the Commission's rules required
the rating agency to do no more than disclose that the conflict exists and
establish procedures and policies to manage the conflict.6 09 Considering
the evidence of persistent conflicts of interest involving credit ratings
that precipitated the financial crisis,6 10 simply disclosing and attempting
to manage these conflicts is not enough to eliminate the problem.
603. Id. at 55,121 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-8(c)(2)).
604. Id.
605. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3)-(4); Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
79 Fed. Reg. at 55,114 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-8(c)).
606. See supra notes 597-98 and accompanying text.
607. See supra Section Ill.A.
608. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4(a), 120 Stat. 1327,
1334 (2006) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(2)).
609. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a)(1)-(2) (2015).
610. See supra Section IlIl.A.
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CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates how the courts and the regulators have af-
forded the credit rating agencies protections from liability. 611 The courts
have considered credit ratings to be opinions and applied the protections
of the First Amendment o shield the credit rating agencies from liability
in actions for fraudulent or negligently prepared ratings.6 12 However,
credit ratings are not pure statements of opinion similar to a newspaper
editorial or a statement of opinion regarding a political matter. Rather,
credit ratings are fact-based opinions made by business professionals.613
Thus, credit rating agencies should be subject to the same liability as
other commercial enterprises.
Moreover, the Commission has provided credit rating agencies with
regulatory protections by shielding the agencies from liability for false or
misleading statements in a registration statement.614 Despite the express
intent of Congress to hold the credit rating agencies accountable,615 the
Commission has effectively nullified those intentions.616 These legal and
regulatory protections provided to the credit rating agencies are clearly
misguided, even more so in light of the conflicts of interest inherent in
617
the issuer-pays model of the rating agencies.
Accordingly, the courts should hold credit rating agencies liable for
fraudulent or negligently prepared credit ratings that are false or mislead-
ing. Similarly, the Commission should honor the express intentions of
Congress and hold the credit rating agencies liable for false or mislead-
ing statements in a registration statement. Finally, as long as the issuer-
pays model remains the accepted standard of practice for the credit rating
agencies, the inherent conflicts of interest endemic to this industry will
continue to persist; thus, more is needed to eliminate the conflicts of in-
terest inherent in the issuer-pays business model of the credit rating
agencies.
611. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
612. See supra notes 4, 12 and accompanying text; see also supra Section I.A.3.b.
613. See supra notes 9, 384-85 and accompanying text.
614. See supra notes 13, 505-09 and accompanying text.
615. See supra notes 17, 525-27, 530-31 and accompanying text.
616. See supra Section II.D.
617. See supra Section IlIl.A.
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ABSTRACT
Lawmakers historically justify the mobilization of criminal laws on
prostitution and HIV as a means of controlling the spread of disease.
Over time, however, public health research has conclusively demonstrat-
ed that criminal laws on prostitution and HIV significantly impede the
ability of sex workers to access services and to live without the stigma
and blame associated with being a transmitter of HIV. In turn, main-
stream public health approaches to sex work and HIV emphasize decrim-
inalization as a way to improve the lives of sex workers in need of care,
treatment, and services. Our current legal system, which criminalizes
both prostitution and HIV transmission and exposure, is not in keeping
with this decriminalization frame and instead compounds criminal penal-
ties on people charged with prostitution related crimes and undermines
HIV efforts.
This Article presents a public health law mapping of U.S. states that
mandate HIV testing and criminalize HIV positive sex workers. The
mapping demonstrates that laws on HIV transmission and exposure in-
teract with laws on sex work to compound criminal penalties on people
charged with prostitution related crimes. In keeping with public health
evidence, this Article argues that decriminalization of sex work and HIV
transmission and exposure is integral to effectively address the HIV epi-
demic. The Article seeks to contribute to a growing literature on the ne-
cessity of decriminalizing sex work by uncovering how these laws inter-
act to undermine the HIV response.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the Lancet dedicated a special issue to sex work and HIV.'
Amongst many findings on sex work, researchers found that the decrimi-
nalization of sex work would have a greater effect on the course of the
HIV epidemic than any other structural intervention in the modeled
countries.2 The study found that the decriminalization of sex work could
"avert[] 33-46% of HIV infections in the next decade."3 In keeping with
this data and a larger body of public health research, international institu-
tions call to decriminalize sex work as an effective and important means
of addressing HIV, as well as increasing sex workers' health and well-
being.4 For example, in 2012, the Global Commission on HIV and the
Law (hosted by the United Nations Development Programme) issued a
series of recommendations to country lawmakers to create legal
1. HIV and Sex Workers, LANCET (July 23, 2014), http://www.thelancet.com/series/hiv-and-
sex-workers.
2. Kate Shannon et al., Global Epidemiology of HIV Among Female Sex Workers: Influence
ofStructural Determinants, 385 LANCET 55, 55 (2015).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., GLOBAL COMM'N ON HIV & THE LAW, RISKS, RIGHTS AND HEALTH 10 (2012),
http://www.hivlawcommission.org/resources/report/FinalReport-Risks,Rights&Health-EN.pdf; OFF.
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COM'R FOR HUM. RTS. & THE JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME
ON HIV/AIDS, INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 30 (2006) [herein-
after OHCHR, GUIDELINES],
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HIVAIDSGuidelinesen.pdf; UNAIDS, TECHNICAL
UPDATE: SEX WORK AND HIV/AIDS 8-10 (2002), http://data.unaids.org/publications/IRC-
pub02/jc705-sexwork-tu en.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF
HIV AND OTHER SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS FOR SEX WORKERS IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-
INCOME COUNTRIES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH 8 (2012),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/77745//9789241504744_eng.pdf.
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environments that would enable successful public health programs and
facilitate a decrease in HIV transmission. Amongst these
recommendations was a call to decriminalize all adult consensual sex,
including the purchase of sex.6  The International Guidelines on
HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, a joint publication of the Joint United
Nations Agency on HIV/AIDS and the Office of the High Commission
for Human Rights, has also called for the decriminalization of sex work.7
Alongside the laws on sex work, in recent years, public health
scholars and activists have increasingly focused on the effect that laws
that criminalize transmission and exposure to HIV have on the epidemic
and on the individuals living with HIV. 8 Public health scholars and
advocates see these laws as increasing stigma, having the potential to
deter HIV testing (thus not receiving care), and increasing the stigma of
living with HIV. 9
Despite the widespread support for decriminalizing sex work
amongst public health and harm-reduction activists, there has been little
work done to disentangle the complicated way that the criminal law
operates to marginalize and disenfranchise sex workers living with HIV.
Focusing on the United States, in which the majority of jurisdictions
criminalize both sex work and exposure to HIV,10 this Article begins to
fill this gap in the literature. In keeping with current public health
evidence, this Article argues for the decriminalization of sex work and
HIV exposure and transmission in order to better address the safety and
health needs of sex workers.
5. See GLOBAL COMM'N ON HIV & THE LAW, supra note 4, at 10. Aziza Ahmed was on the
Technical Advisory Group to the Global Commission on HIV and the Law.
6. Id.
7. OHCHR, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 30 ("With regard to adult sex work that involves
no victimization, criminal law should be reviewed with the aim of decriminalizing, then legally
regulating occupational health and safety conditions to protect sex workers and their clients, includ-
ing support for safe sex during sex work. Criminal law should not impede provision of HIV preven-
tion and care services to sex workers and their clients. Criminal law should ensure that children and
adult sex workers who have been trafficked or otherwise coerced into sex work are protected from
participation in the sex industry and are not prosecuted for such participation but rather are removed
from sex work and provided with medical and psycho-social support services, including those relat-
ed to HIV."); see also GLOBAL COMM'N ON HIV & THE LAW, supra note 4, at 10; WORLD HEALTH
ORG. ET AL., supra note 4, at 8.
8. See generally Joanne Csete t al., Vertical HIV Transmission Should be Excluded from
Criminal Prosecution, 17 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 154 (2009); Carol L. Galletly & Steven D.
Pinkerton, Conflicting Messages: How Criminal HIV Disclosure Laws Undermine Public Health
Efforts to Control the Spread of HIV, 10 AIDS & BEHAV. 451 (2006); Ralf Juirgens et al., Ten Rea-
sons to Oppose the Criminalization of HIV Exposure or Transmission, 17 REPROD. HEALTH
MATTERS 163 (2009); The Evolution of Global Criminalisation Norms: The Role of the United
States, NAM [hereinafter Global Norms], http://www.aidsmap.com/The-evolution-of-global-
criminalisation-norms-the-role-of-the-United-States/page/1442035/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
9. See, e.g., Csete et al., supra note 8, at 154; Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 8, at 451;
Jilrgens et al., supra note 8, at 163; Global Norms, supra note 8.
I 0. Global Norms, supra note 8.
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Part I of this Article provides a brief history and background on
how the criminal law became a mode of intervention for public health
with regard to sex work and HIV. Part II of this Article utilizes a public
health law mapping method to document laws at the intersection of HIV
and criminal law." Our mapping finds that, in some jurisdictions, HIV-
positive persons engaging in prostitution can be charged with felony-
level crimes with significant penalties attached and that procedural aws
in certain states mandate or allow arrested or convicted sex workers to be
tested for HIV. Part III of this Article demonstrates how the mandatory
testing and punishment of sex workers who are HIV positive violates
public health recommendations for addressing the HIV epidemic.
I. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SEX WORK AND HIV TRANSMISSION
A. Criminalization of Sex Work
The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States criminalize
sex work. While the criminal prohibition against prostitution is often
thought of as a permanent fixture of the criminal law in the United
States, it is relatively recent and inconsistently applied.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries laws and regulations around
prostitution developed across the country with a variety of justifications,
including the regulation of women's morality, the prevention of exploita-
tion of women, and the prevention of vagrancy and nuisance.12 With the
advent of governmental and nongovernmental bodies bent on social re-
form, a special focus on the prevention of sexually transmitted infections
(STIs) began to dominate as a goal in regulating prostitution.13 For ex-
ample, in 1918, the Chamberlain-Kahn Act gave the federal government
broad powers to quarantine individuals with venereal disease. 14
Today, laws against prostitution vary depending on the jurisdiction.
In some states, simply offering to buy or sell sex is considered prostitu-
tion.15 Other states vaguely allude to "sexual conduct," leaving what ac-
11. This method is adapted from the Public Health Law Research LawAtlas Project. See
Laws, Maps & Data: LawAtlas, PUB. HEALTH LAW RESEARCH,
http://publichealthlawresearch.org/evidence-and-experts/law-atlas (l stvisited Mar. 23, 2016).
12. JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE MAKING OF THE FBI
11-14 (2014).
13. MARK THOMAS CONNELLY, THE RESPONSE TO PROSTITUTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
14-16 (1980). In 1913, the influential Bureau of Social Hygiene was incorporated by John D. Rock-
efeller, Jr. to study and prevent "those social conditions, crimes, and diseases which adversely affect
the well-being of society, with special reference to prostitution and the evils associated therewith."
Bureau of Social Hygiene Archives, 1911-1940, ROCKEFELLER ARCHIVE CTR.,
http://www.rockarch.org/collections/rockorgs/bsh.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). In 1913, the
American Social Hygiene Association was formed, uniting physicians with social reformers to
accomplish similar goals. See Kristin Luker, Sex, Social Hygiene, and the State: The Double-Edged
Sword of Social Reform, 27 THEORY & SOCIETY 601, 609-10 (1998).
14. See Chamberlain-Kahn Act, Pub. L. No. 65-193, § 15, 40 Stat. 845, 886 (1918).
15. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1 (2015).
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tivities are and are not criminal up to city criminal court judges.16 Cur-
rently, Nevada is the only state to allow for the legal practice of prostitu-
tion by delegating this decision largely to its county governments.17
How sex workers and others actually experience criminalization has
less to do with the substance of the laws than with the policing and pros-
ecutorial practices in their communities. Commercial sex is so diverse
and widespread that it becomes virtually impossible to consistently po-
lice, resulting in location-specific enforcement priorities, quasi-tolerance
of some forms of sex work, and corruption.'8 Criminal laws, especially
those that are vague or impossible to enforce universally, are generally
unevenly enforced, often with disparate impacts on communities of color
and the poor.19 People who are forced or coerced into engaging in sex
work, or who are being exploited by another in sex work, are often more
likely to be arrested because they have less control over where and when
they work, so they cannot avoid arrest. Whether female, male, cisgender,
or transgender, street-based sex workers are at greatest risk of arrest be-
cause of the public and exposed nature of their work. In addition,
transgender women are frequently falsely profiled and arrested for prosti-
tution, even if they are not engaging in prostitution and never have, due
to stereotypes about transgender women always being sex workers.20
Arrest itself is an intensely traumatic experience with a risk of po-
lice violence, exploitation, and abuse. After arrest, sex workers are com-
monly held for a period of time during which they can face humiliation,
violence, and discriminatory treatment because of the crime for which
they were arrested. Sex workers frequently report rape and other forms of
sexual violence and harassment at the hands of police and correctional
21officers. Incarceration can involve potential deprivations of freedom,
food, and medications, and it can also lead to eviction, loss of employ-
16. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney 2016).
17. For a discussion on the regulation of prostitution in Nevada, see Barbara G. Brents &
Kathryn Hausbeck, State-Sanctioned Sex: Negotiating Formal and Informal Regulatory Practices in
Nevada Brothels, 44 Soc. PERSP. 307, 312 (2001). Until 2009, indoor prostitution was also legal in
Rhode Island. See Lynn Arditi, Bill Signing Finally Outlaws Indoor Prostitution in R.I.,
PROVIDENCE J. (Nov. 3, 2009, 2:04 PM),
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/library/2013/02/26/Coyoteprostitution.pdf.
18. Laura Agustin, Sex and the Limits of Enlightenment: The Irrationality of Legal Regimes
to Control Prostitution, 5 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL'Y 73, 74 (2008).
19. See David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice
System 187 (1999); CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & LINH VUONG, Nat'l Council on Crime & Deliquen-
cy, CREATED EQUAL: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE US CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2
(2009), http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publicationpdf/created-equal.pdf.
20. See Jordan Flaherty, Are Police Profiling Transgender Americans?, AL JAZEERA
AMERICA (Oct. 16, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-
tonight/america-tonight-blog/2013/10/16/rise-in-
transgenderharassmentviolencebypolicelinkedtoprofiling.html.
21. Policing Sex Work, INCITE!, http://www.incite-national.org/page/policing-sex-work (last
visited Nov. 3, 2015).
DENVER LAW RE VIEW
ment, or loss of custody of children..22 Sex workers who are migrants can
also be identified by federal immigration enforcement agencies while
incarcerated, leading to the commencement of removal proceedings, with
or without counsel.23 Arrest is costly, and sex workers can incur fines
that create more economic pressure to engage in sex work.
After this period of incarceration, sex workers are brought into
criminal court for their arraignment where they are formally charged. At
this point, in most jurisdictions, the criminal justice system puts enor-
mous pressure on sex workers and others charged with low-level misde-
meanor crimes to forgo their rights as criminal defendants for whom the
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and instead to plead
guilty.24 This results in large numbers of low-level arrests that overbur-
den the court system and the constitutionally guaranteed public defense
system, which does not have the funding or personnel to take every crim-
inal case to trial. Sex workers who do plead guilty may be incarcerated
for up to a year in some jurisdictions or offered an "alternative to incar-
25ceration," such as community service or a rehabilitation program.
When their cases result in a criminal conviction, whether or not they do
time, sex workers can suffer collateral consequences even after the crim-
inal case is complete. These consequences include limitations on em-
ployment options, discrimination by employers, loss of access to public
benefits-including public housing-and loss of the right to sue the po-
lice if they are victims of police violence.2 6 In some states, sex workers
who have prior convictions of prostitution and are arrested again are sub-
ject to felony charges and mandatory jail time. Longer periods of incar-
22. See Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-
Prison Adjustment, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 1, 2001), http://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-
report/psychological-impact-incarceration; see also Ginny Shubert, NAT'L MINORITY AIDS
COUNCIL & HOUSING WORKS, MASS INCARCERATION, HOUSING INSTABILITY AND HIV/AIDS:
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 6-7 (2013), http://wncap.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Incarceration-Report-FINAL 2-6-13.pdf
23. Immigration Detainers: A Comprehensive Look, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-factslimmigration-detainers-comprehensive-look. President
Obama eliminated the Secure Communities Program, which enabled migrants to be transferred
directly to immigration detention from local jails. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y,
Dep't of Homeland Sec. to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., Immigration & Customs Enft et al.
2 (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_ 120_memo securecommunities.pdf.
However, migrants can still be identified in jail and issued notices to appear after their release. Id.
24. As part of the trend towards aggressive policing of low-level misdemeanors as part of a
"broken-windows" theory of order maintenance, defendants are encouraged to take a disposition at
arraignment. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs ofAggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 271, 295 (2009). In 1992, it was
noted that even if all misdemeanor judges spent all their time trying cases, only 2% of misdemeanor
arrests could be taken to trial. HARRY 1. SUBIN, THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT: THE CASE
FOR ABOLITION 1, 4 (1992).
25. See, e.g., DARIA MUELLER, CHI. COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, TREATMENT COURTS AND
COURT-AFFILIATED DIVERSION PROJECTS FOR PROSTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2012),
www.issuelab.org/permalink/resource/14135. This report profiles 19 court projects that offer rehabil-
itation oriented programs to persons arrested for prostitution. Id. at 9.
26. Howell, supra note 24, at 300-313.
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ceration only increase the risks and consequences mentioned above, es-
pecially for more vulnerable individuals.
B. Sex Work and HIV in North America
Existing data suggests that sex workers in the United States face a
high burden of HIV. A recent study by Samuel Jenness et al. found that
fourteen percent of the men and ten percent of the women participating
in sexual exchange in New York were HIV-positive. 27 In 2006, twenty-
four percent of the street-based, women selling sex who used crack co-
caine in Miami were estimated to be living with HIV 28 as were twenty-
six percent of male sex workers in Houston in 2007.29 Among male-to-
female transgender sex workers in Boston, one-third were estimated to
be living with HIV in 2009.30
Criminalization of sex work has been found to be directly counter-
productive to public health. Where sex workers are criminalized, they are
less able to negotiate safer sex practices with clients and have less access
to testing, treatment, and health care in general, making it more likely
that sex workers will not know their HIV status or be able to limit their
risk. The criminalization of sex work also leads directly to violence
against sex workers by customers, strangers, and police, which further
increases sex workers' HIV risk.3  Condoms may be confiscated as evi-
dence of engaging in prostitution justifying arrest. 32
C. Criminalization of HIV Transmission and Exposure in the United
States
With sex work criminalized in most U.S. jurisdictions, and many
sex workers living with HIV, the issue of criminalizing HIV transmission
and exposure adds another dimension to the complex criminal law
27. Samuel M. Jenness et al., Patterns of Exchange Sex and HIV Infection in High-Risk Het-
erosexual Men and Women, 88 J. URB. HEALTH 329, 338 (2011).
28. James A. Inciardi et al., HIV, HBV and HCV Infections Among Drug-Involved, Inner-
City, Street Sex Workers in Miami, Florida, 10 AIDS & BEHAV. 139, 140 (2006). In one study, fe-
male street-based sex workers in Miami "most often reported acute service needs for shelter, fresh
water, transportation, crisis intervention, and drug detoxification, as well as long-term needs for
mental and physical health care, drug treatment, and legal and employment services." Steven P.
Kurtz et al., Barriers to Health and Social Services for Street-Based Sex Workers, 16 J. HEALTH
CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 345, 345 (2005).
29. Sandra C. Timpson et al., Characteristics, Drug Use, and Sex Partners of a Sample of
Male Sex Workers, 33 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 63, 63 (2007).
30. Sari L. Reisner et al., HIV Risk and Social Networks Among Male-to-Female Transgender
Sex Workers in Boston, Massachusetts, 20 J. Ass'N NURSES IN AIDS CARE 373, 373 (2009).
31. See Anna-Louise Crago et al., 'The Police Beat You up, Demand Money and Will Detain
You Until You Pay': Police Violence Against Sex Workers in Eleven Countries in Europe and Cen-
tral Asia, 12 RES. FOR SEX WORK 3 (2010), www.nswp.org/resource/research-sex-work-12-sex-
work-and-violence; JJJ Ass'n & Zi Teng, Fighting for Our Rights: How Sex Workers in Hong Kong
Are Negotiating for More Respect and Protection, 12 RES. FOR SEX WORK 13 (2010),
www.nswp.org/resource/research-sex-work-1 2-sex-work-and-violence.
32. Sex Workers at Risk: Condoms as Evidence of Prostitution in Four US Cities, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (July 19, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/19/sex-workers-risk/condoms-
evidence-prostitution-four-us-cities.
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framework that undermines the health of sex workers. HIV
criminalization refers to the use of criminal law to prosecute individuals
for transmitting HIV, exposing another person to HIV, or having even
protected sex without disclosing HIV status.
Laws criminalizing HIV transmission and exposure began to appear
shortly after the epidemic was identified. By 1986,33 three states passed
HIV laws criminalizing exposure or transmission of HIV (Florida, Ten-
nessee and Washington). In 1989, the American Legislative AIDS Ex-
change Council (ALEC), an organization of state legislators that believe
in limited governments, free markets, and federalism, and often linked to
conservative efforts,34 recommended in an model statute language for an
HIV Assault Law.35 The next year, 22 states had enacted their first law
criminalizing HIV transmission or exposure. Nearly eight years after
AIDS was first detected, the federal government passed its first piece of
legislation on AIDS, the Ryan White Care Act, named after a young boy
who died after contracting HIV through a blood transfusion. The 1990
Ryan White Care Act created incentives to criminalize HIV transmission
and exposure.36 The Act stated the following:
The Secretary may not make a grant under section 2641 to a State
unless the chief executive officer determines that the criminal laws of
the State are adequate to prosecute any HIV infected individual,
subject to the condition described in subsection (b), who-(1) makes
a donation of blood, semen, or breast milk, if the individual knows
that he or she is infected with HIV and intends, through such
donation, to expose another HIV [sic] in the event that the donation is
utilized; (2) engages in sexual activity if the individual knows that he
or she is infected with HIV and intends, through such sexual activity,
to expose another to HIV; and (3) injects himself or herself with a
hypodermic needle and subsequently provides the needle to another
person for purposes of hypodermic injection, if the individual knows
that he or she is infected and intends, through the provision of the
needle, to expose another to such etiologic agent in the event that the
needle is utilized.37
33. See J. Stan Lehman et at., Prevalence and Public Health Implications of State Laws that
Criminalize Potential HIV Exposure in the United States, 18 AIDS & BEHAV. 997, 998 (2014).
34. Nancy Scola, Exposing ALEC: How Conservative Backed State Laws Are All Connected,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/exposing-alec-how-
conservative-backed-state-laws-are-all-connected/255869/.
35. MICHAEL TANNER & ALEC NAT'L WORKING GRP. ON STATE AIDS POLICY, THE
POLITICS OF HEALTH: A STATE RESPONSE TO THE AIDS CRISIS 93-94 (1989),
https://www.propublica.org/documents/item/726593-the-politics-of-health-1989; see also Sergio
Hernandez, Iowa Court Tosses Sentence in HIV Exposure Case, PROPUBLICA (June 16, 2014, 11:00
AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/iowa-court-tosses-sentence-in-hiv-exposure-case.
36. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
381, § 2647, 104 Stat. 576.
37. Id. § 2647(a) (emphasis added).
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Over time, approximately thirty-three states have criminalized HIV
transmission and exposure with varied rates of prosecution.38 These laws
vary from state to state, but some reach widely to include any sexual
activity of an HIV-positive person, regardless of risk of exposure or ac-
tual transmission, regardless of the consensual nature of the sexual ac-
tivity, or whether the sexual partner was warned of the HIV risk.3 9 In
addition, individuals have been prosecuted for HIV transmission and
exposure in several states under general assault laws or laws
criminalizing the transmission of sexually transmitted infections that are
not HIV specific.40 These laws and prosecutions have been generally
decried by advocates for public health, and for the rights of people with
HIV/AIDS, as contributing to stigma and discrimination, and as having a
negative public health impact.4 1 It has been shown that incarceration of
HIV-positive people does not prevent the spread of HIV, it merely trans-
fers risk of infections to the prison context while exposing people living
with HIV to mistreatment.42 For sex workers who face prosecution on the
grounds of prostitution, the criminalization of HIV transmission and ex-
posure can lead to harsher sentencing and entangle individuals further in
the criminal justice system.
II. PENALIZING SEX WORKERS LIVING WITH HIV
In this part, we will describe how sex workers living with HIV are
further penalized for their HIV status, regardless of any actual transmis-
sion or risk of transmission they pose. Laws targeting HIV-positive sex
workers are sometimes nestled with antiprostitution laws in statutory
codes, rather than alongside laws pertaining to HIV. While prostitution is
generally considered a minor crime under state law, sex workers who are
HIV positive are more likely to be charged and convicted of a felony
offense because of the interaction of laws criminalizing HIV exposure,
laws criminalizing sex work, and mandatory HIV testing laws.
A. Methodology
We searched state databases on Westlaw to identify which states
criminalize HIV transmission and exposure and criminalize sex work
38. State-by-State Chart of HIV-Specific Statutes and Prosecutorial Tools, CTR. FOR HIV L.
& POL'Y [hereinafter State Chart I],
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www.hivlawandpolicy.org/files/State%2OBy%20State%20HI
V%20Laws%2OChart%20updated%2010-21-13.pdf (last updated Oct. 21, 2013).
39. See 1 RASHIDA RICHARDSON ET AL., THE CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY, ENDING &
DEFENDING AGAINST HIV CRIMINALIZATION: A MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES 3-5 (2015).
40. State Chart I, supra note 38.
41. See, e.g., Edwin Cameron, Criminalization of HIV Transmission: Poor Public Health
Policy, 14 HIV/AIDS POL'Y & L. REV. 1, 1, 63 (2009); Jfirgens et al., supra note 8, at 163.
42. HIV Among Incarcerated Populations, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/group/correctional.htmi (last updated July 22, 2015); see also Elizabeth
Kantor, HIV Transmission and Prevention in Prisons, HIV INSITE (Apr. 2006),
http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/InSite?page=kb-07-04-13.
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while HIV positive. Further, we looked for statutes that made HIV test-
ing mandatory for people arrested on prostitution charges.43
B. State Laws at the Intersection of Sex Work and HIV
Laws/ Character- AL AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE
istics 44 45 46 47 48 49




Prostitution Re- X X X X X X
lated Conduct
Results in Testing







Person Tested *X X X X X X5o
Judge/Court/Prose X X X X
cuting Attorney/
State Agency
Person with X X X5
Whom Defendant
43. C.f RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 39, at 270-91 (describing a sampling of prosecutions
and arrests for HIV exposure in the United States from 2008-2014).
44. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1415 (2016).
45. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-82-102, 16-82-101 (2015).
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1603.1, 120292, 12022.85 (2016).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. §§18-3-415, 18-3-415.5 (2015).
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102a (2016).
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1345 (2016).
50. And defendant's spouse. Id § 1345(c).
51. Upon request of victim. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102a.
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52. If court orders. Id
53. D.C. CODE §§ 22-3901, 22-3902 (2016).
54. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.08(3) (2015).
55. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-13.1 (2015).
56. IDAHO CODE § 39-604 (2015).
57. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.10 (2016).
58. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-41-8-6, 35-38-1-10.5 (West 2016). IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-9.5
requires a probation officer to obtain HIV information from the state department of health if a de-
fendant is convicted of a "criminal sexual act."
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And defendant's spouse. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-13.1(b) (2015).
Court has discretion to reveal results to anyone else. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.10.
Counseling/referrals must be offered. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3902(c).
When the individual is incarcerated. IDAHO CODE § 39-604(6) (2015).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 438.250 (West 2016).
MICH. COMP. L. ANN. §§ 333.5114, 333.5129, 791.267 (West 2016).
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67. There is no state law against Prostitution, but mandatory testing statute applies to local
ordinances against Prostitution. MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 333.5129.
68. Department of Health engages in partner notification. Id.
69. Only if convicted of promoting charges. Id.
70. If only arrested/charged. Id.
71. Only with knowledge.
72. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2016).
73. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2290 (2016).
74. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 201.358, 209.385 (2015).
75. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-5.1 (2016).
76. Within the discretion of the court. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 567.120.
77. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when a person has been convicted of sexual
assault pursuant to sections 28-317 to 28-320, sexual assault of a child in the second or third degree
pursuant to section 28-320.01, sexual assault of a child in the first degree pursuant to section 28-
319.01, or any other offense under Nebraska law when sexual contact or sexual penetration is an
element of the offense, the presiding judge shall, at the request of the victim as part of the sentence
of the convicted person when the circumstances of the case demonstrate a possibility of transmission
of the human immunodeficiency virus, order the convicted person to submit to a human immunode-
ficiency virus antibody or antigen test. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-22.
78. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 567.120.
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79. Testing upon arrest. Id.
80. The department of health and senior services or local law enforcement agency, victim or
others may file a complaint with the prosecuting attorney or circuit attorney of a court of competent
jurisdiction alleging that a person has violated a provision of subsection I of this section. Id. §
191.677.
81. Disclosure to the Department of Health and Human Services. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2290.
82. Referred to services/treatment. Id
83. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07-07.5 (2015).
84. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3701.243, 5120-9-58 (2015).
85. "B. Any person who engages in an act of prostitution with knowledge that they are infect-
ed with the human immunodeficiency virus shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment
in the custody of the Department of Corrections for not more than five (5) years..." OKLA. STAT. tit.
21 § 1031 (2016).
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duct Results in Testing
Testing Upon Charge or X X X X X
Conviction (mandatory
and/or recommended testing)
Defendant MAY be tested
Defendant MUST be tested X X 92 X X X
Test Result Disclosure -
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07-07(2).
87. 42 R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 23-6.3-7, 42-56-37 (2016).
88. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-740, 44-29-100, 44-29-136 (2016).
89. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-35B-8, 23A-35B-12 (2016).
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-521 (2016).
91. UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-36 (West 2015).
92. Tested by petition and not prostitution specific. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740.
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Can petition for disclosure. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §23A-35B-12.
"Shall" be treated. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-6.3-7, 42-56-37 (2016).
If deemed appropriate. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-100.
42 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-6.3-7,42-56-37.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346.1 (2015).
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.340 (2016).
W. VA. CODE §§ 16-3C-2, 16-3C-3 (2016).
Sentencing judge can order the test. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.340.
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vices for Person Tested mi-- i-
Defendant MUST partake X1o1 X X
in Services/Treatment
Defendant is Offered Ser-
vices/Treatment
C. Discussion ofLaws
1. Mandatory HIV Testing of Sex Workers
At least twenty-five states now require that a person charged with,
or convicted of, engaging in prostitution undergo testing for HIV, other
STIs, or both.102 States have been found to be authorized to carry out
court-imposed mandatory testing for the purpose of detecting, prevent-
ing, and deterring the spread of HIV from and within high risk groups.
Court-mandated HIV testing for prostitution-related charges is nei-
ther uniform nor always clearly defined in state criminal statutes. This
section will describe the range of testing provisions found, which vary in
when they are imposed, and in administration and disclosure of results.
This section will then examine which constitutional rights are implicated
by these factors for sex workers subjected to mandatory testing.
2. When Is Mandatory HIV Testing Imposed?
HIV testing is imposed at various stages in the criminal justice pro-
cess. At least nine states-Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, and Tennessee-prescribe testing
when someone is merely arrested or charged with a prostitution-related
offense, without a criminal conviction.10 3 Some states require the judge
to impose the test upon arrest, while others allow the judge to exercise
discretion in whether or not to impose it.1' For example, in Arkansas,
the judge has discretion to require an individual charged with a prostitu-
tion-related crime to be tested if there is "reasonable cause to believe that
the person committed the offense."'0 5 In Missouri, judges have discretion
to mandate testing as a condition to issuing bond only if the defendant
has a prior prostitution-related conviction.'06 In other states, judges simp-
ly have discretion-they may mandate the test-but there are no cases
defining or interpreting the scope of judicial discretion for preconviction
101. "[S]hall receive counseling . ... " VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346.1(A).
102. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102a(a) (2016) (stating that at the court's discretion, a
venereal examination shall also be administered); see also Section II.B.
103. See supra Section II.B.
104. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.15.300(a),(c)-(d) (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102a(a);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.5129(1) (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.4-01(1) (2015).
105. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-82-101(b)(1) (2015).
106. Mo. REV. STAT. § 567.120 (2016).
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testing. In one state, Florida, a defendant may him or herself request that
testing be administered by the Department of Health.10 7
At least eighteen states-Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
D.C., Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
West Virginia-prescribe HIV testing upon a prostitution-related convic-
tion.1os In some jurisdictions, judges retain discretion in determining
whether to mandate an HIV test while the case is still pending.109 Some
states have both arrest and postconviction testing provisions. For in-
stance, Florida allows a person under arrest to request HIV testing but
requires HIV testing for a conviction.o10 In Delaware, mandatory testing
of someone convicted of prostitution may be stayed if an appeal is
filed."'
In some states, mandatory testing is triggered when the victim
makes a request. In Connecticut, D.C., Ohio, and South Carolina, we find
reference to victim requests in the mandatory testing statutes.112 In Ohio,
for example, mandatory testing is imposed if an alleged victim makes a
request to the court, even if the defendant is not convicted of prostitu-
tion." In D.C.'14 and South Carolina', the testing of a person convicted
of prostitution is only mandatory if a victim requests it. Some states al-
low parties other than victims to request and trigger mandatory testing of
the defendant. Such parties may be defined as a "person with whom the
defendant engaged in sexual penetration during the course of the
crime,"H6 or even more broadly, as "any other person whom the court
reasonably believes had contact with the accused in circumstances relat-
ed to the violation that could have resulted in the transmission to that
person of the human immunodeficiency virus."' 17 This latter statute from
Ohio could be read to mean that any former client of an accused sex
worker could request that the sex worker be forced to have an HIV test.
The terminology of victim as a reference to clients of sex workers
occurs because HIV-testing statutes also often apply to sexual offenses
like sexual assault, where there are victims of nonconsensual sex. In
Ohio, for example, the governing statute on mandatory HIV testing ap-
plies to six "sex offenses": rape, sexual battery, unlawful sexual conduct
107. FLA. STAT. § 796.08(2) (2016).
108. See supra Section II.B.
109. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-5 (2016).
110. FLA. STAT. § 796.08.
111. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1345(e) (2016).
112. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102a(b) (2016); D.C. CODE § 22-3902(a) (2016); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.27(A)(1) (West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740(B) (2015).
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907,27(A)(1).
114. D.C. CODE § 22-3902(a) (formerly cited as D.C. CODE § 24-492 (1981)).
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740(B).
116. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-82-101(c)(1) (2015).
117. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.27(B)(1)(a).
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with a minor, engaging in prostitution, solicitation or loitering for the
purpose of prostitution, and engaging or soliciting for the purpose of
prostitution with the knowledge of positive HIV status." However,
when the word victim is applied to prostitution charges, it is typically in
reference to consensual sex referring instead to the individual who has
been exposed to or contracted HIV.
3. Which Crimes Trigger Mandatory Testing?
States' mandatory testing provisions are triggered by a variety of
crimes. In Idaho, for example, the state may order persons to be tested if
they are charged with one of a list of enumerated crimes, including "any
crime in which body fluid has likely been transmitted to another."ll9
In the case of prostitution, there is usually no additional requirement
that there be an actual risk of exposure, transmission, or even a sexual
act. For example, in Kentucky, "a person is guilty of prostitution when
he engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another
person in return for a fee."120 This language, common to many state laws
against prostitution, requires no sexual act but merely an offer or agree-
ment to engage in a sexual act. However, most states require only an
arrest or conviction of prostitution, not any additional proof of possible,
potential, or actual exposure to HIV, to impose mandatory testing.12 1
Some states reach even wider: in Tennessee, a person will be mandatori-
ly tested if convicted of promoting prostitution, a crime that does not
even involve sexual activity with the defendant.122
There are a few exceptions. In Michigan, for example, mandatory
testing is only required if there is a court determination that there is "rea-
son to believe the violation involved sexual penetration or exposure to a
body fluid of the defendant," although the court still has discretion to
impose testing without this finding. 23 In South Carolina, testing is only
imposed if a "victim" requests it and demonstrates that " here is probable
cause that during the commission of the criminal offense there was a risk
that body fluids were transmitted from one person to another."1 24 In Con-
118. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.27(A)(1).
119. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-604(4) (2015).
120. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.020(1) (West 2016).
121. See supra Section II.B. An exception is the few states where testing is only mandatory
where a "victim" or someone who had sex with the defendant requests the t st. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1415(B) (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243.
122. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-521(e) (2016); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1311(1)
(West 2015).
123. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5129(1), (3) (2016).
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740(B)(2) (2016) (testing certain convicted offenders for Hepati-
tis B and HIV); see also State v. Houey, 651 S.E.2d 314, 318 (S.C. 2007) ("We hold that the State
need not show probable cause that an offender has a disease before testing may be ordered pursuant
to § 16-3-740(B), provided the statutory requirements have been met.").
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necticut, a judge may impose testing only if the violation "involved a
sexual act."l25
4. How and by Whom Are Mandatory Tests Administered?
States also vary in their schemes to administer HIV tests to suspect-
ed or convicted sex workers, demonstrating an entanglement in the law
between criminal codes and public health regulation. In fact, some man-
datory testing laws are codified within public health statutes intended for
prevention of communicable diseases, as opposed to in the penal code.1 2 6
These statutes give judges the authority to distribute educational materi-
als about sexually transmitted diseases, to order testing, and to perform
other duties normally associated with medical professionals or govern-
mental health agencies.127
Some states require that judges impose the test as part of the sen-
tence or a condition of release, but it appears that he defendant must
arrange for the test and pay for it. For example, in Colorado, the court
must order the test, and the test must be carried out by "a facility that
provides ongoing health care," but the defendants must pay the costs of
the test, and it is unclear whether the defendants must arrange the test
themselves, or if the court will order him or her to appear at a certain
health facility at a certain time.128 Delaware vaguely decrees that a per-
son shall be ordered to undergo testing at his or her expense but it does
not specify by whom, when, or where.12 9 Some states, such as Florida,
order that the test be performed "under direction of the Department of
Health."1 30 Nevada's law specifies that the test must be one approved by
the State Board of Health but that it also must return results within thirty
days.i13 In Washington, where the mandated testing statute is part of pub-
lic health laws, the local health departments are subject to a mandate to
ensure that persons convicted of prostitution are tested within seventy-
two hours after a court's order.1 32 Most strikingly, in Utah, if the person
being tested is already confined to jail or prison, law enforcement partic-
ipates directly in administering the test.133 To comply with the statute,
law enforcement must obtain the blood specimen, deliver it to the lab,
and develop a "medical file" on the defendant containing the results.134
125. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102a(a)-(b) (2016).
126. See supra Section I.B.
127. Notably, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5129(2), states that "the judge or magistrate responsi-
ble for setting the individual's conditions of release pending trial shall distribute to the individual the
information on venereal disease and HIV infection" and, W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2(f)(10) (2016),
gives the judge to order additional tests if an HIV-related test results in a negative reaction.
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-201.5(1)(a), (3)(a) (2015).
129. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 1345(a), (d) (2016).
130. FLA. STAT. § 796.08(2) (2016).
131. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.356(l) (2015).
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.340(l)(b), (4) (2016).
133. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1311(2)-(4) (West 2015).
134. Id. § 76-10-1311(3)-(5), (8)(a).
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What is unclear in the statutes, especially in cases where law enforce-
ment is directly responsible for testing, is whether the accepted standards
of care in administering HIV tests are adhered to in the case of mandato-
ry testing, protocols that include risk assessment, consent, pre- and post-
counseling, and training on the part of testing personnel.
5. To Whom Are HIV Test Results Disclosed?
Once a test for HIV is performed, a separate issue arises of who has
access to the test results. Normally, individuals have a respected privacy
interest in their HIV test results that is protected under federal and state
HIV and AIDS confidentiality statutes. For example, Florida's confiden-
tiality statute states that all information and records relating to HIV tests
conducted by the Public Health Department are treated as strictly confi-
dential, disclosed only to the person tested.'35 Exceptions to strict confi-
dentiality generally require informed written consent by the tested indi-
vidual or a medical emergency.'36 Some states allow for disclosure to
known sexual partners of the person tested.'37 Other states and territories
require that people testing HIV positive be reported by name to state
health departments for record-keeping purposes.'38 These name-based
registries are used to develop estimates of the HIV rates in the state.
However, most states allow broader disclosure of the results of
mandatory testing of suspected sex workers. In Georgia, the test result
can be disclosed to the defendant's spouse with the defendant's mandat-
ed "consent,"'39 and in Michigan, the results are also subject to partner
notification.'" Mandatory partner notification of positive HIV test results
may go into effect in other states, even where the HIV test was noncon-
sensual. In twelve states, the results can also be given to the alleged vic-
tim or other indicated person who had sex with the defendant in the
course of the crime.141
In Virginia, the statute specifically indicates that results from a
mandated HIV test are confidential and cannot be admitted to court in a
proceeding related to prostitution.142 But in at least eighteen states, the
HIV test result of a person tested under these statutes is also provided to
the prosecutorial agency, the court, the local police department, or other
135. See FLA. STAT. § 384.29(1).
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740(B)(3), (C) (2016).
138. See supra Section I.B.
139. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-13.1(b) (2015).
140. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5129(1) (2016).
141. See supra Section I1.B.
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346.1(C)-(D) (2015). Interestingly, a test for Hepatitis C is also
administered by mandate in the same circumstances, and those results can be disclosed to "sheriffs'
offices, the state police, local police departments, adult or youth correctional facilities, salaried or
volunteer firefighters, paramedics or emergency medical technicians, officers of the court, and
regional or local jails" to prevent infection. Id. § 18.2-346.1(C).
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government actors.143 It is relevant to note that, where HIV testing is
mandated upon arrest, the test and the disclosure of results happen even
if the person is found not guilty of prostitution.
This nonconsensual disclosure may facilitate the bringing of further
charges or sentences against the defendant. For example, in Florida, the
results "shall be made available by the Department of Health to the of-
fender, medical personnel, appropriate state agencies, state attorneys, and
courts of appropriate jurisdiction in need of such information in order to
enforce the provisions of this chapter" once the defendant is convicted
and tested.1" Likewise, in Tennessee, "For the sole purpose of determin-
ing whether there is probable cause to prosecute a person for aggravated
prostitution under § 39-13-516, the district attorney general may view the
record, notwithstanding subdivision (b)(2)."l 4 5 In California, the District
Attorney need not provide a reason, the Department of Health must fur-
nish the results "upon request," though the results could be used to sup-
port further charges.146
The protocols for making sure this information at least stays with
these designated actors are wide-ranging. In many states, it is unclear
whether the test result becomes a part of the public court file. In Tennes-
see, the District Attorney must file a written request with the court to
view the test results.147 In Nevada, the Department of Health informs the
arresting law enforcement agency of the results of the test without in-
forming the defendant.148 If the test is negative, law enforcement informs
the court, and the court informs the defendant.149 If the result is positive,
law enforcement informs the defendant and the court, and the defendant
must reappear in court to testify that he or she received those results or
risk a bench warrant.50
In Illinois, the statute indicates that "the results . . . shall be kept
strictly confidential" and must be "personally delivered in a sealed enve-
lope" to the judge for inspection in camera.151 The judge then has discre-
tion to reveal the results in "the best interests of the victim and the pub-
lic."1 5 2 In several states, the public can be informed of a person's status
for the stated reason of informing and protecting the public and any al-
leged victims from communicable diseases.153 Where mandated tests
143. See supra Section II.B.
144. FLA. STAT. § 796.08(3) (2016).
145. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-521(e) (West 2016).
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(d) (West 2016).
147. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-521(e).
148. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.356(2) (2015).
149. Id. § 201.356(2)-(3).
150. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.356(2)-(4).
151. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3(g) (2016).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3(g); see also People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574,
581 (Ill. 1992).
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result in charges of transmission or exposure of HIV, and these charges
are part of the public record, a person's HIV status is necessarily made
public. This has been found to be permissible even when it results in
news media broadcasting the defendant's status.154
6. After Testing, What Role Does the Court Play in Treatment or
Counseling?
Standard protocols around HIV testing include requirements for
pre- and post-test counseling and immediate linkage to treatment services
upon receipt of an HIV-positive result. The criminal statutes that man-
date HIV testing interact with these requirements in a variety of ways. In
eight states with mandated testing of sex workers, there is no mention of
providing pre- or post-test counseling, treatment, or eferrals in the stat-
utes. While such protocols may be followed as a matter of course
when testing is administered by state departments of health or other regu-
lated providers, it is not clear whether such services are further funded or
guaranteed to defendants. In ten states, the statute contains a requirement
to at least offer services. 156 In five states-Florida, Kentucky, New Mex-
ico, Ohio, and West Virginia-courts are vested with the power to man-
date services, treatment, or both.157 In New Mexico, the court may view
the results and "shall sentence any diseased defendant to submit to medi-
cal treatment until he is discharged from treatment as noninfectious."15 8
7. Constitutionality of Mandated Testing
Defendants have argued that taking blood to administer an HIV test
mandated by the state is a "search" as understood by the Fourth Amend-
ment because it intrudes upon the defendant's bodily integrity and gath-
ers information in which the defendant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.159 Thus, it is analogous to a blood alcohol test performed by the
state, found to be a search in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives 'Asso-
ciation.160 As the Supreme Court held in Skinner,
154. See In re Application of MULTIMEDIA KSDK, INC., 581 N.E.2d 911, 913-14 (111. App.
Ct. 1991).
155. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-82-101 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-201.5 (2015); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 54-102a (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1345 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-13.1
(2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.356; N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07-07.5 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
10-1312 (West 2015).
156. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(d) (West 2016); D.C. CODE § 22-3903(b) (2016); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 39-604(6) (2015); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3(g); MIcH. COMP. LAWS §
333.5129(2) (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-5.1(B) (2016); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-34.1-12(b)
(2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-521(e) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346.1(A) (2015);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.340(4) (2016).
157. See supra Section II.B.
158. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-5. It is unclear how this statute would apply in the case of HIV,
where there is no known cure or treatment that results in a patient being "noninfectious."
159. See, e.g., State v. Houey, 651 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C. 2007).
160. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
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In light of our society's concern for the security of one's person, it is
obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, in-
fringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable. The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain
physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee's pri-
vacy interests.
161
Searches and seizures must be "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment. Whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment is a ques-
tion of balancing the intrusion on privacy interests versus the state's in-
terests in doing this search.162 There are situations beyond the normal
scope of law enforcement that warrant an exception to the normal re-
quirements of probable cause for practicality reasons. In these circum-
stances, where the court is determining if there are "special governmental
needs," courts balance the state's need against the scope of the intrusion
on the individual.163 Mandatory HIV-testing requirements have been
found constitutional in a variety of circumstances under the exception of
"special government needs."164 State statutes that mandate HIV testing
for a person charged with, or convicted of, a crime in which sexual con-
tact is an essential element have been found to be constitutionally valid,
even where there is no "probable cause" to believe that the defendant is
actually infected with HIV. For example, in In re JG., N.S., and T.,1 6 5
the court sought to compel HIV testing for the defendant who was ac-
cused of aggravated assault.'66 The New Jersey Superior Court, Appel-
late Division held that the mandatory testing statute did not violate feder-
al or state search and seizure clauses.'67 In In re Juveniles A, B, C, D,
E, 8 the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute mandating HIV
testing of juvenile sexual offenders did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.169 In California, a statute mandating HIV testing of arrested per-
sons where there is probable cause to believe that a transfer of bodily
fluid could have occurred between the accused and a public safety officer
was found constitutional when applied to a person who bit a police of-
ficer.170 Although the court recognized that that there was no probable
cause to believe that the defendant was HIV positive and that the likeli-
hood of HIV transmission by biting was negligible, the court found the
application of the statute constitutional because of the special govern-
161. Id.
162. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-90 (1980).
163. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
164. Houey, 651 S.E.2d at 316.
165. 674 A.2d 625 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
166. Id. at 627.
167. Id. at 626, 634.
168. 847 P.2d 455 (Wash. 1993).
169. Id. at 463.
170. Johnetta v. Mun. Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 685 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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ment need.'7 ' This need was identified as the state's interest in protecting
the health and safety of its employees in the line of duty.
Mandatory HIV testing for those arrested for prostitution asks the
Fourth Amendment for even more leniency. These searches invade a
defendant's bodily integrity and retrieve the most private information
without a warrant and without a showing of probable cause that the per-
son has HIV, transmitted HIV, or even engaged in an activity capable of
transmitting HIV. These statutes apply where there is no "victim," let
alone a protected category of persons like police officers, who may be at
risk. However, in the few constitutional challenges to prostitution-related
mandated testing statutes, they, too, have been found constitutional.
In Love v. Superior Court,172 the California mandatory-testing stat-
ute was challenged under the Fourth Amendment.173 This statute man-
dates testing and HIV education upon conviction for prostitution, and the
results can be disclosed to the District Attorney.174 The court identified
the special government need by looking outside the statute to other legis-
lative materials identifying HIV as an urgent public health matter, and
testing and counseling as one means of stopping its spread.'7 5 The court
took judicial notice of a 1986 publication by the federal Department of
Health and Human Services, which advised testing prostitutes and in-
structing them to discontinue prostitution if HIV positive.17
The petitioner in Love questioned whether HIV prevention was real-
ly the special governmental need served by the testing statute, claiming
that, instead, the goal was to collect evidence to be used against the de-
fendant in the future.'77 The California Court of Appeals found that the
testing requirement was not a search for evidence because it required an
"AIDS prevention education program" to provide "at a minimum" in-
formation about the disease and "resources for assistance." Instead, the
court categorized it as a public health measure intended to prevent the
spread of HIV. The court reasoned that mandatorily testing individuals
who are sex workers is needed as a deterrent mechanism to prevent this
group from engaging in "acts known to spread the disease."7 9 Accord-
ingly, mandatory HIV testing is permissible in California for soliciting to
engage in prostitution, even though the crime does not involve sexual
contact. This is justified by the argument that such testing addresses the
171. Id. at 671, 679, 685.
172. 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
173. Id. at 662.
174. Id. at 663.
175. Id. at 663-64.
176. Id. at 664 & n.5.
177. Id. at 664.
178. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(d) (1990)).
179. Id. (noting petitioners' challenge of the mandatory HIV testing for prostitution-related
charges claimed that the statute was a violation of their U.S. constitutional Fourth Amendment
rights).
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issue of informing "high risk" groups about their status "for their own
protection and that of those to whom they could transmit the virus."'80
Although the test reveals private medical information, the court found
that the fact that these results are only disclosed to the District Attorney,
and only for purposes of bringing higher charges, renders this intrusion
minimal.' 8 ' Disclosure of test results to the prosecutor also fulfills the
legislature's legitimate aim "to control the spread of AIDS, in part by
providing a deterrent to prostitution activity by one who knows he or she
is infected with the AIDS virus."' 82
In People v. Adams, two women convicted of prostitution filed
motions challenging the constitutionality of the Illinois statute requiring
them to undergo mandatory testing for HIV.'" The defendants raised
constitutional claims, including "that the statute violated their rights to
privacy, to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and to ...
equal protection."'85 They also challenged the testing requirement as a
sentence, claiming it was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.'86 They presented expert witnesses who testified
that the criminalization of HIV exposure was an ineffective means of
stopping the spread of HIV.' 87 The trial court determined that the testing
procedure represented an illegal search and seizure.'8 The trial judge
found that the personal intrusion required by the testing was unreasona-
ble because the statute did require the state to articulate an "individual-
ized suspicion" that the person was HIV positive before mandating the
test and because the state failed to prove that the intended social benefits
to the state outweighed the privacy intrusion.189 The court also found the
statute denied the defendants equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'90
The State appealed, and the Supreme Court of Illinois issued a thor-
ough opinion fatal to the defendants' claims. The court reviewed the his-
tory of mandatory testing as applied to sex offenders and IV drug offend-
ers, which had been held to be constitutionally valid.'9 ' Then, it exam-
ined the mandatory testing statute as a means of advancing a special gov-
ernment need of preventing HIV and safeguarding the health of the pub-
lic by targeting "at risk" populations for testing. 92 While the defendants
180. Id.
181. See id. at 664-66.
182. Id at 665.
183. 597 N.E.2d 574 (111. 1992).
184. Id. at 576.




189. Id. at 579.
190. Id. at 576.
191. Id. at 607-09.
192. See id.
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argued that public health experts have shown this to be an ineffective
means of curtailing HIV, and that their convictions involved no sexual
acts, the court nevertheless claimed that the statute fell under the state's
broad police powers to advance public health.9 3 Ironically, the court
used the urgency of the HIV epidemic as a weapon against the defend-
ants, stating that his interest outweighed the need for a warrant, probable
cause, or even any articulable suspicion that the defendants were HIV
positive. The language used by the court continually demonized sex
workers as spreaders of disease, saying that the state's interest was one
of "self defense" against such diseased individuals. 94 Without evidence,
it claimed that nonconsensual testing and disclosure would lead to treat-
ment and a slowing of the spread of disease.19 5 It also implied that it
would be too impractical for a judge to have to articulate an individual
suspicion, as there are rarely grounds to suspect someone is infected with
HIV beyond their "membership in a high-risk group."196 The court went
further to judge the intrusion of an HIV test to be "relatively slight" in
light of the reduced privacy interests of offenders after conviction. 97 The
court concluded that the statute did not constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure.
B. Criminalization of Sex Work While HIV Positive
Approximately thirty-two states, two territories, and the federal aw
currently criminalize either exposure to or transmission of HIV. 198 Four-
teen of these jurisdictions specifically criminalize, or have heightened
penalties for, persons who are HIV positive and are charged with a pros-
titution-related offence. ' These jurisdictions include California, Colora-
do, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Guam.200 Sex work-
ers discovered to be HIV positive may also be charged under more gen-
eral laws that criminalize HIV exposure through sexual activity, even if
193. Id. at 609-10.
194. See id at 607; see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) ("Upon the
principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against
an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.").
195. Adams, 597 N.E.2d at 607.
196. Id. at 609.
197. Id. at 608.
198. State-by-State Chart of HIV-Specific Statutes and Prosecutorial Tools, CNTR. FOR HIV L.
& POL'Y [hereinafter State Chart II],
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www.hiviawandpolicy.org/files/State%2By%/2OState%20H1
V%20Laws%20Chart%20updated%2010-21-13.pdf (last updated Oct. 21, 2013).
199. Id.
200. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.85(a) (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-415.5(5)(b)
(2015); FLA STAT § 796.08(5) (2016); GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 529.090(2)-(4) (West 2016); Mo. REV. STAT. § 567.020(2) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. §
201.358(b) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.24 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1031
(2016); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902(a)(4) (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145(2) (2016); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-516(a) (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1309 (West 2015); 9 GUAM CODE
ANN. § 28.10(b)(3) (2015).
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no prostitution-related HIV exposure offense exists. Additional states
where a sex-related HIV exposure crime exists are Arkansas, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Virginia, and Washington.201
States that have both mandatory testing of sex workers and laws specifi-
cally raising penalties for prostitution while HIV positive are California,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Penn-
202sylvania, Tennessee, and Utah.
1. What Are the Elements of Prostitution-While-HIV-Positive
Crimes?
In most states, it is enough to offer or agree to engage in sexual
conduct to be charged with prostitution. In other states, loitering in a
public space with the intent of offering to engage in sexual conduct can
result in a prostitution charge. For example, in Pennsylvania, the defini-
tion of prostitution includes being "an inmate of a house of prostitution
or otherwise engag[ing] in sexual activity as a business; or . . . loiter[ing]
in or within view of any public place for the purpose of being hired to
engage in sexual activity." 2 03 Because of how prostitution is policed,
many people arrested for prostitution are arrested either after police ob-
serve the individual loitering in an area known for prostitution or after an
undercover officer secures an agreement or offer to exchange sexual
conduct for a fee.2 04 Thus, many arrests for prostitution occur without
any sexual conduct occurring.
In some states, the prostitution-while-HIV-positive statute makes
explicit that even if there is only an offer to engage in sexual conduct, it
is enough to charge the defendant with the HIV exposure crime. For ex-
ample, in Colorado, while the prostitution statute usually requires some
act in furtherance of the agreement or offer to engage in sexual conduct
for a fee, the HIV-criminalization statute specifies that "[a]ny person
who performs or offers or agrees to perform any act of sexual inter-
course, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal intercourse . . . in ex-
change for money or any other thing of value," with knowledge of being
infected with HIV is guilty of the crime of "prostitution with knowledge
of being infected with acquired immune deficiency syndrome."20 5 Simi-
larly, in Florida, one can be convicted of a third-degree felony if one
"[c]ommits or offers to commit prostitution" with knowledge of one's
206HIV positive status. An offer to commit prostitution does not include
any sexual contact or any HIV exposure risk. At least eight of the fifteen
201. State Chart II, supra note 198.
202. See id.; supra Section II.B.
203. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902(a)(1)-(2).
204. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653.22 (West 2016).
205. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-7-201.7(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
206. FLA. STAT. § 381.004(5) (2016) (emphasis added).
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states that have prostitution-while-HIV-positive crimes explicitly impose
liability without sexual contact.207 One exception is Ohio, where you
must actually "engage in sexual activity for hire" to be charged or con-
victed of prostitution while HIV positive.2 08
In line with the trend of other HIV criminalization statutes, fre-
quently no actual transmission of HIV is required. One state, Tennessee,
after defining its crime of "aggravated prostitution" broadly to include
"engag[ing] in sexual activity as a business or [being] an inmate in a
house of prostitution or loiter[ing] in a public place for the purpose of
being hired to engage in sexual activity," further specifies that "[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to require that an infection with HIV
has occurred in order for a person to have committed aggravated prosti-
tution."209
Some states also increase penalties for other prostitution-related
crimes if the defendant is HIV positive, most often those crimes that pe-
nalize clients of sex workers. For example, in Kentucky, a defendant
faces the same penalty whether convicted of prostitution or "procuring"
another to commit prostitution if he or she is HIV positive and meets the
21
other elements of this crime.2l In California, a person may be charged
with a felony HIV-exposure crime if he or she is HIV positive and faces
charges under Section 647(b), a disorderly conduct statute used to penal-
ize both sex workers and clients of sex workers. 211 Clients of sex workers
are also liable if HIV positive in states including Colorado,212 Florida,213
214 ~ 21521
Kentucky,214 Oklahoma, and South Carolina,216 although different
207. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c)(3) (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
529.090(1) (West 2016). California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Utah, Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Carolina's HIV criminalization statutes also simply require
committing "prostitution," but in these states, either prostitution is not defined in the statute, or
soliciting for prostitution is defined separately. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 266h(a); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-415.5(5); FLA. STAT. § 796.08(2)-(3); MO. REV. STAT. § 567.020(l)-(3) (2016); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 201.354(1) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.24(A)-(C) (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 1028(f) (2016); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902(a)(l)-(4); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145(2) (2016);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-511(6) (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1302(1)(a)-(c) (West 2015).
208. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.25(B), (C)(2).
209. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-516(a), (c).
210. KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.090 (West 2016).
211. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) ("Who solicits or who agrees to engage in or who engages in
any act of prostitution. A person agrees to engage in an act of prostitution when, with specific intent
to so engage, he or she manifests an acceptance of an offer or solicitation to so engage, regardless of
whether the offer or solicitation was made by a person who also possessed the specific intent to
engage in prostitution. No agreement o engage in an act of prostitution shall constitute a violation of
this subdivision unless some act, in addition to the agreement, is done within this state in furtherance
of the commission of an act of prostitution by the person agreeing to engage in that act. As used in
this subdivision, 'prostitution' includes any lewd act between persons for money or other considera-
tion."); see also State Chart 11, supra note 198.
212. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-205.7(2).
213. FLA. STAT. 796.08(5)(b) (2016).
214. KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.090.
215. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1029 (2016).
216. S.C. CODEANN. § 16-15-90(l)-{ll) (2016).
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penalties may attach to clients of sex workers than to sex workers.2 17
However, in Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and Oklahoma, only sex workers
are liable for the HIV-exposure crime, and clients of sex workers face no
similar penalty if HIV positive.2 18 In Georgia, clients of sex workers are
only liable if they solicit an act of "sodomy" but not if they solicit an act
of vaginal sexual intercourse.2 19 Interestingly, in Florida, a person who
"[p]rocures another for prostitution"-a crime brought against clients of
sex workers-must be proven to have not only procured or intended to
engage in sexual activity but to actually have "engage[ed] in sexual ac-
tivity in a manner likely to transmit the human immunodeficiency vi-
rus."220 Thus, a different and much higher standard for conviction is es-
tablished for clients of sex workers than for sex workers.
While sex work itself is not a crime for those working in registered
brothels in Nevada, sex work while HIV positive by those same individ-
uals is a class B felony.22 1 Individuals need not be proven to have en-
gaged in sexual conduct but only to have been employed as a prosti-
tute.2 22 In addition, Nevada imposes liability on third-party managers of
HIV-positive sex workers. Owners of houses of prostitution that employ
a person with knowledge that the person has tested positive for HIV are
are civilly, but not criminally, liable for damages if that person does in
fact transmit HIV to another.223
2. Interaction with Mandatory Testing
Ten states have both mandatory testing of sex workers and laws
specifically raising penalties for prostitution-while-HIV-positive.22 4
Proving that sex workers have knowledge of HIV status, and thus can be
charged with the higher crime, could be facilitated by the existence of
mandatory testing statutes, and some states explicitly connect the opera-
tion of these statutes. In Utah and California, the law provides a mecha-
nism for the outcome of a mandatory test to result in an additional charge
against the defendant upon subsequent prostitution arrests.22 5 In Califor-
217. In Colorado, patronizing a sex worker while HIV positive is a class 6 felony, while prosti-
tution while HIV positive is a class 5 felony. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-201.7(2), 18-7-205.7(2).
218. See State Chart 11, supra note 198.
219. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c)(4) (2015).
220. FLA. STAT. 796.08(5)(b) (2016).
221. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.358(b) (2015).
222. Id.
223. Id. §41.1397.
224. California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee,
and Utah. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.85(a) (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-3-415.5(5)(b)
(2015); FLA. STAT. §796.08(5); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c)(3); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
529.090(2)-(4) (West 2016); Mo. REV. STAT. § 567.020(2) (2016); NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.358(b);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.24(2) (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 103 1(B) (2016); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-29-145(2) (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-516 (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1309 (West 2015); supra Section I.B.
225. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.85(a); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1309.
384 [Vol. 93:2
2016]CRIMINAL LAWS ON SEX WORK AND HIV TRANSMISSION 385
nia, the statute provides that if a person charged with prostitution has
been previously convicted of that charge,
[A]nd in connection with one or more of those convictions a blood
test was administered pursuant to Section 1202.1 or 1202.6 [the man-
datory testing provision] with positive test results, of which the de-
fendant was informed, the previous conviction and positive blood test
results, of which the defendant was informed, shall be charged in the
accusatory pleading. If the previous conviction and informed test re-
sults are found to be true by the trier of fact or are admitted by the de-
fendant, the defendant is guilty of a felony.226
Thus, the HIV testing results actually form part of the criminal
charge against a person subsequently charged with prostitution and cre-
ate a presumption of knowledge on the defendant's part, giving rise to a
felony conviction.
In Utah, HIV positive defendants are eligible for a felony sentence
enhancement if they commit prostitution, solicitation, or patronizing and
have either actual knowledge of their status or have previously been con-
22
victed of prostitution, solicitation, or patronizing.227 The state may as-
sume that the person was informed of their status through mandatory
testing after their first charge. In Nevada, regulated sex workers are re-
quired to undergo regular HIV tests by the Board of Health and are given
routine notifications of their test results. In this state, even if you are not
proven to have actual knowledge of your status, if you were given notice
under the statutory scheme, you are deemed to have knowledge and can
be charged with prostitution-while-HIV-positive. 228
In all of the remaining states, there is no automatic upgrade to the
prostitution-while-HIV-positive charge upon a second arrest.229 Howev-
er, of these eight remaining states, six provide for notice to the District
Attorney, other prosecutorial agency, or arresting law enforcement agen-
cy when a mandatory test returns a positive result.230 It is a safe assump-
tion that the results are provided in order to facilitate an enhanced charge
the next time the individual is arrested, or even in the instant case. In
Colorado, the statute explicitly states that test results are revealed to the
District Attorney who "shall keep the results of such . . . test strictly con-
fidential" unless the results of such test indicate the presence of "the hu-
226. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(f).
227. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1309.
228. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.538(1).
229. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-415.5; FLA. STAT. § 775.0877; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
5-60; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.090; Mo. REV. STAT. § 567.020; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.24; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-80; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-521.
230. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-415.5(2)-(3)(a); FLA. STAT. § 775.0877(2); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 529.090(1); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.356(1)-(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-80; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-521(b)(2)(A(G).
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man immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome" and it is necessary for the purposes of "pleading and
proving the mandatory sentencing provisions."2 3 1
While it is unclear whether, in California, one can be charged with
the prostitution-while-HIV-positive crime upon a first arrest for prostitu-
tion, it is clear that this could happen in any other state, as long as
knowledge of HIV status (where required) is proven. Mandatory testing
and notice of the result is only one way to document that the individual
had knowledge of their HIV status.
3. What Penalties Are Imposed?
Penalties for committing prostitution-while-HIV-positive vary from
state to state, but they generally expand and exceed the penalties normal-
ly available for the underlying prostitution-related crime, and in most
states they carry a felony-level charge.232 In Kentucky, committing either
prostitution or procuring a prostitute while HIV positive is a class D fel-
ony, which carries a possible penalty of five years.233 In Missouri, the
crime of prostitution is raised from a class B Misdemeanor to a class B
Felony if the defendant has knowledge of his or her HIV status, raising
the possible sentence of incarceration from a term not to exceed six
months to between five and fifteen years.23 4 In Nevada, prostitution-
while-HIV-positive is a class B Felony with a minimum penalty of two
years, a $10,000 fine, or both.235
Also, prostitution-while-HIV-positive is categorized under the pros-
titution statutes, as a degree of prostitution, in only four of the fifteen
jurisdictions with prostitution-related HIV exposure crimes. These four
236are Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah. In the remaining nine
jurisdictions, the HIV-exposure crime is separate from the prostitution
statute.2 3 7 This means that the defendant can be charged both with prosti-
tution and with the HIV-exposure crime. For example, in South Carolina,
the statute "Penalty for exposing others to Human Immunodeficiency
Virus" imposes a felony charge on anyone who has sexual intercourse
with another with knowledge of HIV status, including consensual private
sexual activity, prostitution, and forced sexual intercourse, or rape.2 38
231. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-415.5(2)-(3)(a).
232. See State Chart II, supra note 198.
233. KY. REV. STAT. §§ 532.060(2)(d), 529.090(3).
234. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 558.011(2),(6), 567.020(2).
235. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.358(b).
236. See MO. REV. STAT. § 567.020; 0HO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.24 (West 2015); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5902 (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1309 (West 2015).
237. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (2016).
238. Id.
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Thus, this crime can be charged alongside the underlying crime of prosti-
tution, increasing the overall penalties possible for this individual.239
The 2007 case People v. Hall240 illustrates how charges are com-
pounded. Panchita Hall was approached by an undercover vice officer.241
After negotiating a price and agreeing on services, the police officer sig-
naled to another police officer to arrest Hall.242 Hall testified at trial that
she contracted HIV when she was raped in 1996.243 Hall was charged
with felony prostitution because she had a prior conviction for prostitu-
tion after having tested positive for HIV, and she was also charged with
unlawful sex while infected with the HIV virus.244 Hall was acquitted on
the charge of unlawful sex while infected with HIV when the court de-
termined that the State did not prove that Hall intended to infect the un-
dercover office with HIV. 245 However, Hall was sentenced to three years
in prison on the felony prostitution charge.246 In addition, the trial court
sentenced Hall to three additional years as term enhancements.247 The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 2 48
In addition to incarceration, additional penalties are suggested, or
mandated, in some states. For example, in Colorado, the judge may, in
sentencing someone for "prostitution with knowledge of being infected
with acquired immune deficiency syndrome," order that such person
submit to drug treatment or mental health treatment at their own expense,
in addition to any sentence for probation or incarceration.249 In Tennes-
see, those convicted of the prostitution-while-HIV-positive charge are
required to register on the sex offender registry.250
CONCLUSION
There is no evidence to suggest that a carceral approach to sex work
or to HIV transmission helps to address the HIV epidemic. Nor does a
punitive approach address the needs of sex workers vulnerable to con-
tracting HIV, protect the public health, or address the needs of sex work-
ers living with HIV. Instead, it compounds criminal penalties on people
charged with prostitution-related crimes and undermines HIV efforts.
239. See id. § 44-29-145 (2014).
240. No. B190199, 2007 WL 2121912 (Cal. Ct. App. July 25, 2007).
241. Id. at*1.
242. Id.
243. Id. at *2.
244. See id. at *1.
245. Id. at *3.
246. Id.
247. Id
248. Id. at *6.
249. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-201.7(1), (3)(a)-(b) (2015).
250. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-516(a), 40-39-201(b)(5), 40-39-202(20)(A)(iii) (2016);
Carol L. Galletly & Zita Lazzarini, Charges for Criminal Exposure to HIVand Aggravated Prostitu-
tion Filed in the Nashville, Tennessee Prosecutorial Region 2000-2010, 17 AIDS & BEHAV. 2624,
2625 (2013).
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Rather than rely on a punitive approach, it is necessary to invest in
strategies that actually promote HIV prevention and reduce HIV trans-
mission among sex workers and their sexual partners, while promoting
effective treatment and the human rights of sex workers living with HIV.
Documented public health experiences demonstrate that, to date, the
most effective strategy for increasing consistent condom use and reduc-
ing HIV risk among sex workers is community empowerment-based,
peer-mediated HIV prevention programming.251
Despite this evidence, the possibility of creating comprehensive
programs that address the needs of sex workers, and especially sex work-
ers living with HIV, are not possible in our current legal system that pri-
marily aims to prosecute and punish. Effectively curbing the spread of
HIV, and ensuring that those living with HIV have adequate access to
care and treatment, requires shifting away from criminal law responses to
the epidemic.
251. See, e.g., Andrea Wirtz et al., Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Sch. of Pub. Health, Epidemiol-
ogy, Address at the XIX International AIDS Conference, Modeling the Impacts of a Comprehensive
Community Empowerment-Based, HIV Prevention Intervention for Female Sex Workers in Gener-
alized and Concentrated Epidemics: Infections Averted Among Sex Workers and Adults (July 26,
2012), http://pag.aids20l2.org/Abstracts.aspx?AID=18831.
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SYSTEMATIZING PUBLIC DEFENDER RATIONING
IRENE ORITSEWEYINMI JOE1
ABSTRACT
Under-resourced public defenders have little choice but to respond
to overwhelming caseloads by prioritizing certain clients-picking which
cases will receive comprehensive defense representation and which will
not. This practice, termed "triage" given its similarities to medical care in
emergency rooms and army battlefields, is a necessary part of current
public defender practice. But how public defenders are deploying the
practice is problematic and undermines the very goal public defenders
seek to advance. More specifically, the common public defender triage
strategy of focusing on a particular understanding of the Sixth Amend-
ment's effective assistance of counsel mandate actually limits the ability
of public defenders to provide effective assistance of counsel. This "per-
versity effect" of public defender triage practice has gone unnoticed in
both the criminal procedure literature and the literature on the legal pro-
fession.
This Article puts this problem into sharp relief by examining four
very different public defender attorney distribution schemes: DuPage
County, Illinois; Orleans Parish, Louisiana; Santa Barbara County, Cali-
fornia; and the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Georgia. Across these disparate
offices, I show how the public defender triage system's formalistic ap-
proach to right to counsel compromises the overall ability of public de-
fenders to provide effective assistance of counsel. This Article uncovers
the need for a more comprehensive approach to triage, and charges pub-
lic defender institutions with making resource allocation decisions more
effective by elevating them from the individual public defender to the
institutional level.
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Public defender Colleen Polak spends a typical workday running up
and down a set of courthouse stairs-"in and out of four [different Mis-
souri state] courtrooms."' Ms. Polak's physical exertion is necessary for
her to simultaneously represent clients in ten different legal matters.2 She
works weekends in the hopes of providing each of her clients with effec-
tive defense representation, but she acknowledges that she makes diffi-
cult prioritization decisions that leave some clients without the attention
they deserve.3
Public defender Ed Olexa's typical caseload for his Pennsylvania
Public Defender Office results in a quadruple booking on one particular
court morning.4 This means he represents four clients who are scheduled
1. Erik Eckholm, Public Defenders, Bolstered by a Work Analysis and Rulings, Push Back
Against a Tide of Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014, at AIO
2. See id
3. Id.
4. John Rudolf, Pennsylvania Public Defenders Rebel Against Crushing Caseloads,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2012, 11:18 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/pennsylvania-public-defenders-n_1556192.html. Olexa
works for the Luzeme County Defenders Office, which is considered "one of the most troubled
[public defender offices] in the state" of Pennsylvania. Id. His caseload of 120 clients at a time, most
of whom face felony charges, is described as a typical caseload for the office in "a 2011 report
commissioned by the Pennsylvania legislature." Id.
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to appear at the same time before four different judges.5 Not only does
Olexa have to decide between enjoying an evening off the night before
court or organizing his case files, but he also has to choose which of the
four clients' matters he will prioritize when the court sessions begin in
6the morning.
When the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,7 guaranteeing counsel for the nation's poor defendants, it could
not possibly have foreseen that such difficult resource allocation deci-
sions would become a permanent fixture in public defender offices
throughout the nation.8 At the time Gideon was decided, there were only
about 150,000 defendants facing felony charges in need of representa-
tion.9 In the fifty years that have passed since the decision was handed
down, the number of individuals embroiled in the criminal justice system
has ballooned to such a level that there are approximately 2.2 million
people in prison, on probation, or on parole.io There has not been a simi-
lar increase in funding, so public defenders are constantly tasked with
representing more individuals than their limited resources support. The
prevalence of excessive caseloads supports the common understanding
that this nation is suffering from an indigent defense crisis." The public
defender function, made up of the institutions and the public defenders
themselves, was created to ensure fairness in the criminal justice sys-
tem.12 Insufficient resourcing, however, has created a public defender
system that is commonly described as unfair, struggling, and even bro-
ken.13 Public defender stakeholders wage a constant battle for resources
and often find their cries unheard by state legislators.14
5. Id.
6. See id. Olexa comments, "My choice last night was to watch 'American Idol' or get my
files in order." Id.
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. See id. at 335 (providing in the case syllabus that "Sixth Amendment to federal Constitu-
tion providing that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to assistance of
counsel for his defense is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that an
indigent defendant in criminal prosecution in state court has right to have counsel appointed for
him").
9. Heather Baxter, Gideon's Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in
Times ofBudgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 349.
10. See Anthony Zurcher, Report: US Prison Rates an Injustice,' BBC NEWS: ECHO
CHAMBERS (May 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-27260073. In 1973 there
were approximately 200,000 Americans in prison, and by the year 2009 there were about 1.5 million
Americans in prison and approximately 750,000 more housed in local jails. Id.
I1. See, e.g., Linda Chiem, Fla. High Court Says Public Defenders Can Shed Caseload,
LAw360 (May 23, 2013, 4:23 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/444476/fla-high-court-says-
public-defenders-can-shed-caseload; John P. Gross, The Truth About How Public Defenders Handle
Excessive Caseloads, NAT'L ASS'N FOR PUB. DEF. (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://publicdefenders.us/?q=node/673.
12. See Richard Klein, The Role of Defense Counsel in Ensuring a Fair Justice System,
NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW. (June, 2012), https://www.nacdl.org/champion.aspx?id=24996.
13. See NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 50-52 (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE
DENIED], http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf. Even the nation's
former chief prosecutor, Attomey General Eric Holder, has commented on the system's failure to
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Often forgotten in the justifiable movement for adequate resources
is that public defenders and their institutions also wage a simultaneous
battle in managing their responsibilities with the available resources.
These defenders try to ease the burden of compliance by adopting re-
source distribution schemes that reflect what they deem are their most
important obligations. The order of priority given to these obligations is
critical because the resulting schemes determine whether limited re-
sources are effective or not.1 Decisions about which client matters are
given attention first, which client matters are given attention at all, and
everything in between are comparable to triage decisions that physicians
use in emergency rooms or on army battlefields. Unlike in the medical
field, however, individual public defender triage practice is not guided by
a formal prioritization scheme.'6 Instead, individual public defenders,
like Colleen Polak and Ed Olexa, as well as the public defender institu-
tions that manage attorneys like them, process clients using primarily ad
hoc decisions focused on complying with the Sixth Amendment mandate
for effective assistance of counsel.'7 On its surface, this practice seems to
be all that is required and necessary for indigent defense stakeholders. A
closer look at the costs associated with such a single-minded focus for
the distribution of limited resources reveals a very different reality.
As this Article demonstrates, despite their best intentions, the triage
schemes that public defenders use to manage the burden of providing
effective assistance of counsel, despite inadequate resourcing, compound
the problems by creating an environment where arbitrary decisions and
resource fatigue continue to limit access to the attorney resource. This
point is particularly salient because public defenders handle the vast ma-
jority of criminal cases, as high as 80% in some jurisdictions.8 The
meaning of the Sixth Amendment lives or perishes at the fingertips of
public defenders facing overwhelming caseloads with insufficient re-
provide effective assistance of counsel. Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Attorney General Eric Holder
Speaks at the American Bar Association's National Summit on Indigent Defense (Feb. 4, 2012)
(transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-120204.html) ("Across the country,
public defender offices and other indigent defense providers are underfunded and understaffed....
[T]he basic rights guaranteed under Gideon have yet to be fully realized.").
14. See, e.g., Jennifer Burnett, Justice in Jeopardy: Budget Cuts Put State Public Defense
Systems Under Stress, CAPITOL IDEAS, July-Aug. 2010, at 16-17; Bill Rankin, Georgia Legislative
Proposals Could Gut Public Defender Reforms, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS (Mar. 1, 2015),
https://www.schr.org/resources/georgia legislativeproposals could gut public_defenderreforms.
15. Resource exhaustion is a serious concern for any organization saddled with limited re-
sources.
16. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage,
122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2632-33 (2013).
17. Id. at 2631-33; John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1215, 1221-22 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Editorial, Federal Oversight on Public Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/opinion/sunday/federal-oversight-on-public-defense.html
(explaining that Orleans Public Defenders is responsible for 80% of the criminal cases in Orleans
Parish).
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sources. This Article provides new insight on the procedures these attor-
neys currently use to meet the constitutional and professional obligations
of their practice.
Part I of this Article details the constitutional and professional rules
public defenders and public defender administrators must abide by when
managing their overwhelming caseload with insufficient resources. Part
II discusses the individual and institutional responses to the inadequate
resourcing plaguing public defender services. Part III provides concrete
examples with an analysis of four different public defender institutions
and the way each distributes its attorney expertise resource. Part IV pro-
vides an explanation of the consequences that result from the triage
schemes the institutions use and identifies the institution with the most
satisfying, albeit less than ideal, approach. This approach provides a
bandage, rather than a panacea, for system funding decisions, but it re-
mains a critical consideration for those seeking to improve the admin-
istration of public defender resources.
I. GUIDING COUNSEL IN UNDER-RESOURCED REGIMES
In Gideon, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel was fundamental and
essential to a fair system of justice.19 The Court noted that government
agents use substantial resources to prosecute individuals and that our
nation's "noble ideal[s]" of fairness could be achieved only if the state
provides the "guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings"
to those defendants who cannot afford it.20 In this real world of insuffi-
cient funding, however, public defender resources rarely keep pace with
the resources dedicated to he government's prosecutorial function.21 In
the more than fifty years that have passed since the Gideon decision,
many federal, state, and local governments have struggled with providing
the quality of representation guaranteed under the Court's interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment in Gideon and its resulting progeny. State fund-
19. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963). The Court used its opinion in Pow-
ell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), regarding the historical data of the right to counsel to support its
finding. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43, 345.
20. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
21. See, e.g., ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1, 3 (2002) [hereinafter ABA PRINCIPLES],
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal aid indigent defendants/Is_sclai
d def tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf ("There [should be] parity between defense counsel
and the prosecution with respect to resources . . . ...); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA 34 (2004),
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf ("Average
pay in the offices is $64,000 for [prosecutors] and $46,000 for assistant public defenders."); see also
Lawrence Herman, Gideon and the Golden Thread, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2015, 2030 (2014) (advocating
for creation of a State Department of Justice that would ensure parity between public defenders and
prosecutors with regards to pay, staff services, and other tools necessary for investigation and repre-
sentation); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 225-30 (2004) (arguing for resource parity).
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ing decisions on the staff and resources necessary to ensure effective
representation vary widely from state to state, and the general standard of
practice for all poor persons facing criminal charges has failed to keep
pace with the growing complexity and volume of criminal litigation in
22many jurisdictions.
According to national guidelines, public defenders should only han-
dle "150 felonies; 400 misdemeanors; 200 juvenile [delinquency mat-
ters]; 200 mental health cases; or 25 appeals" each calendar year.23 In the
nation's largest 100 counties, public defenders routinely handle an aver-
age of 530 cases annually, which can consist of cases exclusive to one
genre or a mixed caseload.2 4 This finding means that, on average, even if
a defender works every single day without taking breaks for weekends or
holidays, that defender cannot devote even one full day each year exclu-
sively to each case on her docket.
Although larger counties are often the focus of national attention,
the public defender crisis is no less dire in smaller counties. For example,
individual public defenders in the fifty-seven New York counties outside
New York City averaged 680 cases in the year 2013, more than 150% of
22. See Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 Mo. L. REV. 907, 909-10
(2010). States have full authority to reduce already limited funds dedicated to indigent defense
services through a variety of practices because there is minimal constitutional regulation. See id at
908. States will often cover state budget shortfalls for other agencies by setting low hourly rates for
attorneys who represent indigent clients, requiring attorneys to provide pro bono services to the poor,
imposing fee caps on certain types of cases, reducing the amount available for expert assistance, or
even redefining the criteria for qualifying for indigent defense services in order to reduce the amount
of persons who are held to be in need of public defender services. See id at 928-29. Change of party
control or key committee leadership can also affect discretionary funding of public defender pro-
grams. Id. at 929. Indigent defense has been described as epiphenomenal because "it is [the] second-
ary effect of . .. political events and variations [in state funding], rather than a stable function of
constitutional and statutory mandates that closely tie it to the criminal justice system's other compo-
nents." Id. at 908. Until dependence on uncontrollable funding mechanisms changes, "indigent
defense . . . will [always] have long periods of inadequate service [and] systemic crises that are
[only] periodically interrupted by reform efforts . . . prompted by litigation or intervention . . . [by]
state bar associations, [legislatures or] state judiciaries." Id Brown's conclusion is that legislatures
should establish some type of parity between the funds allocated to law enforcement, the prosecuto-
rial function, and the probation or incarceration methods. See id. at 925-28. If his conclusion were
adopted, indigent defense systems would be more stable and, as a result, more effective. Many of the
resource issues plaguing indigent defense systems would also cease to exist.
23. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 13, at 66. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals established these guidelines in a 1973 report. Id. As noted in the above
reference, these caseload numbers are dated, the numbers "were never empirically based" and were
intended "for a public defender's office and not necessarily for each individual attorney in that
office." Id. (quoting NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS,
COURTS 43 (1973)). These numbers do remain the accepted guideposts for public defender practice.
See id at 66-67. The caseload limits ascribed have been adopted by the American Council of Chief
Defenders, a section of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association that includes the heads of
public defender programs throughout the United States. AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFS., AMERICAN
COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS STATEMENT ON CASELOADS AND WORKLOADS 3 (2007).
24. SCoTT WALLACE & DAVID CARROLL, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS'N, THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE STANDARDS 4-5 (2003).
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the recommended limit for the highest caseload allowance.25 Smaller
counties, with numbers such as those in the New York studies, are in-
cluded in systemic litigation efforts in order to convey to a statewide
authority that public defense practice throughout a particular state fails to
meet acceptable representation standards.26 Because the Sixth Amend-
ment only requires effective assistance of counsel, and not the optimal
assistance of counsel that an attorney could provide to one client if the
attorney had unlimited resources, litigation meant to increase funding for
public defender systems has proven inconsistently successful.27 Public
defenders faced with these finite and limited resources must then limit
the amount of effort and work they put into individual cases so they can
accommodate the needs of their other clients. Both the individual attor-
neys and public defender institutional leadership make these decisions
regarding resource rationing, focusing on the attorney's management of
cases at the micro-level of client representation.
A. The Theory Guiding Public Defender Triage Practice
Legal scholarship has proposed solutions to the problems inherent
in public defender triage practice by identifying principles for the scope
of public defender representation and developing theoretical frameworks
for individual attorneys to make triage decisions more fairly. 28 The avail-
25. Michael Virtanen, Report Details NY Indigent Defense Caseloads, WASH. TIMES (Sept.
24, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/24/report-details-ny-indigent-defense-
caseloads/.
26. Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of
Public Defense in New York State (Oct. 21, 2014) [hereinafter NYCLU Press Release],
http://www.nyclu.org/news/settlement-begins-historic-reformation-of-public-defense-new-york-state
(acknowledging that the five New York counties chosen for the class-action lawsuit, "Ontario,
Onondaga (Syracuse), Schuyler, Suffolk and Washington[,] . . . were chosen because their public
defen[der] systems" differ in the size of the communities they serve but were all emblematic of the
problems with New York state's public defense mechanism).
27. See Rodger Citron, Note, (Un) Luckey v. Miller: The Case for Structural Injunction to
Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 486-87 (1991); Vidhya K. Reddy, Indigent
Defense Reform: The Role of Systemic Litigation in Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel
19 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 1279185, 2008).
28. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J.
2694, 2700-01, 2704-10 (2013) (providing strategies for moving political actors who control mone-
tary policies, the organization and administration of indigent defense services, and the substantive
criminal law to allocate the resources and make the institutional changes necessary to fix failing
systems). The institutional changes Steiker addresses concern training and oversight of public de-
fenders and improving the norms associated with indigent defense practice. See id. at 2704-10; see
also Jonathan A. Rapping, National Crisis, National Neglect: Realizing Justice Through Transform-
ative Change, 13 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331, 333 (2009-2010) (setting forth that "meaningful
indigent defense reform" is only possible if system actors recruit and train "a new generation of
public defenders [who are] equipped with the tools . . . to resist [the] pressures" of the existing
inadequate culture of representation and are able to remain in the job long enough to become de-
fender leaders); Robin G. Steinberg, Beyond Lawyering: How Holistic Representation Makes for
Good Policy, Better Lawyers, and More Satisfied Clients, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 625,
627-28 (2006) (arguing that "holistic" representation, a client-centered and community-oriented
approach to criminal defense, is an effective and critical solution for broken criminal justice sys-
tems). See generally John B. Mitchell, In (Slightly Uncomfortable) Defense of "Triage" by Public
Defenders, 39 VAL. U.L. REV. 925 (2005) [hereinafter Mitchell, Defense]; John B. Mitchell, Redefin-
ing the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1215 (1994) [hereinafter Mitchell, Redefining] (provid-
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able scholarship attempts to provide an ethical framework for individual
public defenders to use when rationing resources.2 9 The majority of this
limited scholarship informs public defender systems about the most ap-
propriate way for individual attorneys to conduct a triage practice, and a
more limited amount has been written on the effect of triage on client
rights.30 There is even less scholarship available suggesting that public
defenders must reject triage or risk providing unconstitutional and unpro-
fessional representation to indigent persons.31 Although this scholarship
has enhanced the conversation about public defender triage, it fails to
fully consider the role an institution assumes in effecting individual pub-
lic defender triage decisions. Legal scholarship is mostly silent about the
institutional design of public defender offices and how an administra-
tion's allocation of limited resources might contribute to the further re-
duction of those resources.32
Part of the difficulty with establishing particular triage schemes
among clients is that such an activity so clearly calls into question the
Sixth Amendment mandate to provide effective assistance to all clients.
The very nature of choosing to provide one particular client resources to
which that client is entitled at the expense of another client suggests that
attorneys are failing to comply with professional and ethical require-
ments of competent and effective advocacy. Despite this problem, legal
scholarship has set forth suggested protocol for public defender adminis-
trators and individual public defenders to consider.
One of the most comprehensive resource-rationing guidelines for
public defenders identifies three types of individual client representation:
(1) messenger representation-"merely convey[ing] [any plea offers]
from the prosecution without any real analysis or counseling;" (2) pattern
representation-"quickly categorizing cases legally, factually, strategi-
cally, and predictively by [finding] certain . . . recurring patterns" from
previous cases; and (3) focus representation-pushing the rules and cre-
ating deeper narratives for a client's defense.33 The support for this triage
model arises from the claim that the Sixth Amendment permits pattern
ing a theoretical framework for individual public defenders to use when rationing resources amongst
clients with competing significant claims and arguing that public defenders should prioritize serious
cases, followed by cases that implicate the system protection function of the criminal defense attor-
ney, and finally cases to which the defender has a personal attraction).
29. For a focus on institutional behaviors, see Darryl K. Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion
to Ration Services and Shortchange Some Clients, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 207, 215 (2004) (proposing
resource allocation rules that are guided by the twin principles of priority to factual innocence and a
harm-reduction principle).
30. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
32. See Brown, supra note 29, at 213-14 (discussing institutional design in his article regard-
ing rationing defense entitlements); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Polic-
ing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 895-906 (2009) (dis-
cussing institutional design from a prosecutorial view); cf Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:
A voiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42 (2010).
33. Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1292-93, 1302.
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representation and, in some situations, messenger epresentation for an
individual client and that the public defender's dilemma comes forth in
choosing which clients or cases receive focused representation.34 It con-
cludes that priority should go first to cases that are deemed "serious"
because of harsh and unjust punishments or collateral consequences, then
to cases involving the defenders primary historical purpose of protecting
the system and "making the screens work," and lastly, to cases that reso-
nate with the individual defender for personal reasons.35 Proponents of
this triage scheme argue that the order of priority is reflective of both the
historical purpose and current best use of the public defender function.36
Criticism of this proposed representation scheme focuses on the
central truth that each client is entitled to effective representation and
that the proposed scheme does little to prevent unfair bias from taking
root in a defender's practice. If every indigent person is entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel, a public defender will find it difficult to
properly and formally decide, at the outset of a case, which clients will
receive the focused type of representation, without relying, to some ex-
tent, on unconscious bias.3 8 In other words, formal triage schemes may
help reduce public defender frustration and wholly deficient representa-
tion by helping public defenders feel like professionals, but they do little
to reduce the potential for bias to affect arbitrary decisions and thus ren-
34. See id. at 1292-94, 1302.
35. Id. at 1288-90. Examples for this first category include clients who a defender believes
are innocent or clients who are facing capital punishment. If the defender's limited resources allow,
then the defender should take cases that inculpate the public defender's historical purpose because
they involve suppression issues or state misconduct. The least priority for any remaining resources
would go to cases that resonate with the individual public defender for personal reasons. See id. at
1302. These would include cases where the defender has formed an attachment with a client because
the defender views the defense work as helping the client turn his or her life around.
Other forms of scholarship discuss the appropriateness of triage in terms of how resources
can be distributed fairly. All ethical theories for justifying and guiding ethical choices of distribution
fall under the single, large concept of distributive justice. Distributive justice differs from other
justice aims by ensuring that people receive a "fair share" of the available goods. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTiCE 259 (1971). Theories of distributive justice are concerned with how to fairly
allocate scarce resources among individuals with competing needs or claims and how the total
amount of goods to be distributed can be distributed in a manner that produces a just pattern. See id
at 265-67. Because any goods, and in fact primary goods, include basic liberties and opportunities,
distributive justice principles are useful in finding solutions to the problems that plague under-
resourced systems. Procedural justice focuses on the process in which goods are delivered, requiring
that a fair process is used in deciding what is distributed. See id at 84-86. Restorative justice, also
known as corrective justice, focuses on returning something back to the way it should be. Retributive
justice focuses on what constitutes a fair and proportional punishment. See id. at 313-14. This Arti-
cle does not include a robust analysis of distributive justice theory or a discussion of the other forms
of justice but does adopt the proposition that indigent defendants are entitled to a fair share of re-
sources under the Sixth Amendment. This Article then focuses on how limited resources can be
distributed more fairly.
36. Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1220-22.
37. See Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U.L. REv.
911, 918-20 (2005).
38. See id at 916.
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der the process unfair for clients.39 Whether a client appears innocent to a
defender, or whether the defender believes the state engaged in miscon-
duct against a client from a particular type of community, will depend
heavily on that defender's perception of innocent behavior or unaccepta-
ble police conduct in certain environments.40 These criticisms might be
the reason no public defender office in the nation has formally adopted
this resource-rationing scheme.4 1 Formally adopting this sort of scheme
may reduce the anxiety or stress that individual public defenders feel
when having to make informal triage decisions on their own, but it also
provides a clear case for review for any enterprising litigant looking to
challenge his conviction or quality of representation.
Avoiding the inevitable influence of bias in prioritization decisions
is the basis of another body of scholarship suggesting that public defend-
42
ers should never engage in triage. This scholarship suggests that public
defenders should stop searching for acceptable strategies to provide cli-
ents with less than what they are constitutionally entitled to, and instead,
inform the court when they are unable to provide counsel without incor-
porating triage decisions in their practice.43 Monroe Freedman, a preemi-
nent legal ethics scholar, set forth this analysis and conclusion in his arti-
cle, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders." Although social sci-
ence had not popularized the term "implicit bias" at the time of publica-
tion, Freedman draws on the formative literature by arguing a central
problem of any triage scheme is that lawyers will make decisions about
which clients will receive which level of representation through a lens
that is affected by the lawyer's own background and preconceived no-
tions.4 5 Such behavior or actions would undermine the role of the public
39. Conversely, other scholars stress the need for defenders and defender leaders to refrain
from ranking cases based on the perception of factual innocence. See, e.g., Richardson & Goff,
supra note 16, at 2644. "Given the limited time defenders have to prioritize cases, innocence deter-
minations [could] only be speculative [guesses] based on inadequate information"-exactly the type
of circumstances where implicit bias takes root. Id. These scholars argue that triage standards ought
to be based instead upon criteria that are objectively measurable and not subject to interpretation.
See, e.g., id In other words, defender offices could "prioritize cases based on custody status, with in-
custody clients being iven priority." Id. Alternatively, cases could be prioritized randomly or based
upon speedy trial deadlines. Id. Public defender institutions would then supplement these triage
schemes with established accountability measures that would not rely on individual attorney subjec-
tive judgments and would drastically reduce the potential of implicit bias. See id. at 2645.
40. For community explanation see Grizzard, The Dominant White Response to Baltimore
Shows Why Black Residents are Justified in their Anger, DAILY Kos (Apr. 28, 2015, 11:30 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/04/28/1380944/-The-Dominant-White-Response-to-Baltimore-
Shows-Why-Black-Residents-are-Justified-in-their-Anger; see also Jon Swaine, Oliver Laughland &
Jamiles Lartey, Black Americans Killed by Police Twice as Likely to be Unarmed as White People,
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015, 8:38 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/01/black-
americans-killed-by-police-analysis; and The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US,
GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-
killings-us-database (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (interactive map).
41. See Richardson & Goff, supra note 16, at 2632.
42. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 37, at 914.
43. See, e.g., id. at 919-2 1.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 916.
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defender in establishing a fair process for indigent persons charged with
criminal offenses. Freedman suggests that public defenders instead use
professional disciplinary rules to avoid any triage methods.4 6
Of most import to Freedman's analysis is the lawyer's duty to in-
vestigate a case. Freedman argues that if a lawyer is unable to fulfill his
obligation to investigate a case or charge, then the lawyer is ethically
required to reject the appointment.47 If the lawyer is ordered to maintain
representation by either his supervisor or the court, then the lawyer
should notify the appropriate disciplinary board.48 The lawyer should
also put forth on the record his inability to give competent representation
because of the conflict of interest inherent to an overwhelming case-
load.49 The lawyer should then go no further than to inform the client of
any plea offers made by the prosecution, without advising the client
whether to accept, fully explaining to the client the lawyer's limited in-
volvement and detailing all the lawyer would have done should he have
not been conflicted out of the representation.so
The scholarly insight to both engage in formal triage, and to refrain
from triage by refusing to represent those clients that would require pri-
oritization decisions by the defender, explore the micro-level triage deci-
sions about every public defender's representation of their individual
clients. The insight overlooks the central role of the administrative allo-
cation of these limited resources. There are triage schemes that are better
suited towards maintaining and supporting a fair distribution of limited
resources because they focus on what injects or maintains fairness for the
51clients of a public defender institution. Choosing certain clients to re-
ceive focused representation is unfair to those that receive only pattern or
messenger representation, especially considering how easy it would be
for unconscious bias to affect those decisions.52 Refusing to represent
46. See id. at 918-21.
47. See id. at 919-21.
48. Id. at 921.
49. Id. at 921-22.
50. See id. at 922.
51. For suggested triage schemes that focus on a fair distribution of the limited resources, see
Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, For another suggested triage scheme that would reduce the
incidence of implicit bias, see Richardson & Goff, supra note 16,
52. See Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1280-81; see also Michelle Maiese, Distribu-
tive Justice, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (June 2013),
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/distributive-justice. Defining the class that receives a
particular resource can prove rather difficult. With regards to the resources of a public defender
office, the class can be the attorney, the clients, the investigators, the social workers, or any other
types of administrative or support staff. Even if one was to limit the class to the clients receiving
representation, i.e. resources, from the public defender offices, such a classification may not be
simplistic enough to evaluate distributive justice outcomes. In addition to the general class of all
clients, clients can be further grouped based on a number of different factors including, but not
limited to, (1) the number of charges the clients faces, (2) the type of charge the client faces, (3) if
the client has a codefendant, (4) the severity of the potential punishments that the client faces, and
(5) whether or not the client is a multiple offender and to what level of multiple offender status the
client can be assigned. Many public defender offices place clients in class groups based on the com-
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any client is also problematic in that it prevents those clients who would
benefit from pattern or messenger representation from receiving even
that little representation.5 ' Also, with regards to either suggested solu-
tion, it is difficult for public defenders to know upon case assignment if
their caseload is overwhelming or if they will need to engage in triage to
manage a client's case. Often, the amount of work that is necessary for a
particular case does not become evident until the case is complete, and
public defenders and public defender institutions may overcorrect, at the
outset, to the detriment of scores of clients who will have to wait for dis-
position of their cases.54 The proposals in legal scholarship regarding
triage practice fail to consider what should be the fundamental goals of
public defender practice-providing effective assistance, preserving the
limited resources where possible, and ensuring fairness in the criminal
justice system for the nation's poor defendants. The constitutional and
professional rules that govern public defender representation provide
support for considering each of these fundamental goals.55
B. The Rules Governing Public Defender Triage Practice
Individual attorneys, and the public defender institutions that house
many of them, do not have unbounded freedom to determine the methods
and means of their triage practice. Rather, they must comply with a num-
ber of constitutional and professional rules that guide the standard of
practice. Although the U.S. Constitution provides a basic framework,
state constitutions provide the legal and structural definitions for the de-
livery of defense services for individual states.56 The American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) provides context for these legal definitions by providing
overarching standards to which indigent defense must ascribe.
plexity of each particular case. See, e.g., ERNIE LEWIS & DAN GOYETTE, REPORT ON THE
EVALUATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS 27-28 (2012),
http://lpdb.1a.gov/Serving%20The%20Public/Reports/txtfiles/pdf/Report%20on%20the%2OEvaluati
on%20f/o20the%200ffice%200f/`20the%200rleans%20Public%20Defenders.pdf. Different
public defender offices, however, hold differing assessment of what levels of severity should be
assigned to which class of cases. These public defender offices then assign more experienced attor-
neys to represent clients who have more complex cases. See, e.g., id. For purposes of this Article, the
class will be defined as the general class of "all clients" assigned to the individual public defender
office. This definition is being used in order to avoid the differing penalty assessments a public
defender office may give to the class of cases they receive.
53. See Mitchell, Defense, supra note 28, at 930.
54. It may seem better for the system to overcorrect for situations involving life and liberty
such as a public defender representation, but the costs of continuing engagement for indigent de-
fendants cannot be ignored. Missed time at work or with family and the stress of not having a resolu-
tion are difficult to measure but can have a profound effect on an individual's quality of life and can
sometimes be avoided with pattern or messenger epresentation.
55. For a thorough discussion of the constitutional and professional obligations for public
defender practice, see discussion infra Section I.B.
56. See, e.g., 7 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO
JUDICIARY POLICY: REPRESENTATION UNDER THE CJA § 210 (2015); ALA. CODE § 15-12-5 (2015);
IOWA CODE § 815.9-11 (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:147(A) (2013).
57. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-1.1-5-1.6 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 3rd ed. 1992).
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1. Federal and State Constitutional Requirements
While Gideon may have secured the right to counsel for the nation's
indigent defendants, it did not provide guidance for state or local gov-
ernments to use in establishing, funding, or training the responsible at-
torneys. As a result, public defender services are provided in a variety of
ways. Some states responded to Gideon's mandate by leaving the issue
up to the local courts, and these courts, in large part, fulfilled their task
by coordinating with private attorneys on an ad hoc basis to serve indi-
gent clients.58 This type of system is commonly referred to as the "as-
signed counsel model."59 Other states responded by creating statewide or
local offices of public defenders.60 The remaining states opted to contract
with individual lawyers, legal partnerships, or nonprofit legal organiza-
tions under formal arrangements-usually a fee per case or lump fee for
agreeing to assume responsibility for all cases.
Regardless of the type of indigent defense system a state uses, there
is always one particular individual, occupying a particular office, who is
authorized to develop, oversee, and manage indigent defense services.62
This person, or a similarly situated person, is responsible for keeping the
service-delivery mechanism financed and advancing the agency's goals
in an efficient and effective manner. This person will also dictate the
distribution scheme for certain limited resources, whether it be financing,
administrative assistance, or anything else associated with the representa-
tion of an indigent defendant.63 In a widely decentralized court-appointed
system, for example, state court judges control the funds used to finance
indigent defense services.64 Although the judges control the purse, some-
one within the court administrative office is usually responsible for over-
seeing the quality and type of attorneys assigned cases, managing the
available funds, and providing the funding mechanism with reports about
the needs and performance of the indigent defense delivery services.65
This administrator will usually use some system, not necessarily previ-
ously determined, to decide which cases receive what type of resources
and how much of the resources are dedicated to a particular function.66
These decisions will also ordinarily be guided by statutory or constitu-
58. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32-33 (1995).
59. See id.
60. Id. at 36.
61. Id. at 34.
62. See id. at 33, 37-40.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 40-41.
65. Such reports and formal standards are required whenever services are financed through
public funds. See, e.g., Jessa DeSimone, Comment, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana
Public Defender Act, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1479, 1505-07 (2006) (describing the fiscal
reports and standards required under the Montana Public Defender Act).
66. See id. at 33.
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tional authority but will also be subject to the professional and ethical
rules adopted by a particular state.
2. Professional and Ethical Rules for Legal Practice
Federal and state constitutional rules only provide an outline, or
minimal standard, for the adequate provision of services. It is up to the
ABA and other professional organizations to provide context to the
frame by detailing more specific requirements for the behavior and prac-
tice of their members. In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) which, although frequently amend-
ed, is the set of professional and ethical rules most used and adopted by
state bar associations.67
Public defenders are required to follow the same professional and
ethical standards promulgated by their governing state bar association as
other attorneys. Thus, in any jurisdiction that is following the Model
Rules, public defenders must comply with the preamble, setting forth that
attorneys must be zealous advocates, and Rule 1.1, prescribing compe-
68tence. Competence is defined by the ABA as the "legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the repre-
sentation."69 These Model Rules are simply reflecting the historical un-
derstanding of the lawyer's role as a professional who is both retained
but also a necessary representative for the individual.70 Subsequent to
Gideon, the Court cautioned that "if the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the
mercies of incompetent counsel, and . .. judges should strive to maintain
proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing de-
fendants in criminal cases in their courts."71
The ABA's Providing Defense Services guidelines focus more spe-
cifically on defense representation.7 2 It considers limiting outside control
over the defender program its primary goal and orders defender programs
to refrain from accepting workloads that interfere with rendering quality
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983); Jessica R. John, Note, I
Gotta Get Out of this Case: Withdrawal from Representation as a Public Defender, 10 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 152, 155 (2000).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
69. Id.
70. See ABA Comm'n on Advertising, A Re-Examination of the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Pertaining to Client Development in Light of Emerging Technologies, ABA (July
1998),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/resources/professionalism/professio
nalism ethics-in_lawyer advertising/ethicswhitepaper.html (describing how changing technology
affects legal marketing).
71. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
72. These guidelines were approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1990, pub-
lished in 1992, and are considered the black letter law standards for criminal justice. For a descrip-
tion, see Quick Guide to National Standards for Indigent Defense, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER
ASS'N, http://nlada.net/library/articles/quick-guide-national-standards-indigent-defense (last visited
Sept. 17, 2015).
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legal representation.73 These standards have not been adopted by any
state regulatory agencies, so they are not clearly enforceable rules for
public defender institutions to use as either a shield or sword in manag-
ing their caseloads.74 Instead, these institutions must develop their own
schemes for managing overwhelming caseloads fairly and effectively,
and use the standards as persuasive authority. The manner in which pub-
lic defenders practice triage, detailed in the following part, differs by
jurisdiction.
II. PUBLIC DEFENDER APPROACHES TO TRIAGE PRACTICE
Because of the lack of resources, public defenders develop schemes
for providing indigent defense that enable them to more closely comply
with the constitutional, statutory, professional, and ethical rules placed
on their practice. The nature of criminal defense representation is that a
limitless amount of time and effort could hypothetically be dedicated to
each individual case. An ideal criminal defense attorney would success-
fully seek out numerous opportunities to interview opposing witnesses,
investigate the backgrounds of these witnesses and the area in which the
charged offenses allegedly occurred, conduct extensive legal research,
litigate every potential constitutional and statutory issue before the court,
obtain substantial funds for expert witness testimony, thoroughly prepare
the defense's own witnesses, and engage in extensive plea negotiations.
Attorneys would also have sufficient time to develop a relationship with
each individual client so they could obtain important information from
the clients to assist in the trial preparation, pretrial release, and plea-
bargaining efforts.76
Given that legal resources are predominantly finite and limited,
such an idealized version of public defender practice is unrealistic.
73. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-5.3 (AM. BAR
Ass'N 3rd ed. 1992).
74. See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 58, at 37-41. Strategic decisions regarding office
organization are thought to have the potential to drastically change a consistently criticized criminal
justice system into one that is more reflective of the values espoused by the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th
Amendments. It is this fact that led the American Bar Association to include structural guidance in
its Ten Principles ofDefense Delivery. See ABA PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 2.
75. See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 631 (1986);
Richardson & Goff, supra note 16, at 2632.
76. See Todd A. Berger, After Frye and Lafler: The Constitutional Right to Defense Counsel
Who Plea Bargains, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 121, 155-56 (2014). This type of client-involved
representation has gained popularity under the moniker "client-centered" representation. See DAVID
A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 17-18 (1991).
Client-centered representation can best be summed up as having four requirements: "l) the duty of
zealous and loyal representation [for the client]; (2) the duty to advocate for the client's [case]; (3)
the duty to thoroughly study and prepare; and (4) the duty to communicate with the client. Jonathan
A. Rapping, You Can't Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform
Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 161, 164
(2009).
77. The harsh reality is that resource constraints are a pervasive problem for all facets of the
criminal justice system. Prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials also struggle with fulfilling
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Even in resource-rich environments, dedicating resources, such as time
and effort, to one client limits the amount of those resources available for
another client. Thus, any legal representation, even for civil lawyers and
private criminal defense attorneys, naturally involves a certain degree of
targeted distribution.7 For overwhelmed public defenders who have very
little control over their caseloads or client allocations, this targeted dis-
tribution practice becomes omething more akin to triage or rationing by
which some clients receive very little, if any, defense representation so
that others can receive an amount deemed sufficient to adequately handle
their case.79
The lack of adequate funding leads to a dearth of available re-
sources and public defender systems, where even the most committed
and skilled of public defenders are faced with the difficult task of repre-
their obligations despite insufficient resources. Even privately funded defense attorneys must priori-
tize the work they conduct on behalf of a client. These other system players differ from indigent
defense providers in the solutions they have available to combat funding problems. Corrections
officials often successfully petition for increased funding through support of "tough on crime" legis-
lators. Private attorneys can choose whether to accept new clients or certain responsibilities for a
particular client. Judges control their dockets and can decide how and when they expend effort
towards their workload each day. Prosecutors exercise the most control in the criminal justice system
because they decide how many cases are pending at a given moment. Prosecutors can also use dif-
ferent case acceptance schemes for limiting or reducing their caseloads. Prosecutors can employ one
of six different charging policies or philosophies in exercising their duties: "(1) a transfer policy
[where there is no screening of the facts alleged in a charging instrument and the case is simply
prosecuted upon receiving information from the police]; (2) a unit policy [where individual assistant
prosecutors make decisions on which cases go forward in a] highly decentralized [and independent
manner]; (3) a legal sufficiency policy [where] (charges are [only] filed if the elements of a crime
are [clearly] present [in the allegations]); (4) a system efficiency policy [where] (charges are filed if
the elements . . . are present without any obvious problems, [this approach] emphasizes early dispo-
sitions and continuous docket movement); (5) trial sufficiency policy [where] (charges are only filed
if conviction at trial is very likely); and (6) a defendant rehabilitation policy [where] (cases are
prosecuted only if a defendant [is determined to be unsuitable] for rehabilitation or treatment. Mitch-
ell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1269 n.172 (5th, 10th, 12th, and 14th alterations in original). Dif-
ferences in charging policies affect the rates of case acceptance or dismissal and the resulting overall
caseload that a prosecutor is responsible for managing. See id.
78. There is a small but significant body of scholarship regarding triage in the civil poverty
law context. See, e.g., Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J.
1529 (1995) (describing "the shortcomings of legal work on behalf of the poor" resulting from large
caseloads and inadequate resources); Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God": Triage
Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999) (suggesting ethical principles for screening
potential clients); see also Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60
N.C. L. REV. 281, 360-61 (1982).
79. See, e.g., Mitchell, Defense, supra note 28, at 926; Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at
1241-42. In the public defender realm, triage often involves lawyers who are "forced to spend their
own money or to . . . ignor[e] some issues, lines of investigation, and defenses because of the lack of
adequate compensation and resources." Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing
and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 783, 790. The medical community has three terms commonly used to refer to the distribution of
medical resources to patients: (1) triage, (2) rationing, and (3) allocation. Kenneth V. Iserson & John
C. Moskop, Triage in Medicine, Part L: Concept, History, and Types, 49 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.
275, 275 (2007). Allocation is "the broadest of the 3" and "describes the distribution of both medical
and nonmedical resources and does not necessarily imply that the resource being distributed is
scarce" or cannot accomplish all of its required objectives. Id. Rationing "implies that the available
resources are not sufficient to satisfy all needs or wants" and that "some system or method is being
used to guide this distribution." Id. Triage "refer[s] to any decision about allocation of a scarce ...
resource." Id.
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senting significantly more people than the available resources make n-
tirely possible.80 Individual public defenders and public defender admin-
istrators recognize that their exorbitant caseloads do not absolve them
from using every tool at their disposal to advance a fair criminal process
for their clients. State criminal courts in many overburdened systems
closely mirror the chaos that is present on army battlefields.8' The court-
rooms are filled with people constantly streaming in or standing about,
and the public defenders have an endless flow of cases and people to
manage.82 Public defenders use triage to make this chaos more managea-
ble. The attorneys identify which cases or clients are most "deserving" of
their attention and quickly obtain plea agreements or proceed to trial less
than ideally prepared for the others.83 This action frees or reserves the
limited resources at the attorney's disposal for the case the attorney has
prioritized. In other words, this public defender triage practice can deny
certain clients core defense functions, such as factual investigation into
guilt or innocence, in order to focus attention on the clients the individual
public defender or the public defender office deems more of a priority.
Triage occurs at both the individual and institutional levels, each with
their own unique characteristics as described below. Individual public
defenders and public defender institutions use a variety of factors to
guide their triage practices, but they have yet to adopt a model that takes
into account legal, resource-based, and bias-reducing requirements.
A. Individual Attorney Triage
Although triage has become an accepted policy and procedure in the
medical community, there is currently "no systemic ethic or approach for
guiding" triage in public defender practice.84 Instead, individual public
80. Former Attorney General Eric Holder ascribed the deficiencies in public defenders to
funding as well when he commented that the failure of the nation to fully realize the mandates under
Gideon are due in large part to the reality that "[a]cross the country, public defender offices and
other indigent defense providers are underfunded and understaffed." Holder, supra note 13.
81. See Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1242.
82. Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1240-41. Misdemeanor courts in Florida routinely
process with a guilty plea "in three minutes or less." John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, Justice is
Swift as Petty Crimes Clog Courts, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2014, 10:33 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-is-swift-as-petty-crimes-clog-courts-1417404782. District court
judges in Detroit have an average of "100 misdemeanor cases on [their] docket" each day, about
"one every four minutes." Id. "In a Houston courtroom," defendants would approach the judge "in
groups of... nine" to enter a plea and receive a sentence, some "in less than 30 seconds." Id.
83. Richardson & Goff, supra note 16, at 2632. Whether or not a client is more "deserving"
depends primarily on the defender's personal assessment. See discussion supra Section I.B (discuss-
ing implicit bias in public defender triage); see also Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1241.
84. Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1247; Richardson & Goff, supra note 16, at 2632.
Charts providing a continuum of triage scenarios and rules for administering medical attention are
studied and learned by medical students and then followed by these students when they become
licensed doctors. See Iserson & Moskop, supra note 79, at 276. Triage has become an accepted
policy and procedure in the medical context when it comes to emergency caregiving and other envi-
ronments deprived of abundant, or even adequate, resources. The presence of these policies and
training demonstrate the amount of attention medical researchers have paid to discerning the best
method of providing services as consistent with the Hippocratic Oath as possible when overwhelm-
ing need and limited resources render strict adherence to the Hippocratic Oath impossible. See Erich
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defenders incorporate triage into their practice informally and, often, on
an ad hoc basis.85 The informal nature of this resource-rationing creates
ethical and professional practice problems and undermines the historical
purpose of the defense attorney. Individual public defenders like those
identified in this Article's introduction, Polack and Olexa, engage in spe-
cific triage decisions whereby they focus their attention on particular
clients at the expense of others. They have little choice but to do so when
they are faced with multiple clients in need at the same time. These types
of prioritization decisions are problematic because they do not consider
all of the fundamental goals of the public defender and, thus, limit the
fair process for the individual clients.
B. Institutional and Organizational Design
Public defender institutions customarily respond to overwhelming
caseloads in one of three ways. A public defender office can decline any
appointments that bring its caseloads up to a level that would render ef-
fective assistance of counsel impossible.86 There has been some judicial
and legislative support for this type of action in states where the public
defenders office declined appointment of cases upon reaching a number
the office considered untenable.87 Such action, however, is usually met
with opposition, or even outright rejection, by a court or funding authori-
ty. For example, the Missouri Supreme Court recently held "that the
[Missouri Public Defender] [C]ommission has the authority to declare
[itself] unavailab[le]" for case appointment if caseloads are excessive.8 9
Within three days of the court's opinion, the Missouri Association of
H. Loewy, Oaths for Physicians - Necessary Protection or Elaborate Hoax?, 9 MEDGENMED 7, 7
(2007). Although the Hippocratic Oath is not a legal requirement, almost 98% of doctors swear to it
or a similar code of professional and personal conduct when graduating from medical school. See
id; Robert D. Orr et al., Use of the Hippocratic Oath: A Review of Twentieth Century Practice and a
Content Analysis of Oaths Administered in Medical Schools in the U.S. and Canada in 1993, 8 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 377, 379 (1997). Regardless of the specific title of the oath, it provides general
and moral guidance for each graduate during his or her practice of medicine. See Loewy, supra.
Although the Sixth Amendment cannot properly be considered a discretionary oath, the oaths medi-
cal students take upon graduation to preserve life whenever possible do place an ethical and moral
mandate on their practice much like the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel places on public
defenders.
85. Triage occurs when micro-allocation decisions are made about specific individuals on the
direct representation or contact level. See Tremblay, supra note 78, at 2482. There is a large body of
literature concerning the rationing of resources defined as triage, but the literature is primarily con-
cerned with the healthcare industry.
86. See Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and
Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 473, 501.
87. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ll/09/us/09defender.html?_r-0 (providing that
public defender offices in seven states were refusing to accept new case appointments or suing to
limit them).
88. See id.; see also Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So.3d 261, 264-
65 (Fla. 2013).
89. David Carroll, MO Supreme Court Rules that Public Defense Commission Can Decline
Cases, SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2012), http://sixthamendment.org/mo-supreme-court-rules-that-
public-defense-commission-can-decline-cases/.
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Prosecuting Attorneys responded with a press statement declaring that
the public defender system is not in a caseload crisis, using a U.S. De-
partment of Justice report as support for its assertion that the court's de-
. . 90
cisions were erroneous.
"A second approach [public] defender [institutions can use when
faced with overwhelming caseloads] is to bring a civil rights action alleg-
ing that, due to excessive caseload[s]," the program cannot provide effec-
tive assistance of counsel.91 Despite the prevalence of complaints about
public defender institutions, few public defender institutions have exer-
cised this option.9 2 Although the last fifteen years have witnessed mas-
sive institutional change to correct system-wide public defender defi-
ciencies, very few have been the result of civil rights litigation. Since the
year 2000, twelve states have enacted new legislation governing the pro-
vision of indigent defense services: "North Carolina in 2000; Oregon and
Texas in 2001; Georgia in 2003; Virginia in 2004; Montana, North Da-
kota, and South Carolina in 2005; . . . Louisiana in 2007;" Alabama in
2011; and New Mexico and Michigan in 2013.93 Ten of the twelve states
experienced new legislation that established a statewide commission
agency, headed by either a state public defender or state director with
authority over all indigent defense services in the state.94 The remaining
two, Georgia and Texas, enacted statutes that created commissions with
90. See Mo. Ass'n of Prosecuting Att'ys, Statement of MAPA President Bob McCulloch in
Response to Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion in Public Defender Case (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://sixthamendment.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/MAPA-Response-to-Public-Defender-
Caseload-Decision.pdf; see generally State ex. rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm'n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d
592 (Mo. 2012).
91. Mounts, supra note 86, at 502.
92. See id. at 502-03; see, e.g., NYCLU Press Release, supra note 26 (describing New York
litigation); discussion infra notes 96, 128 (describing Georgia litigation).
93. Norman Lefstein, The Movement Towards Indigent Defense Reform: Louisiana and Other
States, 9 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 125, 126 (2008) (footnotes omitted); see also David Carroll, A Birds-
Eye View of Independent Commissions in the 50 States, SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2013) [herein-
after Carroll, 50 States], http://sixthamendment.org/a-birds-eye-view-of-independent-commissions-
in-the-50-states/; David Carroll, Alabama Reforms Spark Expanded Use of Public Defender Model,
SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://sixthamendment.org/alabama-reforms-spark-expanded-
use-of-public-defender-model/; David Carroll, Michigan Passes Public Defense Reform Legislation,
SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (June 19, 2013), http://sixthamendment.org/michigan-passes-public-defense-
reform-legislation/. "Prior to [the year] 2000, twenty-eight states [had] enacted legislation that estab-
lished ... [a] statewide entity responsib[le] for [governing or providing] indigent defense services."
Lefstein, supra, at 125. Five of these states enacted their legislation in the 1990s: "Arkansas, Louisi-
ana, Nebraska, Oklahoma and South Carolina." Id at 125 & n.3. Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Wisconsin, Wyoming, West Virginia, and Vermont enacted their
legislation in the 1970s and 1980s. Id. at 125 & n.4. The remaining twenty-two states had a state
appellate commission or agency with authority over indigent defense services "or, in some cases, no
statewide structure . . . [for] indigent defense." Id at 126. Eight of the twenty-eight states with indi-
gent defense legislation enacted before the year 2000 had state commissions or boards that exercised
"only partial authority over indigent defense services." Id The entity created by legislation in the
remaining twenty states had full authority over the provision of indigent defense services in the state
and all but one of these state indigent defender systems "was headed by a [single] staff person with
the title of state public defender." Id. For additional state information, see Carroll, 50 States, supra.
94. See Carroll, 50 States, supra note 93.
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only partial authority over indigent defense services.95 This renewed ef-
fort to improve criminal defense services for the poor in these states can
be attributed to a number of different instigators, but in large part, studies
on the shortcomings of each state's indigent defense system and litiga-
tion, or the threat of litigation, caused legislatures to recognize that the
systems in their jurisdictions needed thorough and extensive reform.96
Some public defender offices use a third approach to overwhelming
caseloads, which is "more [aptly] described as a nonresponse."97 This
approach to exorbitant caseloads is simply "making do," and "depend[s]
on [S]ixth [A]mendment challenges on appeal or collateral relief . .. to
remedy any specific instances of ineffective representation."9 8 It is this
third response that is the focus of this Article. Academics develop stand-
ards and guidelines for providing effective assistance of counsel, despite
the prevalence of extraordinarily high caseloads.99 Practitioners develop
personal guidelines for managing caseloads and will sometimes docu-
ment the actions or resources that are missing from their representation
to aid their clients in any resulting appellate briefs.00 These responses
prove disappointing, however, because of the difficulty in prevailing on
95. Id.
96. For example, the state of Georgia's most recent reform efforts can be traced to a 1988
Eleventh Circuit decision in Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988). At the time of the
litigation in Luckey, Georgia used a county-based system of indigent defense. See id. at 1013. In
Luckey, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the Strickland-Cronic standard for reversal of individu-
al conviction was "inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective relief' because the Sixth
Amendment protects rights that are not necessarily conveyed through the outcome of a particular
trial. Id. at 1017. The appellate court held that the appropriate standard was to look at "the likelihood
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law." Id. (quoting
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). The Eleventh Circuit declined to exercise its equita-
ble jurisdiction to hear the case on the grounds of Young abstention, which prevents federal courts
from issuing rulings that would interfere with ongoing state criminal prosecutions, but the portion of
the ruling concerning prospective relief led to a wave of injunction-centered Section 1983 civil class
action suits. Id. at 1015-16.
These suits, which arose in a number of states including Georgia, Montana, and Louisi-
ana, sought broad reform of state and local indigence systems alleging that indigent defendants were
denied constitutionally guaranteed counsel because of a number of deficiencies like excessive case-
loads, lack of resources and support staff, inadequate facilities, and lack of standards and oversight.
None of these lawsuits resulted in a detailed injunctive order by a court, but they did assist in mov-
ing states down the road towards reform. For example, the 1999 Consent Order issued with Fulton
County, GA, encouraged threats of other lawsuits in Georgia. Reddy, supra note 27, at 21. In 2003,
the Georgia State Legislature responded in part to legislative efforts by passing the Georgia Indigent
Defense Act. Id. at 21-22. Similarly, White v. Governor Martz, was filed in 2002 asserting a claim
against Montana's indigent defense system. No. CDV 02-133, 2002 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1897, at *2
(1st Jud. Dist. Ct. of Mont. Dec. 3, 2002). The American Civil Liberties Union agreed to postpone
the lawsuit until the state of Montana could pursue a legislative solution. See Reddy, supra note 27,
at 49. The suit was withdrawn when the state passed the Montana Public Defender Act in 2005. Id.
97. Mounts, supra note 86, at 502.
98. Id. Public defenders use a variation to the nonresponse option by making an affirmative
record in a systematic fashion of each individual case where ineffective representation has occurred.
Id.
99. See discussion supra Section L.A.
100. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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Sixth Amendment claims. These responses have resulted in little system-
ic, long-lasting relief.' 1o
1. Limiting the Public Defender Responsibility
Some of the public defender offices that use a making do approach
to insufficient resources have either semi-formally or formally incorpo-
rated triage principles into their institutional organization and design.
The historical focus on institutional design triage for public defender
offices has been on either limiting the types of cases an office will accept
responsibility for or restricting the degree of representation by individual
attorneys. These solutions have proven ineffective for a number of rea-
sons. First and foremost, funding allocations closely follow the decisions
that public defender administrators make, limiting the extent of their
responsibility.102 An indigent defendant is still entitled to state-funded
representation, even when an institutional defender office declines to
assume responsibility for that client's case.103 The state must still pay for
that client's representation, whether or not the client receives representa-
tion from a local nonprofit or a private attorney selected by the courts.
Payment for this representation will come from the funds allocated to the
indigent defense function.10 Thus, declining to represent certain types of
cases or charged offenses does little to reduce the strain on the limited
101. See EMILY M. WEST, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA
EXONERATION CASES I (2010),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/InnocenceProject IACReport.pdf. This 2010 report exam-
ines the role of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the first 255 people exonerated through
DNA evidence. Id. at 3. There are now 334 exonerated persons, but the report does not include an
analysis of the 79 people exonerated since the report was commissioned. See The Cases: DNA Ex-
oneree Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment
(last visited Jan. 1, 2016). Of these first 255 DNA exonerations, 54 raised ineffective assistance of
counsel claims (about I in 5). WEST, supra, at 3. Approximately 81% of these ineffective assistance
of counsel claims were rejected. Id. Only 7 of the 54 who raised such claims had their ineffective
assistance of counsel claims granted (6 had convictions reversed and I received new counsel). Id. In
3 of the remaining 51, the reviewing court found that the performance was deficient but not prejudi-
cial or remanded the case to lower courts for further review. Id. There has been great variation in the
substance of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought by these exonerated persons, but
the most common claim asserted in the appellate briefings was failure to present defense witnesses,
failure to have some type of expert testing done, failure to object to prosecutor's evidence, and
failure to interview witness in preparation for trial or cross examine witnesses. Id. at 4.
102. See HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, STATE, COUNTY AND
LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008 5 (2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal aidindigent defendants/Is-sclai
d def expenditures fy8.authcheckdam.pdf.
103. There is an argument amongst the attorneys that constitute the public defense bar that a
client cannot ever permanently waive his right to state funded counsel. See, e.g., Jack Healy, Utah
Court Strips Criminal of Right to Counsel, and Some Lawyers Object, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2015, at
A18.
104. The state has an obligation to provide counsel to indigent defendants risking incarceration
with few exceptions. Each state has the freedom to decide how it will dispense the funds allotted to
fulfill that obligation but they must still fulfill the mandate. There has been concern about how states
fund certain methods. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, RATIONING JUSTICE: THE
UNDERFUNDING OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS 9 (2013),
https://www.nacdl.org/reports/gideonat50/rationingjustice/.
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resources. It simply encourages the funding authority to reallocate the
funds deemed necessary for representation of those cases or charged of-
fenses from the public defender organization to the newly obligated
mode of representation.'o0
For example, some offices, such as the Orleans Public Defenders in
New Orleans, Louisiana, respond to limited funding by declining to han-
dle juvenile cases and farming that responsibility out to a regional non-
profit.10 6 This differs from other public defender offices in the same state,
such as the Baton Rouge Public Defenders Office in Baton Rouge, Loui-
siana, which handles both adult and juvenile cases.'o7 As a consequence,
the state funding authority distributes the funds deemed necessary for
juvenile representation to the organizations that assumed responsibility
for juvenile representation, whether it was the nonprofit in the case of
Orleans or the Baton Rouge Public Defender Office example.08 Declin-
ing to represent certain types of cases in response to insufficient funding
actually proves an ineffective solution to triage needs because the public
defender institution loses the funding that would ordinarily be dedicated
to that legal responsibility.109 Shrinking the pool of available resources
105. Cf Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Reforming Indigent Defense: How Free
Market Principles Can Help to Fix a Broken System, POL'Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 1, 2010, at 11-13
(suggesting that states provide various options for fulfilling its mandate to provide counsel to the
nation's poor defendants).
106. LEWIS & GOYETTE, supra note 52, at 3, 6.
107. LA. PUB. DEF. BD., LPDB 2014 ANNUAL BOARD REPORT 382 (2015),
http://lpdb.1a.gov/Serving%2OThe%2OPublic/Reports/txtfiles/pdf/2014%20LPDB%20Annual%2ORe
port.pdf; About Us, EAST BATON ROUGE OFF. PUB. DEFENDER,
http://www.ebrpublicdefender.org/contact/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
108. See id. at 19, 52-53. The same analysis holds true for capital cases. Until the year 2013,
the Orleans Public Defenders also declined to assume responsibility for representing indigent people
charged with capital offenses. See LEWIS & GOYETTE, supra note 52, at 6. Capital cases that arose in
the parish were handled by a statewide nonprofit organization. Id. The Baton Rouge Public Defend-
ers did assume responsibility for capital cases and the difference in funding amounts reflected that as
the capital funds were taken from a different pot of money. It is true that both juvenile and capital
cases require specialized skills. Recent Supreme Court case law has used newly available research
on adolescent development to require additional responsibilities of both lawyers and courts dealing
with juveniles facing certain adult charges. See, e.g., Michael Barbee, Comment, Juveniles Are
Different: Juvenile Life Without Parole After Graham v. Florida, 81 MIsS. L.J. 299, 317 (2011).
Supreme Court jurisprudence underscores the claim that "death is different." See, e.g., Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("[T]he penalty of death is different in kind from any other pun-
ishment imposed under our system of criminal justice."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-87
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that the death penalty is a "unique punishment in the
United States"). The American Bar Association has also issued death penalty guidelines requiring
defense attorneys to possess a certain level of experience or ability in order to assume responsibility
for a death penalty case. See generally ABA, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appoint-
ment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913
(2003). Individual states may also adopt their own more guidelines. See, e.g., State Bar of Tex.,
Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel, 69 TEX. B.J. 966 (2006). These national and
state-specific standards are such that newer public defender offices may not have any attorneys with
the necessary skill to handle those types of cases.
109. The LPDB Annual Board Report provides the funding information for the 42 separate
public defender districts in Louisiana. See LA. PUB. DEF. BD., supra note 107, at 19, 52-53. The
allocation of funds to each district differs by the responsibilities for which each district assumes
responsibility.
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the institution can draw from to meet its constitutional and professional
obligations only makes compliance harder.
There has been an i creased call for public defender offices to focus
their limited resources on one particular class of cases as a means of ef-
fectively dealing with insufficient resources."10 These various triage sug-
gestions usually encourage public defender administrators to focus their
limited resources on felony charges, usually capital cases, or on those
clients who are likely innocent, at the expense of misdemeanor charg-
es.11' There is "a small but vibrant literature" suggesting the opposite as a
means to "crash the system" or call attention to the unfairness of mass
incarceration and inadequate funding by encouraging every indigent de-
fendant to challenge the charges against them to the fullest extent possi-
ble.112 The same problem presents itself for offices that might choose
either of these methods as triage schemes to improve the quality of their
practice. Every indigent person, whether facing misdemeanor or felony
charges, is entitled to state- or local-funded representation, and the public
defender funding authority will undoubtedly distribute the resources in
the manner it sees fit to the organizations or entities that assume respon-
sibility for these excluded cases."3
2. Retracting the Scope of Representation
There are also significant drawbacks to limiting the scope of de-
fense representation as a method of triaging cases. Best practices encour-
age a more comprehensive legal practice than those that limit the repre-
sentation to a certain level or quality.1 4 Shifting to a model of represen-
tation that is incompatible with the model deemed best for the client im-
plicates a public defender's constitutional and professional obligations.
For example, some offices make triage decisions about whether they will
110. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Insti-
tutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 808 (2004) [hereinafter Brown, Rationing]; Brown, supra
note 29, at 207-08.
111. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 461, 467 (2007) (arguing that counsel in misdemeanor cases do not provide as significant of a
benefit to their clients as counsel in felony cases and that state should reduce counsel appointment in
misdemeanor cases to save available resources for felony cases).
112. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1096-
97 (2013). Critics have responded to this and similar proposals by claiming they are unrealistic and
tantamount to trading the best interests of both the clients facing felony charges and those facing
misdemeanors for the hope of system reform. See id. Not only would felony clients not receive any
assistance but also some misdemeanor clients would be better served through a quick guilty plea. See
id.
113. The Louisiana Public Defender Board, the statewide regulatory agency for indigent de-
fense in the state of Louisiana, has promulgated a Restriction of Services Protocol that outlines how
public defender institutions facing limited resources should reduce their responsibilities. See, e.g.,
Press Release, La. Pub. Def. Bd., Calcasieu Parish Implements Service Restriction,
http://lpdb.1a.gov/Serving%2OThe%2OPublic/Media/txtfiles/pdf/Recent%2OMedia/July%2027%202
01 2%20-Calcasieu%20PDO%20Restricts%20Services.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2016) (identifying the
withdrawal from 400 felony cases as the least harmful to the continuation of public defender services
within the jurisdiction).
114. For a discussion of holistic advocacy and vertical representation, see, infra Section II.B.2.
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be a holistic office, which means looking beyond the criminal charge to
other challenges a client faces that may affect their quality of life or
chances of reoffending, or whether they will be an office that only focus-
es on the criminal charge at hand.'15 The Bronx Defenders in New York
is perhaps the most well known example of a holistic public defender
office.116 The "innovative, holistic, and client-centered" advocacy that
the Bronx Defenders practice includes criminal defense services, civil
legal services, social work support, and immigration advocacy.17 Other
offices in New York operate under different parameters, choosing to
focus their efforts on the criminal charge directly affecting the client.11 8
Holistic representation is certainly more expensive and many offices
limit their representation to the criminal charge at hand in acknowledg-
ment of their limited resources.119
Holistic representation, however, is gaining awareness and populari-
ty as an effective, albeit costly, solution to the troublesome growth of the
criminal justice system.120 Mass incarceration has become a source of
constant news attention as both legislators and citizens become aware
that the cost of incarceration is both financially and morally untenable.1 21
Communities are decimated by the lack of stable parenting available
115. Orleans Public Defenders trains and requires their attorneys representation in a holistic
manner. See Our Work, ORLEANS PUB. DEFENDERS (May 22, 2015), http://www.opdla.org/what-we-
do/our-work. Their client-centered advocacy model includes a client services coordinator as well as
community partners to assist in improving client's life experience. See id. The Baton Rouge office
limits their practice to the criminal charge and any issues that relate specifically to the criminal
charge. The costs of operation at both offices differ drastically but are not clearly divided among
funds dedicated to the criminal charge and those dedicated to the more expansive client-centered
advocacy.
116. See generally DAVID FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER'S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO
OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2006) (describing the first few years of his employment with the Bronx
Defenders in New York).
117. Our Mission and Story, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.org/who-we-are/
(last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
118. Any of the five counties cited in the recent ACLU lawsuit regarding the state of New
York indigent defense could be examples of public defender offices that do not practice holistic
advocacy. See NYCLU Press Release, supra note 26.
119. Holistic advocacy has expanded in the last decade. For an example of another innovative
public defender office that practices holistically. See Our Vision and Mission, NEIGHBORHOOD
DEFENDER SERV. HARLEM, http://www.ndsny.org/index.php/about-us/our-vision-and-mission/ (last
visited Sept. 18, 2015). The director of the office, Robin Steinberg, travels to educate other public
defenders on the benefits of holistic advocacy and provide guidelines for implementing holistic
advocacy in their individual jurisdictions. See Robin Steinberg, BRONX DEFENDERS,
http://www.bronxdefenders.org/staff/robin-steinberg/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
120. See Robin Steinberg, Heeding Gideon's Call in the Twenty-First Century: Holistic De-
fense and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 961, 963 (2013).
121. See, e.g., Editorial, End Mass Incarceration Now, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2014, at SRI 0;
Adam Gopnik, The Caging ofAmerica: Why Do We Lock up So Many People?, NEW YORKER (Jan.
30, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-america; Elizabeth
Gudrais, The Prison Problem, HARV. MAG. (Mar.-Apr. 2013),
http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/03/the-prison-problem; Chris Hedges, Why Mass Incarceration
Defines Us as a Society, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 2012), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-
places/why-mass-incarceration-defines-us-as-a-society-135793245/.
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because of incarceration.12 2 Children often find themselves subject to the
welfare or delinquency system because a parent is absent due to recur-
ring, or a significant length of, incarceration.1 23 Any public defender of-
fice that declines to practice holistically in order to manage limited re-
sources may find itself expending more resources in the long term as it
deals with both reoffending clients and the children who may follow in
their parents' footsteps.124 Additionally, even if an offender's child does
not require indigent criminal defense services in the future, a broken
home may require more state support in other noncriminal justice related
areas, such as housing, unemployment, or medical care.125 All of these
methods of state-supported care further reduce state budget amounts
available for resourcing indigent defense.
The ABA has also encouraged holistic advocacy as a model of rep-
resentation for effective public defense delivery systems.126 The ABA
holds the primary responsibility for establishing the legal profession's
ethical standards.127 Declining to practice holistically may help an office
and its attorneys more easily provide the cursory or surface-level repre-
sentation that is facially required to pass constitutional muster, but it will
make it fall short in meeting any other description of defense advocacy
that includes collateral circumstances and community improvement.
Nonholistic advocacy also calls into question whether or not a defender
office is complying with the ABA's requirements for effective and com-
petent advocacy.128
122. See Robin Steinberg, Addressing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System Through
Holistic Defense, CHAMPION, July 2013, at 51.
123. See Katy Reckdahl, Mass Incarceration's Collateral Damage: The Children Left Behind,
NATION (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/mass-incarcerations-collateral-damage-
children-left-behind/.
124. Participatory defense, defense representation that includes input and effort by family
members and communities, has grown in popularity because of the role it may play in reducing
recidivism. Janet Moore et al., Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the Struggle for
Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1281-83 (2014-2015).
125. See Reckdahl, supra note 123.
126. Holistic advocacy has become a frequent part of ABA publications and conference semi-
nars. See, e.g., Four Pillars of Holistic Defense, CTR. FOR HOLISTIc DEF.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/criminaljustice/FourPillarsHolisticDe
fense.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2015); Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Pro Bono &
Pub. Serv. et al., Request for Proposals, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_services/2014/04/equal-justice-
conference/2015 rfpjguidelines.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2015); Dan Wiessner, Reu-
ters Legal: ABA Urges Criminal Defense Lawyers to Embrace Holistic Approach, BRONX
DEFENDERS (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.bronxdefenders.org/bxd-in-the-news-aba-urges-criminal-
defense-lawyers-to-embrace-holistic-approach-reuters-legal/.
127. See Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
128. Some judicial districts have implemented solutions to the excessive caseload problems
that make the criminal justice system unfair for poor defendants that have proven just as startling as
the caseload averages. Courts in Mississippi and Georgia, for example, have recently faced signifi-
cant media attention for incorporating solutions that are not consistent with the Sixth Amendment's
mandate for effective assistance of counsel. See Campbell Robertson, In a Mississippi Jail, Convic-
tions and Counsel Appear Optional, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2014, at Al5; Bill Rankin, Lawsuit Tar-
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The same can be used for public defender institutions that respond
to insufficient resources by practicing horizontal representation, as op-
posed to vertical representation. In horizontal representation, also re-
ferred to as "stage" representation, defenders are assigned to courtrooms
rather than cases, and the attorney in a particular courtroom is responsi-
ble for any matters appearing in court on that day.129 Some offices incor-
porate horizontal representation by limiting each defender to one stage of
the proceeding, having "defender[s] . . . handle only one particular func-
tion, such as interviewing [a client or conducting a bail] or preliminary
hearings."13 0 In an office that practices horizontal representation, a client
will have contact with a minimum of two attorneys and can often receive
representation by up to a half a dozen, or more, attorneys during the
course of the criminal case.31 Vertical representation differs from hori-
zontal representation in that the client is represented by the same attorney
throughout the entire criminal case, sometimes even on appeal.132
Horizontal representation is common in public defender jurisdic-
tions, but vertical representation is more beneficial to an individual cli-
ent. The continuity in representation that is a hallmark of vertical repre-
sentation allows the client and attorney to build trust and openly com-
municate.133 Horizontal representation can also lead to serious errors or
even incompetent representation because it discourages personal respon-
sibility and rests on the quality of transferred notes and other case infor-
mation from attorney to attorney.134 Similar to the discourse surrounding
holistic representation, the ABA has promulgated that model public de-
fender systems use vertical representation in their practice, and to do
otherwise is a detriment to the client and the client's right to the effective
assistance of counsel.135 Even the Bureau of Justice Assistance, under the
gets Georgia Public Defender Office, ATLANTA J.-CONST., (Jan. 7, 2014, 5:38 PM),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/lawsuit-targets-georgia-public-defender-office/ncfWm/. These
districts have been charged with engaging in "assembly line justice" whereby groups of defendants
enter guilty pleas en masse or judges are allowed to remain on the bench even though they unconsti-
tutionally withhold defense counsel from incarcerated clients for weeks in order to reduce the strain
on public defender resources. See Robertson, supra; Rankin, supra. Judge Gordon explains his
practice denying counsel to indigent defendants until after an indictment as a tool to prevent the
public defenders from spending time and money investigating a case that may not even go forward.
See Robertson, supra. The four counties named in the Georgia lawsuit were accused of processing
adult defendants and allowing juveniles to go unrepresented in court proceedings. See Rankin, supra.
129. See Malcolm C. Young, Providing Effective Representation for Youth Prosecuted as
Adults, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE BULL., Aug. 2000, at 3,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/182502.pdf.
130. Mounts, supra note 86, at 484.
131. Id.
132. Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1254 (2006).
133. See id. at 1254-55
134. Id. at 1255.
135. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-6.2 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 3rd ed. 1992). The majority of state public defender programs have written policies
establishing at least some level of vertical representation. As per the 2007 census, 71 percent of the
county-based public defender offices provided primarily vertical representation for clients in felony,
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premise that vertical representation would not be possible in every juris-
diction, advised that each juvenile defender office attempt to incorporate
some degree of vertical representation in its practice by assigning "[a]
student, intern, or social worker ... to [each] juvenile" client who would
then be knowledgeable enough to brief any newly assigned attorneys.136
Choosing to practice horizontal representation as opposed to vertical
representation may reduce the need for individual public defenders to use
triage to manage their caseload, but it also contradicts the best practices
outlined by the governing authorities of the criminal justice system and
places clients at risk of subpar, or even completely deficient, defense
representation. Individual public defenders, and the institutions that
house them, look to the constitutional and professional rules that are out-
lined in Section I(B) for governing principles.'37 As demonstrated in the
previous section, limited resources force public defenders to engage in
triage practice, but the way it is currently done at the individual and or-
ganizational levels leads to serious problems that implicate attorney
burnout and arbitrary decision-making.138
Navigating the difficult terrain of providing quality representation
in an environment that only guarantees funding for effective representa-
tion can be incredibly frustrating for enterprising public defender sys-
tems.139 Not only does the individual defender lose the autonomy that is
considered the hallmark of professionals by becoming a victim to forces
outside of her control, but both the defender and the defender system also
limit the effect individual practice can possibly have on criminal law and
procedure. Much has been written about an indigent client's perception
of their free lawyer as being of a lesser quality, or less beholden to the
client, than a lawyer the client would pay.140 Public defenders are also at
risk of adopting the same mindset when they informally incorporate tri-
noncapital cases. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 6 (2010),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf; see also LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR.,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, at 8
(2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf.
136. Young, supra note 129.
137. See discussion supra Section I.B. .
138. For implications of various public defender distribution decisions, see discussion infra
Part Ill.
139. See, e.g., Tom Robertson, Minnesota Lawyers Frustrated over Shortage of Public De-
fenders, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 30, 2003),
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/09/30_robertsontpdshortage/.
140. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness:
Self-Selection by the "Marginally Indigent," 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 230, 247 (2005); Floyd
Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the
Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 368-69 (1991); STEVEN K.
SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE 4 tbl.7 (1996),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf (reporting the 69% of clients who paid for their representation
through private funds met with their lawyer within a week of their arrest while only 47% of those
who were represented by govemment-paid attorneys could claim the same).
415
DENVER LAW RE VIEW
age into their practice. 141 When the client is unable to pay for specific
services or withhold payment for unacceptable service, it is easy to dis-
regard the client's role as the primary recipient of a valuable service.
That is an even stronger tendency when the defender trades upon the
services one client may be entitled to in order to provide services to an-
other client. As opposed to operating as a professional, who is rendering
valued services, the defender is subject to forces beyond his control-the
presence of other clients in need-with no professional rubric to use in
determining which client receives which necessary services and when.14 2
Failing to consider certain fundamental objectives of the public defense
function further removes a public defender institution and its attorneys
from a legal practice that complies with their constitutional and profes-
sional obligations.
Failing to consider how best to manage a resource so that it is per-
petually available or capable of regenerating itself to maximum utility,
only further contributes to the lack of available resources caused by an
inadequate funding stream. While it is true that some resources may not
be able to sustain themselves when they are not originally an adequate
amount to achieve their objective, certain triage decisions are better for
the maintenance of resources than others.143 An enterprising public de-
fender institution must make sure it adopts the triage system that is most
beneficial to it in the long-term. The four public defender institutions
detailed in the following sections have made four different decisions
regarding the distribution of the limited attorney-experience resource and
these decisions implicate their effectiveness in a variety of ways.
III. FOUR APPROACHES TO DISTRIBUTING THE ATTORNEY RESOURCE
One very important public defender resource that is often in short
supply in public defender institutions faced with overwhelming need and
limited resources is attorneys with practice experience.' While it is true
141. Professionalism is marked by civility in the practice of law. Haphazard approaches to
providing subpar representation to client's who may have their life or liberty on the line implicates
an attorney's understanding of his or her role in the legal process. See Michael Davis, Professional-
ism Means Putting Your Profession First, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 342-44 (1988).
142. This is primarily because there are no formal public defender ethic guiding triage deci-
sions. For different scholarly opinions, see discussion supra Section I.A. For different public de-
fender institutional approaches, see discussion supra Section II.B.2.
143. Expert witness fees might be an example of resources that are too finite to sustain regard-
less of the triage scheme used. Dispensing those fees on a contractual basis instead of through indi-
vidual hires could be considered a triage decision that proves more efficient.
144. See Rapping, supra note 76, at 173-74. The attrition rate for public defenders nationwide
was 10% in 2007 with Virginia having the highest at 24%. LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 135, at
18. Several scholars have advocated for public defender administrators to focus hiring on newer,
inexperienced attorneys as a way to improve indigent defense. This follows from the fact that many
of the public defender institutions that fall prey to the "ordinary injustice" claims set forth by authors
such as Amy Bach are older attorneys who have become accustomed to the status quo. "Ordinary
injustice" occurs when legal professionals become so used to inadequate and often appalling rights
violations that they fail to see their role in providing such subpar representation. See AMY BACH,
ORDINARY INJUSTICE: How AMERICA HOLDS COURT 2 (2009).
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there is no consensus on the legal skills necessary for effective assistance
of counsel, there are few system stakeholders who would argue that de-
fender experience is not a valuable component.145 The more experience a
defender has, the better the defender is at making quick assessments of
certain issues in cases, seeing general patterns to pursue, and developing
an effective and efficient method for pursuing them.146 Experience also
enables a defender to more accurately evaluate how a particular decision-
maker-prosecutor, judge, probation or parole officer, or jury-will treat
a particular defense or explanation for certain types of conduct. It is for
these reasons that few clients would reject an attorney with substantial
practice experience in favor of an attorney with little or no experience.
The attorney is often considered the primary resource of a public
defender institution.147 Although subsequent case law has interpreted the
Sixth Amendment mandate of effective assistance of counsel as includ-
ing investigation, interpretation, or mitigation services, all of these fall
under the umbrella of the right to an attorney.148 The manner in which a
public defender institution distributes attorneys with experience to clients
is central to the ability of the client to obtain a fair criminal process. The
more highly functioning public defender institutions used a combination
of the three avenues for experience-training, guidance, or mentorship
by a senior attorney, and completion of the defender's own cases-as
tools for evaluating or assigning experience levels to an attorney.'49
145. See ABA PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 3. This is particularly true in newer public de-
fender offices or systems. The dearth of experienced attorneys exists because new offices must
engage in values-based recruitment in order to truly reform a broken or ineffective public defender
office and establish an office culture that values client-centered representation. The reform-minded
public defender leader must identify candidates who are the most receptive to the agency's new and
improved values and the values-based training that should accompany the change in mission. Once a
leader has identified attorneys who are receptive to pursuing this change, the leader must instill these
values and ensure that these l ssons are reinforced and internalized through training. The experi-
enced public defenders in broken systems are often unaware of the value and necessity of a client-
centered approach to indigent defense representation because they were neither trained on nor prac-
ticed in such an environment. Those who study organizational change note that resistance from those
who are asked to alter their approach or practice is a major problem in creating change. Accordingly,
experienced public defenders in a broken system may see a commitment to change and a new client-
centered form of representation as a comment on their competence. See Rapping, supra note 76, at
173-74.
146. A public defender can gain experience in a number of ways: training, guidance or mentor-
ship by a more senior attorney, or completion of the defender's own cases.
147. This claim is self-evident because indigent defense is about legal representation. Regard-
less of how important investigation, expert witness testimony, or administrative services may be to a
successful defense team, there can be no effective assistance of counsel without an attorney. The
Strickland standards for Sixth Amendment violations begin and end with the role, the function, and
the ability of the attorney to provide representation. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th
Cir. 1988).
148. See ABA PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 3.
149. The Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia is widely considered one the of
the best public defender offices in the country, serving as a model for indigent defense throughout
the nation. See THE PUB. DEF. SERV. FOR THE D.C., ANNUAL REPORT 1-5 (2012) [hereinafter PDS
ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.pdsdc.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/fy-2012-
pds-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=0. Their training program is expansive and can be accessed at PDS
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Some offices that suffer from significant resource deficiency may disre-
gard formal training programs and instead rely on the defender's own
natural abilities or the informal guidance by other more senior attor-
150neys.
Public defender institutions primarily distribute attorney experience
to clients in three ways. Some public defender offices pay little attention
to the amount of experience an attorney has and simply assign clients or
cases at random or through some type of scheduled pickup process for
the attorney. These institutions will often assign public defenders to a
particular courtroom and hold that the public defender is responsible for
any cases, regardless of severity, that are assigned to that courtroom.1 52
Other public defender institutions use an attorney's experience level to
guide case assignments.153 These offices categorize the level of legal
experience a particular client or charge requires for effective assistance
of counsel and then assign those clients to attorneys who possess the
requisite experience.'5 4 For example, a public defender office could de-
cide that an attorney only needs six weeks of training in order to provide
effective assistance of counsel for a client facing a simple misdemeanor
charge.'55 A final group of public defender institutions distribute attorney
experience in a form that mirrors attorney specialization, either in the
particular stage of the proceeding or the particular type of case.156 Such
an institution may determine that homicide or rape cases are the exclu-
sive domain of a certain group of attorneys.'5 7
Training Programs, PUB. DEFENDER SERV. FOR D.C., http://www.pdsdc.org/professional-
resources/pds-training-programs (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
150. See Rapping, supra note 28, at 331-33. For a discussion of ineffective public defender
training models, see Rapping, supra note 76.
151. These type of distribution schemes will usually still consider separate public defender
assignments for clients facing capital offenses so as to ensure compliance with the Supreme Court's
description of "death as different" when it comes to the requirements of effective assistance of
counsel.
152. See, e.g., Public Defender Frequently Asked Questions/Client Assistance, COUNTY
DUPAGE, https://www.dupageco.org/PublicDefender/30835/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) [hereinafter
Client Assistance]. The DuPage and Will County Public Defender Offices in Illinois are two exam-
ples of public defender institutions that use this form of representation. Id.; FAQ's: Can I Choose
Which Assistant Public Defender I Want to Represent Me?, OFF. WILL COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER,
http://www.willcountypublicdefender.com/faqs/1 12-can-i-choose-which-assistant-public-defender-i-
want-to-represent-me (last visited Jan. 12, 2016). The Orleans Public Defenders used this form as
well before adopting a reformed approach where experience was taken into account in 2009. LEWIS
& GOYETTE, supra note 52, at 40-A1.
153. For a discussion of The Orleans Public Defenders as an example, see infra Section III.B.
154. For a discussion of The Orleans Public Defenders as an example, see infra Section III.B.
155. See PDS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 5.
156. LA. PUB. DEF. BD., supra note 107, at 283. This form of specialization appears facially
similar to horizontal representation but differs in that one attorney is responsible for an individual
client's entire case and not just a particular portion of it.
157. The public defender office in Lake Charles, Louisiana, uses this form of representation.
For detailed information, see the Louisiana State Public Defender Report. Id.
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A. Courtroom Based Representation (DuPage County, Illinois)
Some public defender institutions, such as the one in DuPage Coun-
ty, Illinois, do not use experience to inform case assignments and instead
require attorneys to handle any type of case or charge they are assigned.
DuPage County uses a courtroom assignment model, where a particular
defender is assigned to a particular judge or a specific courtroom.58 That
assigned public defender is then required to handle all clients or charged
offenses in that section of court or before that particular judge.159
Defense representation is a skill that improves with experience, and
failing to use experience to inform the assignment practice leaves a client
at risk of obtaining subpar or ineffective representation.'6 0 Additionally,
clients are not ordinarily assigned to a particular courtroom upon ar-
rest.161 Although an individual is able to retain a private attorney to rep-
resent him or her any time after being taken into custody, DuPage Coun-
ty does not currently provide a public defender to a similarly situated
indigent defendant until formal charges have been filed. 162 In this county,
the district attorney has thirty days, if the defendant is in custody, from
the defendant's arrest to indict the individual or conduct a preliminary
hearing that would replace the need for a formal indictment."' If the
accused is out of custody, the district attorney has sixty days to complete
either option. I6 This means that clients can remain in jail for thirty days
without an attorney representing their interests. An enterprising public
158. Client Assistance, supra note 152. "There are 102 counties in Illinois and each county
operates its criminal justice system independently." JUNAID AFEEF ET AL., POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2012),
http://www.icjia.org/assets/pdf/ResearchReports/Policies-andProcedures-of theIllinoisCriminal
JusticeSystemAug2012.pdf. Some indigent defender assignment systems use a "wheel" to assign
cases whereby an attorney is selected through a lottery method and assigned to a case with little
attention paid to the attorney's level of practice experience. See Bill Piatt, Reinventing the Wheel:
Constructing Ethical Approaches to State Indigent Legal Defense Systems, 2 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 372, 388-90 (2012). These types of public defender systems do not have
an attorney assigned to a particular courtroom and may just rely on the services of private counsel to
accept appointments for all indigent clients. See id.
159. See Client Assistance, supra note 152. In some jurisdictions, such as the Lake Charles
Public Defenders in Lake Charles, Louisiana, certain attorneys only represent clients facing misde-
meanor offenses or city court charges. LA. PUB. DEF. BD., supra note 107, at 283. There are also
attorneys who only handle certain types of cases such as sex offenses, drug offenses, mental health
offenses or offenses risking the maximum punishment of life incarceration or death. See id.
160.
Counties throughout the state of Nevada have been cited for assigning attorneys to seri-
ous felony and murder cases for which the attorney is not qualified. Most recently, the
9th Circuit Court of Appeals allowed a defendant who was exonerated from death row af-
ter fourteen years to sue the Clark County (Las Vegas) public defender administrator for
appointing an attorney just out of law school who had never handled a murder case to
represent him on capital charges.
Gideon Reviewed: The State of the Nation 40 Years Later, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N,
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender-Gideon/Gideon Reviewed (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
161. Cf AFEEF ET AL., supra note 158, at 10 (explaining the court's role in the criminal process
and noting that certain crimes are only adjudicated in certain courts).
162. See id. at lL.




defender office may assign an attorney at arrest, but if the process focus-
es on assigning representation by courtroom, every client may not have
the same attorney at arrest that they will have assigned to them once
charges have been formally filed.
Although not an entirely horizontal system of representation, this
type of distribution scheme is counter to Principle 7 of the ABA's guide
for an effective indigent defense delivery system. Principle 7 describes
the ideal representation as being one where the same attorney represents
the same client throughout the criminal proceedings.16 5 As discussed
previously, horizontal representation places a client at risk of having
gaps in time without any representation. The importance of an attorney to
a fair process is critical at every stage of the proceeding, and adopting a
distribution scheme that allows for gaps in representation undermines a
fair criminal process.
One popular argument used by proponents of this representation
scheme is that there are moral implications to allocating scarce resources
according to any system other than random selection.'66 Any allocation
of resources should be equitable or just, and the targeted distribution of
certain resources can easily move from equitable terrain to a favored
mode of practice that relies on unconscious bias. Adopting a random
distribution scheme, however, could also be considered morally objec-
tionable. Acknowledging the special needs of certain clients or charges
would, in fact, be considered necessary for an equitable distribution and
a fair process in the criminal justice system. For example, an individual
may need additional attention or resources in the form of expert witness
assistance or scientific testing to ensure they are provided the same level
of adequate and effective representation as an individual who does not
need either. Ignoring the difference in station or existence could be con-
sidered a dereliction of duty to provide effective assistance of counsel.
B. Minimal Standards Distribution (Orleans Parish, Louisiana)
The Orleans Public Defenders in Louisiana uses a distribution
scheme that provides clients with an attorney who possesses the minimal
level of training or experience deemed necessary to protect the client's
rights.167 Charged offenses are placed into one of five categories ranging
from those with the lowest potential punishment, up to six months in jail
for misdemeanors such as simple possession of marijuana or curfew vio-
lations, to those with the highest sense of complexity.168 Attorneys are-
165. See SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE CRUCIBLE OF ADVERSARIAL TESTING: ACCESS TO
COUNSEL IN DELAWARE'S CRIMINAL COURTS, at v (2014),
http://sixthamendment.org/6ac/6AC delawarereport.pdf. The entire state of Delaware actually
practices horizontal representation. Id.
166. Tremblay, supra note 78, at 2484-85.
167. See LEWIS & GOYETTE, supra note 52, at 40-41.
168. See id. at 27-28.
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assigned a class level based on the amount of criminal defense experi-
ence they have acquired.'6 The Level One attorneys are the attorneys
with the least amount of experience in the office, usually less than one
year, and represent clients facing misdemeanor charges.17 0 The Level
Five attorneys are those attorneys in the office with the highest amount
of experience, at least four years, and represent clients facing the highest
possible noncapital charges. '7 Levels Two through Four consist of attor-
neys with increasing amounts of experience and are assigned cases with
corresponding increases in case complexity.172 This system slightly mir-
rors the rotating courtroom assignment system used in jurisdictions like
Santa Barbara County, but it differs in that public defenders are not ro-
tated back through less serious offenses.
Once these less experienced attorneys achieve a modicum of suc-
cess or skill in a certain class of cases, client demands encourage leader-
ship to immediately move these attorneys "up the ladder" to handle more
complex cases. It is hard to find fault in this system because hiring new
attorneys to handle lower level misdemeanor cases, or any noncomplex
cases that require little experience, is much more easily done than hiring
attorneys qualified to handle the higher level and more complex felony
cases.173 When the facts and circumstances are simplistic or potential
penalties are limited, the amount of experience an attorney has seems
less important. Additional benefits of this type of approach are that it
would ensure all clients receive a basic level of representation and also
allows the attorneys to ease into representing defendants charged with
more complex offenses and risking stricter punishments more comforta-
bly.
If attorneys are also faced with constantly representing new and
more complex cases, they are more likely to exist in a constant state of
stress over learning new elements of a charge or investigative and repre-
sentative techniques.174 Disillusionment and fatigue may more easily take
hold in public defender disposition or approach to the professionalism of
the work. The benefits of financial and temporal investment in recruiting
and training new attorneys cannot be fully realized if these new attorneys
169. See id. at 9, 27-28. One could imagine that prosecutorial experience could be used in lieu
of defense experience because of the trial skills that are developed on either side. Attorneys have to
advise defense clients of constitutional rights, however, so the transfer may not be a clear match.
170. See id. at 12, 28 (stating that the OPD case assignment system "intend[s] to match the
seriousness of the case with the practice level and experience of the attorney").
171. Id. As noted earlier, Orleans Public Defenders did not historically accept capital cases and
only recently established a small division to assume responsibility of a handful of defendants facing
capital charges. See id. at 45.
172. See id. at 9.
173. More experienced public defenders may find it difficult to transition to a more client-
centered form of representation. See Rapping, supra note 76, at 173-74. This may be due to a num-
ber of reasons including a lack of training in that area and a need to experience their previous de-
fense work as acceptable and not deficient. See id.
174. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century,
58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 85-89 (1995).
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leave their employment with the public defender's office in significant
numbers because of the desire to seek the type of work they feel they can
conquer or to develop a particular skill. Some attorneys may actually
prefer a fast-paced movement through different levels of cases. This type
of change ensures that the work will vary and the attorney will use dif-
ferent skills at different times. This pattern of growth will face the same
eventual pitfall when the attorney reaches the highest level of representa-
tion. The only difference is the attorney will reach that stage sooner
without nearly the same level of expertise as they would have obtained
for less complex cases.
In such a scheme, all but the highest level of cases receive represen-
tation by an attorney with just the minimum level of experience neces-
sary to represent their charges. The lower level misdemeanor clients do
not have the benefit of representation by an attorney with years, or even
decades, of experience, and the same holds true to varying degrees for
the classes in between the lowest and highest classes. This result actually
limits the influence a public defender office can potentially have on the
criminal justice system or its community. In 2007, forty percent of the
nation's criminal justice system was made up of low-level misdemeanor
offenses with the smallest percentage of cases consisting of those facing
the highest potential punishments, so the impact of representation in
those cases has the most effect in a given community.'75 Preventing those
clients from having access to attorneys with the highest levels of experi-
ence limits the potential impact that defense could have in improving the
criminal justice system.
C. Rotating Courtroom Assignment (Santa Barbara County, California)
The Santa Barbara County Public Defenders uses a rotation system
for its attorney experience resource.176 When newer and more inexperi-
enced attorneys are first hired by the administration, they are first as-
signed less serious offenses.77 Once they have achieved a certain level of
experience, they become eligible to represent clients charged with high-
er-level offenses.17 8 Only after having obtained a certain level of experi-
175. LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 135, at 10. The exponential growth of misdemeanor
charges in the criminal justice system has been well chronicled in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Rob-
erts, supra note 112, at 1090. This shift was based in large part on a zero-tolerance policing theory
referred to as the "broken windows theory." Id. at 1091-92. The "broken windows theory" states that
monitoring certain urban environments to prevent smaller offenses creates a sense of law and order
that prevents serious crime from occurring. See id.
176. See Santa Barbara Cty. Grand Jury 1997-1998, Final Report on Public Defender Depart-
ment, SANTA BARBARA CTy. GRAND JURY (June 1, 1998), http://www.sbcgj.org/97-
98/MPUBLICDEFENDER.html.
177. See Santa Barbara Cty., Deputy Public Defender I-III, GOVERNMENTJOBS,
https://secure.govemmentjobs.com/viewjob.cfm?JoblD=247066 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
178. See id. As discussed in supra note 157, the distribution scheme in Lake Charles, Louisi-
ana, occupies an area in between the courtroom assignment model of DuPage County and the rotat-
ing courtroom assignment model of Santa Barbara County. The Lake Charles Public Defenders
assigns public defenders to individual courtrooms. It deviates from the courtroom assignment model
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ence representing clients charged with low-level felony offenses are the
attorneys allowed to represent clients charged with more serious felony
offenses. The attorneys are then rotated through different types of cases
at the discretion of the public defender administrator.
Even with this type of rotation system, there is no formal process
for clients facing less serious misdemeanor charges to obtain representa-
tion by the more highly experienced attorneys in the office. This assign-
ment process is a game of chance where the lower-level misdemeanor
client might obtain representation by the more experienced person but
that same client could also be assigned the least experienced person. In
fact, because new hires are assigned only misdemeanor offenses, a mis-
demeanor client who is able to obtain representation by a more experi-
enced attorney could still be considered the exception and not the rule.
D. Practice Specializations (Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Georgia)
Specialization is often preferable in the criminal defense context,
especially when considering certain protected classes or characteristics of
the available dispositions, such as juvenile representation, immigration
consequences, or capital punishment.179  These types of distribution
schemes are supported by the general knowledge that certain types of
cases, such as juvenile, sex offense, or capital cases, require specialized
skills. 1o Holistic advocacy, done properly, actually rests on having spe-
cialized individuals on each defense team. Specialized distribution, how-
ever, has many of the same consequences a a more default, courtroom-
based distribution scheme.
by creating a "life without parole" specialization for attorneys who are assigned any life without
parole cases that arise in the jurisdictions regardless of the courtroom to which the case is assigned.
LA. PUB. DEF. BD., supra note 107, at 283. The office also has specific attorneys who are tasked with
representing misdemeanors. Id. at 18. For each of these categories there is no elevation process but,
instead, the attorneys are hired for a particular role be it misdemeanor attorney, courtroom specific
felony attorney or a life without parole attorney, and the attorney is dedicated to that case subject
matter for the entirety of their employment unless they apply for and are hired for another position.
See id.
179. There may be an even more marked shift towards more specializations in the wake of
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). In Padilla, the Court found that, for there to be a valid
conviction, defense counsel must provide access to immigration advice. See id. at 374. This decision
has tasked defense attorneys with a "responsibility to consult others and create an effective defense
team." Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1515, 1517 (2011). Before Padilla, public defender organizations experimented with various
methods for delivering the best service to clients facing immigration consequences as a result of
their criminal charges. See id. at 1531-33. Some of those methods involved contracting out the
immigration work to specialists outside the organization; others entailed bringing the immigration
expertise inside the organization, either through placing experts in a single state-level position or by
sending immigration experts to local offices. Id. at 1532-33.
180. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2012) (discussing the importance
of understanding adolescent development in the sentencing of a juvenile); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 78 (2010) (discussing the importance of understanding adolescent development in the
sentencing of a juvenile).
423
DENVER LAW REVIEW
The Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, divides all of the
cases into one of three tracks: noncomplex, standard, and complex.18'
Noncomplex matters consist of "non-violent, lower level felony offenses
including drugs, theft," and property crimes, and "are 'fast-tracked'
through the criminal justice process" with a sixty-three day timetable
between arrest and final disposition.182 Burglaries and aggravated as-
saults belong on the standard track.18 3 The remaining cases, which range
from terroristic threats to armed robbery, are in the complex division.184
There is also a juvenile court division. Attorneys in the Fulton County
Public Defenders Office are assigned to the particular divisions based on
experience but do not necessarily transition between the divisions.Iss
Such a distribution scheme also does little in furtherance of ensur-
ing a fair process for defendants by requiring a fair share of limited re-
sources. Attorney burnout, which can also be thought of as "resource
fatigue," can occur much more readily when an attorney is tasked with
representing the same type of case continuously or has no hope for im-
proved assignments. Also, expertise in particular types of cases is com-
plimented by new ideas and the fresh perspectives that may result from
having an attorney, who does not specialize in a particular type of case or
charge, responsible for the representation.
IV. RECLAIMING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY REASSESSING
DISTRIBUTION
Although each of the four counties adopt certain distribution
schemes to handle caseload concerns, each pays insufficient attention to
the resource preservation and intrinsic fairness that are fundamental
goals of the public defender practice. The discussion has provided im-
portant examples of how this failure undermines the overall public de-
fender goal of providing effective assistance of counsel and a fair crimi-
nal process for the nation's poor defendants. Incorporating resource
preservation practices and system accountabilities to limit arbitrary deci-
sion-making are two critically important changes to make for the im-
provement of indigent defense delivery systems. Public defenders will
find it difficult to accomplish their prescribed objectives without these
changes.
181. See About the Office of the Public Defender, FULTON COUNTY, GA.,
http://www.fultoncountyga.gov/fcpubd-about (last visited Sept. 19, 2015); see also Matthew A.
Sorensen, EVALUATION OF THE FULTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT'S CRIMINAL NON-COMPLEX
CASE MANAGEMENT DIVISION 12 (2007),
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%2Careers/CEDP%2OPapers/2007/Sore
nsen CriminalDCM.ashx; cf Trial, OFF. FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT AT'Y,
http://www.atlantada.org/divisions/prosecution units/trial.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
182. Trial, supra note 181.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. About the Office of the Public Defender, supra note 18 1.
424 [Vol. 93:2
2016] SYSTEMATIZING PUBLIC DEFENDER RATIONING
On the surface, the Atlanta Judicial Circuit appears to use a distribu-
tion scheme that more closely aligns with the fundamental public de-
fender goals of providing effective assistance of counsel while preserv-
ing resources and limiting arbitrary decision-making. It is deficient,
however, because it fails to incorporate attorney advancement and could
encourage attorneys to develop a rote style of representation as they rep-
resent the same type of cases repeatedly. An enterprising public defender
institution may consider adopting a set amount of time for each attorney
to stay in a particular division or level of representation in consideration
of how much time it takes a particular attorney to master the skills need-
ed for representing a particular class of cases. That public defender insti-
tution may also consider providing all attorneys with a mixed caseload or
rotating attorneys in the most complex division through the less complex
divisions to ensure those clients are provided with the most highly skilled
attorneys. This move would ensure the attorneys are not facing signifi-
cant burnout because of the difficulty managing cases at the mostly high-
ly complex level. Regardless of how a defender approaches incorporating
the three components of effective public defender triage, the institution
must ensure that every case and client are afforded serious consideration
and treated with importance.
In developing a triage scheme to "make do," public defender institu-
tions must consider more than just their legal constraints. Before the ad-
vent of public defenders, the criminal justice system was characterized
by a government-resourced, prosecuting attorney opposing a lone de-
fendant who was too poor to afford hiring an attorney with the defend-
ant's own personal financing.' Public defenders were created to inject
fairness into a criminal justice process that was growing increasingly
large and life determining.187 In order to accomplish its objectives in light
of limited resourcing, public defender institutions must make manage-
ment decisions about work priorities.188 The private sector refers to these
types of institutional decisions as organizational strategies.1 89 "An organ-
izational strategy is a coherent [plan or] idea that: 1) [clearly defines] the
purposes [or mission] of an [agency] and the value[s] [that] it is trying to
[promote]; 2) identifies [all of] the sources of support . .. that [are neces-
sary] to sustain its operations; and 3) describes how the [agency's] re-
sources . . . can best be [distributed] to accomplish the [agency's purpose
or mission]."1 90 The failure of public defender institutions and the schol-
186. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 7-8 (1964).
187. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also LEWIS, supra note 186.
188. MARK H. MOORE & BRYAN SHAHA, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS




190. Id.; see generally CAIT CLARKE & CHRISTOPHER STONE, BOLDER MANAGEMENT FOR
PUBLIC DEFENSE: LEADERSHIP IN THREE DIMENSIONS (2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bjall87768.pdf.
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arship that addresses the improvement of services comes from the single-
minded focus on the legal constraints the institution must operate under.
A superficial view of national public defender systems may lead to
the conclusion that a uniform approach to distribution practices would
not work in every jurisdiction. It is true that, as discussed in Part III pub-
lic defender services are provided in a variety of ways, and the system
used for delivery will impact the ability any system has to incorporate the
fundamental goals into its triage scheme. With the three customary mod-
els for the delivery of indigent defense services in mind, it is clear that
the comprehensive distribution scheme is best used to determine the ap-
propriate method of distributing resources to clients in staffed public
defender offices. In these staffed, full-time offices, there is one individu-
al familiar with each attorney's growth and supervision schemes that
allow the distributors to witness the individual attorney's capabilities.191
There is also one individual available to view outcomes of the distribu-
tion scheme and to ensure the practice remains consistent.'92
191. See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 105, at 6-8.
192. Much has been written about the deficiencies in the management associated with non-
public defender office models of indigent defense representation. A public defender office, as op-
posed to an assigned counsel or contract program, has "a salaried staff of full or part-time attorneys
who represent indigent defendants and are ... government employees or [the employees of] a public,
non-profit organization." LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 135, at 3. The 2007 Census of Public
Defender Offices "was the first systemic, nationwide study of public defender offices." Id. It collect-
ed "data on the staffing, caseloads, expenditures, standards and guidelines, and . . . training [pro-
grams or procedures of all of the existing state public defender programs in] 49 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia" in the year 2007. Id. The only state not included in the study was Maine, which
did not have a public defender office in 2007. Id.
In the assigned counsel model, courts usually have lists or "wheels" from which a private
attorney is chosen for a particular case. Bill Piatt, County Needs More Efficient Indigent Defense
System, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEWS (June 1, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/County-needs-more-efficient-indigent-
defense-1403588.php. An attorney's ability to get on the wheel will depend on the attorney's ability
to fulfill certain requirements, including a certain level of experience. See id. This type of system
does not lend itself to quality control and oversight. For example, under the current assigned counsel
system in one Texas jurisdiction, qualified attorneys who have submitted applications to be one of
the attorneys assigned to represent indigent clients have their names placed on a "wheel" of lawyers
who are then assigned, in order, to a client by the presiding judge for that case. Id. In this Texas
example, there are nearly 300 lawyers on the appointment list, and very little attention is paid to the
specific quality of representation each attorney provides to his or her indigent client. Id. Additional-
ly, any system that allows for the judges to control the appointment accepts the possibility that
judges may manipulate the system in determining which attorneys are placed on the wheel or grant-
ed a case assignment. Judges may also manipulate through their control of the purse strings since
they would hold the power to approve or deny payments for time spent working on a case or for
experts or investigation for a particular client. See Brown, Rationing, supra note I10, at 833. In his
article about rationing, Darryl K. Brown noted that judges and other funding allocators ration de-
fense funds by assigning public defenders or court-appointed attorneys more cases than they can
possibly handle. See id. at 812, 833-34. Courts also tend to give preferential treatment in attorney
assignments to those attorneys who resolve cases quickly, often without motion practice or investi-
gation or request for expert witness funds. Id. at 812. Even if a judge does not consciously manipu-
late this system there remains a strong potential for significant disparities in resources expended on a
particular case depending on which judge is presiding over a defendant's case.
Contract models are not without criticism. One example of a contract model exists in San
Mateo County, California, where the California Private Defender Program (PDP) bas been in place
since 1969 and holds status as the largest private defender program. Rachel Swan, Private Defense
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Additionally, the majority of public defenders in the nation today
work in large, complex organizations.'93 According to a national census
conducted in 2007, there were 957 public defender offices operating in
the United States, with 427 of those offices funded at the state level, and
530 controlled and primarily funded at the local or county level.' " The
sizes of these offices vary greatly. Public defender offices at the local or
county level employ a median of 7 litigating attorneys but the 154 offices
with the highest caseloads employed a median of 28 litigating attorneys
per office.195 Despite the prevalence of public defender offices, these
offices remain organized according to plans that emphasize the individu-
al responsibility of a single attorney for a single client. The most senior
attorneys are then assigned to the most serious felony charges.'96 Be-
cause the majority of public defender systems are large organizations that
practice vertical representation, incorporating distribution policies that
reflect more effective triage schemes dedicated to fair shares of limited
Saves Public Money in San Mateo County, EXAMINER (May 31, 2013),
http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/private-defense-saves-public-money-in-san-mateo-
county/Content?oid=2350131. In this public defender model, participating attorneys, and not the
county, pay to maintain their own office space and practices. Id. When a judge determines that a
defendant is indigent and in need of a state-funded attorney, the judge appoints the PDP. The PDP
then assigns the case to one of its private attorneys. The overall benefits of such a system, including
the amount of insight and supervision and the degree and method of accountability is unclear. See id
It is also unclear whether such privatization of the public defender function is more cost-effective
because the PDP does not record the cost per defendant. Id. The PDP's annual defender budget of
$17 million is much lower than the $34 million required for San Francisco's public defender's office
when the San Francisco population is only about 12 percent larger than that of San Mateo County.
Id. The difference in budget could reflect the reduction of best practices as defined by the ABA and
other public defender system commenters that tend to require a more significant budget. For exam-
ple, the San Francisco public defender office is able to provide services "linking defendants to social
workers" and expunging criminal resources, none of which is available in San Mateo. Id. There are
also incentive structures in private defender offices that may prove problematic. Peter A. Joy &
Kevin C. McMunigal, Does the Lawyer Make a Difference? Public Defender v. Appointed Counsel,
27 CRIM. JUST. 46, 47 (2012). For example, in order to discourage lawyers from simply processing
cases by obtaining guilty pleas, attorneys receive a high hourly legal rate which increases once a
case goes to trial. See id. Absent adequate supervision, however, even an attorney who takes cases to
trial may simply be processing cases for increased fees.
193. See LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 135, at 3-4.
194. Id. at 3.
195. See id. at 4.
196. The classes assigned for cases can range from misdemeanor to capital cases and the par-
ticular positioning of the defendant can also play an integral role. Although an attorney may under-
stand fully how to represent a misdemeanor charge, in some jurisdictions, enhanced sentencing for
multiple offenses makes a client facing a "simple misdemeanor" the type of case usually reserved for
a more experienced attorney because of the increased potential punishment. For example, in Louisi-
ana, a simple marijuana conviction carries a maximum penalty of six months in jail. Editorial,
Should Louisiana Take the "High" Road, CREOLE (Feb. 4, 2014),
http://www.thecreole.com/?p=22422. A defendant charged with a simple marijuana first offense can
receive a fine and inactive probation. This can also happen for the first few marijuana first convic-
tions. It is at the discretion of the district attorney to charge a particular defendant with a multiple
marijuana charge. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 61 (2015) (providing the district attorney
with "entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district").
Until recently, a multiple marijuana convictions could carry up to life in prison as the maximum
punishment. See Kevin Litten, Bobby Jindal Signs Marijuana Bills that Reform Criminal Penalties,
Medical Marijuana Access, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 29, 2015, 4:39 PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/06/bobbyjindal marijuanalaws.html.
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resources is critical to achieving permanent changes in the delivery of
indigent defense services. In this matter, equity and efficiency actually
converge to create a better system for the nation's indigent people. It also
creates a system that much more closely follows the mandate of the Sixth
Amendment by considering resource preservation and fair distribution of
limited resources to clients.
CONCLUSION
Individual public defender triage practice undermines the fair pro-
cess public defenders are meant to ensure by depending on informal pri-
oritization decisions and increasing the likelihood of public defender
burnout. If a public defender institution envisions a fair criminal process,
regardless of class, as its goal, then it must first develop a comprehensive
scheme for distributing limited resources to indigent defendants that con-
siders all of its constitutional and professional obligations. There is no
system of services that can claim to be fair if it does not first fairly allo-
cate the limited goods it provides to the individuals with competing
needs or claims.19 7 This is particularly true where unfair allocation exac-
erbates the ability of the resource to accomplish its intended objectives.
Recall that attorney expertise is not the only finite resource public
defender offices must strategically distribute. Investigative services and
administrative services are two more resources available at most public
defender offices that are necessary to the effective assistance of counsel
but are also severely limited in under-resourced institutions.198 As with
the attorney-experience resource, public defender administrators distrib-
ute these limited resources in a variety of ways. Some institutions dis-
tribute them using a team-based model, where the same investigator and
administrative person are assigned to the same attorney and assume re-
sponsibility for each case an individual attorney possesses. Others assign
investigators and administrative personnel independent of the attorney
assigned to a particular case.199 The methods used to distribute these oth-
er two limited resources are also critical to the ability of a client to re-
ceive a fair criminal process. Each of these limited resources can be
197. Economists and philosophers both consider such decisions in their fields.
198. The importance of investigation cannot be overstated, and the ABA has listed quality
investigation as one of the hallmarks of effective defense. See ABA PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 3.
Quality investigation includes similar characteristics as quality lawyering, including experience or
expertise. The lack of quality investigative services are present in many challenged systems and
public defenders often bemoan the amount of administrative paperwork they are responsible for
completing.
199. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 120, at 1003-07 (describing the advantages of a team-
based approach to indigent defense). Nonteam based representation can occur when investigators are
hired for cases on a contract basis or subject to approval by the court. For investigative deficiencies
when investigators are subject to approval by the court, see Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of
Guilt: Systemic Factors that Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL.
W. L. REv. 263, 288-89 (2009).
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evaluated using the same analysis presented for distributing attorney
experience.
In this era of limited resources and overwhelming need, reassessing
public defender office structure is critical to maintaining some constitu-
tionally and professionally acceptable representation in the indigent de-
fense field. Undoubtedly, the primary problem of indigent defense is a
problem of insufficient funding. This Article's overall thesis is not meant
to diminish the importance of secure, stable, and sufficient funding. Nei-
ther is it meant to discount a review of mass incarceration and the role
current crime classifications and police targets involving certain margin-
alized individuals may have on increasing the amount of people in need
of public defender services. All of these reforms may be part of the con-
tinuing struggle to create a more just indigent defense system, but devel-
oping the best organizational strategies within these limits imposed by
inadequate funding is also an important action.200 Public defender admin-
istrators and legal scholars truly seeking permanent improvement of the
nation's broken indigent defense system should focus on providing indi-
gent defendants a fair share of the limited resources. This would help
alleviate some of the stress in the overburdened system and help the pub-
lic defender function regain its role of maintaining a fair criminal process
for the nation's poor defendants.
200. Neither is this Article meant to lessen the need for caseload caps. Caps on caseloads or
standards that govern the number of cases an individual can properly oversee at one time are critical
to maintaining effective assistance of counsel. If a defense system or defender leader does not im-
pose case limits on an individual lawyer, case pressures will inevitably overwhelm the lawyer and
compromise the quality of representation. Overwhelming caseloads can render even the most dedi-
cated, experienced attorneys into a simple plea machine or a system processor who cannot spend








The influence of money in politics has beguiled and beleaguered
legislators and judges for decades. Campaign finance laws were borne
out of a desire to limit the role that money plays in the political process.
The constitutionality of those laws hinges on a judge's interpretation of
the First Amendment and whether and how it applies to laws that limit
the giving and spending of money in elections and the disclosure of those
sums.
While the role that money plays in our political system has in-
creased exponentially, the Supreme Court has continued to strike down
laws that seek to stem the flood of money that is pumped into our elec-
tions. Particularly in the wake of landmark rulings like Citizens United v.
FEC and McCutcheon v. FEC, limits on how much individuals and
groups can give and spend in elections are constitutionally suspect. As a
result, lawmakers and judges are looking to transparency and disclosure
laws to do much of the work that campaign contribution and expenditure
limits were designed to accomplish.
Unfortunately, while lawmakers throughout the country are rushing
to draft new and more robust disclosure laws to limit the influence of
money in our political system, it is becoming clear that the Supreme
Court's campaign disclosure jurisprudence is a loophole-ridden failure.
This leaves lawmakers and lower judges with little guidance when craft-
ing and ruling on disclosure laws.
This is the moment for the Supreme Court to clarify its campaign
disclosure jurisprudence. The Court must be specific about the benefits
and burdens that result from disclosure provisions and must also consider
additional factors, such as the identity of the donor and the recipient of
campaign funds, the type of election, and the revolutionary impact the
Internet has had on campaign disclosure laws. This Article provides a
roadmap for the Supreme Court and the lower courts to rule on campaign
disclosure laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION: IT IS ALL ABOUT DISCLOSURE
Lawmakers throughout the country have long sought to guard
against the pernicious influence of money in politics by enacting cam-
paign finance laws.' Money can affect every step of the electoral process:
from who runs for office, to who wins, to which bills are introduced and
passed. Campaign finance law can be seen as a tool chest filled with four
tools-contribution limits, expenditure limits, public financing programs,
and disclosure provisions.
Unfortunately, the Court has whittled away at the ability of law-
makers to employ three of these four tools.2 Since 2006, when Justice
I. See 148 CONG. REC. S1991-02 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold); S.
REP. No.93-689, at 5587-88 (1974).
2. The Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo remains the bedrock of campaign finance
law. 424 U.S. I (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). There it struck down limits on expenditures by candi-
dates and independent individuals and groups. Id. at 143. Decades later in Citizens United v. FEC,
the Court struck down limits on independent expenditures by corporations and unions. 558 U.S. 310,
372 (2010). Shortly thereafter in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the
Court invalidated a key provision of many public campaign financing programs throughout the
nation. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2812 (2011). In 2014, the Court invalidated aggregate contributions limits in
McCutcheon v. FEC. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014). It sadly now seems possible that he Court could
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Samuel Alito replaced Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on the Supreme
Court, the Court has struck down or weakened, in five-to-four rulings,
the constitutionality of expenditure limits,3 certain types of contribution
limits,4 and portions of public campaign financing laws.5 While the Court
has recently looked with disfavor on laws that limit the amount of money
that can be given and spent in elections, it has consistently endorsed laws
requiring report and disclosure of campaign spending.
Simply put, campaign disclosure laws face increasing pressure in
the wake of recent United States Supreme Court decisions such as Citi-
zens United v. FEC6 and McCutcheon v. FEC.7 Because of the Court's
campaign finance jurisprudence, voters, legislators, and judges are look-
ing to disclosure provisions to fix the problems that all of the tools in the
campaign finance toolbox were meant to remedy.
Disclosure laws have served as an important facet of our legal
framework for more than a century.8 Reporting laws require electoral
actors (candidates, political committees, political parties, and others) to
report campaign funds, both raised and spent, to a government agency.
Disclosure laws then require public dissemination of that information.
Disclosure laws will bear a much heavier burden than they have in the
past. This is problematic for at least five interconnected reasons.
First, disclosure laws are only one-fourth of a comprehensive cam-
paign finance solution. They were never intended to, nor can they, solve
all of the ills that contribution and expenditure limits and public cam-
paign financing programs were also designed to remedy.
Second, even if disclosure laws could conceivably bear a heavier
burden, our current system of campaign disclosure is largely a loophole-
ridden failure. So-called dark money, campaign money that is undis-
closed to the public, flows freely throughout our political system.9 One
need only look at the vast sums of money funneled through 501(c) non-
also invalidate direct contribution limits. At that point, lawmakers truly will be left with little more
than disclosure provisions as the only tool through which to try to regulate the flow of money in
politics.
3. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 316, 372; Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 727, 744-45
(2008); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 454, 476-81 (2007).
4. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462.
5. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2812.
6. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
8. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 241 (1910) (repealed 1972). This Article focuses on campaign disclo-
sure laws and at times references other election law related disclosure laws. It does not address
disclosure laws that apply in other contexts.
9. Andy Kroll, Follow the Dark Money, MOTHER JONES (July-Aug. 2012),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/history-money-american-elections.
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profit corporations to know that transparency laws have failed to meet
their goals. 10
Third, while at first blush the Court's rulings on the constitutionality
of disclosure provisions appear to embody a rare moment of consistency
on campaign finance issues, a closer reading of the cases demonstrates
that the doctrinal foundation of the Court's campaign disclosure juris-
prudence is badly fractured. Doctrinally, the Court's analysis is both po-
tentially contradictory and shallow. This manifests in three main areas.
First, what burden do disclosure laws place on constitutional rights? How
much of a burden is too much? The Court often fails to fully define the
precise burden at issue. Second, what standard of review should be used
to review disclosure provisions? The Court has employed a loosely de-
fined standard known as "exacting scrutiny" to disclosure laws. Worse, it
has inconsistently applied what amounts to a balancing test. Third, what
is the government's interest in enacting disclosure laws? Legislators and
members of the public often exaggerate or misunderstand the purposes of
disclosure, if not both. The government must be more specific about
what it hopes to accomplish through disclosure provisions and whether
those goals are achievable.
Fourth, the Court's thin doctrinal treatment of disclosure laws ig-
nores or glosses over a number of important factors that could alter the
Court's analysis. First, should the identity of the donor matter? The bene-
fits and burdens associated with disclosure provisions could change de-
pending on whether the donor is a small or big donor, or an individual or
an artificial entity. Second, should the identity of the recipient (the do-
nee) change the Court's calculus? The Court's analysis could, and per-
haps should, shift depending on whether a candidate, a political party, a
political committee, a nonprofit corporation, or another individual or
entity is the recipient of a campaign donation. Third, should the Court's
analysis change depending on the type of election? For instance, perhaps
both legislators and the courts could take into account the differences
between candidate and ballot measure elections before crafting and rul-
ing on disclosure laws. Fourth, should the temporal aspect of disclosure
play a bigger role in the Court's analysis? Disclosures made before elec-
tions differ significantly from those made after elections.
10. See CAUSE OF ACTION, CONPROFIT: HOW THE IRS's FAILED OVERSIGHT ALLOWS
NONPROFIT MONEY LAUNDERING 5 (2013), http://causeofaction.org/assets/uploads/2013/06/130614-
Fiscal-Sponsorship-FINAL-report.pdf; BRENDAN FISCHER & BLAIR BOWIE, ELECTIONS
CONFIDENTIAL: How SHADY OPERATORS USED SHAM NON-PROFITS AND FAKE CORPORATIONS TO
FUNNEL MYSTERY MONEY INTO THE 2012 ELECTIONS 1-2 (2013),
http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/USP%20Elections%20Report%2Janl/3%201`%203.pd
f; Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-
Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16
NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL'Y 59 (2010-2011); Kim Barker, How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elec-
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Fifth, the Court's doctrine fails to account for the revolutionary im-
pact of online campaign finance disclosure. Both the doctrine and the
policy must change in light of online disclosure, which significantly in-
creases both the benefits and burdens of disclosure requirements.
It is past time to solidify the framework we use to analyze the con-
stitutionality of disclosure laws. Legislators throughout the country are
rushing to propose new ways to shed light on campaign giving and
spending. When crafting these laws, we must ask at least the following
questions: Who should disclose? What do they need to disclose?" When
should information be reported to a government agency, and when
should that information be disseminated to the public? Before we craft
and adopt more disclosure provisions, we must be specific about what
these laws can accomplish and at what cost.
Part II discusses the creation and implementation of disclosure re-
gimes and the Supreme Court's response to those laws. Part III focuses
on the burdens created by disclosure laws. Part IV addresses the standard
of review applicable to disclosure provisions. Part V focuses on the ap-
plication of that standard of review, exacting scrutiny, and focuses on the
government's interest in providing public disclosure. Part VI addresses
the implications of online disclosure. This Article concludes in Part VII
by discussing potential solutions to campaign disclosure regimes.
II. THE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE-EXAMINING THE COURT'S APPROACH
TO DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS
The following part explores the legislative and jurisprudential histo-
ry of disclosure provisions.
In 1910, Congress passed the nation's first federal disclosure provi-
sions as part of the relatively toothless Federal Corruption Practices Act
(the Publicity Act).'2 The Publicity Act required disclosure of political
spending by certain political committees after an election.3 The next
year, Congress amended the Act to include both disclosure of donations
to and expenditures by federal candidates.14 Congress once again amend-
ed the Publicity Act in 1925 by, in part, broadening and strengthening the
disclosure requirements to apply to presidential elections.
The Court evaluated the validity of campaign disclosure laws con-
tained in the Publicity Act in Burroughs v. United States.16 In that 1934
11. For instance, must they disclose their name, address and/or occupation?
12. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822.
13. Id. § 2, 36 Stat. at 823.
14. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 24
(2001).
15. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-506, §§ 303-306, 43 Stat. 1070,
1071-72.
16. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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case, the Court upheld the law as within congressional power.'7 The
Court framed the question as whether such laws must be left to the states
or if Congress could legislate in this area." Hence, the Court treated the
law as raising a question of federalism, not the First Amendment.
Congress supplanted the Publicity Act in 1971 when it passed the
nation's first comprehensive campaign finance scheme, the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act (the FECA).' 9 The FECA was later amended in 1974
to establish an independent agency to monitor campaign spending, the
Federal Election Commission, as well as create stricter restrictions on
contributions and expenditures, and establish public financing options for
candidates.20 The FECA required disclosure of contributions over $100.21
As is typically the case, with a new law comes a lawsuit challenging
that law. In 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo,22 the Court analyzed the constitu-
tionality of, among other provisions, the disclosure provisions in the
FECA.23 Buckley stands as the foundation of our understanding of the
constitutionality of campaign finance laws, including campaign disclo-
sure provisions.
Prior to delving into Buckley, it is important to survey the legal
landscape in place in 1976 and to have an understanding of the cases that
Buckley relied upon. Buckley was the first case since Burroughs to ana-
lyze the constitutionality of campaign disclosure provisions. Hence, all
other pre-Buckley case law focuses on laws providing for disclosure in
areas outside of the campaign finance context.
17. Id. at 547-48.
18. Id. at 544-45.
19. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). Prior
to the passage of the FECA, in 1946, Congress passed the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act to
increase information regarding federal lobbyists. 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1964) (repealed 1995). In
1954, the Court upheld the Federal Regulation Lobbying Act against a challenge that it was uncon-
stitutionally vague. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 624 (1954). Chief Justice Warren,
writing for the Court, expressed his full-throated support of the disclosure provisions. Id. at 624-25.
The Court found that in passing that Act Congress "ha[d] merely provided for a modicum of infor-
mation from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that
purpose. It wants only to know who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much." Id.
at 625. The Court further found that "full realization of the American ideal of government by elected
representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressure. Other-
wise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest groups
seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal." Id. The Court
rejected the argument that the law would act as a deterrent to the exercise of First Amendment rights,
finding that "the restraint is at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship, comparable in
many ways to the restraint resulting from criminal libel laws." Id. at 626. Congress repealed the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act in 1995 with the passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act.
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65 § 11(a), 109 Stat. 691, 701.
20. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 309-318, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280-89.
21. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
22. 424 U.S. 1 (1976), overruled by Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
23. Id. at 60-84.
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The Court appears to be more likely to strike down disclosure laws
or create exemptions to those laws in cases outside of the campaign fi-
nance context. It is also important to note that typically, when the Court
reviews campaign disclosure laws, it does so in the context of challenges
to other facets of campaign finance laws as well, such as contribution
and expenditure limits. The Court has only once ruled on a challenge to a
campaign disclosure law in isolation.2 4 Hence, in the campaign finance
context, the Court may feel additional pressure to uphold disclosure pro-
visions when it strikes down limits on campaign contributions and ex-
penditures so as not to entirely dismantle campaign finance laws. The
Court often views disclosure laws as a less burdensome alternative to
contribution and expenditure limits. However, outside of the campaign
finance context, the Court has ruled on isolated challenges to disclosure
provisions. The Court evidences none of the same concerns when ruling
on noncampaign disclosure laws in isolation.
In 1958, in a noncampaign finance case, the Court created what
would become the test for qualifying for exemptions from disclosure
laws. In NAACP v. Alabama,2 5 the Court ruled on the propriety of a re-
quest by the State of Alabama to obtain the names and addresses of
members and staff of the National Association of Colored People
(NAACP) residing in Alabama.26 There, the Court first recognized that
disclosure provisions can raise serious associational and speech concerns
under the First Amendment.27 The Court concluded that disclosure was
not justified where the NAACP has shown "on past occasions revelation
of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members
to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion,
and other manifestations of public hostility."28 Hence, the Court protect-
ed the disclosure of membership lists when members faced serious
threats. This, as demonstrated by subsequent decisions, is a difficult
standard to satisfy.
In 1964, in Talley v. California,29 the Court struck down a Los An-
geles law that required the authors and distributors of handbills and leaf-
lets to disclose their names and addresses.30 Based on a First Amendment
challenge to the laws, the Court struck down the disclosure provisions
even though they provided the public with information about the identity
of the authors and distributors. In striking down this disclosure provision,
the Court noted that the affected forms of communication, handbills and
leaflets, had "played an important role in the progress of mankind."
24. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 89-90 (1982).
25. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
26. Id. at 451.
27. See id. at 461-62.
28. Id. at 462.
29. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
30. Id. at 60-61, 65.
31. See id. at 64-65.
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Hence, it may be that in Talley, instead of protecting lists of members
facing serious threats (as in NAACP), the Court protected potentially
poor and marginalized people who might not want to disclose their
names to the public.
Where did the law stand at this point? Again, unlike Burroughs,
NAACP and Talley were not campaign disclosure cases. They dealt with
disclosure of membership lists (in the case of NAACP) or the authors and
distributors of handbills and leaflets (in the case of Talley). Burroughs
upheld campaign disclosure provisions as within congressional authority,
and NAACP and Talley struck down other disclosure provisions as gov-
ernmental overreaching in light of First Amendment concerns. Prior to
the Court's decision in Buckley, it was not entirely clear which course the
Court would follow the next time a campaign disclosure law came before
it.
This lack of clarity was resolved in 1976 in Buckley, where the
Court followed the path tread in NAACP and Talley and firmly placed an
analysis of the propriety of campaign disclosure laws as falling within
the First Amendment.32 The Court concluded that laws requiring the dis-
closure of names of members of political organizations (such as those at
issue in NAACP) did not differ substantially from those that require the
names of campaign contributors (such as those contained in the FECA).
Simply put, the Court concluded that "[o]ur past decisions have not
drawn fine lines between contributors and members but have treated
them interchangeably."3 4 Therefore, the Court imported the NAACP
analysis into the campaign finance context.
In Buckley, the Court employed a deferential standard of review and
upheld the disclosure laws against a challenge that they were overbroad
as applied to minor-party and independent candidates and small contribu-
tors but were not per se unconstitutional. The Court concluded that
disclosure provisions serve three interests: preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption, providing the public with information regard-
ing campaign contributors and spenders, and detecting violations of other
campaign finance laws.36
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee (Socialist
Workers)37 stands at the intersection of NAACP and Buckley. There, the
32. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
33. Id. at 65-66. The Court concluded that "the invasion of privacy of belief may be as great
when the information sought concerns the giving and spending of money as when it concerns the
joining of organizations." Id. at 66.
34. Id. at 66.
35. Id. at 60-61.
36. Id. at 66-68.
37. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
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Court protected the disclosure of campaign contributors to the Socialist
Workers Party (SWP) and the recipients of those contributions when
members of the SWP faced harassment by government officials and pri-
vate parties.38 Socialist Workers is the first and last case since Buckley
where plaintiffs successfully waged an as-applied challenge to a cam-
paign disclosure law. This is because it is difficult for any group to bring
forth specific evidence of threats that survive the NAACP test. It is also a
rare case in which the Court addresses a campaign disclosure provision
in isolation. Again, it is typically the case that the Court reviews chal-
lenges to campaign disclosure provisions in cases in which other cam-
paign laws are also challenged. This may be another reason why the
Court carved out an exemption to the disclosure provision here.
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,3 9 the Court once again
analyzed a disclosure law outside of the campaign finance context.' In
that 1995 case, the Court struck down an Ohio law that prohibited the
distribution of anonymous campaign literature (including pamphlets
geared toward candidate and ballot measure campaigns).4' Plaintiff Mar-
garet McIntyre distributed anonymous campaign literature to people at-
tending a public meeting at a school, in violation of the statute.42 Justice
Stevens, writing for a majority of the Court, relied heavily on Talley,
another case dealing with disclosure laws outside the realm of campaign
disclosure, to strike down the Ohio law requiring the identification of
authors of campaign literature.43
38. Id. at 101-02. The Socialist Workers majority rejected the argument that the test elucidat-
ed in Buckley applies only to campaign contributors and not also campaign recipients. Id. at 94-95.
The Court held that "[c]ompelled disclosure of the names of such recipients of expenditures could
therefore cripple a minor party's ability to operate effectively and thereby reduce 'the free circula-
tion of ideas both within and without the political arena."' Id. at 98 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at
71). Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion in which she argued that "there are important differ-
ences between disclosure of contributors and disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures." Id.
at 109 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor concluded that
"the heightened governmental interest in disclosure of expenditures and the reduced marginal deter-
rent effect on associational interests demand a separately focused inquiry into whether there exists a
reasonable probability that disclosure will subject recipients or the party itself to threats, harassment,
or reprisals." Id. at 112.
39. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
40. See id. at 334.
41. Id. at 357. Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize her perception of the
Court's ruling as a narrow one. Justice Ginsburg concluded that "[w]e do not thereby hold that the
State may not in other, larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing
its identity." Id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion to
underline his point that he Court should have taken an originalist's perspective and analyzed only
"whether the phrase 'freedom of speech, or of the press,' as originally understood, protected anony-
mous political leafletting." Id. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas concluded that it did.
Id. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he agreed with Justice Thomas on how to
frame the pertinent question but disagreed with him as to the ultimate conclusion. See id. at 371-72
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia concluded that the Court has improperly "discover[ed] a hither-
to unknown right-to-be-unknown while engaging in electoral politics." Id. at 371.
42. Id. at 337-38 (majority opinion).
43. See id at 341-44. The law in Talley was broader, as it applied to all handbills and leaflets,
not just campaign literature.
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The McIntyre Court rejected the voter information interest and
found the state's interest in preventing fraud and libel to be insufficient,
despite acknowledging that it "carries special weight during election
campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse
consequences for the public at large." The Court found that other por-
tions of Ohio's statutory scheme served those interests sufficiently
well.45 In addition, the Court rightly pointed out that the prohibition on
the distribution of anonymous campaign literature "encompasses docu-
ments that are not even arguably false or misleading."46
The Court once again entered the election disclosure thicket in 1999
in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. (ACLF).4
There, Justice Ginsburg, writing for a majority of the Court, struck down
a Colorado law that, among other things, required that ballot initiative
proponents file disclosure reports including the names and addresses of
paid circulators, the amount paid per petition signature, and the circula-
tor's total salary.48
The Colorado law at issue in ACLF also required the reporting of
the petition proponents' names and the amounts they spent on circulating
petitions for specific measures.49 The Court did not review whether those
reports would alone survive review.50 The Court's opinion relied, in large
part, on the existence and availability of monthly reporting requirements
as a way to provide the electorate with important information and pro-
vide a check against the power of special interests on the initiative pro-
51cess.
Legislative reforms often follow scandals.52 After the explosion of
so-called soft money, not to mention the use of the Lincoln bedroom for
44. Id. at 349.
45. See id. at 350.
46. Id. at 351. Justice Scalia took the majority to task on this point, finding that Ohio's law
served important interests: "How much easier-and sanction free!-it would be to circulate anony-
mous material (for example, a really tasteless, though not actionably false, attack upon one's own
candidate) with the hope and expectation that it will be attributed to, and held against, the other
side." Id. at 383 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
48. Id. at 201. Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion to emphasize his point that
mandatory disclosure provisions can chill the First Amendment rights of association and belief. See
id. at 212 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976), superseded by
statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized
in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010)). Justice Thomas also argued that the government's interest in providing the electorate infor-
mation was lower as applied to ballot measures, at least at the petition phase, than as applied to
candidate elections. Id. at 213.
49. Id. at 201 (majority opinion).
50. Id
51. Id. at 202-03. The Court also pointed out that "ballot initiatives do not involve the risk of
'quidpro quo' corruption present when money is paid to, or for, candidates." Id. at 203.
52. See Amanda S. La Forge, Note & Comment, The Toothless Tiger -- Structural, Political
and Legal Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 351, 356-57 (1996).
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campaign donors, Congress passed its first major overhaul of the cam-
paign finance system since the FECA. The 2002 Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (commonly known as McCain-Feingold) partially revamped
federal disclosure, disclaimer,54 and reporting requirements.
McCain-Feingold provided for disclosure of so-called electioneer-
ing communications, or radio advertisements that refer to a clearly iden-
tified federal candidate and air sixty days before a general election or
thirty days before a primary election.5 ' The creation of electioneering
communications as a new class of communications subject to, among
other things, mandatory disclosure provisions came as a result of heavy
spending of soft money56 on sham-issue advertising.57 These are adver-
tisements that are clearly designed to advocate for the election or defeat
of a candidate, but do not use the "magic words" described in Buckley
that previously triggered the application of the disclosure requirements.
Hence, individuals, corporations, and labor unions could donate soft
money to political parties that could then use that money to air sham-
issue ads that were not subject to limitations or disclosure provisions.59
One year later, in 2003, in McConnell v. FEC,60 the Supreme Court
upheld the disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting requirements contained
53. Editorial, The Soft Money Explosion, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/28/opinion/the-soft-money-explosion.html.
54. Disclaimer requirements are distinguishable from disclosure requirements because they
mandate that a communicator set aside space in or on a communication. The disclaimer provision at
issue requires that noncandidate televised electioneering communications provide that " is
responsible for the content of this advertising." Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 311, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 441(d)(2)). Under 2 U.S.C.
§ 441d(d)(2) the required disclaimer had to be made in a "clearly spoken manner" and displayed on
the television screen in a "clearly readable manner" for a minimum of four seconds. Id. The dis-
claimer also had to state that the electioneering communication "is not authorized by any candidate
or candidate's committee" and had to display the name and address (including web site address) of
the individual or group that paid for the advertisement. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366
(2010) (emphasis omitted). In addition, "any person . . . spend[ing] more than $10,000 on election-
eering communications []in [one] calendar year [has to] file a disclosure statement with the FEC"
that identifies that person, the amount of the expenditure, and the names of some contributors. Id.
55. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 81, 88-89 (2002) (codified as 2 U.S.C. §
434(f)(3)).
56. "Soft money" began as "nonfederal" money that can be given "to political parties for
activities intended to influence state or local elections." McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 123 (2003),
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). An FEC ruling held that soft money
could be used to fund "mixed-purpose activities" that would affect both state and federal elections.
See id. As the Court found in McConnell, "[t]he solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus
enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA's limitations on the source and amount of con-
tributions in connection with federal elections." Id. at 126.
57. Id. at 126-27.
58. Id. In Buckley the Court upheld disclosure requirements for independent expenditures but
only with respect to those expenditures that contained the so-called "magic words," such as "vote
for," "vote against," "cast your ballot for," "elect," or "defeat." FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449, 513 (2007) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976), superseded by statute,
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
Hence it was easy to avoid the disclosure provisions by simply avoiding use of the magic words.
59. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126.
60. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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in McCain-Feingold under a relaxed standard of review. 61 The disclosure
provisions at issue required disclosure of those making electioneering
communications of over $10,000.62 The Court concluded that the provi-
sions imposed a minor burden and served the three governmental inter-
ests identified in Buckley-providing the electorate with information,
deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and
gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering
restrictions applied to the disclosure provisions contained in the Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).63
McConnell v. FEC was the Court's last campaign finance case de-
cided with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on the bench. In 2006, Justice
Samuel Alito replaced Justice O'Connor, shifting the balance of the
Court from five-to-four favoring campaign finance regulations, to five-
to-four against such regulations. Justice Alito authored the first campaign
finance decision the Court made during his tenure on the bench. In Davis
v. FEC,4 the Court struck down a provision of McCain-Feingold com-
monly referred to as the "Millionaire's Amendment" and its accompany-
65ing disclosure provisions. While the substance of that ruling has little to
do with disclosure, it is important because it clearly marks the shift in the
Court's course away from deference to campaign finance laws that limit
the amount of money given and spent in elections. That shift in the
Court's composition ushered in our modern era in which campaign dis-
closure laws bear the weight of remedying the problems contribution and
expenditure limits and public campaign finance laws were designed to
solve.6 6
61. See id. at 190-202.
62. Id. at 194-95.
63. Id. at 196.
64. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
65. See id at 728-29, 744-45.
66. It is true that even before Justice Alito joined the Court in 2006, a majority of its members
struck down limits on expenditures by in part relying on the efficacy of disclosure provisions. For
instance, in 1986, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), the Court struck down a
prohibition on the ability of corporations to make independent expenditures, as applied to a small,
ideological nonprofit. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986). As is
often the case when the Court strikes down prohibitions on spending, it specifically relied on disclo-
sure provisions to do some of the work the monetary limitation was supposed to do. For instance,
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of the Court, dismissed the FEC's argument that without
the prohibition there would be "massive undisclosed political spending by similar entities, and ...
their use as conduits for undisclosed spending by business corporations and unions" because inde-
pendent expenditures would trigger the disclosure provisions still in place. Id In MCFL the Court
also worried about the organizational burdens that disclosure laws can place on outside spenders. Id.
As Justice Brennan observed, "These additional regulations may create a disincentive for such
organizations to engage in political speech." Id. at 254. Justice O'Connor wrote separately to empha-
size her view that Buckley "was concerned not only with the chilling effect of reporting and disclo-
sure requirements on an organization's contributors, but also with the potential burden of disclosure
requirements on a group's own speech." Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citation omitted).
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This pattern of striking down expenditure limits and upholding dis-
67
closure provisions continued in subsequent cases, including, most fa-
mously, the Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United.8 There, while the
Court struck down a prohibition on the ability of corporations and labor
unions to use general treasury funds on electioneering communications
on a five-to-four basis, the Court upheld both disclaimer and disclosure
requirements at issue by a vote of eight-to-one.
The Citizens United Court relied heavily on Buckley and McConnell
in upholding the disclaimer and disclosure provisions against as-applied
challenges. The Court had recently upheld the same provisions under a
facial challenge in McConnell.70 In Citizens United, eight members of the
Court emphasized "that disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more
comprehensive regulations of speech."7  Put another way, the Court
characterized disclosure provisions as a less burdensome alternative to
contribution and expenditure limits.
The Citizens United Court found "that independent expenditures . . .
[could] not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption" and
struck down limits on those expenditures.72 The disclaimer and disclo-
sure provisions at issue were tied to independent expenditures. Hence,
when upholding those disclaimer and disclosure provisions, the Court
necessarily had to conclude that the informational interest alone was suf-
ficient.
In Citizens United, it was only Justice Thomas who dissented from
the Court's decision to uphold the disclaimer and disclosure require-
ments against as-applied challenges. Unsurprisingly, Justice Thomas
relied in part on McIntyre to argue that the "right to anonymous speech"
cannot be abridged "based on the 'simple interest in providing voters
with additional relevant information."' 74 Justice Thomas concluded that
"[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements enable private citizens and
elected officials to implement political strategies specifically calculated
67. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). Wisconsin Right to Life
also evidences the Court's current hostility to campaign finance laws. See id. at 457. However, that
case does not relate to disclosure laws and has little bearing on the issues discussed in this Article.
68. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
69. See id. at 316, 365-66.
70. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
71. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369. Interestingly, while Justice Thomas was the only justice
to dissent from this portion of the Court's holding in Citizens United, it was Justice Thomas in
another case, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, who suggested that disclosure may often be a less
restrictive vehicle through which to limit corruption and the appearance of corruption. Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 429-30 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
72. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356-57.
73. See id. at 368-69.
74. Id. at 480 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 276 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
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to curtail campaign-related activity and prevent the lawful, peaceful ex-
ercise of First Amendment rights."75
The bulk of Justice Thomas's dissent focused on the events follow-
ing the passage of Proposition 8 in California.76 Proposition 8 was a bal-
lot initiative that defined marriage as between only a man and a wom-
an.77 In the aftermath of its passage, opponents of the measure gathered
information about who donated money in favor of the measure, including
their names, addresses, occupations, employer's names, and total amount
of the contributions.78 This information was posted online at the Califor-
nia Secretary of State's website.7 9 Opponents of the measure used this
information to create web sites with maps showing the locations of the
homes or businesses of those who donated in favor of the measure.so
Some of those donors experienced property damage and threats.81 Others
resigned from their jobs.82
Because of the events following the passage of Proposition 8, late
contributors sued in federal court seeking a preliminary injunction to
prevent forced disclosure of their names and addresses.83 However, the
court upheld the disclosure provisions, finding that the provisions would
not result in "a threat of harm so substantial" that plaintiffs were entitled
to an exemption from the disclosure provisions.84 The court emphasized
that exemptions from disclosure provisions are "historically reserved for
small groups promoting ideas almost unanimously rejected" as opposed
to a majority of voters whose ballot measure was successful.85 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an exemption to the dis-
closure requirements because they were successful at the polls, which
"evidenced a very minimal effect on their ability to sustain their move-
ment," and were "unable to produce evidence of pervasive animosity
even remotely reaching the level of that present in [Socialist Workers].""
While the majority in Citizens United focused on the importance of
online disclosure to increasing the effectiveness of transparency provi-
sions, Justice Thomas, focusing on the Proposition 8 litigation, argued
75. Id. at 483.
76. Id. at 480-85. Justice Thomas also argued that "the threat of retaliation from elected
officials" was another reason to invalidate the disclosure requirements. Id. at 483.
77. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 184 (2010) (per curiam).
78. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 481 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Stephen R. Klein, A Cold Breeze in California: ProtectMarriage Reveals the
Chilling Effect of Campaign Finance Disclosure on Ballot Measure Issue Advocacy, 10 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC'Y PRAC. GROups 68, 68 (2009).
81. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 481 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 482.
83. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
84. Id. at 1205.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1214. It may be that the informational interest is not high enough to sustain post-
election late disclosures. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 80, at 71.
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that online disclosure increases the potential chill on First Amendment
rights that results from mandatory disclosure laws.87 Justice Thomas
concluded that online disclosure provides "political opponents 'with the
information needed' to intimidate and retaliate against their foes."" Both
the majority of the Court and Justice Thomas agreed that online disclo-
sure changes the impact of disclosure laws; they just disagreed as to
whether that was a benefit or a detriment.
Following on the heels of its endorsement of the disclaimer and dis-
closure provisions in McCain-Feingold in Citizens United, the Court
examined and upheld disclosure provisions outside of the campaign fi-
nance context in John Doe #1 v. Reed.89 In that 2010 case, the Court up-
held a Washington state law that provided for the disclosure of the names
and addresses of those who signed referendum petitions.90 Justice Rob-
erts, writing for an eight-member majority of the Court,91 found that a
signature on a referendum is entitled to some First Amendment protec-
tion because "[ain individual expresses a view on a political matter when
he signs a petition under Washington's referendum procedure."92 The
Court upheld the disclosure requirement, finding that it preserved "the
integrity of the electoral process by combating fraud, detecting invalid
signatures, and fostering government transparency and accountability."93
Justice Roberts explained that Washington's interest in maintaining elec-
toral integrity extended beyond combating fraud to things like discover-
87. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 484 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. (quoting Id. at 916 (majority opinion)).
89. 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010).
90. Id. The Court framed the issue broadly as "whether disclosure of referendum petitions in
general would [violate the First Amendment.]" Id The Court found that plaintiffs had to satisfy the
standards for a facial challenge, in part because the claim "is not limited to plaintiffs' particular case,
but challenges application of the law more broadly to all referendum petitions." Id at 194.
91. Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence in Reed to emphasize that there were "com-
peting constitutionally protected interests" at issue that had to be balanced. Id. at 202 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring)).
92. Id. at 194-95 (majority opinion). The Court held that most often "the individual's signa-
ture will express the view that the law subject to the petition should be overturned. Even if the signer
is agnostic as to the merits of the underlying law, his signature still expresses the political view that
the question should be considered 'by the whole electorate."' Id. at 195 (quoting Meyer v. Grant,
486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988)). Justice Scalia wrote separately in Reed to contend that "[o]ur Nation's
longstanding traditions of legislating and voting in public refute the claim that the First Amendment
accords a right to anonymity in the performance of an act with governmental effect." Id. at 221
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also emphasized a point he made in McIntyre, arguing that
"[riequiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which
democracy is doomed." Id. at 228. Justice Scalia argued that petition signers were akin to legislators
or voters, and there was nothing to indicate that the act of legislating or voting is entitled to First
Amendment protection. See id at 221.
93. Id at 197 (majority opinion). The Court did not address Respondents argument that the
laws were justified by the government's interest in "providing information to the electorate about
who supports the petition." Id. Instead, the Court found the interest "in preserving the integrity of the
electoral process" to be sufficient. Id.
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ing invalid signatures caused by mistakes and "more generally to pro-
moting transparency and accountability in the electoral process."94
In Reed, and consistent with his position in Citizens United, Justice
Thomas found that because of the "'vital relationship between' political
association 'and privacy in one's associations"' the Court should apply
"strict scrutiny to laws that compel disclosure of protected First Amend-
ment association."95 The compelled disclosure provisions failed to sur-
vive this level of review, according to Justice Thomas. First, Justice
Thomas found that the asserted interests were not compelling.97 Justice
Thomas relied on McIntyre to conclude that the informational interest
was insufficient in this context." Next, Justice Thomas argued that the
availability of as-applied challenges did not sufficiently alleviate the
harm caused by disclosure provisions because they "require substantial
litigation" and "risk . . . chilling protected speech."9 9
Most recently, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court struck down ag-
gregate contribution limits as contravening the First Amendment but
again endorsed disclosure provisions as a less burdensome alternative.'0 0
Justice Roberts, writing for five-members of the Court, trumpeted the
efficacy of online disclosure.'01 While disclosure may have been "only a
partial" remedy in 1976 when the Court decided Buckley, Justice Roberts
found that online disclosure "now offers a particularly effective means of
arming the voting public with information" and "offers much more ro-
bust protections against corruption." 0 2  Justice Roberts failed to
acknowledge that online disclosure also significantly increases burdens
on privacy rights.
In sum, the legislative and jurisprudential history of disclosure pro-
visions reveals a fractured constitutional approach to those provisions.
94. Id. at 198. It is worth questioning whether, unlike in the case of McIntyre when the Court
protected the identity of leaf letters and handbill distributors against forced disclosure, here the Court
is simply less concerned with protecting ballot measure signatures from disclosure.
95. Id. at 232 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958)).
96. Id. at 233.
97. Id. Justice Thomas analyzed the asserted interests in 'transparency and accountability,'
which . . . encompasses everal subordinate interests: preserving the integrity of its election process,
preventing corruption, deterring fraud, and correcting mistakes by the secretary of state or by peti-
tion signers." Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent Sam Reed at 40, Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (No. 09-
559)). Justice Thomas concluded that "[i]t is readily apparent that Washington can vindicate its
stated interest in 'transparency and accountability' through a number of more narrowly tailored
means than wholesale public disclosure." Id. at 238.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 241 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 326-27 (2010)).
100. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459 (2014).
101. See id. at 1460.
102. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). Justice Rob-
erts concluded, somewhat naively, that the invalidated aggregate contribution limits could have
encouraged money to be given and spent by entities not subject to disclosure provisions. Id.
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The Court has inconsistently described the burdens, benefits, and stand-
ard of review to be employed when analyzing disclosure provisions.
III. THE BURDEN RESULTING FROM DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS
In part because of a larger doctrinal incoherence with respect to
campaign finance law, the Court has been purposefully or ignorantly
inconsistent about defining the burden imposed by disclosure laws and in
analyzing how severely that burden affects various individuals and
groups. The Court's jurisprudence focuses much more heavily on the
government interests served by disclosure and does not give the same
weight to defining the rights burdened by such provisions.03
It is worth initially asking which rights we are worried about when
we talk about the burdens imposed by disclosure provisions. We are like-
ly worried about First Amendment rights, but which ones? First, we are
worried about speech rights because forced disclosure can chill speech
and reduce the flow of ideas by discouraging people from giving and
spending money. Second, we are also worried about associational rights
because forced disclosure may make people r ticent to join and contrib-
ute money to a particular group.10 Third, we are additionally worried
about privacy rights. It is unclear whether those rights are separate or
connected to privacy rights that fall under the umbrella of First Amend-
ment protections. The Court, unfortunately, provides no guidance on
those questions.
The Court's campaign disclosure jurisprudence also begs the ques-
tion of what exactly gives rise to a cognizable burden. Is it simply fears
of physical and economic harms and public hostility, such as those dis-
cussed in NAACP1os and Socialist Workers?0 6 Or can and should we
include additional concerns, such as fears related to personal or profes-
sional isolation, simple loss of privacy or anonymity and aversion to pub-
lic exposure, or the more abstract concept loss of dignity and autonomy
in the ability to shape one's identity? The Court glosses over these nu-
ances and instead discusses the rights to anonymity and privacy.
In Buckley, the seminal case in the area of campaign disclosure, the
Court declared that while "disclosure requirements impose no ceiling on
campaign-related activities . . . we have repeatedly found that compelled
disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and
103. Left with little guidance regarding the burden imposed by disclosure laws, the Court is
unsurprisingly inconsistent when defining and applying the proper standard of review.
104. Disclosure laws can infringe on the First Amendment rights of association and speech by
acting as a deterrent to an individual's ability to associate and speak or an organization's ability to
speak, which in this case is the giving and spending of money. While the majority opinions in this
area often give a thin treatment to how exactly disclosure laws can infringe on First Amendment
rights, some of the justices' separate opinions paint a slightly fuller picture.
105. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
106. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98-101 (1982).
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belief guaranteed by the First Amendment."07 The Court has relied on
this language in subsequent cases. For instance, relying on Buckley, the
Socialist Workers Court characterized the burden as one on "privacy of
association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.,108 But the
Court has failed to examine fully what it meant by the First Amendment
guarantee of "privacy of association and belief."
The Buckley Court treated the freedom of association as important
only insomuch as it leads to speech and advocacy.109 Having explained
why association is significant, the Court concluded that "funds are often
essential if 'advocacy' is to be truly or optimally 'effective,"' and "the
right to pool money through contributions" bolsters the "advancement of
beliefs and ideas." 0
According to Buckley, courts must look to NAACP to determine
whether the burdens on those challenging disclosure provisions are so
great that they are entitled to an exemption. Courts look to whether there
is a "reasonable probability" that the compelled disclosure will lead to
"threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or
private parties.""' The Buckley Court added that proof could include
"specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their
associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization it-
self. A pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public hostility
may be sufficient."ll2 When plaintiffs can come forward with such evi-
dence, then there "exists the type of chill and harassment identified in
NAACP v. Alabama."' 1 It is only at that point that would-be disclosers
could obtain an exemption from forced disclosure.
107. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The Court later referred
to "the invasion of privacy of belief' that may occur from the imposition of disclosure laws. Id. at
66.
108. Socialist Workers, 459 U.S. at 91 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64). The Court also pro-
vided that disclosure laws could only survive as-applied challenges where there is a "substantial
relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest." Id. at 91-
92 (alteration in original) (quoting Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539,
546 (1963)).
109. Citing to NAACP, the Court provided that, "group association is protected because it
enhances '(e)ffective advocacy."' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65 (alteration in original) (quoting NAACP,
357 U.S. at 460).
110. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460). The Court refused to
differentiate between contributors and members. Id. at 66.
Ill. Id. at 74.
112. Id. The Court added that "[n]ew parties that have no history upon which to draw may be
able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding
similar views." Id. Reviewing the Court's ruling in NAACP, there the Court found an "uncontrovert-
ed showing" of "economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other mani-
festations of public hostility." Id. at 69 (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462). Further, the Court found
that the government could now show a 'substantial bearing' on the issues it sought to clarify." Id
(quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 464).
113. Id. at 74. As Justice O'Connor noted in a separate opinion in Socialist Workers, "[T]he
application of the Buckley standard to the historical evidence is most properly characterized as a
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The Court found the NAACP exemption to be met in only one cam-
paign disclosure case. Justice Marshall, writing for a majority of the
Court in Socialist Workers, concluded that, among other things, there
was "proof of specific incidents of private and government hostility to-
ward the SWP and its members within the four years preceding the tri-
al."ll 4 There, the evidence consisted of "threatening phone calls and hate
mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members'
property, police harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots
at an SWP office."" 5 Additionally, there was "a past history of govern-
ment harassment of the SWP," including massive FBI surveillance of
SWP.16
There may be indications that at least outside the campaign finance
context, the Court is willing to recognize that the burdens imposed by
disclosure laws sometimes require exemptions from those laws. The
McIntyre Court waxed poetic about the importance of anonymity. "The
decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or
official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a
desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible.""7 The Court
continued by pointing out the following:
[Q]uite apart from any threat of persecution, an advocate may believe
her ideas will be more persuasive if her readers are unaware of her
identity. . .. Thus, even in the field of political rhetoric, where 'the
identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts
to persuade,' the most effective advocates have sometimes opted for
anonymity.
Hence, McIntyre recognizes that disclosure laws may lead to cog-
nizable burdens that stretch beyond immediate threats."l9 NAACP and
Socialist Workers hinge on specific evidence of immediate threats. McIn-
tyre, by contrast, discusses the importance of a mere desire to be free
from forced identification.120
mixed question of law and fact, for which we normally assess the record independently to determine
if it supports the conclusion of unconstitutionality as applied." Socialist Workers, 459 U.S. at 113
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Socialist Workers, 459 U.S. at 99.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995).
118. Id. at 342-43 (citation omitted) (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)).
119. It may be that McIntyre can now be viewed as an outlier in the Court's disclosure juris-
prudence. McIntyre may represent the height of the Court's protection of anonymous speech.
120. Justice Scalia touched on this point in his dissent. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 379 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). He argued:
[NAACP and Socialist Workers] did not acknowledge any general right to anonymity, or
even any right on the part of all citizens to ignore the particular laws under challenge. Ra-
ther, they recognized a right to an exemption from otherwise valid disclosure require-
ments on the part of someone who could show a "reasonable probability" that the com-
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In another case outside of the campaign finance context, the Justic-
es' many separate opinions displayed a marked disagreement regarding
the burden caused by the disclosure of the names and addresses of those
signing referendum petitions. In Reed, once Justice Roberts decided to
frame the case as a facial challenge rather than as an as-applied chal-
lenge, it was relatively easy for him to reject plaintiffs' contention that
the potential First Amendment burdens caused by the law were too great
in light of the government interests served by the law.'2' The Court re-
jected the claim that online disclosure could "become a blueprint for
harassment and intimidation," 22 finding that it relied on specific harms
that could result from signing a particular referendum, not any referen-
dum.12 3
Justices Alito and Thomas both wrote separately to emphasize the
burdens wrought by public disclosure. Justice Alito was particularly con-
cerned with the "associational privacy" interests that could be harmed by
compelled disclosure.124 Online disclosure, Justice Alito argued in his
concurrence, allowed "anyone with access to a computer [to] compile a
wealth of information" about those signing referendum petitions or mak-
ing campaign contributions.125
Justice Thomas wrote the lone dissent in Reed, arguing that com-
pelled disclosure of signed referendum and initiative petitions "severely
burdens" the First Amendment rights of speech and association and that
"there will always be a less restrictive means" of "preserving the integri-
ty of [the] referendum process."'2 6 Justice Thomas specifically focused
pelled disclosure would result in "threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Govern-
ment officials or private parties."
Id. at 379 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). As Justice Scalia
rightly pointed out, there was no evidence that Mrs. McIntyre faced the sort of threats that would rise
to the level of the NAACP and Socialist Workers standard. Id. at 380.
121. See John Doe #1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 199-200 (2010). Justice Roberts concluded that,
"there is no reason to assume that any burdens imposed by disclosure of typical referendum petitions
would be remotely like the burdens plaintiffs fear in this case." Id. at 201. While Justice Alito agreed
with the Court's result, his agreement seemed to stem only from the fact that the Court framed the
case as a facial challenge. See id at 202-04 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito, in fact, laid out the
reasons why the Plaintiffs in Reed had likely alleged a sufficient case for an as-applied challenge to
the law. Id at 207-08. Justice Alito stressed the need for speakers to be able to obtain as-applied
exemptions from disclosure provisions "quickly and well in advance of speaking." Id. at 203. Justice
Alito's concurrence focused on the necessity of maintaining as-applied challenges as a viable option
for those seeking exemptions from disclosure laws. Justice Alito pointed to the aftermath of the
passage of Proposition 8 and commented that "if the evidence relating to Proposition 8 is not suffi-
cient to obtain an as-applied exemption in this case, one may wonder whether that vehicle provides
any meaningful protection for the First Amendment rights of persons who circulate and sign referen-
dum and initiative petitions." Id. at 205.
122. Id at 200 (majority opinion).
123. Id. at 201.
124. Id. at 204-07 (Alito, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 208. Justice Alito concluded that, "[t]he potential that such information could be
used for harassment is vast." Id.
126. Id at 228-29 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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on the "privacy of association."27 Justice Thomas discussed the risks
that online disclosure can pose and relied on his opinion in Citizens Unit-
ed to conclude that "the state of technology today creates at least some
probability that signers of every referendum will be subjected to threats,
harassment, or reprisals if their personal information is disclosed."l28
By contrast, Justices Sotomayor and Stevens wrote separate concur-
rences in Reed to argue that the disclosure provisions caused relatively
minor burdens. Justice Sotomayor focused on "the character of initiatives
and referenda"1 29 and concluded that "the burden of public disclosure on
speech and associational rights [is] minimal in this context."l30 The im-
pact on "expressive interests is even more attenuated" with respect to
initiatives and referenda as compared to campaign finance disclosure,
Justice Sotomayor argued.3 1
In the campaign finance context, the Court pretty consistently dis-
misses claims in which the burdens of disclosure provisions outweigh
their benefits. The Court grants exemptions only when plaintiffs can
demonstrate that the burdens imposed by the laws rise to the level of the
standard elucidated in NAA CP. In such cases, plaintiffs must make an
uncontroverted showing of economic or physical harms or public hostili-
ty.1 32 Outside of the campaign finance context, the Court has been less
consistent about when burdens are too great to overcome the benefits of
disclosure provisions. In both areas, the Court fails to fully define the
burden or burdens it is worried about and when those burdens are so
great that disclosure laws should not stand.
IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO DISCLOSURE
PROVISIONS
The Court is inconsistent about the applicable level of scrutiny be-
cause it lacks clarity when defining the burdens imposed by disclosure
laws. Again, Buckley provides the foundational understanding for this
question. There, the Court rejected rational basis as the proper test, ex-
plaining that disclosure cannot be justified by "a mere showing of some
legitimate governmental interest."l3 3 The Court cited to NAACP v. Ala-
127. See id. at 240. Contrary to the positions staked out by Justices Stevens and Sotomayor,
Justice Thomas concluded that "signing a referendum petition amounts to 'political association'
protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 232 (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for
Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981)).
128. Id. at 242.
129. Id. at 212 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 214. Justice Sotomayor further argued that "[d]isclosure of the identity of petition
signers, moreover, in no way directly impairs the ability of anyone to speak and associate for politi-
cal ends either publicly or privately." Id.
131. Id.
132. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958).
133. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), overruledby Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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bama for the proposition that such laws must survive "exacting scruti-
ny," which requires "a 'relevant correlation' or 'substantial relation' be-
tween the governmental interest and the information required to be dis-
closed."1 3 4 Later in the opinion, the Court reiterated that "[t]he strict test
established by NAACP v. Alabama is necessary because compelled dis-
closure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First
Amendment rights."l35
The exacting scrutiny standard falls somewhere in between the strict
scrutiny and rational basis tests.136 Courts have applied something less
than strict scrutiny because "disclosure requirements impose no ceiling
on campaign-related activities."1 37 By the same token, courts have ap-
plied a more searching standard than rational basis because disclosure
provisions can present a "significant encroachment[] on First Amend-
ment rights."'38
This level of scrutiny is, therefore, typically seen as requiring both
"a sufficiently important governmental interest" and a "substantial rela-
tion[ship]" between the restriction and that interest.'3 9 These words alone
provide little guidance to legislators and lower courts. An interest is "suf-
ficiently important" when the Court says that it is. The same is true for
when a relationship will be "substantial" or "relevant."
In part because the exacting scrutiny standard presents serious defi-
nitional issues, it is inconsistently applied. While this criticism may be
lodged against other standards of review, exacting scrutiny, in particular,
suffers from definitional issues. In addition, application of exacting scru-
tiny often looks like little more than a balancing test, which is easily mal-
leable depending on the judge's predilections.14 0 Hence, exacting scruti-
ny is tailor-made for inconsistent application.14 1
The discretion given to judges when applying exacting scrutiny is
almost complete. The only real guidance comes from looking at how this
134. Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court later described this as a "strict test," despite the fact that
it applied the test in a most deferential fashion. See id. at 66-67.
135. Id.
136. As many of the justices and legal scholars have pointed out, "exacting scrutiny" is not the
same as strict scrutiny. As Justice Thomas has explained, "in Buckley, although the Court purported
to apply strict scrutiny, its formulation of that test was more forgiving than the traditional under-
standing of that exacting standard." Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182,
214 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring).
137. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 16, 64 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
140. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Privacy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
801, 813 (2012) ("Once one or more particular governmental interests have been identified as suffi-
ciently important, however, the Court appears to have essentially weighed the benefits from that
interest or interests being furthered against the costs of disclosure to the affected parties.").
141. See Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413,
419-20 (2012) (arguing that exacting scrutiny "may be more subject to change than either strict
scrutiny or rational basis review because, unlike those standards, 'exacting scrutiny' does not put a
thumb on either side of the constitutional scale").
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standard has been applied in precedent. Prior case law puts meat on the
bones of these all-but-hollow terms. This is a problem when trying to
give legislators and members of the public notice about what is permissi-
ble under the First Amendment. Simply put, exacting scrutiny provides
too little protection for those subject to disclosure provisions in light of
sometimes significant privacy costs.
For instance, the exacting scrutiny applied in Buckley looks more
like a rational basis level of review than a heightened level of review.
The Buckley Court took a permissive, deferential view of congressional
power in this area, upholding all of the challenged disclosure provi-
sions.142 First, with respect to the applicability of the FECA's disclosure
provisions to minor party and independent candidates, the Court upheld
the provisions despite finding that the government's interests in applying
disclosure provisions is decreased and that the burden on the contributors
is significant.143
Second, with respect to the applicability of the FECA's disclosure
provisions to small contributors, the Court upheld the $10 and $100
thresholds despite finding that small contributors are "likely to be espe-
cially sensitive to recording or disclosure of their political prefer-
ences."1" In fact, the Court explicitly acknowledged that Congress had
merely adopted the thresholds that were part of the 1910 Publicity Act.145
Clearly applying something far less than strict scrutiny, the Court held
that the thresholds were not "wholly without rationality." 46 This lan-
guage sounds like a far cry from anything approaching exacting scruti-
ny.147
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger dissented from the portion of Buckley
upholding the disclosure provisions as applied to small contributors.
Burger acknowledged that disclosure "is an effective means of revealing
the type of political support that is sometimes coupled with expectations
of special favors or rewards" but cautioned that "disclosure impinges on
142. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83-84.
143. See id. at 70-71. Specifically, with respect to the burden that the disclosure provisions
placed on contributors to minor party and independent candidates, the Court acknowledged that:
[T]he damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and
their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements
are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in
contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point
where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes
to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within and
without the political arena.
Id. at 71 (footnotes omitted).
144. Id. at 83.
145. See id.
146. Id
147. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger spent much of his dissent in Buckley arguing that the Court
failed to apply the proper level of scrutiny. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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First Amendment rights." 48 Burger argued that while disclosure provi-
sions serve many important governmental purposes, the provisions con-
tained in the FECA were "irrationally low" and should be struck down.149
Burger worried that with such low limits many small contributors would
be deterred from contributing to candidates and committees.150 Conclud-
ing that the disclosure provisions were impermissibly low, Burger fa-
mously found that "Congress has used a shotgun to kill wrens as well as
hawks."'5 1
In McIntyre, and in contrast to its decision in Buckley, the Court ap-
plied a much more stringent version of exacting scrutiny than applied in
Buckley. Finding that the Ohio statute burdened "core political speech,"
the McIntyre Court applied exacting scrutiny to the prohibition on the
distribution of anonymous campaign literature.152 The Court defined ex-
acting scrutiny as requiring narrow tailoring to serve "an overriding state
interest."153 This language sounds much more like strict scrutiny than the
exacting scrutiny standard applied in Buckley.
In sum, while the Court has consistently used exacting scrutiny as
the level of scrutiny applicable to disclosure provisions, it has been in-
consistent in its discussion of how that standard should be applied.154 At
times, the Court has appeared to apply something akin to strict scrutiny,
while at other times, the Court has applied something much closer to
rational basis.
V. APPLYING EXACTING SCRUTINY
Exacting scrutiny, like other constitutional tests, includes two
prongs. First, courts look to the strength of the government's purpose.155
Second, courts look to the level of fit between the law and that pur-
pose.156 In the case of exacting scrutiny, prong one requires "a sufficient-
148. Id. at 236.
149. Id. at 236-37.
150. Id. at 237.
151. Id. at 239.
152. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995). Justice Scalia, by con-
trast, characterized the statute as far from burdensome. Justice Scalia concluded that the law "forbids
the expression of no idea, but merely requires identification of the speaker when the idea is uttered in
the electoral context." Id. at 378 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Scalia viewed the disclosure
provisions in Buckley as far more burdensome. Id. at 383-85. Justice Scalia believed the court
should have been more deferential to legislative judgment, concluding that the issue "bears closely
upon the real-life experience of elected politicians and not upon that of unelected judges." Id. at 381.
153. Id. at 347 (majority opinion) (citing First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
782 (1978)).
154. As the Ninth Circuit noted in California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, "[T]he Su-
preme Court has been less than clear as to the proper level of judicial scrutiny we must apply in
deciding the constitutionality of disclosure regulations such as those in the [Political Reform Act]."
328 F.3d 1088, 1101 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003).
155. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
156. See id. at 64.
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ly important government[] interest," and prong two requires a substantial
relationship between the restriction and that interest.'57 This Article, like
the courts that analyze campaign disclosure provisions, focuses on the
first prong of the test.
We again return to Buckley for the foundation of our understanding
about campaign disclosure laws, this time about what those laws seek to
accomplish. Buckley discusses three government interests served by such
restrictions: preventing corruption or its appearance, informing voters,
and enforcing other campaign finance laws.58 These remain the three
interests most often discussed as sufficient to uphold disclosure provi-
sions.
A. Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
1. Definitional Issues
The Court has provided little guidance regarding the specific type of
corruption that disclosure laws prevent and how exactly those laws serve
that goal. Buckley stated, in expansive terms, that disclosure provisions
"deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by ex-
posing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity."'59
The Court did little to explain what it meant by this broad proclamation.
The Court added only a few explanatory statements. First, public disclo-
sure "may discourage those who would use money for improper purposes
either before or after the election."'60 Second, disclosure gives the public
"information about a candidate's most generous supporters [so they are]
better able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in
return."'6'
In essence, the Court argues that disclosure provisions serve pre-
and post-election purposes. The underlying assumption here seems to be
that there is something nefarious about certain contributions, and subject-
ing those contributions to the light of day will have a cleansing effect.1 62
Before the election, the requirement that contributions be disclosed could
avert the giving of problematic contributions because donors will want to
avoid revealing themselves and the recipient of their donations to the
public. 63 After the election, the disclosure requirement could place a
157. Id. at 16, 64 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
158. Id. at 66-68.
159. Id at 67.
160. Id. The Court later found that disclosure "tends 'to prevent the corrupt use of money to
affect elections."' Id (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934)).
161. Id.; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L.
REV. 311, 326 (arguing that disclosure laws put "the question of undue influence or preferential
access in the hands of voters, who, aided by the institutional press, can follow the money and hold
representatives accoutable [sic] for any trails they don't like.").
162. See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 274
(2010).
163. Id. at 281.
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check on elected officials who might be predisposed to make decisions
that favor their contributors. If the disclosure provisions do not lead
elected officials to avoid such behavior, they will at least allow the pub-
lic to be aware of special favors. In this way, corruption may be seen to
encompass accountability. 164 Knowledge regarding who contributes to
candidates and groups could allow members of the public to hold their
officials accountable.16 5 For instance, even Justice Thomas, long hostile
to disclosure provisions, concluded that "disclosure laws work to make
donors and donees accountable to the public for any questionable finan-
cial dealings in which they may engage."'66 But what exactly does public
accountability look like? Who is watching? How? And what are the con-
sequences?
The government's interest in preventing corruption or its appear-
ance after the election can at times sound like an iteration of the voter
informational interest. Essentially, corruption is avoided by empowering
voters to obtain the information necessary to root it out. However, this
interest is distinct from the pure voter informational interest, which in a
way is broader and encompasses a voter's desire to place a candidate
along a political spectrum, not necessarily to detect or prevent problem-
atic behavior.
Corruption now stands as a narrow concept that arguably prevents
little more than bribery.167 In Citizens United, the Court dispelled any
beliefs that corruption could embrace a broad concept and defined cor-
ruption as merely quid pro quo.'ss The Court reiterated this crabbed view
of corruption again in McCutcheon.169 Hence, it is unclear how much
force the interest in reducing the appearance of corruption has in the
wake of Citizens United and McCutcheon.
Was corruption intended to embrace much more than merely the
concept of quid pro quo? Buckley and earlier campaign finance cases
likely envisioned corruption as a broader concept. For instance, Buckley
talks about preventing the "'buying' of elections and ... undue influence
of . . . contributors on officeholders."'70 In Socialist Workers, Justice
O'Connor explains that "[c]orruption of the electoral process can take
164. See Johnstone, supra note 141, at 436-37 (explaining that Buckley can be interpreted as
supporting disclosure on the basis that it prevents corruption or its appearance because disclosure
laws promote accountability).
165. Briffault, supra note 162, at 281 ("Most advocates for disclosure from the 1890s through
the 1960s emphasized the Brandeisian 'cleansing power' of disclosure.").
166. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 643 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgement and dissenting in part).
167. See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).
168. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
169. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
170. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 70 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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many forms: the actual buying of votes; the use of 'slush funds;' dirty
tricks; and bribes of poll watchers and other election officials."1 7 1
2. Other Factors to Consider
Outside of the definitional issues regarding what exactly we mean
by corruption, we also must dig deeper than the Court and ask more nu-
anced questions about how the identity of the contributor and the recipi-
ent might alter the Court's analysis as to the importance of the govern-
ment's interest in preventing corruption or its appearance. With respect
to the identity of the contributor, it may be that donations by small con-
tributors go entirely unnoticed by recipients and fail to provide useful
information to the public to hold public officials accountable for their
actions or root out corruption.
Further, with respect to the identity of the recipient, when the recip-
ient is a third-party member or independent candidate who is unlikely to
win, "[t]he Government's interest in deterring the 'buying' of elections
and the undue influence of large contributors on officeholders also may
be reduced."l72 In such cases, it becomes unclear whether disclosure can
serve anticorruptive purposes.
Next, one must ask whether there is a difference between disclo-
sures made before and after the election. Mandating disclosure on the
basis of preventing corruption or its appearance before an election is
likely based on assumptions that there is something nefarious or prob-
lematic about certain contributors or contributions. But there must be
more than that. It must also be that disclosure will do something to reme-
dy those problems. Perhaps disclosure will deter contributions made by
people who would expect something in return for their contributions.
Pre-election disclosure, therefore, seems premised on the belief that con-
tributions will predict the behavior of candidates once they are office-
holders, specifically, behavior with respect to certain contributors. After
the election, disclosure laws premised on preventing corruption or its
appearance are likely designed on a belief that disclosure will place a
check on elected officials who might be predisposed to make improper
decisions that favor their contributors.
B. Voter Information
1. Definitional Issues
The voter informational interest clearly places First Amendment
concerns on both sides of the balance when analyzing disclosure provi-
171. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 109-10 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70.
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sions.17 3 Simply put, under the voter informational interest, disclosure
can be seen supporting, rather than merely burdening, First Amendment
rights. 174
The Court recognized that disclosure provisions provide the public
with useful information regarding the identity of those who seek to influ-
ence ballot box decisions.175 With respect to candidates, the Buckley
Court found that disclosure "allows voters to place each candidate in the
political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the
basis of party labels and campaign speeches."7  The Court concluded
that disclosure of campaign contributions "alert[s] the voter to the inter-
ests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facili-
tate predictions of future performance in office."l77 Hence, disclosure of
contributions essentially serves as a voting cue and an indication of a
candidate's position as an officeholder, much like party affiliation or the
identity of endorsers might.
In contrast to its decisions in Buckley, McConnell, and Citizens
United, in McIntyre the Court found the voter informational interest to be
insufficient to uphold the prohibition on the distribution of anonymous
literature. The Court treated the identity of the speaker as indistin-
guishable from any other piece of content in a document.'79 From this
conclusion, it followed that "[t]he simple interest in providing voters
with additional relevant information does not justify a state requirement
that a writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise
173. Justice Breyer has noted that "constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the
legal equation." Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
174. Justice Stevens wrote separately in Reed to emphasize his point that "[t]his is not a hard
case" because the regulation did not affect pure speech, and "any effect on speech that disclosure
might have is minimal." John Doe #1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 215-16 (2010) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
175. For an argument that the Court has misidentified the foundations of the informational
interest, see Johnstone, supra note 141, at 415-16. Johnstone argues that the informational interest is
both broader and narrower than the Court's current understanding. Id. at 415.
It is broader in the sense that informing voters through disclosure of a wide range of in-
terests in political campaigns is critical to the full function of the Constitution's antifac-
tional machinery. It is narrower in the sense that the interest is in disclosing interests-
factions-and not other information that voters may find valuable for other reasons.
Id.
176. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67; see also Burt Neuborne, One Dollar-One Vote: A Preface to
Debating Campaign Finance Reform, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 15 (1997) ("[C]ompelled public disclo-
sure of campaign contributions, campaign expenditures, and individual expenditures on behalf of a
candidate was sustained in Buckley, in part, because the Court believed that knowledge of a candi-
date's financial supporters was of great value to voters in assessing the candidate's political posi-
tions.").
177. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
178. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-53 (1995).
179. Id. at 348 ("Insofar as the interest in informing the electorate means nothing more than the
provision of additional information that may either buttress or undermine the argument in a docu-
ment, we think the identity of the speaker is no different from other components of the document's
content. . . .").
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omit.,,so However, the speaker's identity is not the same as any other
piece of content that might be omitted from or added to a communica-
tion. The speaker's identity allows the voters to evaluate how much cred-
ibility they want to give to a message. There is a reason that some adver-
tisements must tell viewers whether a spokesperson is paid; we will
evaluate the message based on the speaker's motivations. There is a rea-
son why people take advice on taxes from their accountants and medi-
cine from their doctors. Having said that, all of those examples presume
that the listener or viewer will be able to identify the speaker. If that is
not the case, then the disclosure obviously provides little information.
The McIntyre Court distinguished Buckley on the basis of the in-
formational interest." However, it is difficult to square Buckley's hold-
ing regarding the importance of disclosure with respect to independent
expenditures and McIntyre's holding regarding the importance of ano-
nymity with respect to campaign literature. Both provisions serve the
government's interest in providing information to the electorate. As Jus-
tice Scalia argued in his dissent, "The provision . . . here serves the same
informational interest" as those discussed in Buckley.1 82
The McIntyre Court acknowledged that Buckley addressed the dis-
closure of not just contributions to or expenditures by candidates but also
independent activity, like Mrs. McIntyre's activity.1 83 But the basis on
which the McIntyre Court distinguished the disclosure provision at issue
in Buckley from the Ohio statute fails to withstand serious scrutiny.84
The McIntyre Court held that while the mandatory reporting at issue
in Buckley "undeniably impedes protected First Amendment activity, the
intrusion is a far cry from compelled self-identification on all election-
related writings. A written election-related document-particularly a
leaflet-is often a personally crafted statement of a political view-
point."185 But the same is true for many independent expenditures, which
180. Id. The Court added that, "in the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not
known to the recipient, the name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader's
ability to evaluate the document's message." Id. at 348-49.
181. Id. at 353-57. The Court quickly dismissed Bellotti as concerning the protections given to
corporations. See id at 353-54.
182. Id. at 384 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 354-55 (majority opinion) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 75-76 (1976),
superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81,
as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010)). The Court recognized that in Buckley it had "expressed approval of a requirement
that even 'independent expenditures' in excess of a threshold level be reported to the Federal Elec-
tion Commission." Id. at 355.
184. The Court distinguished Buckley by finding that the Federal Election Campaign Act
"entailed nothing more than an identification to the Commission of the amount and use of money
expended in support of a candidate." Id.
185. Id. The Court further concluded, without evidence, that "even though money may 'talk,'
its speech is less specific, less personal, and less provocative than a handbill-and as a result, when
money supports an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate retaliation." Id If that were
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the Court has said are akin to the spender's speech. And while reporting
information to the Federal Elections Commission (FEC), as opposed to
placing it on the face of a leaflet, may have been qualitatively different
before the advent of widespread online disclosure, the same is not true
now. While it is of course true that the disclosure provision in Buckley
was not identical to the one at issue in McIntyre, that does not make the
provisions analytically distinguishable.
Back in the campaign finance arena, in both McConnell and Citi-
zens United, the Court focused primarily on the informational interest
when upholding disclosure provisions.'86 For instance, the Citizens Unit-
ed Court found that "[a]t the very least, the disclaimers avoid confusion
by making clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or political
,,187party. Similarly, with respect to the disclosure requirements, the
Court found that "the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking
about a candidate shortly before an election."'8 8 The Court concluded
that "transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages."'8 9 Hence, the
Citizens United Court focused on the importance of pre-election disclo-
sure.
The voter informational interest, unlike the interest in preventing
corruption or its appearance, mainly supports pre-election purposes.
Simply put, the Court concluded that information regarding a candidate's
supporters tells the public more about who their candidates are and who
those candidates may later support than other information provided dur-
ing the often rancorous political campaigns.
The voter informational interest must stand alone with respect to
laws that require disclosure of funds, which the Court says cannot give
rise to corruption or its appearance. For instance, the Court has said that
spending by independent groups does not lead "to corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption."'9 For the same reason, lower courts have con-
cluded that contributions to independent groups cannot lead to corruption
or the appearance of corruption.191 Therefore, disclosure provisions that
true, then limits on independent expenditures should not be treated as limits on pure speech that are
subject to strict scrutiny.
186. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 368 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
195-96 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 3 10.
187. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368.
188. Id. at 369. The Court also rejected Citizens United's contention that the disclosure re-
quirements would chill speech by exposing donors to retaliation. The Court found that Citizens
United "offered no evidence that its members may face similar threats or reprisals." Id at 370.
189. Id. at 371. The Court found that "[a] campaign finance system that pairs corporate inde-
pendent expenditures with effective disclosure has not existed before today." Id at 370.
190. Id. at 357.
191. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692-94 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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apply to independent expenditure groups must be supported only by the
voter informational interest.192
The same is true of disclosure provisions on the state level regard-
ing the financing of ballot measure campaigns. Because th  Court has
said that spending by ballot measure committees cannot give rise to cor-
ruption or its appearance,'93 it is the informational interest alone that
supports disclosure provisions affecting ballot measures.
It may be that the voter informational interest applies with special
force in the ballot measure context.194 In ProtectMarriage.com v. Bow-
en,195 the Ninth Circuit found that the informational interest applies most
strongly in the ballot measure context because "[v]oters rely on infor-
mation regarding the identity of the speaker . .. particularly where the
effect of the ballot measure is not readily apparent."'96 In addition, citi-
zens act as legislators in the ballot measure context and have a strong
interest in knowing who is trying to sway their votes.'97
However, while the informational interest must stand alone in sup-
porting disclosure regarding independent expenditure groups and ballot
measure committees, this interest has been found to be insufficient with
respect to distributors of leaflets and handbills in Talley and McIntyre.198
2. Other Factors to Consider
As is true for the government's interest in preventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption, courts must look to additional factors to see
if the government's voter informational interest is truly served by disclo-
sure provisions.
For instance, with respect to the identity of the contributor, one
must evaluate which contributors provide the voters with useful infor-
mation. Small individual donors are unlikely to give the voters any in-
192. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). In Buckley the Court
upheld the disclosure of independent expenditures, despite striking down limits on those expendi-
tures because the limits failed to prevent corruption or its appearance. The Court found that the
disclosure provisions "serve another informational interest, and . . . increase[] the fund of infor-
mation concerning those who support the candidates." Id. at 81. The Court held that disclosure of
independent expenditures "helps voters to define more of the candidates' constituencies." Id. This, of
course, assumes those who make independent expenditures on a candidate's behalf are a candidate's
constituency.
193. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1981); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978).
194. See ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1207 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
195. 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
196. Id. at 1208 (quoting Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, No. 00-1698, slip op. at
17:12-28 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2005)).
197. Id. (citing Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)).
198. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-49 (1995); Talley v. Califor-
nia, 362 U.S. 60, 63-65 (1960).
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formation that could bear on their ballot box decisions. Instead, when it
comes to small donors, and indeed most individual donors, what would
be useful to the public is the aggregation of certain types of information.
It would be helpful, for example, for the public to know if forty percent
of the donors to a ballot measure committee, a candidate committee, or
another political committee were all employed in the real estate industry,
the health care industry, or the legal industry. Similarly, it might be elu-
cidative for the public to know what percentage of the donors to a com-
mittee live in a certain area, are a certain age, or even identify as being
from a certain racial background.
With respect to donors that are artificial entities, it is important for
the public to obtain information about that entity and the identity of its
supporters, members, and employees. Innocuous sounding names like
Americans for a Better Tomorrow or even Smith and Adams LLC may
provide the public with little information. However, information regard-
ing the source of its funds (in the case of Americans for a Better Tomor-
row) or the identity of its members (in the case of Smith and Adams
LLC) can give the public important information about the identity of
those campaign contributors. Disclosure laws should be designed to pro-
vide the public with the information necessary to evaluate the motivation
of contributors and spenders.
Further, with respect to the identity of the recipient, when the donee
is a third-party member or independent candidate, the voter informational
interest may be low because "minor parties usually represent definite and
publicized viewpoints."I99 In such cases there is a decreased need to give
the voters information about the views that a candidate espouses.
When the donee is a ballot measure committee, as opposed to a
candidate committee, it may be that disclosure of campaign funds most
directly serves the voter informational purpose. In the case of candidate
elections, the voters are confronted with a living, breathing candidate
who they can evaluate. Candidates typically share their views on a wide
range of issues prior to an election. In the case of ballot measure elec-
tions, the voters face only a proposal on which they can vote yes or no.
The proposal may have a somewhat misleading title and summary and
may be confusing to understand for those few voters who endeavor to
199. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 70 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), overruledby Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The Court continued:
Major parties encompass candidates of greater diversity. In many situations the label
"Republican" or "Democrat" tells a voter little. The candidate who bears it may be sup-
ported by funds from the far right, the far left, or any place in between on the political
spectrum. It is less likely that a candidate of, say, the Socialist Labor Party will represent
interests that cannot be discerned from the party's ideological position.
Id.
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read it. When the donee is an artificial entity, the same considerations
apply as when the entity is a donor.
Again, the voter informational interest demonstrates that disclosure
provisions can also foster, not merely burden, First Amendment rights.
Disclosure provisions increase the amount of information available to
voters when deciding who will represent them and, in the case of ballot
measures, which laws to enact.
C. Detecting Violations and Enforcement
Finally, in Buckley, the Court found that "recordkeeping, reporting,
and disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data
necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations [contained
in the FECA]."a
Here, the Court likely conflated these various restrictions. Public
disclosure is not necessary to detect violations; instead, recordkeeping
and reporting alone serve that purpose. It may be that the public serves a
watchdog function. But it is far from clear how much the public truly
polices campaign finance laws.
VI. THE EFFECT OF ONLINE DISCLOSURE
Online access to campaign finance information significantly enlarg-
es both the benefits and burdens of disclosure laws. The case law should
essentially be divided between cases decided before and after the advent
of widespread online disclosure. Citizens United, decided in 2010, is
arguably the first major decision regarding the constitutionality of disclo-
sure provisions made in our modem Internet Age. And it is no coinci-
dence that the majority focused on the efficacy of online disclosure when
striking down limits on expenditures, while the dissent focused on the
detriments of online disclosure and discussed privacy concerns.
A. Benefits
There can be no doubt that the ability to access disclosure infor-
mation with the click of a mouse button, as opposed to a trip to a city
hall, county seat, state capitol, or the District of Columbia, has radically
increased the ease of obtaining disclosed information. Online disclosure
facilitates the government's interests identified in Buckley: enhancing
voter information, preventing corruption or its appearance, and promot-
ing enforcement of campaign finance regulations.
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy leaned heavily on the utility of
disclosure provisions when striking down McCain-Feingold's prohibi-
200. Id. at 67-68. It is worth noting that this interest may be losing efficacy because there are
simply fewer contribution and expenditure laws to enforce. Therefore, courts seeking to uphold
disclosure provisions hould be careful about putting too much weight on this interest.
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tion on the ability of corporations and labor unions to use general treas-
201
ury funds on electioneering communications. Justice Kennedy, writing
for five other Justices, explicitly found that "[a] campaign finance system
. . . with effective disclosure has not existed before today."202 justice
Kennedy took this to mean that limits on spending were no longer re-
quired because disclosure laws could do much of the work that contribu-
tion and spending limits were designed to achieve.
But what exactly does "effective disclosure" mean to Justice Ken-
nedy? Justice Kennedy focuses on accountability: "[M]odern technology
makes disclosures [more] rapid and informative. . . . With the advent of
the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders
and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected
officials accountable for their positions and supporters."2 03
The Citizens United Court additionally emphasized the importance
of online disclosure to the efficacy of disclosure rules.204 There are a
number of assumptions that must be examined regarding the ability of
disclosure laws to provide voters with useful information about candi-
dates before an election. First, should the voters associate a candidate's
ideology with that of her contributors? Second, how often do contribu-
tions affect an officeholder's decisions and votes? Third, does the current
form of delivering campaign finance data to the voters serve this pur-
pose? For instance, would it be more useful to aggregate information
based on factors such as geography and type of employment?
The world that Justice Kennedy describes is a dream far from reali-
ty. Dark money flows freely throughout our political system.205 Immense
sums of money are spent to sway the ballot box decisions of voters
throughout the country. And much of that goes undisclosed. If money is
speech, as the Court has said, quite often the voters do not know who is
speaking.2 06
The public similarly faces very real challenges in obtaining the in-
formation necessary to hold their officials accountable.207 This is a fail-
ing, not of online disclosure, but of a complex web of rules and regula-
201. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67 (2010).
202. Id. at 370.
203. Id; see also Briffault, supra note 162, at 276 ("[E]ven if the constitutional rules governing
disclosure do not change, the enhanced potential for disclosure to affect political participation ought
to force us to think more carefully about what we want and what we can get from disclosure and
how disclosure laws ought to be tailored to provide important election-related information with the
least impact on participation.").
204. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
205. "The political involvement of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, which often do not
disclose their financial supporters, has become a topic of national interest." Mayer, supra note 140,
at 802.
206. See Kroll, supra note 9.
207. See Johnstone, supra note 141, at 417 (arguing that "[i]n short, 'disclosure failed colossal-
ly in the 2010 election."' (quoting William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Persona: Bringing Privacy
Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 864 (2011))).
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tions promulgated by the FEC and Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
While federal election law requires that some entities that engage in po-
litical activity, such as political action committees, must disclose their
donors, it also allows other entities that engage in some amount of politi-
cal activity, like social welfare organizations, trade associations, cham-
bers of commerce, and labor unions, to not disclose their donors.208
Additionally, the world Justice Kennedy describes has also failed to
come to fruition for some practical reasons. Notably, the press corps is
dramatically shrinking. One study of DC Media Corps found "a signifi-
cant decrease in the reporting power of mainstream media, [in part] be-
cause . .. the number of newspapers" devoted to covering Congress has
decreased by fifty percent, and the number of reports monitoring Con-
gress has fallen by thirty percent.209 Members of the press often serve a
watchdog function by mining data, finding connections between contrib-
utors or spenders and candidates, and digesting and contextualizing cam-
paign finance information. However, there are simply fewer performing
that function.
Further, while the Internet can serve a democratizing function by
providing anyone with access to a computer with the ability to obtain
disclosed information, the reality is that very few citizens take it upon
themselves to pore over disclosure reports. Hence, while campaign fi-
nance information is available, it is largely underutilized.
Justice Kennedy naively misstates the legal and practical implica-
tions of online disclosure. The legal framework has failed to bring about
full and complete disclosure. Practical realities have similarly failed to
create a world in which disclosure laws can supplant other campaign
finance tools-such as contribution and expenditure limits.
B. Detriments
The Internet no doubt bolsters the effectiveness of disclosure provi-
sions by making information easier and faster to access. However, with
the ease and speed come increased concerns about burdening speech and
associational rights.210 Our current rules were crafted in a pre-Internet era
in which legislators could little fathom our current systems of delivering
information to the public. As discussed above, the detriments of online
disclosure are thoughtfully detailed in Justice Thomas's dissent in Citi-
zens United.2 11 In the wake of the threats, harassments, and reprisals
faced by donors to "Yes on [Proposition] 8" campaigns, there can be
208. Mayer, supra note 140, at 804-05.
209. LEA HELLMUELLER, THE WASHINGTON, DC MEDIA CORPS IN THE 21' CENTURY: THE
SOURCE-CORRESPONDENT RELATIONSHIP 20 (2014).
210. Briffault, supra note 162, at 274; see also William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Check-
book: Privacy Costs ofPolitical Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. I, 8-24 (2003).
211. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 480-85 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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little doubt that online disclosure can have negative consequences.212
These consequences must be examined and, if possible, quantified.
VII. CONCLUSION
While disclosure laws can serve important purposes, campaign fi-
nance laws, including contribution and expenditure limits, are designed
to accomplish much more than disclosure laws alone can.213 Contribution
limits, for example, can allow qualified candidates without a preexisting
network of financial support to run for office. Expenditure limits can
serve to prevent the drowning out of voices of those who cannot or do
not wish to spend large sums of money in political campaigns.
A. Change the Existing Framework
While citizens, legislators, and even members of the judiciary are
looking to disclosure laws to carry a heavy burden in our current elec-
toral system, we lack a strong doctrinal framework through which to
view and evaluate disclosure provisions. We begin by looking at the ex-
isting doctrine and reconceptualizing the way we analyze disclosure pro-
visions. First, we must recognize that disclosure provisions often impose
deeper and more varied burdens than we currently recognize. Courts
should consider protecting additional concerns, including those that do
not rise to the level of NAACP-like harms. The Court's opinion in McIn-
tyre, for instance, provides support for the idea of recognizing additional
burdens imposed by disclosure laws. Second, we should accept hat ex-
acting scrutiny is a vague standard of review that provides little guid-
ance. Once we recognize that the burdens imposed by disclosure provi-
sions are greater than currently thought, it might make sense to apply
something closer to strict scrutiny. Third, it is important to realize that
the government's interests in enacting disclosure provisions are ill-
defined and overstated. It is time to be more specific about what we can
and hope to achieve in our current framework.
212. See ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200-01 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
213. Briffault, supra note 162, at 276 ("Disclosure alone is likely to accomplish little. It is
unlikely to be effective at advancing the anti-corruption value that is one of its justifications, and
reliance on disclosure alone effectively abandons many of the other long-established goals of cam-
paign finance regulation, such as voter equality, promoting electoral competition, ameliorating the
time-burdens of fundraising, and reducing the role of private wealth in politics."). Justice White's
dissent in Citizens Against Rent Control addresses this issue. See Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley/Coalition for Fair Housing, 454 U.S. 290, 306-08 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
There the Court struck down a California law that limited contributions to ballot measure commit-
tees on the grounds that the law failed to serve a governmental interest. Id. at 298-99 (majority
opinion). Justice White noted that disclosure laws alone failed to sufficiently serve the voter infor-
mation interest. Id. at 309 (White, J., dissenting).
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B. Explore Additional Factors
We must then be explicit about additional factors that should weigh
into the Court's analysis. First, we should undertake a deeper exploration
of how the identity of the contributor and recipient, and the type of elec-
tion may factor into the Court's analysis. Disclosure may be more im-
portant with respect to ballot measure elections than candidate el ctions.
The disclosure of campaign contributions may be one of the important
indications of who would benefit from ballot measure proposals because
there are few other voting cues in such elections.
Second, all of this should be done with an understanding that online
disclosure of campaign finance data significantly alters both the benefits
and burdens of public disclosure. The Court has focused on how online
disclosure increases the effectiveness of disclosure provisions but has not
similarly recognized the increased burden that online disclosure can im-
pose on First Amendment rights.
C. Maintain Campaign Contribution and Expenditure Limits
Disclosure provisions are not a substitute for a comprehensive sys-
tem of campaign finance law that includes limits on contributions and
expenditures. Indeed, in Buckley, the foundation of modem campaign
finance law, the Court explicitly rejected appellants' arguments that "dis-
closure requirements are the proper solution to virtually all of the evils
Congress sought to remedy."2 14 However, the Court's current trajectory
is to leave disclosure as the only tool or solution through which to reme-
dy the problems of money in politics. Given that, now is the time for the
Court to clarify its campaign finance jurisprudence.
214. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60 (1976) (quoting Brief of the Appellants at 171, Buckley,
424 U.S. I (Nos. 75-436, 75-437)), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), over-
ruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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LAWYERS, POWER, AND STRATEGIC EXPERTISE
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ABSTRACT
The only sound in a courtroom is the hum of the ventilation system.
It feels as if everyone in the room is holding their breath.. . . Liti-
gants are uneasy in the courthouse, plaintiffs and defendants alike.
They fidget. They keep their coats on. They clutch their sheaves of
paper-rent receipts and summonses, leases and bills. You can al-
ways tell the lawyers, because they claim the front row, take off their
jackets, lay out their files. It's not just their ease with the language
and the process that sets them apart. They dominate the space.I
This empirical study analyzes the experience of the parties de-
scribed above, specifically the power, representation, and strategic exper-
tise they bring to a dispute. Our analysis of these factors clarifies how
representation may be a solution to the access to justice crisis. We find
that a representative helps most parties most of the time. We also find
that the other party's representation and the representative's strategic
expertise are significant factors for understanding representation for civil
litigants.
This study analyzes a database of 1,700 unemployment insurance
appeals in the District of Columbia over a two-year period, the broadest
and deepest collection of data about representation in recent years. The
analysis shows wide disparity in representation, with employers (the
more powerful party to a dispute or the quintessential "haves") repre-
sented twice as often as claimants (the less powerful party or the "have
nots"), as well as a notable difference in parties' use of procedures in
hearings. Using difference-in-proportions tests, this Article examines the
interaction of party power and representation and finds that represented
parties have better case outcomes than unrepresented parties, though
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employers see less benefit from legal representation than claimants. In
addition, the Article confirms the intuitive result that represented parties
are more likely to use procedures than unrepresented parties. Yet, sur-
prisingly, the Article finds that represented claimants who use certain
evidentiary procedures have worse case outcomes than represented
claimants who do not use those same procedures.
We recommend that any policy solution to the country's civil litiga-
tion crisis, whether it is a right to civil counsel, unbundled legal services,
lay advocacy, or pro se court reform, must account for these factors. To
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INTRODUCTION
Advocates, scholars, and courts are struggling to address critical
needs in civil representation in the United States. Despite these focused
efforts, we are still unable to answer a fundamental question: when do
civil litigants need a lawyer to effectively participate in our justice sys-
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tem?2 In part, this ongoing quest is the result of the incomplete develop-
ment of empirical research-much existing research is focused on the
outcome of cases with little exploration of how those outcomes are
reached. And in equal part, this quest continues because we have not yet
fully developed theories that explain the effectiveness of representation.4
This Article attempts to provide both theoretical grounding and empirical
analysis of when, why, and how representation matters.
This study is informed by existing scholarship regarding the role
lawyers play in civil justice settings, including theories of the balance of
power and of professional expertise. Scholars have developed theories of
the role that lawyers play in civil justice settings and how representation
interacts with a range of variables, including the area of law, the com-
plexity of procedural rules,' and the balance of power between the parties
in a given dispute. Yet, these theories have not been tested in practice,
until now.
We believe these core questions can only be understood, and we can
only make good legal and policy decisions about when civil litigants
should have lawyers, by investigating legal representation in context. We
begin to engage in the complexity of studying representation in context
by moving beyond the question of whether a litigant wins when he or she
has a lawyer. To do this, we investigate how the balance of power be-
tween the parties interacts with representation and ask exactly what ex-
pertise a lawyer lends to the civil litigation process. We then use our em-
pirical findings to propose a new theory of strategic expertise: how law-
yers connect formal training with situational understanding and supple-
ment it with judgment as they serve their clients. We argue that these
findings mean policy decisions about legal assistance must be grounded
in balance of power and strategic expertise.
Part I of this Article describes the site of the study: an administra-
tive court where judges hold de novo hearings to resolve legal disputes
between two parties, claimants seeking unemployment benefits and em-
2. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of
Access to Justice, 2013 Wis. L. REV. 101, 106; Jeffrey Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Lab
Office, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 145, 158-60; D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Random-
ized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use)
Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2125-26 (2012); Jeffrey Selbin et al, Service Delivery, Resource
Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 45, 53-54 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 2.
4. See generally Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 2, at 105-19 (offering an access to justice
research agenda that is theory-driven and exploring a broad range of issues related to civil justice);
Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting 'Is' and 'Ought' in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
117, 121 (2013)(calling for legal scholars to develop and be explicit about normative goals in empir-
ical research and noting that "[i]ntuition alone cannot suffice to relate observable data to normative
claims; legal scholarship needs conceptual frameworks and empirical methods that can bridge the
gap between 'is' and 'ought').
5. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational
and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers' Impact, 80 AM. Soc. REv. 909, 915-16 (2015).
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ployers opposing the grant of unemployment benefits. The units of ob-
servation are cases, all of which have the potential to end in a hearing
and most of which do end in this way. Thus, like much of the access to
justice literature, this study is concerned with legal disputes that are for-
mally adjudicated.6 These hearings are a particularly good context for
examining the complexity of the value of representation because they
have clear binary outcomes, a variety of parties and representatives, and
a relatively formal legal process with clear procedural steps.7
This Article relies on a data set of 1,794 unique cases. As described
in the Methodological Appendix, the data encompass all unemployment
benefit appeals in the District of Columbia in 2012 where the circum-
stances of separation were at issue, regardless of which parties appeared
at the hearing. The data for each case include extensive coding regarding
the circumstances and activities in the case, such as the fact and type of
representation, the presence of a representative at the hearing, the pres-
ence of parties at the hearing, the participation of parties in different pro-
cedural steps of the hearing process, and the procedural and substantive
outcomes of the cases. This data set is larger in the number of cases col-
lected than many recent empirical studies of representation and has
broader data collected about each case than previous studies.8 Further,
while this study is not randomized, it uses a complete set of cases to look
at differences among groups and, thus, contributes to ongoing research of
representation in context.9
Part II of the Article presents our first finding from this examination
of representation in context, which is that less powerful parties gain more
from representation than more powerful parties do. To test theories of
balance of power and representation, we ask whether one or both parties
6. Most empirical studies on access to justice focus on civil justice problems that actually
reach a lawyer's attention and become formal cases in the justice system, a focus that Albiston and
Sandefur have challenged because it leaves out the vast majority of civil justice problems that never
actually come to the attention of a lawyer, let alone an adjudicator. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra
note 2, at 108-09.
7. It is common, when writing about administrative hearings, for scholars and policy-makers
to assert that the quasi-inquisitorial nature of these hearings-where many parties are pro se, repre-
sentation is rare, and the rules of evidence and procedure are relaxed-is a departure from the regu-
lar operation of civil courts. See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 2, at 2136-37. It might be sug-
gested that the applicability of a study such as this is limited given the differences between adminis-
trative hearings, and city and county civil courts. However, the reality of the day-to-day operations
of our civil justice system suggests this claim is overstated. The vast majority of litigants in civil
cases are unrepresented, and even a brief observation at any of our nation's workhorse civil courts
will reveal that hearings in these settings are often no less inquisitorial in nature, the rules of evi-
dence and procedure are similarly relaxed (or ignored), and representation is rare. Although the
structure, and perhaps the dream, of the adversarial system are more visible in our civil justice sys-
tem, it is certainly not the case that inquisitorial judging is a rarity in America today. For that reason
and others, we argue that the results of this study have wider applicability than the administrative
appeals setting.
8. For a discussion of other empirical studies, see infra Section I.D.
9. For a detailed discussion of the contributions of observational and randomized studies, see
infra Methodological Appendix.
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have lawyers. We then investigate the case outcomes across variation in
balance of power and balance of representation. The data show that rep-
resentation makes a difference, especially for claimants and especially
for claimants when employers are not represented. Interestingly, claim-
ants also benefit from representation when both parties are represented.
In this context, the employer generally is the party with more power and
corresponds with the haves in the civil justice system, while the claimant
is the party with less power and corresponds with the have nots.1o As a
result, we argue that while legal representation may offer advantages for
anyone who can secure it, the benefit that flows from a representative's
legal expertise is greatest for those who can least afford representation
because the haves can acquire and use elements of legal expertise," even
without actual representation.1 2 Thus, the have nots are at a disadvantage
when they do not have representation and face the haves. If representa-
tion can shift the power dynamic in the civil legal setting, as we suggest
it does, this raises the question of what lawyers are doing to create this
shift.
Part III explains our second finding: what representatives do to help
parties is more complex and dependent on context than simply using the
available law or procedure. Our data reveal that all represented parties
are more likely to appear at a hearing and use evidentiary steps than un-
represented parties. Represented employers who use these steps have
better case outcomes than represented employers who do not use the
same procedures. In contrast, represented claimants who use certain evi-
dentiary steps have comparatively worse case outcomes than represented
claimants who do not use the same procedures. This finding is surprising
because it challenges basic assumptions about how lawyers use law and
procedure to help their clients. As discussed more fully below, this find-
ing suggests a variety of explanations, including the interaction of use of
procedures with substantive legal burdens, the nature of representation in
this study's context, and the signaling function of lawyers. We argue that
one important explanation is a lawyer's strategic expertise, an important
and previously uninvestigated component of representation. If lawyers
potentially contribute three types of expertise-substantive, relational,
and strategic-the concept of strategic expertise captures how lawyers
make choices by synthesizing the rules that govern their work and the
informal relationships they navigate in the course of that work.
10. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97-107 (1974) (dividing parties in the civil legal
system into "repeat players" and "one-shotters" and describing how well-resourced repeat players-
the "haves"-gain advantage in litigation against one-shotters-the "have nots").
I1. In this Article, we will use the terms "legal expertise" and "professional expertise" inter-
changeably.
12. See Galanter, supra note 10, at 98-101.
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Finally, Part IV examines the implications of our findings for theo-
ry, future research, and policy reform. We reach the conclusion that it is
not sufficient to ask whether a party is represented; we must also ask
who that party is, what the balance of power is between the parties, and
what the representative is doing for the party. We recommend avenues
for future research and policy reforms to better match the problem of the
civil litigation crisis with the solution of representation.
I. THE DATA: UNEMPLOYMENT CASES
To understand the data, and thus our analysis of the context in
which we investigate our theories of balance of power and expertise, it is
helpful to understand the unemployment insurance appeals that are the
subject of our study. The site of this study is the District of Columbia's
central administrative court, the Office of Administrative Hearings
(OAH). The study focuses on a subset of OAH cases, unemployment
insurance appeals regarding qualification. In these cases, an individual
seeking unemployment insurance benefits, a claimant, faces his or her
previous employer in a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) who determines whether or not the claimant will receive unem-
ployment insurance benefits.14 This process begins when the claimant
files for benefits with the D.C. Department of Employment Services
(DOES), and one party subsequently appeals the grant or denial of bene-
fits by DOES to OAH.15 Under District law, unemployed workers are
presumed qualified for benefits but may be disqualified from benefits for
one of two reasons: (1) because they were terminated for work-related
misconduct or (2) because they voluntarily quit without good cause.16
A. The Parties
Our data set for this Article includes unemployment appeals where
the employer and the claimant are parties to the case. Employers have a
stake in these cases because the regulatory scheme requires payroll taxes
based in part on the number of former employees who have received
unemployment insurance.17
In this study, we did not collect identifying or demographic data on
either party, in part for confidentiality reasons and in part because the
data was not consistently available in the case files. However, based on
other research and our own observations in litigating cases from 2010 to
2015, we can generally describe the characteristics of employers and
13. Much of the discussion of the procedural practices and characteristics of these courts
come from the authors' own observations. For a detailed discussion, see infra Methodological Ap-
pendix.
14. See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1, § 2821 (2015) (emergency action adopted as a regulation on
Nov. 6, 2015).
15. See id. (emergency action adopted as a regulation on Nov. 6, 2015).
16. D.C. CODE § 51-110(a)-(b) (2015).
17. See id. § 51-103(c)(l)H2).
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claimants in unemployment appeals. The employers who appear before
OAH in unemployment cases range from small businesses to major cor-
porations to federal agencies. Our anecdotal experience suggests that
certain high turnover industries that tend to pay lower wages may be
overrepresented among employers. For example, private security, food
service, janitorial, and health-care companies were often the opposing
parties in the cases the authors tried before OAH. In addition, due to a
feature of the unemployment tax system, many nonprofit employers have
a strong incentive to participate.'8
Claimants, similarly, include individuals from a range of back-
grounds and industries, from low-wage workers to lawyers who earned
six-figure salaries.19 However, our observation and data from studies of
unemployment claimants indicate that those who receive unemployment
benefits are disproportionately low income and people of color.20 In addi-
tion, for a variety of reasons too numerous to list here, low-wage jobs
tend to expose workers to the possibility of being terminated, or present
reasons for quitting a job, far more often than higher wage work.2 1
B. The Representatives
Although most litigants are unrepresented, with claimants much
more likely to be unrepresented than employers, there is a significant
amount of representation in OAH cases.22 On the employer side, there
23are lay representatives and attorneys. On the claimant side, representa-
tives are usually either attorneys or law students working in the context
18. Under federal law, nonprofit employers may opt out of paying unemployment axes and
instead reimburse states directly for the cost of payments made to former employees. 26 U.S.C.
§ 3306(c)(8), 3309(a)(2) (2012).
19. In the United States during 2013, the number of weekly claims was around 682,102,
56.2% of which were by males while 43.2% were by females. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Characteristics
of the Unemployment Insurance Claimants, http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/chariu.asp
(last visited Nov. 7, 2015). The industries with the highest unemployment submissions were the
Administration and Support/Waste Management/Remediation Services at 12.9%, Construction at
I1.9%, and Manufacturing at 9.8%. Id. The races with the highest claims rates were whites at 54.7%,
blacks at 17.5%, and Hispanics at 15.9%. Id.
20. But see AUSTIN NICHOLS & MARGARET SIMMS, URBAN INST., UNEMPLOYMENT AND
RECOVERY PROJECT BRIEF # 4: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE BENEFITS DURING THE GREAT RECESSION 4 (2012),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412596-Racial-and-Ethnic-
Differences-in-Receipt-of-Unemployment-Insurance-Benefits-During-the-Great-Recession.PDF
(finding African-Americans are less likely to receive unemployment benefits even after accounting
for factors that affect benefit receipt for other workers); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-
07-1147, LOW-WAGE AND PART-TIME WORKERS CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE LOW RATES OF
RECEIPT 3 (2007) (finding low-wage workers were half as likely to receive UI benefits despite being
two and a half times more likely to be out of work, even where job tenure for both groups was simi-
lar).
21. Christine Vestal, An Unemployment Insurance Balancing Act, STATELINE (June 1, 2010),
https://web.archive.org/web/20140113030802/http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/
an-unemployment-insurance-balancing-act-85899374819 (finding low-wage and part-time workers
are less likely to quality for unemployment benefits as other workers).
22. See infra Section III fig 1.
23. See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1, § 2835 (2015).
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of a clinical education program where an attorney supervises their
work.24
Employer lay representatives are typically employees or contractors
working for third-party employer representation firms. OAH rules allow
these lay representatives to appear on behalf of parties in unemployment
appeals.25 A third-party firm may, entirely or partially, manage an em-
ployer's unemployment insurance cost-reduction program.26 Services
provided by representatives may include handling correspondence with
DOES and OAH, collecting and submitting evidence, and full represen-
tation at a hearing.27 The actual representatives who appear at a hearing
may have years of experience in unemployment appeals, or may have
little experience. When an attorney appears on behalf of employers at
OAH, the attorney may be a private lawyer, in-house counsel for the
company (this is particularly common where the employer is a District or
Federal government agency), or part of a program run by the Chamber of
Commerce, which provides attorney representation to employers who
qualify for services.2 8
On the claimant side, the most common attorney representatives
work for the District AFL-CIO's Claimant Advocacy Program, which
provides free legal representation to claimants.29 The Legal Aid Society
also assists unemployment claimants on a limited basis, and a number of
local law schools provide student attorney representatives in unemploy-
ment appeals.30
C. Hearing Process and Procedure
OAH hears all unemployment insurance appeals in the District.3 '
The hearings are de novo, which means the ALJ takes evidence in the
case and makes factual determinations and conclusions of law without
32
regard to DOES's initial determination. An unemployment insurance
24. See id. § 2833.
25. Id. § 2982.
26. See, e.g., Help Control Unemployment Claims Cost, Maximize Human Capital, and Miti-
gate Risk, ADP, hrtps://www.adp.com/solutions/large-business/services/tax-and-
compliance/unemployment-claims.aspx last visited Nov. 8, 2015); Unemployment Cost Manage-
ment, EQUIFAX, http://www.talx.com/solutions/Compliance/UnemploymentTax/ (last visited Nov.
8,2015).
27. See, e.g., Help Control Unemployment Claims Cost, Maximize Human Capital, and Miti-
gate Risk, supra note 26; Unemployment Cost Management, supra note 26.
28. See Enrique S. Pumar & Faith Mullen, The Plural ofAnecdote is Not Data: Teaching Law
Students Basic Survey Methodology to Improve Access to Justice in Unemployment Insurance Ap-
peals, 16 UDC L. REV. 17, 22-23 (2012).
29. Id. at 22-24.
30. Id. at 23-24. While we acknowledge it is an imperfect distinction, for the purposes of this
Article, we consider only licensed lawyers as attorneys, and all other representatives, including law
students, as nonattorney or lay representatives.
31. About OAH, D.C. OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, http://oah.dc.gov/page/about-oah (last visited
Nov. 8,2015).
32. See Rodriguez v. Filene's Basement Inc., 905 A.2d 177, 179-80 (D.C. 2006).
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hearing begins with the baseline legal presumption that a claimant is
entitled to benefits, and it is up to the employer to prove otherwise.33
Because the hearing is de novo and the employer has the burden of proof,
if a claimant attends and the employer does not, the claimant automati-
cally wins. 34
Because the claimant is presumed qualified for benefits, hearings
begin with the employer's case-in-chief, including witnesses and docu-
mentary evidence.35 Next, the ALJ takes evidence from the claimant,
who may also have witnesses or documents. The ALJ may ask questions
of either party and may also allow the employer to present a rebuttal
case.
Although this basic pattern is followed by most ALJs in most hear-
ings, individual judges have different styles and preferences." As OAH
has been part of a recent effort in the District of Columbia to improve
access to justice for pro se parties, ALJs have focused on providing more
consistent and clearer descriptions of concepts like burdens of proof and
use of testimony in hearings with unrepresented parties.37 For example,
some judges, when faced with an unrepresented employer, may ask the
employer to give a narrative about why the claimant was separated from
employment. Other judges may ask a series of very direct questions and
refuse to hear a longer narrative.
1. Burdens of Proof
Burdens of proof are an important part of the legal and procedural
landscape of an unemployment hearing, as in any litigation. As a matter
of procedure, the burden of proof determines which party must present
evidence first. As a matter of law, the party with the burden must provide
the evidence necessary to prevail under the law. Under District law, in a
misconduct case where the claimant was terminated, the employer bears
the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
claimant was terminated for a reason that amounts to misconduct.38 In
such hearings, the ALJ will typically instruct the employer to present
evidence first, followed by the claimant. In a "quit" case, where the
claimant resigned from the position, the employer bears the burden of
33. See id at 180; see also D.C. CODE§ 51-110 (2016).
34. See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1, § 2822.4 (2016); see also Rodriguez, 905 A.2d at 180.
35. See D.C. CODE § 51-111 (providing minimal guidelines for hearing procedure); see also
D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1, § 2822.4-5.
36. See Shannon Portillo, The Adversarial Process of Administrative Claims: The Process of
Unemployment Insurance Hearings, 2014 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 1, 1-2 (concluding, based on a sociolog-
ical study of forty-five unemployment insurance hearings at OAH, that "the hearing runs like tradi-
tional courtroom litigation" but that when claimants represent themselves, "[ALJs] engage directly
with the claimant, gathering as much information as possible," and in contrast, when counsel is
present, finding that "ALJs behave in traditionally passive ways, allowing each party to present their
case").
37. See infra note 58.
38. See D.C. CODE § 51-110; D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1, § 2822.2(d).
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proving the claimant quit voluntarily.39 The burden then shifts to the
claimant to prove that the resignation was for good cause as defined by
District law.
The burden of proof has a significant impact on the strategic choices
that parties, including legal representatives, make in presenting unem-
ployment cases. Because the hearings are de novo, a threshold issue in
any appeal hearing is whether it is a misconduct or quit case. There is a
strategic calculus regarding whether it is in a claimant's interest to accept
the facts framed by the employer's presentation of facts or whether it is
in the claimant's interest to attempt to define the issues from the begin-
ning by, for example, making an early evidentiary objection. It may be
that the facts of a claimant's separation from employment may blur the
line between termination and resignation. To understand this concept,
consider this hypothetical example:
Wilma worked as a security guard, earning minimum wage, for Secu-
rity Guards, Inc. Wilma has a high school education and has never
been involved in a legal proceeding. SGI is a company with approx-
imately 700 employees. Wilma was fired from her job after she got a
new supervisor who did not like her. The supervisor and Wilma had
several heated exchanges over the length of Wilma's breaks, ex-
changes that were very upsetting for Wilma. In addition, in a period
of three weeks Wilma was late to her shift three times: by four
minutes, six minutes, and seven minutes. Wilma's supervisor wrote
her up each time and then fired her after the third incident for violat-
ing the company's attendance policy.
Wilma filed for and was denied unemployment benefits by DOES
based on a finding that she was fired for misconduct. Wilma filed an
appeal and is attending her hearing by herself. SGI sends Elaine, the
director of Human Resources, to the hearing. Elaine handles five to
ten unemployment benefits hearings for SGI each year.
Now imagine if Wilma knew she was about to be fired, perhaps be-
cause she heard statements to that effect from other employees. Rather
than face the potential embarrassment of being fired, Wilma chose to
resign instead. Unfortunately for Wilma, it may be very difficult to win
an unemployment insurance appeal under District law on resignation.
Thus, if Wilma has a sophisticated representative, she may assess the
facts and law and determine that Wilma's chances of winning will be
greatly improved if the ALJ applies a misconduct analysis. Despite the
fact that the employer technically has the burden of proof, and even if the
ALJ turns to the employer first, the representative may make the strategic
choice to make a statement o the ALJ noting that Wilma was functional-
39. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 7, § 311.3.
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ly terminated, with the hope that this remark will frame the hearing as a
misconduct case, resulting in a more favorable burden for Wilma.
In an alternate scenario, where Wilma is unrepresented, she might
say at the beginning of the hearing that she quit because she was not be-
ing treated well by the employer, her supervisors were always getting on
her case about her breaks, and she had enough of it. Wilma may be oper-
ating out of a desire to protect her own personal pride-she may not
want to admit that she was about to be fired for something she did on the
job. Unfortunately for Wilma, satisfying her personal instincts may de-
feat her legal case by framing it as a quit case with a more challenging
burden.
The burden of proof also presents critical choices about offering ev-
idence. In a misconduct case where the employer has the burden, it is
often unwise for a claimant to offer much evidence at all, other than evi-
dence that undercuts the employer's case-in-chief. A claimant may un-
wittingly make a statement, introduce a document, or call a witness who
provides facts that actually harm the claimant's case and help the em-
ployer's argument for misconduct. Just like a defendant in a criminal
trial, the wisest strategy for a claimant is often to say as little as possible.
A nuanced understanding of the role of burdens in unemployment
appeals can make the difference between a claimant winning or losing. In
this context, representatives can frame issues and present evidence in the
light most favorable to their client.4 0 A representative might also decline
to put a claimant on the stand to testify based on an assessment that the
employer's evidence is too weak and the claimant's potential testimony
too damaging to risk opening the client up to cross-examination or ques-
tioning by the ALJ. Similarly, a representative might make a motion at
the close of the employer's case, pursuant to a little-used OAH rule, ask-
ing that the claimant be granted benefits because the employer has not
carried the burden of proof.41
An understanding of burdens of proof can also affect preparation for
a hearing. For example, a claimant's lawyer may present her client's
testimony in a limited way so that the employer has to present evidence
to uphold its burden rather than relying on the claimant's testimony. Sim-
ilarly, a representative may prepare the client for the hearing by explain-
ing the particular court and judge so that the client knows what to expect,
feels more confident, and thus is a better witness.42
40. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 38-
39(1998).
41. See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1, § 2819.




Another critical aspect of hearing procedure is an OAH procedural
rule that governs the disclosure of evidence prior to a hearing. The rule
requires a party to send the court and the opposing party, at least three
days prior to the hearing, any documents and a list of any witnesses that
the party plans to offer at the hearing.43 This "three-day rule" is designed
to ensure that parties, and the court, have notice of evidence that will be
presented at a hearing."
Parties may choose to disclose, and ultimately introduce, a variety
of documentary evidence.45 For employers, this may include documents
such as employee policies, documents reflecting discipline of the em-
ployee such as prior warnings, communications between the employee
and supervisors about conduct or the circumstances of separation from
employment, or documentary evidence of conduct such as video or writ-
ten reports. Claimants may have documentary evidence, including com-
munications with supervisors reflecting permission or acquiescence to
conduct; documents reflecting contrary or supplementary policies; com-
munications regarding the circumstances of separation from employ-
ment; or evidence of mitigating circumstances such as health problems,
family demands, or failure to be paid.
The three-day rule presents a choice for claimants, employers, and
their representatives: if there are documents or witnesses you may want
to use at the hearing, do you disclose them? For employers, the choice is
fairly simple. If you want to be sure the evidence gets in, you should
probably disclose it. For claimants, the picture is more nuanced. The rule
has an exception for evidence that will be used for impeachment or re-
buttal, which leaves an opening for claimants to introduce evidence
without disclosing it.46 Thus, a representative may decide not to disclose
documents in advance in a misconduct case, relying on an attempt to use
the documents as rebuttal or impeachment at the hearing. In contrast, in a
resignation case, a claimant may be more likely to disclose documents. A
claimant or representative without appropriate expertise might disclose
documents to the claimant's disadvantage based on an assumption that
disclosure is required or on a misunderstanding of the burdens of proof in
the case.
Similarly, a representative can contribute her expertise by gathering
evidence and preparing evidentiary arguments based on her understand-
ing of what evidence will be useful and whether documents or testimony
are more powerful.47 This is particularly important for employers, who
43. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1, § 2985.1.
44. See id.
45. See D.C. CODE § 51-111 (c) (2016).
46. D.C. MUN. REGs. tit. 1, § 2985.1(b).
47. KRITZER, supra note 40, at 39-41.
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are required to bring witnesses with personal knowledge and documenta-
tion of the incidents to meet their burden of proof.48 Experienced or rep-
resented employers may begin gathering evidence from the day an em-
ployee starts work (for example, having the employee acknowledge re-
ceipt of company policies) and will be able to easily access these records
for an unemployment hearing. In contrast, unrepresented claimants are
unlikely to appreciate or operationalize the need for documents or other
evidence for the strategic power of disclosing (or not disclosing) evi-
dence. This documentation is particularly important for claimants to try
to exclude or at least discredit the weight of hearsay evidence. In general,
understanding, preparing, and asking good questions on direct and cross-
examinations of witnesses is also an element of expertise in presenting
evidence. So in Wilma's case, a lawyer may choose to introduce a vague
employer policy regarding attendance or to object to Elaine's testimony
on hearsay grounds because Elaine's office location means she did not
witness any of Wilma's conduct.
Although unemployment hearings are not procedurally complex
compared to protracted commercial litigation, the cases do present signif-
icant layers of legal and procedural choices for any party or representa-
tive. The ability of a litigant to navigate these legal and procedural steps
can make the difference between winning and losing.
D. Previous Studies ofRepresentation i Unemployment Appeals
Ours is not the first study to investigate unemployment insurance
appeals. Existing research overwhelmingly concludes that parties with
representation-in general, and in unemployment insurance appeals-
fare better in legal disputes than those who are not represented.4 9 Previ-
ous studies of unemployment appeals have examined questions of the
effectiveness of representation by comparing success rates of claimants
with representation to those of claimants without representation.50 All of
these studies, save for the most recent one, reach the conclusion that rep-
resentation improves a claimant's probability of winning, and these same
studies also suggest that there are advantages to representation by
nonlawyers, such as paralegals, law students, and lay representatives.5' In
48. See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 7, § 312.2.
49. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JusT. 51, 69-71 (2010); see also Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice?
Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POt'Y
453, 456-58 (2011) (examining the effectiveness of unbundled legal services). As discussed below,
we acknowledge that one study does not support this assumption and believe others have adequately
discussed the limits of that study.
50. See, e.g., KRITZER, supra note 40, at 33-34; Murray Rubin, The Appeals System, in 3
NAT'L COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMP., UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: STUDIES AND
RESEARCH 625, 628-29 (1980); Maurice Emsellem & Monica Halas, Representation ofClaimants at
Unemployment Compensation Proceedings: Identifying Models and Proposed Solutions, 29 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 291-92 (1996); Greiner & Pattanayak supra note 2, at 2124.
51. See, e.g., KRITZER, supra note 40, at 76-77; Sandefur, supra note 49, at 79.
481
482 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:2
three major observational studies of unemployment insurance appeals,
authors analyzed national or state data in cases where parties appeared at
hearings and consistently found higher rates of representation for em-
ployers as compared to claimants, as well as higher win rates for repre-
52sented claimants as compared to unrepresented claimants. There is in-
teresting variation among the previous studies of unemployment insur-
ance appeals and this project. In the present study, in all cases with any
level of participation by the parties, the claimant won in 67% of the cas-
es, which is higher than in most of the previous studies.53 In addition to
differences in samples, this variation may be explained by the fact that
unemployment regulations in many states, including the District of Co-
lumbia, have evolved in the decades since earlier studies conducted by
Kritzer, Emsellem and Halas, and Rubin. Specifically, states have enact-
ed statutory or regulatory exceptions in favor of claimants, including
exceptions granting benefits for claimants who are victims of domestic
violence,54 relocate with spouses, or are caretakers for sick family
52. The 1980 Rubin study examined cases nationally where the parties appeared at hearings
and found representation rates for both parties of less than 10% and overall claimant win rates of
35.7%, regardless of representation. Rubin, supra note 50, at 628. Further, the Rubin study found
that claimants won 30.8% of cases where employers appeared, but 45.4% of cases where employers
appeared and the claimant was represented, and 49.3% of cases where both parties were represented.
Id.
The 1995 Emsellem and Halas study analyzed data from unemployment insurance appeals
in Ohio and found employers were represented four times (45%) as often as claimants (10%). Emsel-
lem & Halas, supra note 50, at 292. The study found that unrepresented claimants won 34% of
cases, and represented claimants won 45% of cases. Id. It is not clear whether this study included all
appeals or only those where the parties appeared at the hearing.
Kritzer's 1998 study examined unemployment insurance appeal data in Wisconsin, and
for the first time parsed the data according to which party appealed and which party had the burden
of proof, though the analysis was restricted to cases where both parties appeared for the hearing.
KRITZER, supra note 40, at 33. Kritzer found that representation made no difference for employers
(winning approximately 58% of cases whether represented or not) but that unrepresented claimants
won 41.5% of cases and represented claimants won 50.4% of cases. Id. at 34. Further, Kritzer found
that when both sides brought a representative, claimants won 44.6% of cases, when representation
was imbalanced in favor of the claimant, claimants won 53.4% of cases, and when representation
was imbalanced in favor of the employer, claimants won 41.6% of cases. Id.
53. See supra note 52. In Greiner and Pattanayak's more recent data from Massachusetts, in
all cases, claimants won 47% of cases where the claimant appealed and 75% of cases where the
employer appealed. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 2, at 2135-36. It appears from the description
of the sample for the study that while the appeals in this sample are legally de novo hearings, the
process in these hearings is not necessarily a de novo review of the evidence. But see id at 2136.
This difference in practice may lead to lower claimant win rates where claimants appeal.
54. In addition to the District of Columbia, there are thirty-four states and the Virgin Islands
that have extended unemployment benefits to cover victims of domestic violence. LEGAL
MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2013),
http://www.legalmomentum.org/sites/default/files/reports/State%2Guide%20UI%20Final%2OJune
%202013.pdf.
55. An exemption for claimants who voluntarily leave his or her employment for the purpose
of relocating with his or her spouse exists in some states, including D.C., but it is unavailable in
others. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-618 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii)
(2015); see also George L. Blum, Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation as Affected by Volun-
tary Resignation Because of Change of Location of Residence Under Statute Denying Benefits to
Certain Claimants Based on Particular Disqualifying Motive for Move or Unavailability for Work,
27 A.L.R. 6th 123, pt. IIA, § 4 (2007).
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members.6 In addition, the tribunal for this study, the District of Colum-
bia Office of Administrative Hearings, is unusual in that it is a highly
professionalized administrative court that hears a variety of administra-
tive appeals.57 As such, it has been the subject of a variety of efforts
aimed at protecting the rights of pro se litigants, including a revision of
the D.C. Code of Judicial Conduct, effective January 1, 2012, emphasiz-
ing the affirmative duty of judges to facilitate the use of the courts by pro
se litigants. Thus, one would expect the nature of judicial conduct in
our study would result in higher win rates for claimants who benefit from
this assistance. Each of these factors is likely to contribute to the greater
win rates for claimants as compared to earlier studies. However, as noted
above, we are less concerned with overall win rates and more concerned
with the relative advantages provided by representation and the use of
procedures, as measured by case outcomes.
The most recent study of unemployment insurance appeals has gar-
nered attention for its use of randomized design to measure the effect of
an offer of representation. In this study, Greiner and Pattanayak found
that an offer of representation by clinical law students does not make a
significant difference in a claimant's probability of winning.59 In addi-
tion, the claimants who received an offer of representation waited longer
for resolution of their case.60 While others have raised critiques of this
study,61 several characteristics of the Greiner and Pattanayak study are
useful for understanding this Article. 62
56. Most states, including D.C., provide exceptions for caregivers of family members with an
illness, others provide very limited exceptions in some cases, and others do not provide an exemp-
tion for this circumstance. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-236(a)(2)(A) (2015) (providing an
exception); FLA. STAT. § 443.101(1)(a) (2015) (providing no exception for caregivers).
57. This is in contrast to unemployment insurance appeal hearings in other jurisdictions that
have been the subject of other studies. See, e.g., KRITZER, supra note 40, at 24; Greiner & Patta-
nayak, supra note 2, at 2135-36.
58. See Zoe Tillman, D.C. Courts System Adopts New Code of Judicial Conduct, BLOG OF
LEGAL TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/01/dc-courts-system-
adopts-new-code-of-judicial-conduct.htmi (explaining additional changes made to the D.C. Code of
Judicial Conduct for pro se litigants beyond what is provided by the ABA Model Rules, including
that judges may change the order in which they collect evidence, explain or avoid legalese, and
suggest additional resources that may help a pro se litigant). See generally CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT
r. 2.6 cmt. IA (D.C. COURTS 2012). In addition to the District of Columbia, twenty-four states have
adopted provisions similar to the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct to help a litigant's
ability to be fairly heard. Margaret J. Vergeront & Jeff Brown, Access to Justice Commission Up-
date, 21 THIRD BRANCH 7 (2013), http://wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch/docs/falll3.pdf
59. Of those claimants who received an offer of clinical law student representation, 76% won
their cases, and of those who did not receive an offer, 72% won. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 2,
at 2149.
60. Id. at 2125.
61. See, e.g., Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 2, at 106-13 & n.29; Fischman, supra note 4, at
165-67 & n.234; Selbin et al., supra note 2, at 48-51; Bob Sable, What Difference Representation -
A Response, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 28, 2011),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/03/what-difference-representation-a-
response.html; David Udell, What Difference Presentation?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 28,
2011), http:// www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/03/what-difference-presentation.html.
62. For a detailed description of our methodological choices, see Methodological Appendix.
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The core challenge of a nonrandomized study, like the one present-
ed in this Article, is the effect of selection bias on the analysis of repre-
sentation and case outcomes. For example, it may be that only the most
sophisticated claimants or only employers with the strongest factual cas-
es seek out representation, but there is no way of knowing the effect of
these factors on the measured variables. The Greiner and Pattanayak
study overcame this challenge through randomization of the offer of rep-
resentation and relied heavily on its randomized design as its source of
authority. We do not dispute the value of randomized studies, but we
believe that relying solely on randomization of claimants' offers of rep-
resentation and then observing win rates misses important opportunities
to understand legal representation.63 For example, Greiner and Patta-
nayak's randomized design did not account for the ultimate representa-
tion status of claimants, whether they received an offer of clinical law
student representation or not. Thus, their study ultimately provides lim-
ited insight into the relative experiences of claimants with different types
of representation, or no representation at all. Similarly, the randomized
design does not account for the representation status of the employer. In
addition, the Greiner and Pattanayak study does not investigate the level
of participation by the parties or the representatives, including use of
procedures and attendance at the hearing, and so does not engage in
questions of what representatives actually do for parties. While our study
does not rely on randomized design, it does use a substantial data set and
valid statistical methods to observe and investigate correlations at a
breadth and depth of analysis that has not previously been conducted. In
particular, this Article's analysis of the correlation between parties' use
of procedural steps and case outcomes compares parties with the same
representation status, thereby avoiding selection bias concerns. In sum,
this study examines the experiences of parties with varying types of rep-
resentation and participation in a way that a randomized study cannot.
II. REPRESENTATION AND BALANCE OF POWER
While there is extensive theory about the role of party power in the
legal system, there is limited empirical examination of this phenomenon.
As a general matter, scholars have examined how socioeconomic status
and social power have a relationship with a person or organization's in-
teractions with law and the justice system." If the operation of law and
63. See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 2, at 2198-2208 (discussing limitations of random-
ized controlled studies).
64. Scholars from a range of fields, including law and sociology, have examined the relation-
ship between the social power of individuals and groups and the operation of law and justice. The
idea that legal doctrine, by itself, does not explain how cases are handled in the legal system, and
that differences may be attributed in some measure to the social status of the parties, can be traced
back to legal realism. In response to this idea, sociologists and legal scholars have attempted to
explain the social factors that influence the operation of law. An early work in the field of legal
sociology, Donald Black's Sociological Justice, published in 1989, explored how the social structure
of cases and the power of parties predicts the way those cases are handled in the legal system. See
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justice varies with social status, a full understanding of the impact of
legal representation requires understanding the status of each party to a
dispute and their statuses relative to each other.65
A corollary issue is the symbolic effect of a powerful party. Others
have investigated how a party's social status or power has a signaling
function in the legal system.66 Scholars have theorized how individuals
and businesses who have (or are perceived to have) higher status and
better reputations are likely to be perceived more positively by judges
and other court staff.6 7 Along the same lines, representatives may confer
a signaling benefit on a party by virtue of their presence. The lawyer's
presence can signal to the court that the party is of some significance and
generally DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989). Black argued that law is "situational"
and "relative" and explained how law varies with social status. See id. at 6. He proposed that high
status and low status parties experience the legal system differently as a baseline matter and noted
that the treatment of a given case may be predicted by looking at the balance of power between
parties. See id. at 8-10. More recently and in the context of access to justice literature, sociologist
Rebecca Sandefur examined empirical approaches to studying the relationship between civil justice
and various forms of social inequality. She notes:
Civil justice experiences can reflect inequality in the sense that inequalities that exist pri-
or to contact with or in some other way outside law and legal institutions are reproduced
when people and groups come into contact with justiciable events or legal institutions.
Such experiences can also create inequality, in the sense that differences between people
or groups become disparities through contact with justiciable events or legal institutions.
Finally, civil justice experiences can destroy or destabilize inequality, as disparities are
reduced through contact with justiciable events or legal institutions.
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN. REV.
Soc. 339, 346 (2008). In legal scholarship, an expansive literature has assessed how social factors,
including race, class, and gender, systematically influence law and justice. The literature explores
issues such as the role of race in sentencing decisions, the effect of gender on jury selection, and the
relationship between poverty, economic inequality, and constitutional law. See, e.g., Margareth
Etienne, Pain and Race: A New Understanding of Race-Based Sentencing Disparities, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 496, 503 (2006) ("The fourth (and current) wave of research questions the existence
and extent of race-based sentencing disparities in the post-guideline, or 'determinate sentencing'
era."); Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations: The Contributions of Social Science, 12 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 2 (2005) (exploring gender and jury dynamics); Stephen Loffredo,
Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1993) ("[E]xamin[ing]
the Supreme Court's use of the rationality standard in areas that affect poor people, and argu[ing]
that the political powerlessness of the poor requires some form of enhanced judicial protection.");
Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People from Equal Constitutional
Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2012) (arguing the poor have been excluded from consti-
tutional protection). A goal of this Article is to add to the literature by questioning how the combina-
tion of representation, a party's power, and the balance of power between the parties influences the
legal process and the outcomes of cases in civil legal settings.
65. See BLACK, supra note 64, at 10-11.
66.
In general, one sees evidence that lawyers, officials, and legal authorities, as well as per-
haps legal procedures themselves, exhibit impaired comprehension of the disadvantaged
and less powerful. However, in the case of class inequality, . . . we have no studies com-
paring different groups' experiences handling similar problems or in similar hearing set-
tings ....
Sandefur, supra note 64, at 349 (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., Karyl A. Kinsey & Loretta J. Stalans, Which "Haves" Come Out Ahead and
Why? Cultural Capital and Legal Mobilization in Frontline Law Enforcement, 33 L. & Soc'Y REV.
993, 996 (1999) ("Status expectations theory argues that the influence attempts of high-status indi-
viduals succeed, and those of lower-status people fail, due to socially shared cognitions and expecta-
tions that link social status to attributions about personal ability and worth . . . .").
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that merits of the claim are worthy of consideration.6 8 This may be par-
ticularly true in courts with a large number of pro se litigants, where the
presence of a lawyer is notable. Thus, we hypothesize that representation
provides the represented party with an advantage and that this advantage
is greater when the parties have imbalanced representation. As a general
matter, we are using the employer as a proxy for the more powerful party
in civil legal processes and the claimant as a proxy for the less powerful
party in the civil legal process.
This analysis begins with the independent variable of the fact of
representation. As shown in Figure 1, employers are represented more
than twice as often as claimants, and rarely do both parties have repre-
sentation. It is also rare for a claimant to have representation when an
employer does not. In contrast, an employer has representation when a








As it is possible for a party to have a representative of record who
does not actually appear at the hearing, another independent variable is
68. Sandefur, supra note 5, at 910.
69. We acknowledge that employers and claimants, like all parties, are a variety of individuals
and institutions. However, we believe that the general characteristics of claimants and employers in
unemployment insurance appeals make the use of these parties as proxies for "haves" and "have
nots" a fair one. See infra note 98.
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70whether a representative actually appears at a hearing. In our data, 51%
of employers with representatives and 65% of claimants with representa-
tives have that representative appear at the hearing.
As shown in Figure 2, claimants' win rates are significantly higher
when represented, while unrepresented employers do not see a signifi-
cant difference in win rates compared to represented employers.7 ' An
additional layer of analysis is whether a party with representation imbal-
anced in its favor sees higher win rates than a party in a case with bal-
anced representation. Figure 2 also shows how both a claimant and an
employer with a representation advantage see a significantly higher win
rate compared to a claimant and an employer without that advantage.
Figure 2: Party Win Rates with Levels of Representation
Claimant Wins Employer Wins
All Cases 67% 33%
Claimant unrepresented 62% 38%
Claimant represented 83.2% 16.8%
Claimant representation 88.3% 11.7%
advantage
Employer unrepresented 66.2% 33.8%
Employer represented 67.3% 32.7%
Employer representation 63.7% 36.3%
advantage
Both parties represented 79.3% 20.7%
Neither party represented 61.0% 39.0%
In addition, the data demonstrate that claimants have higher win
rates when both parties have representation, as opposed to when both
parties do not have representation.
70. For a discussion of situations where a representative of record may not appear at a hear-
ing, see infra note 72.
71. As this Article uses difference in proportion tests to demonstrate patterns of relationships
between the examined variables, we report our findings as comparisons, e.g., "represented claimants
have a higher win rate than unrepresented claimants." For ease of expression, we do not reiterate
each time we describe a finding that this describes two distinct groups: the group of claimants in the
data who were represented and the group of claimants in the data who were not represented, rather
than the experience of a single claimant exposed to the presence and absence of the variable of
representation. In addition, we use the word "significant" to report statistically significant findings,
as reflected in the Methodological Appendix. All of the differences described in this Article are
statistically significant unless explicitly described otherwise.
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As it is possible for a party to have a representative of record who
does not actually appear at the hearing,72 and this dynamic has not yet
been studied, we examine this additional layer of representation-a rep-
resentative who actually appears at the most important moment of repre-
sentation.73 When the representative's appearance at the hearing is fac-
tored in, a different picture appears. Among those cases where an em-
ployer has representation of record, the employer wins a significantly
greater number of cases when the representative appears at the hearing,
winning 23.9% of the time when the representative does not show up as
compared to 46% when the representative appears. When a claimant is
represented and her representative appears, there is no significant differ-
ence in the proportion of cases the claimant wins as compared to repre-
sented claimants whose representative does not appear. This result is not
particularly surprising, as there is a high correlation between a claimant
having representation and the representative showing up at the hearing.
Thus, it is difficult to determine the additional benefit of the appearance
of a claimant's representative, given both the high win rate in the repre-
sented group, as well as the high rate of appearance by that representa-
tion.
Our analysis of imbalance in the appearance of a representative is
similar to overall imbalance in representation. Claimants for whom a
representative appears win a significantly greater amount of the time
when no representative appears for the other party, 90.5%, as compared
to when representation appearance is balanced, 71.5%. When representa-
tion is unbalanced in favor of the employer, the employer wins a signifi-
cantly greater amount of the time, 58.9%, compared to when representa-
tive appearance is balanced, 28.4%.
Our results reflect the practical reality of the civil justice system in
America, one in which the vast majority of low-income Americans rep-
resent themselves-often against much more powerful parties-in the
"ordinary, everyday cases" that constitute the bulk of the civil justice
72. See supra notes 27-27 and accompanying text. There are a variety of situations where a
representative of record may not appear at a hearing. It may be that a party has a retained representa-
tive who is the contact for service of process. Thus, there is a representative of record but that repre-
sentative might not actually be asked to be involved in the handling of a case. It may also be that a
party retains a representative to help a human resources employee prepare for the hearing but does
not want to spend the money to pay the representative to attend the hearing. It may also be that a
party indicates to the court that she has a representative but in fact does not or ceases retaining that
representative before the hearing. It is the authors' anecdotal impression that these situations are
more likely to occur for employers, where the lay representative industry involves large companies
that provide claims management as well as actual representation. These distinctions in representative
type are a topic for future research.
73. This analysis also avoids concerns about randomizing representation and selection bias, as
the entire sample in this section of the analysis is parties with representation. For a discussion of
selection bias challenges in research on the effects of representation, see Greiner & Pattanayak,
supra note 2, at 2192-95.
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landscape.74 The results similarly support the theory that the civil justice
system can reflect and reproduce existing social inequality, just as it can
be a site where inequality is challenged. Where less powerful litigants
represent themselves against those with more power, baseline inequities
are likely to persist. But where such litigants have legal representation,
the opportunity to challenge inequality follows. If there are power dy-
namics at play between the parties and representatives are a significant
layer of these dynamics, especially when representation is imbalanced,
what are representatives doing to shift the power dynamics? Our second
area of analysis examines this question.
III. REPRESENTATION AND USE OF PROCEDURES
We use the concept of expertise to frame our inquiry into what rep-
resentatives are doing that shifts the power dynamics between the parties.
This examination of expertise builds upon existing scholarship regarding
effectiveness in civil legal settings and, in particular, on theories of two
categories of a lawyer's professional expertise: substantive and relational
expertise, or what might also be called "formal training" as compared to
"people knowledge."76
"[S]ubstantive . . . expertise is [the] abstract and 'principled'
knowledge held by professionals and gained through formal training. In
the legal context, this includes knowledge of the essential framework of
professional theories, concepts, and rules, as well as an understanding of
74. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION
3, 27 (1990) (offering a comprehensive analysis of lawyers' role in the routine litigation that takes
place in America's state and federal civil courts). For a vivid description of the day-to-day opera-
tions of an American civil court, see COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3, 11
(2012),
http://www.courtstatistics.orgl-/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP DEC.ashx,
finding in a study of seventeen state general jurisdiction courts in 2010, 61% of cases were contract
matters, 11% probate, 11% small claims, 6% tort, 2% real property, 2% mental health, and 7% all
other civil; this excludes domestic relations cases, which make up 6% of state cases nationwide, and
Aaron, supra note 1. One study found that "62% of all plaintiff award winners (in state courts] were
awarded $50,000 or less." LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 (2009),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf.
75. See Sandefur, supra note 64, at 346-52 (discussing how race, class, and gender inequali-
ties influence, reproduce, and are challenged by civil justice experiences).
76. See KRITZER, supra note 40, at 14-16, 194-95 (describing formal training and insider
knowledge, or people knowledge, and a third category called process knowledge); Sandefur, supra
note 5, at 911-12 (describing substantive and relational expertise). Sandefur describes two aspects of
legal expertise, substantive (Kritzer's "formal training") and relational (Kritzer's "insider" or "peo-
ple" knowledge). See Sandefur, supra note 5, at 911-12. Sandefur's substantive expertise category
includes formal knowledge of the law, as well as procedural rules. See id. at 911. In contrast, Kritzer
places knowledge of procedural rules in a separate category called "process expertise," which also
includes lawyers' understanding of how a court or other legal institution operates and the processes
involved in legal advocacy in that setting, such as the process of a given type of hearing in a given
court. KRITZER, supra note 40, at 15.
77. Sandefur, supra note 5, at 911; see Stephen R. Barley, Technicians in the Workplace:
Ethnographic Evidence for Bringing Work Into Organizational Studies, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 404, 424-
29(1996).
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how to operate within those rules.78 Thus, substantive expertise includes
both law and procedure.7 9 Substantive legal knowledge consists of legal
theories, common law rules, statutes, doctrine, case law, and other con-
tent-based knowledge.80 In their work, lawyers draw on this knowledge
to determine what law is relevant to a given client's case.81 Procedural
knowledge is what lawyers use to move cases through the formalities of
the civil justice system, such as the appropriate means of communicating
with the court and opposing parties, the use of pleadings and motions, the
mechanisms of introducing evidence, and the navigation of litigation
timelines.82
In contrast to the principled and rule-based nature of substantive
expertise, relational expertise is "'situated' and 'contextual.'"83 It in-
volves understanding how to navigate human relationships, including
how to behave and how to communicate with others.84 This includes
what can be called "people knowledge" and is the expertise that guides
interactions with judges, court staff, clients, and other attorneys.85 A
characteristic of relational expertise across professional contexts is that it
is not typically part of the "explicit curriculum of professional training,"
despite the fact that it may be essential for a professional's success in her
work.86 Many professionals learn relational skills outside of formal train-
ing and through experience in their day-to-day working lives. 7 In addi-
tion, relational expertise operates on specific as well as general levels.
There are ways of behaving and communicating that are fairly universal,
but there are also ways of behaving and communicating that are context
dependent. For example, when speaking in court, a lawyer will address a
judge with "Your Honor" because this is a universal practice in the pro-
fession. But that same lawyer, if she is new to the courtroom, will not
know whether that judge prefers standing objections until she has ap-
peared several times.
78. Sandefur, supra note 5, at 911; see KRITZER, supra note 74, at 7.
79. Sandefur, supra note 5, at 911.
80. See id.; see also KRITZER, supra note 74, at 7.
81. Sandefur, supra note 5, at 911.
82. Id. Sandefur notes that an important use of substantive expertise is the translation of a
client's real-world problems into legally cognizable terms. See id. For example, transforming a
client's experience of a car accident into an argument for liability and damages uses formal legal
knowledge, while knowing where to file such a claim and how the applicable court processes work
uses procedural knowledge. Through substantive expertise, a lawyer will identify which harms might
have a legal remedy, such as physical injury and property damage, and which do not, such as psy-
chological effects.
83. Id. (quoting Barley, supra note 77, at 425).
84. Id. at 911-12.
85. KRITZER, supra note 40, at 196.
86. Sandefur, supra note 5, at 912. This is traditionally the case in legal education, which
emphasizes instruction in legal doctrine and formalized legal argument, particularly in the core
courses of the first year of law school. Many law students graduate without any formal training to
develop the knowledge and skills of relational expertise. However, the growth of clinical and other
forms of experiential legal education has incorporated the development of relational expertise into
the law school curriculum for some students.
87. See id.
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As our first set of findings reflects, representation correlates to ad-
vantages, and this reflects the value of professional expertise. But in the
absence of representation, some parties to legal disputes may have the
functional equivalent of professional expertise. Some parties may pos-
sess this functional equivalent unrelated to their involvement in the civil
justice system, but most gain this equivalent expertise over time by virtue
of their involvement as repeat players.8 Mark Galanter famously articu-
lated how powerful parties, whether individuals or organizations, benefit
from being repeat players and how comparatively less powerful parties,
one-shot litigants, are disadvantaged.89 Repeat players have frequent
dealings with the legal system, can develop the functional equivalent of
substantive expertise by anticipating the issues they will face in a given
case, and thus can plan in advance for the litigation. These parties can
also develop relational expertise by building relationships with court
staff and judges and, thus, develop both comfort and fluency in com-
municating with the people who work within a civil justice setting.
Even parties that are not repeat players can use some elements of a
lawyer's professional expertise, particularly relational expertise. For ex-
ample, nonlawyers who are familiar with general norms of professional
communication may have the ability to relate effectively to actors in the
civil justice system. Other parties who are not repeat players may be able
to obtain a basic level of substantive expertise through education by
studying the law or reading a court's procedural rules. Finally, some in-
dividuals may seek the advice of an attorney but then choose to represent
themselves, and thus, they benefit from at least a measure of professional
legal expertise. Of course, those parties that are the least likely to have
some equivalent to professional expertise may be those without the so-
cial, cultural, economic, or professional background to come to the legal
process with this knowledge or to quickly adopt such knowledge during
their interaction with a court. These parties are the ones at the greatest
disadvantage in the legal process and, thus, have the most to gain from
representation and the expertise it provides.
To examine the role of expertise, our second area of inquiry identi-
fies four different procedural steps in the unemployment appeals process:
(1) whether the party appears at the hearing, (2) whether the party pre-
sents testimony,90 (3) whether the party discloses documents before the
88. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data
Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 79 (2010) ("Repeat players
are more likely to wield financial power, utilize a forum that serves their interests, benefit from the
substantive law, and be familiar with the procedure."); Galanter, supra note 10, at 97-99; see also
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1806 (2001) ("Yet comparative
research finds that nonlawyer specialists are generally at least as qualified as lawyers to provide
assistance on routine matters where legal needs are greatest.").
89. See Galanter, supra note 10, at 97-107.
90. This variable is defined broadly-whether there is any testimony for a party's case-to
encompass both parties who themselves testify (i.e., did Elaine or Wilma testify) and witnesses
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hearing as provided by court procedures, and (4) whether the party intro-
duces documents at the hearing.91 We focus on these procedures as they
are the most commonly used steps for a party to present evidence in a
case. For each procedural step, we examine two distinct questions: (1)
whether having a representative results in greater use of the procedure,
and (2) for those parties with representatives (or those without), whether
using each procedural step correlates with improved case outcomes.92
Examining these dependent variables provides additional nuance to the
interaction of representation, expertise, and power. At the outset, it is
important to note that the overall rate at which parties win is less mean-
ingful in a study such as this one that looks at comparative case out-
comes. Because our theories concern the relative advantages of represen-
tation, the more important analysis is case outcomes for the same party in
light of different variables.
In the entire sample, regardless of representation, claimants and
employers used procedures at the rates shown in the figure below.












Party Appears Testimony Disclose Introduce
MClaimant
whose testimony is elicited by parties (i.e., did Elaine bring another company employee to testify).
We use this broad definition because our interest is in the choice by the party or representative to
present testimony.
91. We use the terms "appearance" and "evidentiary steps" to capture the four variables
measured in this Article and the term "procedures" to describe the more general concept. There is
admittedly some variation in the nature of the procedural steps considered in this analysis. One
variable-disclosure of documents-occurs before the hearing, while the other variables occur at the
hearing.
92. For all of these dependent variables, our analysis includes all of the cases in our sample,
regardless of whether or which party appeared at the hearing and, thus, whether a full hearing was
held. We include all of these cases because we cannot know why one party or its representative
appears at a hearing. For example, this may be due to an imperfect appeal, ignorance, inadvertence,
or a party or representative's trategic choice.
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And for the entire sample, regardless of representation, use of each
procedural step correlates to the case outcomes in the table below.







Party Appears Testimony Disclose
i Claimant Win OEmployer Win
We then analyzed how representation interacts
behaviors against these baseline measurements.
with procedural
A. Party Appearance at Hearing
As an initial matter, we examined whether epresented parties ap-
pear at the hearing more often than unrepresented parties, which they do.
When a claimant has a representative, the claimant appears at the hearing
at a significantly higher rate, compared to when the claimant does not
have a representative. If a claimant's representative appears at the hear-
ing (as opposed to just being a representative of record), claimants also
attend the hearing at a higher rate, compared to the group in which the
claimant's representative does not appear. Figure 5 describes how the









































When a claimant has a representative and the claimant appears at
the hearing, the win rate for those claimants is higher-though not quite
statistically significant-than for those in the group of represented
claimants who do not appear at their hearing.93 Similarly, among repre-
sented claimants, when both the claimant and representative appear at a
hearing, the claimant has a higher win rate compared to when only the
representative appears. Figure 6 shows that employers ee the same dif-
ferences in significant proportions.
93. Note that represented claimants who appear at their hearing do not necessarily appear with
a representative. For an explanation of why a party may have a representative of record, but that
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The second variable we examine is the presentation of testimony.
We find that when parties have a representative, they present testimony
at a higher rate compared to those who do not have a representative. In
addition, among represented claimants, those whose representative does
not appear present testimony at a significantly lower rate than when the
representative does appear. The same is true for employers.
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We then examined the correlation between presentation of testimo-
ny and win rates. As Figure 8 shows, when an unrepresented claimant
presents testimony of any kind, there is not a statistically significant dif-
ference in the claimant's win rate compared to when an unrepresented
claimant presents no testimony. But represented claimants see higher win
rates, as do claimants whose representative appears.
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Unrepresented: Represented: Rep Appear:
Testimony Testimony Testimony
**not statistically significant for unrepresented, p=.001 for
represented, p=. 00for representative appear
The analysis of an employer's representation and presentation of
testimony demonstrates a different situation, as demonstrated in Figure 9.
When an employer is unrepresented, those in the group who present tes-
timony win at a significantly higher rate than those in the group who do
not present testimony. Among represented employers, those who present
testimony have a higher win rate than those in the group who did not
present testimony. And there is a similar pattern among employers whose
representatives appeared: those who present testimony have a higher win
rate.
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We also analyzed parties' use of the required document disclosure
procedure. Both represented claimants and represented employers dis-
close and introduce documents at a higher rate than unrepresented claim-
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We next examined win rates across representation and document
disclosure. When a claimant is represented, or when a representative
appears at a hearing, there is no statistically significant difference in the
claimant's case outcomes based on document disclosure. However, there
are significant differences for employers. Represented employers, and
those whose representative appears, have significantly higher win rates
when disclosing documents as compared to not disclosing. Unrepresent-
ed employers also have significantly higher win rates when they disclose
documents as compared to those unrepresented employers who do not
disclose documents.
499
500 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:2
















Unrepresented Represented Rep Appears
p=.09, p=.00, p=.00
D. Introduction ofDocuments
The introduction of documents follows a similar pattern, with
claimants and employers in the respective represented group introducing
documents at a significantly higher rate than unrepresented claimants and
employers.94
94. For both parties, the introduction of a document almost always resulted in admission of
that document (95% of the time for claimants and 99% of the time for employers).
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The introduction of documents has a different relationship to case
win rates for employers and claimants, as shown in Figures 13 and 14.
For unrepresented claimants, represented claimants, and claimants whose
representative appears, the introduction of documents is associated with a
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Figure 13: Represented Claimant Win Rates Across
Document Introduction
100%
No Introduce No Introduce
90% 85.4% 85.4%
80% 1 Introduce 
Introduce I
73.3% 73.9%









Unrepresented Represented Rep Appears
p=.08, p=.01, p=.01
On the other hand, for employers, the introduction of documents is
associated with a higher win rate (as compared to the win rates of the
groups not introducing documents) for unrepresented and represented
employers, but this difference in proportions is not statistically signifi-
cant in the representative appearance comparison.
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Unrepresented Represented Rep Appears
p=.00, p=.00, p=.26
E. Procedures in Combination
Finally, we combined party appearance and the use of the four evi-
dentiary steps described above into a single model to examine whether a
party's use of any of these steps is advantageous and whether it is more
or less advantageous for parties in represented groups. Here, we use a
binary indicator-claimants and employers are separated into groups
based on whether they have used any of the four variables or not.
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As shown in Figure 15, the win rate for unrepresented claimants
who do not appear or use any evidentiary steps is not significantly differ-
ent from the win rate for unrepresented claimants who use these proce-
dural steps. When these four steps are combined for represented claim-
ants, claimants see slightly, but still not significantly, lower win rates
when using an evidentiary step.
However, the win rate for unrepresented employers who appear or
use evidentiary steps is significantly higher than the win rate for those
unrepresented employers who do not use any of these steps. And the
same is true for represented employers who see proportionally higher
win rates when appearing or using an evidentiary step compared to rep-
resented employers who do not use any of these steps.
IV. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
FUTURE RESEARCH
"The only thing less popular than a poor person these days is a poor
person with a lawyer."
Jonathan D. Asher, Executive Director, Legal Aid Society
of Denver95
Though Mr. Asher was commenting on public opinion of legal aid
funding two decades ago, the question remains if and how his assessment
bears out in the courtroom. Our empirical results are consistent with pre-
vious studies finding that representation does help the less powerful. We
add to these studies with our new results measuring the interaction be-
tween balance of power and representation. Our results show for the first
time that a representative who uses court procedures is not necessarily
helpful, especially if that assistance is not grounded in, what we define
as, strategic expertise. These empirical findings have implications for
theories of representation, and so we propose a theory of strategic exper-
tise that captures the overlap of formal training with client and case-
specific judgment. Our findings, and this concept of strategic expertise,
translate to policy and practice, as well as to future research.
A. Representation and Balance ofPower
Our findings support the theory that the lower a party's power rela-
tive to its opponent, the more it stands to benefit from representation. We
believe this is due to the ability of better resourced parties to use func-
tional equivalents of professional expertise, an ability that is based on a
party's resources, social status, education level, and other elements of
social and economic power. Thus, as a baseline matter, while some par-
ties have advantages that would otherwise be conferred by representa-
95. Robert Pear, As Welfare Overhaul Looms, Legal Aid for Poor Dwindles, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1995, at Al.
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tion, others have no such advantage. This latter group will benefit the
most from legal representation, particularly when it faces a more power-
ful opponent.
Our findings support previous studies that have found representa-
tion correlates with improved case outcomes for claimants.96 More im-
portantly, the data demonstrate that the relationship between representa-
tion and case outcomes is more pronounced when the balance of power is
introduced into the analysis. In the modem American legal system,
where civil legal representation is not guaranteed by the state, a more
powerful party, such as an employer, is more likely to have the resources
to obtain representation, whether it is through an in-house legal depart-
ment for a large employer or through a third-party lay representative
retained to control costs for a smaller employer. In this scenario, our data
show that the less powerful party, such as a claimant, is at a significant
disadvantage. In addition, the lower marginal advantage of representation
for employers is consistent with the theory that employers come to the
process with greater power-that can often approximate expertise-and,
thus, have less to gain from representation than claimants. Similarly,
claimants come to the process with less power and, thus, have more to
gain from representation, whether it is the fact of their own representa-
tion, representation when the employer has none, or when both parties
are represented.
And for both parties, this theory and the findings carry through to a
representative who appears at a hearing, as opposed to simply being the
representative of record. This is consistent with theories of power and
expertise, as a representative who appears is more likely to affirmatively
act on behalf of a party than a representative who is only of record. Alt-
hough, it is important to note that the data show that representation with-
out appearance still confers some advantage. We argue that this is be-
cause representatives can still provide expertise without appearing at a
hearing-by helping the party select which evidence is important to dis-
close or introduce, by shaping case theory or testimony, by explaining
substantive or procedural law, or through other means.
Notably, when both parties are represented, claimants see a higher
proportion of favorable outcomes as compared to when both parties are
unrepresented. This last observation highlights the role of party power in
any question of representation and supports the idea that more powerful
parties, whether through functional expertise, repeat player advantage, or
simply greater resources, necessarily have an advantage in the civil legal
process. The presence of representation on both sides mitigates this ad-
96. Despite the difference from previous studies in overall claimant success rates, this study's
findings that represented claimants, as compared to unrepresented claimants, have a higher propor-
tional win rate than represented employers, as compared to represented employers, is consistent with
those studies. See KRITZER, supra note 40, at 34; Rubin, supra note 50, at 628.
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vantage. Where there is no representation, the parties do not have bal-
anced power, but when there is representation for both parties, the par-
ties' power is more balanced.97
Returning to our example, when Wilma faces SGI in her unem-
ployment benefits appeal, there is an obvious disparity in power between
the parties. Wilma has never been in the court before; indeed, she has
never been in any court. She earned minimum wage working for SGI and
has had no income for a month while awaiting a decision on her appeal.
Elaine has been in the court many times before. She has a basic under-
standing of what she must prove to ensure the judge denies the worker's
claim for benefits. She knows the type of evidence the judge wants to
see. Although she is not a lawyer, she understands the setting and the
process well.
In this setting, Elaine would certainly benefit from legal representa-
tion. For example, a lawyer would understand that the testimony of a
witness is better than assertions contained in a hearsay document. But we
argue Elaine will do a fairly good job on her own because she has done it
so many times before and learned some things along the way.98 In com-
parison, the relative benefit of legal representation for Wilma is much
greater. She has everything to gain from a lawyer's expertise. In addition,
the fact of representation may provide Wilma with some psychological
comfort and increase in power as the party who has never been to court
before. A corollary issue is the symbolic effect of a powerful party. Thus,
in our example, SGI's reputation in the community as a significant em-
ployer and Elaine's reputation in the court as a regular presence may be
another imbalance in power that works against Wilma.
B. Representation, Use of Procedures, and Strategic Expertise
An initial finding of our research, that employers are more likely to
take advantage of appearing at the hearing and evidentiary steps, can be
explained in two different ways. First, the employer has the initial burden
in quit cases and the entire burden in misconduct cases and, as a result,
must show up and use testimony or documents to make its case. Thus, it
is unsurprising that employers are more likely to appear and take ad-
97. Of course, a limitation of our study is that we do not know why some parties have repre-
sentation and some do not. There are many reasons why an employer or a claimant may seek or
retain counsel, and these reasons are likely to interact with our findings regarding balance of power.
We hope that future work explores the interaction of these issues.
98. We recognize that there is variation in employers and claimants. For example, if Wilma
had been a cashier at a store with two employees and the owner, who appears at the hearing, has
never been to court before, the role of representation may be different. If the owner, like Wilma,
knows nothing about the substantive law, procedures, or formalities of communication in the court-
room, he would also benefit significantly from legal representation. For example, a lawyer might
introduce a crucial piece of evidence that he owner would never think to bring. However, for pur-
poses of this project we are relying on the assumption that employers, in general, are more sophisti-
cated and appear in court more frequently than claimants. It is our hope that future research will test
our findings and theories through a more detailed examination of parties' sources of power.
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vantage of the mechanisms for introducing evidence. Second, employers,
whether represented or not, are more likely to be sophisticated or repeat-
player actors and, thus, more likely to be aware of and take advantage of
procedural mechanisms.
Further, the finding that represented parties on both sides appear, in-
troduce testimony, and disclose, introduce, and admit documents at high-
er rates, as compared to unrepresented parties, is a logical result because
it reflects the procedural expertise of the representative. In addition, the
frequency with which employers use procedures-whether epresented
or not-underscores the theory of how parties' inherent power interacts
with the expertise contributed by a representative. In this data, the em-
ployer uses most of the studied procedures most of the time, and the rate
is slightly higher when the party is represented. This is consistent with
the theory that employers come to these cases with sophistication and
repeat-player experience that places them in an advantageous position,
regardless of representation. Thus, as borne out by the data on represen-
tation and case outcomes, an employer wins marginally more cases when
represented, as compared to employers who are not. A represented em-
ployer who uses any procedure has more favorable case outcomes com-
pared to employers, represented or not, that do not use these procedural
steps.
However, the analysis of the relationship between use of procedures
and the party's case outcome reveals a more complicated picture. Our
analysis of balance of power argues that claimants have more to gain
from representation because they begin in a position of less power and
sophistication. The data showing significant differences in use of proce-
dural steps when a claimant is represented as compared to when she is
not represented is consistent with this theory. However, our results also
reveal the surprising result that when a represented claimant uses some
of these steps, the claimant's win rate is lower than when the represented
claimant does not use those same procedures.
The data show that a represented claimant who presents testimony
or discloses or introduces documents is associated with a lower propor-
tion of favorable case outcomes as compared to represented claimants
who do not use these same steps. The same is true when the claimant
presents testimony and is exaggerated when the claimant testifies. The
only exception to this pattern of worse case outcomes with increased
procedural participation is when the claimant appears at the hearing.
When all of the procedures are analyzed together, neither represented
claimants nor unrepresented claimants see significant differences in case
outcomes with the use of any procedure as compared to not using any
procedure. This result-contrary to our hypothesis-suggests that claim-
ant representatives' use of procedures is in some way not effective and
raises important questions about the value of representation and the type
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of representation necessary to have a positive effect on a party's out-
come.
There are a number of potential explanations for this surprising
finding, and we argue that our theory of strategic expertise captures a
number of these explanations. One explanation for this finding is that the
substantive legal context of our study-where the burden of proof is
placed entirely on the employer in misconduct cases and initially on the
employer in voluntary quit cases-creates disincentives for a claimant to
use procedural steps to introduce evidence. In these cases, a claimant
automatically wins when an employer introduces no evidence. Thus, any
use of procedures to introduce evidence by a represented claimant holds
the inherent risk of weakening the presumption in the claimant's favor.
Claimant representatives may choose to introduce documents in "closer"
cases or cases where the representative perceives the case as unlikely to
win and, thus, is simply using every procedure. Alternatively, it may be
that represented claimants are more likely to use procedures to introduce
evidence where the employer has already presented a strong case, and the
representative perceives the need to introduce more evidence to counter
the perceived or real lower likelihood of winning the case. Relatedly,
when a representative uses a procedure to introduce evidence, there is a
risk that the lawyer goes too far and introduces more evidence than is
necessary to advance the claimant's case theory, ultimately weakening
the claimant's case.
Another explanation may be the judge's perception of a claimant
representative's procedural activity. It may be that because employers
have the burden of proof a judge perceives a represented employer's use
of procedures to introduce evidence as a signal that the employer has a
strong case. This may be especially true when employers or their repre-
sentatives are repeat players before a particular judge. The judge may
similarly perceive a represented claimant's use of procedures as a sign of
a weak case, interpreting introducing evidence when the burdens of proof
do not require it as a desperate measure. A more cynical explanation may
be that a judge may not be used to claimants having representatives, and
the shift in procedural dynamics that results from a lawyer in the court-
room leads the judge to be less receptive to the claimant's case.
This pattern of better outcomes for represented employers who use
procedures and worse outcomes for represented claimants who use pro-
cedures suggests that there is more to understand about how power and
expertise function in civil justice settings. Each of these explanations
underscores that for a representative to be effective, she must understand
and adapt to the context in which she operates. As a result, we argue that
the advantage provided by representation only occurs when the repre-
sentative acts strategically. Thus, a representative who reflexively uses
procedures, such as having a claimant testify when the claimant does not
have the burden, may hurt the party. In contrast, a representative who
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strategically uses procedures, uch as keeping a claimant from testifying
so that the claimant does not help the employer meet its burden, is more
likely to help the party. This is especially true for the party without the
burden-usually the claimant-as a representative for an employer who
has the burden is more likely to improve outcomes by using any proce-
dure. Similarly, a representative for a claimant who uses a procedure
based on unsound strategic judgment is more likely to worsen outcomes
because the presentation of evidence may carry the employer's burden
and, thus, worsen the claimant's case.
Thus, we propose a third theoretical component of representative's
expertise: strategic expertise. This third component of strategic expertise
complements existing theories of substantive and relational expertise.9 9
Specifically, strategic expertise is the ability to synthesize substantive
expertise with relational expertise and to exercise judgment in applying
this synthesis to a particular client's circumstance. This concept of stra-
tegic expertise explains what lawyers do to connect formal training with
situational understanding and supplement it with strategic thinking and
judgment as they serve their clients. Where substantive expertise is ab-
stract, rule based, and learned primarily through formal training, and
where relational expertise is grounded in relationships and learned
through experience, strategic expertise involves the knowledge, judg-
ment, and skill lawyers employ when making decisions based on a syn-
thesis of inputs gleaned from substantive and relational expertise."0 o Stra-
tegic expertise involves combining knowledge of the underlying legal
framework with the particularities of a given civil legal setting, including
individual personalities and preferences, and exercising judgment to ap-
ply this knowledge to a particular client's circumstance.
Revisiting Wilma's case illustrates how lawyers can employ strate-
gic expertise. Imagine that both Wilma and Elaine have lawyers for the
hearing, and during the hearing Elaine testifies about Wilma's tenure as
an employee of SGI. Elaine asks a question about Wilma's habit of lend-
ing money to fellow employees-a topic that is not relevant under the
rules of evidence. In the moment that she hears the question, Wilma's
99. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
100. Others have attempted to define legal strategy and strategic decision-making in a variety
of ways. See, e.g., David R. Barnhizer, The Purposes and Methods ofAmerican Legal Education, 36
J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 63-64, 66-67 (2011) (differentiating strategic awareness from both substantive
law and "[j]udgment, [a]nalysis, [s]ynthesis and [p]roblem-[s]olving" as an essential focus for legal
education); Angela Olivia Burton, Cultivating Ethical, Socially Responsible Lawyer Judgment:
Introducing the Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigm into the Clinical Setting, II CLINICAL L.
REV. 15, 26-27, 42-43 (2004) (observing that "strategic intelligence" is essential in exploring sce-
narios and choosing effective courses of action and differs from personal, narrative, logical-
mathematics, categorizing and linguistic intelligences, which together contribute to a lawyer's "criti-
cal judgment"); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 345 (1990) (de-
fining legal strategy as a composition of legal tactics based upon fundamental principles such as
"concentration of effort on an [sic] hypothesized decisive event, planning from that event backward
in time to the present, [and] generating the largest number of reasonable strategic options from
which to choose").
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lawyer has a decision to make: does she make a relevance objection? Her
substantive expertise in the law of evidence tells her that the statement
may be inadmissible and that most judges would sustain an objection.
She knows the case well enough to anticipate the answer, one that she
believes is not damaging for her case if it comes in (again, drawing on
her substantive expertise regarding what she must prove to win the case).
Turning to her relational expertise, she knows that this judge has little
patience for objections as a general matter, and she has already objected
on a number of issues that concern her more than this particular question.
She also believes that if she objects, the judge may read it as a sign of
weakness in her client's case. The attorney also knows that Wilma is
confident in her advocacy and will not be concerned if she does not ob-
ject to this question. In the mere seconds that she has to make this deci-
sion, she weighs all of the inputs from her substantive and relational
knowledge and skill and considers how they interact to impact her
chance for overall success in the case. She decides there is a greater risk
to objecting than there is to letting the answer in. Thus, although an ob-
jection would be a legally and procedurally accurate choice, one that
would likely have been sustained by the judge, her understanding of the
human dynamics in the room, the substantive legal issues in her case, her
particular client, and her strategic understanding of the choice presented
led her to not object. 01
Strategic expertise is the hallmark of quality legal representation
and is inextricably linked with good judgment and zealous representa-
tion. It is the expertise that lawyers draw on when making bold choices
or taking calculated risks in their work. It comes into play when a lawyer
pushes the boundaries of the law to make a novel legal argument; when a
lawyer presents the facts of her client's case in a way that reflects not
only the merits of the case but also her impressions of the jury; when a
lawyer chooses to make a lengthy closing argument before a visibly im-
patient judge based on the calculation that the legal and factual issues are
too complex to forego thorough treatment; or when a lawyer chooses to
disclose information to an opposing party because she believes it will
lead to a favorable settlement, even when the disclosure is not required
by formal legal procedures. Unlike substantive or relational expertise,
only a representative can provide a party with strategic expertise. While a
judge may be able to explain a legal concept or procedure to a pro se
party, and an unbundled service provider may be able to tell a claimant to
101. Kritzer's concept of "process knowledge," described supra note 76, includes a lawyer's
understanding of how a given legal setting typically operates, for example, knowledge about the
hearing process for a particular type of case, including the process in a particular court. Our concept
of strategic expertise includes the understanding of the operation of a given legal setting that is
captured in Kritzer's process knowledge, but strategic expertise expands process knowledge to
capture a lawyer's contextualized decision-making, which takes into account her knowledge of
"typical process" as well as what this knowledge means for the specific case, client, and issue she is
handling, and ultimately, how the synthesis of this information will inform her choices.
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speak slowly before a certain judge, only a representative who is in a
hearing with a party and knows the party's case as her advocate can lend
strategic expertise at a given moment.
This theory of strategic expertise is consistent with the sociological
theory that a lawyer's effect is primarily about helping a party navigate
procedures and forcing a court to follow its own rules.'02 However, our
view is that a lawyer using strategic expertise may push a court to en-
force its own rules if that is the strategically advantageous choice in a
particular factual and legal context. But it is just as likely that a lawyer
makes the choice to not encourage the enforcement of a rule because that
is the strategically sound choice for that client in that context.
Strategic expertise, like relational expertise, is not necessarily
taught in any formal context.1o3 It is perhaps sometimes innate or devel-
oped from nonprofessional experiences, but it is typically gained and
developed through professional experience. It is situated and highly con-
textual, but it includes a deep appreciation for legal and procedural com-
plexity. It also includes an appreciation of risk and the ability to weigh
costs and benefits of choices. It necessarily involves judgment. Some-
times, strategic choices require an attorney to ignore social and cultural
cues in favor of a principled legal position. Sometimes, strategy requires
a lawyer to ignore legally incorrect moves by judges or opposing counsel
in favor of preserving relationships. It is the expertise that guides a law-
yer in choosing her battles wisely. In many ways, it is the essence of ef-
fective problem solving; it combines an appreciation of legal frame-
works, an understanding of the human context in which law operates,
and effective contextual judgment, and it is thus an essential component
of a lawyer's professional expertise.
C. Recommendations for Policy and Practice
Readers may draw varying conclusions from our findings. Some
may conclude that our data suggest that lawyers are not the solution to
the civil litigation crisis, while others may conclude that our findings
support full representation for all civil litigants. We do not believe that
our findings tell us that representatives do not help less powerful parties.
In fact, the data show that, overall, representatives can and do help less
powerful parties. But there are things that representatives do that may not
be helpful in certain contexts. Thus, we think the appropriate starting
point to any policy change is the principle that representation is not mon-
olithic.
102. See Sandefur, supra note 5, at 910-11, 924; Sandefur, supra note 49, at 74 (describing
empirical evidence suggesting that "part of what lawyers do to affect litigation outcomes may be
assisting people in managing procedural complexity").
103. Though, like relational expertise, clinical legal education and other experiential curricular
approaches are opportunities for law students to develop strategic expertise.
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As a matter of policy, we recommend that different legal contexts
call for different types of legal assistance and for representatives making
different strategic choices. It may be that our theories of strategic exper-
tise lead to the conclusion that lay representation, unbundled services,
court reform, or technology-based services are the most effective solu-
tions for particular legal contexts. But we cannot assume representation
needs based on partial information. Instead, we need to understand how
the balance of power and expertise interact with the particular legal con-
text and how that translates to the role of representation and other forms
of legal assistance. That said, we believe that several broad policy rec-
ommendations emerge from our analysis.
First, any policy designed to increase access to civil justice requires
a particularized understanding of the balance of power in the cases and
civil justice settings in question. For example, those courts with drastical-
ly unequal balances of power are likely to be legal contexts that require
full representation because limited representation or nonlawyer court
assistance does not provide enough expertise to offset an imbalance in
power between parties. Similarly, some legal contexts are (or can be de-
signed to be) ones where the parties are on equal footing and, thus, repre-
sentation is a poor use of limited resources to assist civil litigants.
Second, our findings regarding strategic expertise suggest that par-
tial representation or limited legal assistance may be more harmful than
helpful. Our findings show that among represented claimants, those who
use procedures do not fare better than those who do not use procedures,
and we suggest this is closely tied to strategic expertise. This suggests
that even a lawyer who does not wield appropriate strategic expertise
runs the risk in certain contexts of being harmful to her client. Though it
is theoretically possible that limited assistance can be designed to include
strategic expertise, we believe this is a daunting challenge. Thus, it may
be that limited legal assistance or unbundled representation is in fact
counterproductive for a client in that circumstance.
A corollary to this recommendation is that we need effective mech-
anisms for making sure lawyers are using strategic expertise on behalf of
their clients. This is a component of the challenge that legal education
continues to face regarding how to prepare law students to be practicing
attorneys. It is also a challenge for legal employers to understand how
particular lawyers can share their own contextual knowledge most effi-
ciently. Finally, this is a particular challenge for pro bono legal services.
Pro bono representation often involves handling individual cases that
diverge from an attorney's usual area of expertise. Our findings suggest
that, for this approach to legal services to be effective, we must identify
ways to ensure these attorneys have relevant strategic expertise, and do
not reflexively-and harmfully-use their knowledge without an appre-
ciation for the legal and factual context.
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Our third policy recommendation is that self-help resources must
find a way to convey the functional equivalent of strategic expertise to
litigants. For example, in our data, burdens of proof are a powerful legal
concept that shape strategic choices and ultimate outcomes in many cas-
es. And, like many courts with largely pro se parties, the site of our study
has resources available for pro se litigants in unemployment insurance
appeals.1 0 4 Yet, none of these resources explain how the burdens of proof
function in these cases, even though a basic instruction like "if the em-
ployer does not appear and you do, you will win" would be meaningful
for many litigants. If self-help resources are going to continue to play a
major role in access to justice reforms and if they are to be effective, they
must evolve to convey some equivalent to strategic expertise to pro se
litigants.
Our final policy recommendation concerns pro se court reform.
Though we are not willing to abandon representation as a powerful tool
for increasing access to justice, we recognize that pro se court reform is
also an important strategy.05 We believe that our findings suggest that
pro se court reform rightly focuses on increasing the navigability of
courts for unrepresented individuals, but it must also account for situa-
tions when representatives do appear. As our findings demonstrate, the
balance of power and representation is as significant as the presence or
absence of representation for a single party. Thus, even in the most pro
se-friendly court, the unusual appearance of a representative may shift
the power dynamic and, thus, complicate the litigants' experiences of
justice. If pro se court reform is to be an effective access to justice strate-
gy, then it must account for these balance of power dynamics.
D. Areas for Future Research
In addition to insights for policy reform, our findings raise new
questions for future research in this study and others.06 One issue raised
by our analysis is whether and how the type of representation affects the
represented party's advantage. For example, in our sample, employers
have nonlawyer representatives in 38% of all cases while claimants have
nonlawyer representatives, mostly student attorneys, in 2% of all cases.
Other studies have shown that nonlawyer representatives are less effec-
104. See Department of Employment Services, D.C. OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS,
http://oah.dc.gov/node/1 73242 (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
105. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People's Court, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 741, 787-88 (2015). See generally Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se
Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227 (2010) (emphasizing the importance of focusing energy and
resources on pro se court reform due the shortcomings of the "Civil Gideon" approach).
106. See, e.g., Dalie Jiminez et al., Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress
Using a Randomized Control Trial: A Research and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL'Y 449, 451 (2013) ("Our hope is that, in describing our project in detail, we will clarify the
process and encourage other to dip their toes in, seek out an empirically-minded partner if needed,
and start testing hypotheses.").
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tive than lawyer representatives.107 This suggests a number of questions
for future research. Do nonlawyer representatives help parties less than
lawyers? Does this analysis change relative to the power of the repre-
sented party or the balance of representation in the case? Could the high
proportion of nonlawyer representation explain this Article's finding that
employers gain less advantage from representation than claimants? What
is it that lawyers do for a party, as compared to what nonlawyers do, that
makes them more helpful? What is the nature of nonlawyer expertise
versus lawyer expertise? These questions naturally tie to questions of
strategic expertise. If, as we theorize, lawyers contribute strategic exper-
tise in a way that lay representatives cannot, then the data should bear
this out. Employers with attorneys who show up should win more than
employers with lay representatives, and this should be especially true
when these representatives appear at the hearing. In addition, analysis of
the variation in actors may reveal different insights. Does expertise func-
tion differently for different representative types? Are there differences
in how expertise functions for individual representatives within a given
category of representatives? Does it function differently for representa-
tives who are repeat players as compared to those who are not? The role
of representative expertise, which leads to increased engagement in the
legal process but that can, paradoxically, lead to worse case outcomes
when exercised inappropriately, also suggests areas for future inquiry.
Does the use of procedure and its success vary by the type of representa-
tive? Is a lawyer more successful than a nonlawyer at using procedures,
suggesting that lawyers do contribute unique, or at least less common,
strategic expertise? These questions of representative type are especially
important for our civil legal system. We continue to struggle with
achievable ways to provide civil litigants with effective access to legal
systems, and we continue to debate solutions ranging from guaranteed
attorney representation to limited legal advice to self-help resources. Yet,
we are trying to create change without understanding which of these
types of representation is effective in which contexts. Thus, understand-
ing representation type in context is a crucial part of this conversation,
and a future article will focus on some of these questions.
An additional area of inquiry is how the presence of representation
in a particular court or type of case might itself impact the dynamics of
power balance and expertise. Put another way, when representatives are
repeat players in a legal context, does that presence create systemic
change that alters or reduces the need for representation? Are there types
of cases-in our data and generally-where representation has been con-
sistently present, and are there measurable changes in behavior or out-
comes in those cases even when representation is no longer present?
107. KRITZER, supra note 40, at 76-77.
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Another set of questions concerns how parties come to have repre-
sentation. Qualitative research into the selection criteria representatives
use to take clients may help us understand selection in context, as might
qualitative research into how employers and claimants come to seek out
or obtain representation. Further, developing controlled or randomized
study designs that take these factors into account will enhance our under-
standing of this important component of representation in context.
Analysis of procedures other than those used to introduce evidence
may reveal additional insights into representation and expertise. Is there
a difference between those procedures that happen in a hearing and those
that happen outside the hearing, such as motion practice? Does expertise
function differently with regard to procedures that do not implicate the
burdens of proof, such as a motion to continue as compared to a motion
to dismiss on the merits? Does analysis of how expertise actually func-
tions pose critical questions about theories of client-centeredness and
how a lawyer should enable her client's voice and narrative in the legal
process? Are a representative's actions outside the hearing important to
the analysis of expertise? Are there procedures which representatives use
more and with more success, such as pretrial motions, requests for con-
tinuances, or requests for phone hearings, that have different relation-
ships to case outcomes than procedures in the hearing?
We also believe our findings raise important questions about the
sources of parties' power and how they affect the balance of power be-
tween the parties. One identified source of power is substantive law; in
this study the burden of proof is an example of this source of power for a
claimant and her representative. An area for future research is theorizing
a typology of sources of power and how these sources of power are dif-
ferent in different legal contexts. Another source of power is procedural
rules, and this source of power may shift depending on how representa-
tives and parties use it. For example, a representative who makes fre-
quent use of a procedure that has not been previously used may shift the
balance of power in that legal setting. Thus, another area for future re-
search is the existence of these sources of power and how use of them by
representatives shifts the balance of power between the parties. Are there
characteristics of parties that can predict the functional expertise the par-
ty wields without representation?
In addition, there is much to learn about how the characteristics of a
case interact with the balance of power and representation. For example,
in unemployment cases, the burden of proof varies depending on the
theory of the case, and so we hope to explore how this variable interacts
with the balance of power and representation. Analysis regarding the
type of case may provide more insight into the use of procedures and
strategic expertise. It may be that claimants' use of procedures to intro-
duce evidence in a quit case-where the claimant bears part of the bur-
den of proof-has a different relationship to case outcomes than in a
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misconduct case-where the employer bears the entire burden. And if
there is not variation in the use of procedures and case outcomes, that
may provide important insight into whether representatives for claimants
are in fact contributing strategic expertise that translates to effective rep-
resentation. An additional layer of analysis could also include which
party files the appeal, as this may help understand the party's interest in
the case or motivation to use procedures. Does the type of case change
the expertise dynamic? Is it more or less important to have a lawyer's
expertise when you are a party with the burden or a party without the
burden? Similarly, does this expertise operate differently in cases where
the party on the other side is the government as opposed to an employer?
In addition, is there a way to measure the factual strength of a case to
explore the interaction of that variable with balance of power and repre-
sentation?
Finally, we believe there is a compelling need for analysis of the
role of judges. Do different individual judges or their backgrounds result
in different case outcomes relative to use of procedures? What is the role
of judges in analyses of representation in context? What role does the
judge play in exacerbating or mitigating the balance of power and repre-
sentation between the parties in the hearing? If one party is unrepresent-
ed, does the judge-intentionally or unintentionally-change her behav-
ior to level the playing field? How does strategic expertise, and particu-
larly the absence of it, affect a judge's perception of a party and that par-
ty's case outcomes? Does the presence or absence of a representative
exercising strategic expertise interact with the judge's procedural or sub-
stantive choices in the hearing? Are judges appropriate and effective
actors in mitigating an imbalance of power or lack of expertise? Some of
these questions may be answered by additional analysis of this data set,
and some may be understood better through qualitative research.
All of these questions for future exploration underscore the central
concept of this project: to understand when, how, and why representation
matters, we must engage in the complexity of the legal process and par-
ties' experiences in it. The corollary to embracing complexity in our re-
search efforts is understanding how these questions and their empirical
results affect the reality of the civil justice system.
CONCLUSION
We cannot understand civil justice outcomes, party experiences, or
the role of representation without an appreciation of context. This Article
begins a conversation about the context in which representation operates.
Our analysis of the balance of power and the role of expertise can be
replicated across a range of civil justice settings, from other administra-
tive courts to immigration proceedings to municipal and state district
courts. These issues can and should be explored in other areas of sub-
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stantive law, particularly those affecting the vast majority of litigants in
American courts, such as housing, family, and consumer law.
Beyond the specific questions about representation raised in this Ar-
ticle, this research project and others like it add to our base of knowledge
and understanding regarding the real-world operation of civil justice in
America-a necessary step in solving problems facing the civil justice
system. Despite the recent resurgence of interest in access to justice is-
sues, there is still much that we do not know about how the civil justice
system actually operates.1os Even with ongoing conversations about the
crisis in civil justice among those who work in the trenches of legal ser-
vices and on access to justice research, it is all too clear that we do not
yet have the theory, the data, or the analysis needed to change our civil
justice system for the better. Studies such as this one advance our under-
standing of the nuanced dynamics of legal representation and legal pro-
cesses in context. Just as importantly, this work also increases our under-
standing of what is actually happening, on a day-to-day basis, in our na-
tion's civil courts.
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
This Article is part of a broader study based on the broadest and
deepest collection of data about representation in recent years. The study
is informed by our experience representing claimants in unemployment
insurance appeal hearings before the District of Columbia Office of Ad-
ministrative Hearings. Though we did not conduct formal qualitative
observations of these hearings, two of the authors have supervised clini-
cal law students in these cases over the course of five years and in more
than a hundred cases combined. This clinical practice has led to conver-
sations with other representatives, judges, and court staff about various
issues concerning representation in this context. The questions raised by
the authors' experiences in these cases were the impetus for this project;
the relationships developed during these cases led to access to the data
for this study; and the authors' observations contribute to the hypotheses
in this Article.
To identify a universe of cases for this Article, we collected unem-
ployment benefits appeals hearing data from the District of Columbia
Office of Administrative Hearings for the year 2012. This data set en-
compasses 1,794 unique cases over the study period. 109 In order to ensure
the greatest utility of the data, coded variables include the following:
108. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 2, at 117-20 (identifying a lack of information about
the demand for civil legal services including how individuals understand and interact with law and
the justice system).
109. The data discussed in this Article are the result of a larger effort to collect data on all
unemployment insurance appeals in the District of Columbia for 2011, 2012, and 2013. We antici-
pate that this data set will be available for the future research proposed at the conclusion of this
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* a party's representation (or lack thereof),
* the type of representation (lawyers, third parties, clinical
students, lay representatives),
* the presence of representation at the hearing (as representa-
tives do not necessarily attend the hearing),
* the appearance of parties at the hearing,
* the participation of parties in different procedural elements
of the case, and
* the length of time for procedural steps and cases to be re-
solved.
As a key goal of the study is to understand the context of represen-
tation, we attempted to code every possible procedural element of each
case, though only a subset of these procedures are addressed in this Arti-
cle.110 The coded variables include the following:
* dates of the eligibility period,
* date and substance of the underlying agency (claims) deter-
mination,
* date of filing of the appeal,
* date and number of document disclosures,
* number of documents introduced,
* number of documents admitted,
* date and number of witnesses disclosed,
* date and outcome of requests for subpoena,
* date of any pretrial motions filed and their outcomes,
* date of any hearings held,
* the appearance of parties at the hearing(s),
* the appearance of representatives at the hearing(s),
* any appearance and testimony by witnesses,
* telephone appearances,
* use of interpreter,
* verbal motion for judgment at a hearing,
* verbal voluntary dismissal at a hearing,
* date of any posthearing motions and their outcomes,
* final procedural outcome, and
Article and will include approximately 7,000 unique cases, approximately 5,200 of which concern
the circumstances of separation from employment.
110. Some procedures, such as disclosure of witnesses, are excluded from this Article because
of small sample sizes in our one-year data set. Other procedures, such as the use of motions, are not
considered because we believe they are more complex and potentially implicate other areas of in-
quiry. Thus we plan to address them in future articles.
Ill. Pretrial motions include those to withdraw the appeal, withdraw as representative, expe-
dite the final order, continue the hearing, for a new hearing or to reopen a case, for relief from a final
order, for reconsideration, for subpoena, for telephone hearing, to compel, noting intent not to ap-
pear, for judgment, for extension of time, to file under seal, to add a party, to quash, for an interpret-
er, to consolidate cases, to appear pro hac vice, to supplement the record, and to remand, as well as
responses to these motions.
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* final substantive outcome.
To collect the data, we engaged in a three-step process. First, we
downloaded data from the court's case-management system. Second, we
supplemented and verified this data through review of each paper case
file, conducted according to a comprehensive collection protocol. Third,
we performed supplemental two-tier data checks of the paper case files
and reviewed the collected data for both internal consistency and con-
sistency with court procedures. We then coded the collected data accord-
ing to a comprehensive coding plan to allow for the use of statistical
software for analysis.
This Article focuses on a subset of the data: all unemployment ap-
peals where the circumstances of separation are at issue, regardless of
which parties appeared at the hearing. This is not a sample of available
cases but rather every such case in the District of Columbia in 2012. This
data set captures the breadth of circumstances where representation may
have a correlation to outcomes and is a larger and broader sample than
earlier studies. It does not, however, include the subset of unemployment
appeals regarding underlying questions of eligibility and benefit calcula-
tion, as those appeals involve a state agency rather than the employer as
the opposing party. 112
We use a combination of cross tabulations and difference in propor-
tions tests to demonstrate patterns of relationships between the variables
of interest present in the data. Cross tabulation allows us to demonstrate
basic patterns of correlation in the data, and difference in proportions
tests allow us to further investigate the relationships of interest through
statistical testing of the comparison of groups. Cross tabulation is a de-
scriptive statistical tool that summarizes data into contingency tables by
grouping the frequency of interrelation between variables."' Difference
in proportions tests allow us to determine if certain outcomes of interest
(e.g., winning or losing an appeal) can be attributed to a statistically sig-
nificant difference between groups based on the presence or absence of
an additional characteristic of interest (e.g., having representation or
not).114 In this initial examination of the data, we seek to identify mean-
ingful patterns in the data that may be further tested by more complex
empirical methodology in future work.
112. The results presented in this paper include only cases where the legal issue is a claimant's
qualification for benefits. We have made the analytical choice of separating the two data sets be-
cause the parties, the nature of representation, the hearing process, and the legal and factual issues
involved in eligibility and qualification cases are substantively different and would make a combined
analysis unworkable. In future work, we hope to explore the particular dynamics of eligibility cases,
which also raise issues of power and legal expertise, albeit in different ways.
113. PHILIP H. POLLOCK Ill, THE ESSENTIALS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS 59-61 (4th ed. 2012).
114. ALAN C. ACOCK, A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO STATA 139-42 (2d ed. 2008).
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We recognize the criticisms lodged against observational studies
about the impact of representation. Though our access to data and the
ethical challenges of randomizing representation mean this study is not
based on a randomized design, it is based on all unemployment cases,
rather than a sample, in the relevant time period.' 5 We note that we do
not call what we do "causal" and instead use statistical methods to com-
pare groups and to demonstrate the correlative relationships between
representation and case and procedural outcomes. While we recognize
the limitations of our analysis, we believe our observations are still
meaningful. Even though it is not operating from a random sample, our
approach of using a complete set of cases to look at differences between
groups provides important insights into the questions of representation,
balance of power, and strategic expertise that frame future work to test
the theories we develop in this Article.
I15. An example of the logistical and ethical challenges of randomizing the contextual ques-
tions we raise is: even if one could randomize ethically the fact of representation for a party, it is
hard to imagine how to randomize ethically whether a particular party presented testimony or intro-
duced a document, in order to measure the corresponding case outcomes.
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HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA: MISTAKEN CONCLUSIONS ON
MISTAKES OF LAW
ABSTRACT
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Traditionally, the primary mechanism for enforc-
ing the Fourth Amendment has been the exclusionary rule. If a search
was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment, any evidence of
the defendant's illegal conduct was excluded from the defendant's crimi-
nal trial. The main rationale for the exclusionary rule is that when evi-
dence is excluded, it deters police officers from future Fourth Amend-
ment violations.
After deterrence became the primary justification for the exclusion-
ary rule in the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court, in United States
v. Calandra, declared that unless police officers can be deterred, the ex-
clusionary remedy serves no purpose whatsoever. In subsequent cases,
when police violated the Fourth Amendment, but acted reasonably in
"good faith," the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not ap-
ply because the officer could not be deterred. The Court has since ex-
panded the good-faith exception to an increasingly broad range of situa-
tions.
This Case Comment analyzes the Court's most recent expansion of
the good-faith exception in the context of police mistakes of law. Heien
v. North Carolina is the first Supreme Court case to hold that police of-
ficers who make (reasonable) mistakes of substantive law do not violate
the Fourth Amendment. In effect, the Court not only expanded the cir-
cumstances to which the good-faith exception applies, but also made
good faith an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirements, rather
than merely an exception to the exclusionary rule. Now, instead of decid-
ing whether the search or seizure was reasonable, as required by the
Fourth Amendment's text, the Court decides the convoluted metaquestion
of whether it was reasonable for a police officer to believe the search was
reasonable. This decision not only further erodes Fourth Amendment
protections and stunts the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine, but
also creates a perverse double standard for the criminal law maxim that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse."
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INTRODUCTION
Early one morning in 2009, Maynor Vasquez and Nicholas Heien
were driving down a major interstate in North Carolina.' Vasquez was
driving, while Heien lay across the back seat.2 Meanwhile, Officer Matt
Darrisse sat on the side of the interstate watching traffic when he noticed
that Vasquez looked "stiff and nervous" as he drove by.3 Darisse pulled
onto the interstate and began to follow Vasquez's car.4 When Darisse
noticed that one of the rear brake lights was not working, he pulled
Vasquez over, mistakenly believing that state law required two working
brake lights.5 After giving Vasquez a citation, he got permission from
both men to search the car and subsequently found a bag of cocaine.6
Heien, who was the owner of the car, was sentenced to two years in pris-




5. Id at 534-35.
6. Id at 534.
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on for drug trafficking.7 He challenged the stop as a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.8
In 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Heien v. North
Carolina9 to review the question of "[w]hether a police officer's mistake
of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires to justify a traffic stop."'0 In an 8-1 decision, the Court
held that "[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth
Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government offi-
cials, giving them 'fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's
protection."'
This Case Comment argues that Heien was wrongly decided for a
number of reasons. First, it provides police officers with a legal justifica-
tion to circumvent Fourth Amendment protections and to stop drivers for
violating laws that do not actually exist. Second, the decision creates a
perverse double standard for the basic tenet that "ignorance of the law is
no excuse."l2 Police officers are now permitted to interpret vague laws in
individualized, "reasonable" ways, but citizens are still expected to know
and follow every law, regardless of how vague it is.'3 In other words,
citizens, most of whom have no legal education, are held to a higher
standard regarding knowledge of the criminal code than the very people
who are trained and entrusted to understand and enforce it.
Allowing an exception to the Fourth Amendment for police mis-
takes of law also seriously undermines the protections that the Fourth
Amendment provides individuals. The Fourth Amendment states: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no [wiarrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . . The Court
routinely analyzes criminal Fourth Amendment cases using three basic
steps.' First, there must be a search, meaning the person must have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy"' 6 or property interest7 in the area
7. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3-5, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014)
(No. 13-604).
8. Id. at 3-4.
9. 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
10. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 1; see also Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
11. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 533, 536 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949)).
12. Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REv. 687,
743 (2011) ("It is a hallmark of substantive criminal law that ignorance of the law is no defense.");
Robert L. Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 507,
509 (1986) (explaining that the rationale for this strict liability standard is that the refusal to reward
ignorance ensures "that the proper standard of conduct will be learned and respected by others").
13. See Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 536-40.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Marceau, supra note 12, at 733.
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects "people, not places"); Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the Fourth Amend-
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searched. Second, the search must be reasonable, meaning the officer
must have had probable cause that the person was doing something ille-
gal.19 Third, if the search was unreasonable, the Court invokes the exclu-
sionary remedy, meaning that the jury is barred from considering evi-
dence of the defendant's illegal conduct that was obtained during the
search.20 The analysis in Heien comes in at the second step of this
framework because the Court held that the Fourth Amendment is not
violated if the officer makes an objectively reasonable mistake when
21interpreting the law.
Previous Supreme Court cases that analyze police officer's "good-
faith"2 2 mistakes in the context of searches and seizures focus on the
third step in the above framework2 3-whether the defendant should have
access to the exclusionary remedy.24 In these cases, the Court continually
ment's protection applies as long as the person had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the area
searched).
17. In United States v. Jones, the Court considered whether the government's attachment of a
GPS device to a vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). The Court explained that the govern-
ment's physical intrusion on an area, unlike an intrusion on an "effect," is of no Fourth Amendment
significance because there is no meaningful interference with an individual's possessory property
interests. Id. at 953.
18. Marceau, supra note 12, at 733.
19. See id. at 733, 751-54. Reasonableness comes in various forms in the different contexts of
Fourth Amendment analysis. Generally speaking, a search and seizure is unreasonable if it was
conducted without a warrant or if it was based on a warrant that was issued without probable cause.
See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment, 68 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 589, 595-98 (2014). In exigent circumstances, where obtaining a warrant would be
impractical, the officer can conduct a search as long as he has probable cause for believing that the
person committed a crime. Id. at 598-99. In the context of traffic stops, officers must have reasona-
ble suspicion to stop a driver. See id. at 624-25.
20. Marceau, supra note 12, at 733. The exclusionary rule is the primary remedy for criminal
Fourth Amendment cases. See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the
Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237,
239-40. In civil cases there are a variety of remedies in addition to the exclusionary rule. See id. at
241-44. These mostly arise in the context of damages against individual government agents and
municipalities as well as injunctive or declaratory relief. See id
21. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
22. When police act reasonably, but violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court calls it "good-
faith." However, unlike the ordinary meaning of good faith, which refers to subjectively good inten-
tions, good faith in the context of the Fourth Amendment refers to whether the officer made an
objectively reasonable mistake. Sherry F. Colb, U.S. Supreme Court Considers Whether the Fourth
Amendment Allows Reasonable Mistakes of Substantive Law, VERDICT (May 5, 2014),
https:/verdict.justia.com/2014/05/05/supreme-court-considers-whether-fourth-amendment-allows-
reasonable-mistakes-substantive-law-2.
23. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 138-39, 146-48 (2009) (holding that as
long as the officer is negligent in attenuating the arrest, he is acting in good faith, and the jury should
not be barred from considering all of the evidence); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 3-4, 14 (1995)
(refusing exclusion when an officer mistakenly believed that a warrant had been issued for an indi-
vidual's arrest); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350-52, 359-60 (1987) (holding that the exclusion-
ary remedy is unavailable when legislators violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule is unavailable when judges violate
the Fourth Amendment).
24. There is one exception to this. Five years before the Court explicitly adopted the good-
faith exception in United States v. Leon, it decided Michigan v. DeFillippo, which essentially used
the good-faith justification to hold that an officer's reasonable reliance on a law that was later invali-
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held that the officers' mistakes did violate the Fourth Amendment; how-
ever, because the officers reasonably believed they had satisfied the
probable cause requirement (i.e., they acted in good faith), they did not
have mental states that could be deterred through legal sanctions. As
such, the supposed sole justification for the exclusionary rule did not
25
apply, and the evidence was admitted.
Heien essentially shifted the good-faith exception from a question
of remedy to a question of right. Consequently, the availability of the
Fourth Amendment's protections will no longer turn on whether the
search or seizure was reasonable, as the text of the Fourth Amendment
requires. Instead, the validity of a search or seizure will turn on the con-
voluted metaquestion of whether it is reasonable for the police officer to
believe the search was reasonable. This runs the risk of suppressing any
meaningful development of the Fourth Amendment because instead of
analyzing many of the critical and evolving aspects of reasonable search-
es and seizures, the Court will decide whether it was reasonable for the
officer to make a mistake about the relevant law.
In short, the Heien decision shows that the Court has not only ex-
panded the good-faith exception to include police mistakes of substantive
law, but also has begun to use the good-faith exception to limit the avail-
ability of the Fourth Amendment right, in addition to the Fourth
Amendment remedy. Expanding this exception both in degree and appli-
cation will cause the Fourth Amendment's general guarantee to be free
from unreasonable searches to only apply if the search involves egre-
gious officer conduct and obvious culpability.26 Over time, as remedies
fade from the Court's analyses, there will be less of a need to litigate
Fourth Amendment cases, and the doctrine will stagnate and lose its liv-
ing character.27 But most importantly, under Heien, if a law is unclear,
citizens are punished instead of the government.
Part I of this Case Comment will trace the emergence of deterrence
as the primary justification for the exclusionary remedy and show how
the Court's focus on officer culpability began the era of good-faith ex-
ceptions. It will then summarize the current state of the good-faith excep-
dated for void-for-vagueness grounds did not violate the Fourth Amendment itself. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31 (1979). Once the good-faith exception was expressly adopted in Leon, the Court only used it
to bar defendants' access to the exclusionary remedy. See id at 35-36, 39-40.
25. David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court's Contemporary Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 30-31 (2013).
26. On the day Herring was decided, Tom Goldstein, a lawyer who has argued almost two-
dozen cases before the Supreme Court, blogged, "Today, the Supreme Court holds that negligent
errors by the police generally do not trigger the exclusionary rule.... Put another way, the Supreme
Court today extended the good faith exception to ordinary police conduct." Tom Goldstein, The
Surpassing Significance of Herring, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 14, 2009, 11:32 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/the-surpassing-significance-of-herring/. Heien merely extends this
notion through the mistake of law exception.
27. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 732.
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tion to show how it has significantly eroded the exclusionary remedy and
paved a path for allowing police mistakes of law. Part II provides a brief
summary of the facts of Helen as well as the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes how Heien's extension of the good-
faith exception has narrowed the scope of the Fourth Amendment right
and precluded any discussion of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
remedy. Now, as long as the officer makes an objectively reasonable
mistake, the Fourth Amendment is nothing more than a holographic
promise that disappears when invoked.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment's Protections and the Importance of the Ex-
clusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule emerged as the primary remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations in Weeks v. United States.28 The Weeks Court
emphasized that a law enforcement officer's Fourth Amendment viola-
tions could not be approved by judges under any circumstances for two
key reasons.29 First, courts are bound by the duty to uphold the Constitu-
tion.30 Second, if personal property can be seized and "used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amend-
ment" to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures "is of no value,
and . . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution."31 The Court
emphasized that remedies define rights and that, without the exclusionary
rule, police officers have no incentive to refrain from conducting unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.32 Additionally, the Court stressed that
judicial integrity would be threatened if Fourth Amendment violations
were approved by judicial decision. These foundational justifications
made up the backbone of the Fourth Amendment, and in effect, what was
reasonable was narrowly construed in all contexts, making the exclusion-
ary rule a natural adjunct to Fourth Amendment violations.34 However, at
the time Weeks was decided, the Fourth Amendment only applied to fed-
28. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Weeks, a feder-
al marshal entered the defendant's house without a warrant and seized papers that were later admit-
ted in trial as proof of the defendant's lottery crimes. Id. at 388-89. The Court held that the evidence
should be excluded because the seizure violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at
398.
29. See id at 393-94.
30. Id. at 393 ("The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established be
[sic] years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land.").
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 394.
34. See Gray, supra note 25, at 14-15.
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eral officers because the Bill of Rights had not yet been extended to the
states.35
It was not until 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado,36 that the Court incorpo-
rated the Fourth Amendment to the states.37 The majority opinion in Wolf
emphasized that the exclusionary rule is both an individual remedy to the
person whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated as well as a
general deterrent aimed at law enforcement officers.38 Nevertheless, the
Court declined to extend application of the exclusionary rule because it
decided that it would be best for states to fashion their own remedies to
Fourth Amendment violations.9 However, in 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,40
the Court incorporated the exclusionary rule to the states when it con-
firmed that other remedies had proved to be "worthless and futile" when
it came to punishing and deterring law enforcement misconduct.41 The
Court also emphasized that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment and that failing
to require exclusion when law enforcement agents violate the Fourth
Amendment would be "to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment."4 2
In addition to providing a framework for the expansion of the exclu-
sionary rule's application, Weeks, Wolf and Mapp demonstrate that de-
terring police officers was initially viewed as only a partial justification
for exclusion that helped strengthen its application rather than fully sup-
port it. 43 However, starting in the 1960s, deterrence began to emerge as
the exclusionary rule's most important justification."" In Elkins v. United
States,45 Justice Stewart explicitly stated that the exclusionary rule's
"purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it."46 Eventually, in United States v. Calandra47 the Court declined
35. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 700-01.
36. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37. Id. at 27-28, 33.
38. Id. at 30-31.
39. Id. at 31-33.
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41. Id. at 651-53, 657-58.
42. Id. at 655-56.
43. See id. at 659 (explaining that judicial integrity is another imperative consideration of the
exclusionary rule); see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, "A More Majestic Conception":
The Importance ofJudicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47,
47, 53 (2010) ("Judicial integrity was the original reason for adopting the exclusionary rule in the
Supreme Court case of Weeks v. United States . . . ."); Gray, supra note 25, at 17 (discussing how in
Wolf v. Colorado "the Court had fully embraced punishment and deterrence as partial justifications
of the exclusionary rule").
44. See Gray, supra note 25, at 17-18.
45. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
46. Id. at 217. Elkins barred use of the so-called "silver platter" doctrine, which allowed
federal prosecutors to avoid the exclusionary rule remedy by encouraging state officers to unlawfully
obtain evidence on their behalf. Id. at 208. The Court emphasized the importance of preventing
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to recognize any justification for the exclusionary rule other than deter-
ring law enforcement officers.48 Significantly, Calandra marked the shift
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from using deterrence as a justifica-
tion for invoking the exclusionary remedy to a justification for barring
application of the exclusionary remedy.49 The Court accomplished this
by setting forth the notion that if the exclusionary rule does not have the
effect of deterring the police officer, it has no purpose whatsoever.o This
shift acted as a catalyst for allowing the Court to use a theory of police
culpability and punishment to guide its practices.5 But the difficulty in
proving that an officer's mistake was objectively unreasonable has creat-
ed an increasing number of ever-expanding good-faith exceptions that
have been slowly reshaping the exclusionary remedy's role in Fourth
Amendment criminal procedure.5 2
B. The Expansion of the Good-Faith Exception
The most important exception that stemmed from using deterrence
to bar exclusion came up in United States v. Leon.53 There the Court es-
tablished that when an officer violates the Fourth Amendment, but rea-
sonably believes that he has satisfied the legal probable cause standard,
he is acting in good faith.54 Accordingly, because the officer did not have
a mental state that could be deterred, evidence of the defendant's illegal
conduct was not suppressed. In Leon, police officers obtained a search
warrant to enter Leon's residence and subsequently found a large quanti-
56
ty of illegal drugs. Later, the warrant was held to have been invalid
because it was issued without probable cause.57 The Court initially at-
tempted to make Leon's holding a narrow exception by only applying it
to excuse an officer's reasonable reliance on a warrant that was later in-
validated.58 However, over time, the Court began to routinely rely on
Leon's reasoning-the exclusionary rule "cannot be expected, and
courts from serving as "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold." Id at 223.
47. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
48. Id. at 347. Calandra held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury investiga-
tions. Id. at 351-52. The Court explained that it is unlikely that police would carry out an unlawful
search and seizure in an effort to gather information to ask questions at a grand jury proceeding and
as such, applying the exclusionary rule in such cases would not deter police misconduct. Id
49. See Gray, supra note 25, at 20.
50. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350-52. According to the Calandra Court, the exclusionary
rule was nothing more than a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved." Id. at 348.
51. See Gray, supra note 25, at 22-23.
52. See Bloom & Fentin, supra note 43, at 57-59; see also Marceau, supra note 12, at 733.
53. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
54. Id. at 913.
55. See id at 923-24.
56. Id. at 901-02.
57. Id. at 903-04.
58. Marceau, supra note 12, at 739.
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should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity"59-as a basis for expanding the good-faith exception.so
In 2009, in Herring v. United States,61 the Court held that an of-
ficer's good-faith reliance on a clerk's mistake would also preclude ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule because at the time of the search, the
officer reasonably believed he had satisfied the necessary probable cause
62requirement. Significantly, the Herring Court created a new standard
for invoking the good-faith exception by explaining that as long as the
officer was merely negligent in conducting a search or seizure, he does
not have a mental state that can be deterred, and thus, the jury should not
be barred from considering all the evidence.63 However, the notion that
punishing negligent behavior cannot be deterred through sanctions runs
completely contrary to our entire system of tort law.M Indeed, as Justice
Ginsberg pointed out in her dissent, almost all of tort law is based on the
premise that liability for negligence incentivizes people to act with great-
65er care.
Herring also directly contradicted almost all of the Supreme Court's
exclusionary-remedy precedent by stating, "exclusion 'has always been
our last resort, not our first impulse."'6 6 Going forward, the Court shifted
away from viewing the exclusionary rule as a natural adjunct to a Fourth
Amendment violation and started viewing it as an extraordinary step that
should only be used in cases involving flagrant police misconduct.67
Two years later, the good-faith rationale was extended by Davis v.
United States,8 which held that an officer's reasonable reliance on a
binding appellate precedent, which was later overruled by a Supreme
59. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.
60. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426-28 (2011); Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-44 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-12, 14 (1995); Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-51 (1987); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-91 (1984).
61. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
62. Id. at 144-46; see also Kamin & Marceau, supro note 19, at 591 (explaining that a search
can be sufficiently unreasonable to violate the defendant's right, but not so unreasonable that he
should have access to the exclusionary remedy).
63. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 147-48.
64. Id. at 153 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("The exclusionary rule, the Court suggests, is capable
of only marginal deterrence when the misconduct at issue is merely careless, not intentional or
reckless. The suggestion runs counter to a foundational premise of tort law-that liability for negli-
gence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an incentive to act with greater care." (citation omitted)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 140 (majority opinion) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006));
see also id. at 137 ("Our cases establish that such suppression is not an automatic consequence of a
Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, the question turns on the culpability of the police and the
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.").
67. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 19, at 618 ("[T]he exclusionary rule now requires a
fact-specific inquiry into the culpability of the officer, and where an officer was acting reasonably,
even when the Fourth Amendment was violated, exclusion is not permitted.").
68. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011).
53 1
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Court case, does not trigger application of the exclusionary rule.69 Once
again, the Court analyzed whether the police officer acted in good faith
and subsequently held that the seizure was sufficiently unreasonable to
violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment right, but because the officers
were acting reasonably, there was no justification for the exclusionary
remedy.70
C. The Emergence of Police Mistakes ofLaw
The Court also used the good-faith exception to broaden related ex-
ceptions like mistake of fact and mistake of law. Mistake of fact has
long been viewed as insufficient to trigger the exclusionary rule because
probable cause and reasonable suspicion do not require meticulous accu-
racy.72 However, unlike mistake of fact, mistake of law has historically
never served as an exception to the exclusionary rule because it contra-
dicts the most important maxim of substantive criminal law: ignorance of
the law is no excuse. The rationale behind a strict liability standard for
mistake of law is that refusing to reward ignorance will encourage citi-
zens and law enforcement alike to learn and respect the law.74 However,
after Herring, some courts75 began to acknowledge that, in certain cir-
69. Id. at 2428-29. In Davis, police officers conducted a traffic stop and arrested the defend-
ant for giving a false name. Id. at 2425. They subsequently searched his car and found a gun. Id The
Court held that the evidence of the gun should not be suppressed because the officer acted in objec-
tively reasonable good faith. Id. at 2428-29.
70. Id.
71. Gray, supra note 25, at 38-40; Marceau, supra note 12, at 742-54.
72. Marceau, supra note 12, at 742-43 (explaining that lower courts have historically
acknowledged that he maxim has no less force in the context of the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule: "Even a good faith mistake of law by an officer cannot form the basis for reason-
able suspicion, because 'there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for police who do
not act in accordance with governing law."' (quoting United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 739
(2001))).
73. See id. at 743-44; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Term Paper, Herring v. United States: A
Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 488-89 (2009).
74. See Gray, supra note 25, at 43; Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J.
69, 91 (2011) ("Reciprocal expectations of law-abidingness between government and citizens can
scarcely be expected to endure if one party-the government-need not uphold its end of the bar-
gain." (footnote omitted)).
75. In 2005, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first Court to hold, in United States
v. Martin, that police can make objectively reasonable mistakes of law. 411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005).
The officer pulled over a Native American driver because he only had one working light and subse-
quently discovered that Martin had a pound of marijuana in the car. Id. at 1000. It was undisputed
that the officer mistakenly understood the Motor Vehicle Code to require two working brake lights,
when it actually only required one. See id. However, the Court held that the search and seizure did
not violate the Fourth Amendment and explained that "the validity of a stop depends on whether the
officers actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and in mistake cases the question
is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or fact, was an objectively reasonable one." Id at
1001; see also Logan, supra note 74, at 80-81 (discussing how, in addition to the Eighth Circuit, the
D.C. Circuit, as well as the state appellate courts in Georgia, Mississippi, Ohio, and South Dakota
have condoned what they consider to be reasonable mistakes of law).
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cumstances, mistakes of law bar exclusion because of the good-faith
exception.76
Herring's effect on subsequent cases involving police mistakes be-
gan a new phase of limiting the use of the exclusionary rule to instances
where law enforcement officers have knowledge that their conduct is
unconstitutional. If the officer lacks knowledge that his conduct is un-
constitutional, there is no way to deter him, and therefore, his conduct is
reasonable.78 Under this approach, the blamelessness of a law enforce-
ment officer, not a Fourth Amendment violation, determines the availa-
bility of exclusion.79 Heien essentially moved the good-faith justification
outlined in Herring from a question of remedy to a question of right by
holding that as long as the officer's basis for probable cause is based on
an "objectively reasonable" mistake of the law, there is no Fourth
Amendment violation in the first place.80
Police mistakes of law can be divided into three broad categories.
The first category concerns whether a law that was invoked by a police
officer as a basis for an arrest, but later found unconstitutional, violates
82 8the Fourth Amendment. In Michigan v. DeFillippo,8 3 the Court held
that the search was still reasonable and thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because law enforcement should not be required to antici-
pate that a court would later overturn particular laws.84 However, exclu-
sion is still available when the statute is "so grossly and flagrantly un-
constitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to
see its flaws."85
The second category involves mistakes that relate to Fourth
Amendment procedure, such as when a warrant is required and what
76. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 745 ("There is a sense that Herring has ushered in, despite
protestations by the Court to the contrary, an era of exclusion that is markedly more focused on the
culpability of the officer-in assessing the deterrence benefit of the exclusionary rule, the relative
culpability of the offending officer has moved to the forefront of the remedial analysis.").
77. See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[E]vidence
should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may
properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amend-
ment." (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144-46 (2009))).
78. Marceau, supra note 12, at 745.
79. Id.
80. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539-40 (2014).
81. Marceau, supra note 12, at 744-45.
82. Logan, supra note 74, at 76.
83. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). In DeFillippo, a Detroit city ordinance authorized police to stop and
question individuals if they had probable cause that the person was doing something illegal. Id. at
33. Officers found DeFillippo in an alley with a woman who was in the process of lowering her
slacks. Id. When asked for identification, DeFillippo gave inconsistent and evasive responses. Id. He
was subsequently arrested and searched, and the police found illegal drugs. Id. at 34. The ordinance
was later invalidated on void-for-vagueness grounds. Id. at 35.
84. Id. at 37-38.
85. Id at 38.
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level of suspicion86 is required for a warrantless stop or arrest.87 In these
circumstances, the mistake involves the application of the Fourth
Amendment itself, as opposed to an extrinsic law.88 For example, in
Stoner v. California,89 the police searched the petitioner's hotel room
without a warrant and without consent from the petitioner.90 Instead, they
obtained permission from the hotel's night-desk clerk.91 The Court unan-
imously held that the search was unreasonable because the police did not
have a warrant.9 2 As such, evidence found in the hotel room was exclud-
ed.93
The third category of police mistakes of law involves misinterpreta-
tions of settled law.94 In these situations, courts analyze the reasonable-
ness of an officer's interpretation of the law, which now hinges on
whether the officer acted in good faith and whether his behavior is some-
thing that can be deterred.95 Police mistakes of substantive law have re-
mained one of the last circumstances where the good-faith exception
does not apply and where a defendant can realistically rely on the exclu-
96sionary remedy. However, Heien v. North Carolina closed in this gap
by holding that an officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law pro-
vides the necessary reasonable suspicion to preclude any application of
the Fourth Amendment's protections.97 In effect, ignorance of the law is
an excuse.
II. HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA
A. Facts
In April 2010, a North Carolina policeman named Sargent Matt
Darisse sat in his patrol car observing traffic on a major interstate.9 8 Dar-
86. Reasonable suspicion is a standard used in criminal procedure that is less stringent than
probable cause. Reasonable suspicion is sufficient to satisfy brief stops and detentions, but it is not
enough to justify a full search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968) (holding that a brief stop is
only valid if the officers have an objectively reasonable suspicion to believe that a law is being
violated).
87. Logan, supra note 74, at 77.
88. See id.
89. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
90. Id. at 484-85.
91. Id. at 485.
92. Id. at 490.
93. Id.
94. Marceau, supra note 12, at 744.
95. Logan, supra note 74, at 78-79. There is a fear that, after Herring, courts will begin to
hold that as long as the police officer was negligent in making the arrest, the behavior is reasonable,
and the Fourth Amendment's protections barred. Marceau, supra note 12, at 741 ("[T]here is a
palpable fear that the 'sweeping language' from [Herring) will be used to establish an understanding
of the good faith exception as 'a general exception to exclusion for negligent-rather than reckless
or deliberate-police misconduct."' (quoting I. Fourth Amendment -- Exclusionary Rule, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 153, 157 (2009))).
96. See Logan, supra note 74, at 79.
97. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
98. Id at 534.
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isse noticed that the driver of a passing car looked "stiff and nervous," so
he started following in his car.99 After following for several miles, Dar-
isse noticed that only one of the brake lights of the car was working, so
he pulled the driver over. 1 When he asked the driver of the car, Maynor
Javier Vasquez, for his license and registration, he noticed that the owner
of the car, Nicholas Brady Heien, was lying across the rear seat.10 There
were no problems with the documents, and Darisse issued a warning
ticket.102 However, Darisse became suspicious when the two men gave
inconsistent answers about their destination and acted nervous.10 3
Vasquez and Heien answered further questions, and when Darisse asked
whether he could search the car, the men consented.'1 After a thorough
search of the car, Darisse found a sandwich bag that contained cocaine,
and both men were arrested.05
B. Procedural History
The trial court denied Heien's motion to suppress the evidence and
concluded that the faulty brake light gave Darisse reasonable suspicion to
stop the vehicle.'1 "Heien pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal
the suppression decision."'07 The North Carolina Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that the stop was invalid "because driving with only one.
. . brake light was not [technically] a violation of North Carolina law." 08
The relevant provision of the vehicle code states that a car must be
"equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle,"'0 9 and it was un-
disputed that Heien had one working brake light. The State appealed, and
the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and concluded that Darisse
could have reasonably read the statute to require that both brake lights
need to be in working order." l0 The case was remanded to the North Car-








106. Id. at 535.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Section 20-129(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides in relevant part: "Rear
Lamps. -- Every motor vehicle ... shall have all originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in
good working order. . . ." Subsection (g) provides:
No person shall sell or operate on the highways of the State any motor vehicle, motorcy-
cle or motor-driven cycle, manufactured after December 31, 1955, unless it shall be
equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. The stop lamp shall display a red or
amber light visible from a distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal sunlight,
and shall be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake. The stop lamp may be
incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-129(d), (g) (2009).
110. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
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motion to suppress.' The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to re-
view the question of "[w]hether a police officer's mistake of law can
provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires
to justify a traffic stop."ll2
C. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsberg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan joined." 3
The opinion affirmed the state court's ruling that reasonable suspicion
can rest on a mistake of law.114 Justice Roberts began by emphasizing
that the Court has long held that "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is 'reasonableness.""15 However, "[t]o be reasonable is not
to be perfect," and therefore, the Fourth Amendment allows some mis-
takes on behalf of law enforcement officers."'6 The opinion stressed that
the limiting factor is that "the mistakes must be those of reasonable
men."' 17
Justice Roberts then delved into justifying mistakes of substantive
law by explaining that a reasonable person can confuse the law just as
much as he could confuse the facts, and both are equally compatible with
the concept of reasonable suspicion."8 Indeed, to justify this type of sei-
zure, officers only need reasonable suspicion instead of probable
cause.119 Reasonable suspicion, the Court explained, is defined as "a par-
ticularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped" broke the law.' 2 0 The Court went on to explain that reasonable
suspicion arises from both "an officer's understanding of the facts and
his understanding of the relevant law."'21 After mentioning that there are
no recent precedents that address substantive mistakes of law in the con-
text of the Fourth Amendment, the opinion stressed that the concept has
appeared in numerous cases since the early 1800s.12 2 It also recognized
that there were no cases that were directly on point but explained a con-
trary conclusion would be difficult to reconcile with DeFillippo, which
held that there is no Fourth Amendment violation if government searches
are based on statutes that are later declared unconstitutional.123
111. Id.
112. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-
604), 2014 WL 2601475, at *1.
113. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 533.
114. Id. at 534.
115. Id. at 536 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014)).
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687-88 (2014)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 536-37.
123. Id. at 537-38.
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Justice Roberts then rejected Heien's argument that DeFillippo was
a case solely about the exclusionary rule by explaining that DeFillippo's
marginal discussion24 of the exclusionary rule does not displace the
holding that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.125 It then
drew a parallel to Heien by explaining that "there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment" because the officer's mistake about whether both
brake lights were required by the vehicle code was reasonable.126 Heien's
second argument attacked the notion that the Fourth Amendment's toler-
ance of mistake of fact should extend to mistake of law because mistake
of law is plainly a question of the officer's knowledge rather than a
judgment the officer made on the fly while working in the field.12 7 JUS-
tice Roberts addressed this argument by pointing out that an officer may
suddenly confront a situation in the field where the statute is unclear,
which makes mistake of law and mistake of fact one category that hinges
on reasonableness, rather than two separate categories.'28 The opinion
also rejected the suggestion that the decision would discourage police
from learning the law because the mistake must still be "objectively rea-
sonable." 29
The last major point that the Court addressed was that ignorance of
the law is still no excuse.'3 0 In cases like this one, police are trying to
implement the Fourth Amendment, not break the law.131 Thus, when law
enforcement officers reasonably believe that others have broken the law,
they may stop them to investigate without violating the Fourth Amend-
ment.13 2
D. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Ginsberg joined, agreed with the
majority opinion that the "'Fourth Amendment tolerates only . .. objec-
tively reasonable mistakes of law."'1 33 Justice Kagan's first main point
was that an officer's subjective understanding is irrelevant and that the
government cannot defend the officer using mistake of law if the officer
was unaware or untrained in the law.' 34 Her second point was that "if [a]
statute is genuinely ambiguous," then the mistake is reasonable.35 If the
statute is not genuinely ambiguous, the statute must be "really difficult"
124. The Court pointed out that in DeFillippo, the Court stated in a footnote that that suppres-
sion of the evidence found on DeFillippo would serve none of the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
Id. at 538.
125. Id.




130. Id. at 540.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Id. at 539 (majority opinion) (alteration in original)).




to understand or a "very hard question of statutory interpretation."' 36 The
opinion concluded by speculating that the vehicle code posed a difficult
question of interpretation because it had conflicting signals as to whether
the brake light requirement was to be taken in the singular or plural.137
E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor began her dissent by agreeing with the majority
opinion that "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'rea-
sonableness."'l38 However, she promptly pointed out that "a fixed legal
yardstick" would make it easier to administer this notion rather than a
vague standard of reasonable legal mistakes.'39 She emphasized that the
state of the law should always trump an individual's misunderstanding of
the law because, unlike facts, the meaning of the law is not indefinite.14 0
As such, it is a court's job to interpret the law, not a police officer's.141
She also pointed out that permitting mistakes of law to justify seizures
has the effect of preventing the clarification of the law because courts no
longer need to clarify laws through decisions; they merely need to decide
if the officer's interpretation was reasonable.14 2 Additionally, Justice
Sotomayor pointed out that DeFillippo was not a case about mistake of
law at all because it simply concerned the validity of a law.143 Thus, the
Court was wrong in justifying the decision in Heien using DeFillippo.'44
She concluded by explaining that she would hold that "an officer's mis-
take of law, no matter how reasonable, cannot support he individualized
suspicion necessary to justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment."45
III. ANALYSIS
The Heien decision further erodes the general guarantee to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures because it allows police to en-
force nonexistent laws without violating the Fourth Amendment. Indeed,
as long as a police officer makes an objectively reasonable mistake (i.e.,
he is acting in good faith), when interpreting and enforcing the law, it is
the citizen who is punished instead of the government. Expanding the
good-faith exception in this way not only limits the scope of the Fourth
Amendment right, but also expands the factual scenarios where the Court
will preclude any discussion of the exclusionary remedy.
136. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530
(2014) (No. 13-604)).
137. Id at 541-42.
138. Id. at 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482
(2014)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 542-43.
141. Id. at 543.
142. Id. at 542-43.
143. Id. at 546.
144. See id. at 546-47.
145. Id. at 547.
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The following analysis proceeds in three main sections. Section A
will discuss how the Court accomplished this expansion. Section A. 1 will
show how the Court broadened the holding in DeFillippo to justify al-
lowing police mistakes of law, and Section A.2 will show how the Court
combined police mistakes of law and mistakes of fact into one category.
Section B will show how Heien's expansion of the good-faith exception
is procedurally eroding the Fourth Amendment and stunting the devel-
opment of the Fourth Amendment's doctrine. Section C will discuss the
implications of allowing police to make mistakes of substantive law.
Section C.1 will show how the expansion of police discretion will dis-
proportionately impact minorities, and Section C.2 will show how allow-
ing police mistakes of law threatens judicial integrity, undermines the
expectation that the law is "definite and knowable," and disincentivizes
legislators to make laws that are clear and concise.
A. The Unlimited Scope of Reasonable Mistakes ofLaw
Since the Court first started making good-faith exceptions to the ex-
clusionary rule, it has struggled to find a way to limit each exception to a
narrow range of circumstances.146 As a result, all of the exceptions have
followed a trend of expanding to encompass an increasingly broad range
of situations.147 Heien is unique in the expansion of the good-faith excep-
tion because it not only gives police officers a legal justification to use a
nonexistent law to circumvent Fourth Amendment protections, but also
contradicts the most important maxim of substantive criminal aw that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse."1 48 The Court accomplished this dis-
turbing expansion in two significant ways. First, it broadened the holding
in DeFillippo to justify allowing a law enforcement officer to make a
reasonable mistake of substantive law. Second, the Court erased the dif-
ferences between mistake of law and mistake of fact by combining them
into one broad category.14 9 Now, as long as the officer makes an objec-
tively reasonable mistake, the Fourth Amendment is nothing more than a
holographic protection that disappears when invoked.
146. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 733.
147. See id.
148. Notably, Heien argued that because the maxim ignorance of the law is no excuse applies
to citizens who break the law, it should also apply to police. In the majority opinion, the Court re-
sponded to this argument by explaining that ignorance of the law does not apply because Heien "is
not appealing a brake light ticket; he is appealing a cocaine-trafficking conviction as to which there
is no asserted mistake of fact or law." Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540. But the ultimate effect of this deci-
sion is that the Court no longer holds police officers accountable to knowing and abiding by the rule
of law. The phrases "reasonable mistake of law" and "ignorance of the law" essentially mean the
same thing. See Alschuler, supra note 73, at 488-89 (explaining that the good-faith exception in
Leon weakens the exclusionary rule because it undermined the familiar rule of strict liability: igno-
rance of the law is no excuse).
149. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536-37.
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1. The Vague Limit on Objectively Reasonable Mistakes
Throughout the past decade, the Court has made a routine of using
search and seizure precedents in a way that ignores any limitations on
good-faith exceptions yet bolsters the notion that, if the police officer
acted reasonably, deterrence cannot be achieved.150 The source of this
problem dates back to Leon, which was initially intended to limit the
good-faith exception to situations that involve an officer's reasonable
reliance on a warrant that is later invalidated.'5 1 However, in subsequent
cases,152 the Court refused to acknowledge that the good-faith exception
only applies to invalidated warrants and simply explained that if the of-
ficer reasonably believes he has satisfied the probable cause requirement,
the exclusionary rule serves no purpose whatsoever.153
The Court used the same tactic in Heien to expand DeFillippo's
mistake of law limitations. In Heien the Court's central justification for
expanding the good-faith exception to include mistakes of substantive
law was that a contrary ruling would contradict the Court's holding in
DeFillippo.154 However, DeFillippo was intended to set precedent only
in circumstances where the law enforcement officer relied on a law that
was later deemed unconstitutional.155 In contrast, Heien had nothing to
do with a law that was later deemed unconstitutional. It involved a police
officer's interpretation of an ambiguous law and whether his interpreta-
tion was reasonable.15 6 Yet, instead of limiting DeFillippo's narrow rul-
ing by recognizing that it does not overlap with the facts of Heien, the
Court justified allowing police mistakes of substantive law by implying
that, in both cases, the officers acted reasonably.157
Moreover, instead of providing a clear standard to limit the scope of
reasonable mistakes, the Court provided an extremely vague and expan-
sive standard by stating that the only "limit is that 'the mistakes must be
those of reasonable men.""58 In essence, it remains entirely unclear how
much law a reasonable police officer is supposed to know. Do reasonable
police officers know the most recent Supreme Court cases interpreting
the laws? Are police officers acting reasonably if they simply follow the
150. See Gray, supra note 25, at 19-22 (discussing the Court's contemporary deterrence-only
approach).
151. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984).
152. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 138-39 (2009) (holding that as long as the officer
is negligent in attenuating the arrest, he is acting in good faith, and the jury should not be barred
from considering all of the evidence); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1995) (refusing exclu-
sion when an officer mistakenly believed that a warrant had issued for an individual's arrest); Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary remedy is unavailable when legis-
lators violate the Fourth Amendment.).
153. See Gray, supra note 25, at 39-41.
154. See Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 538-39.
155. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 39 (1979).
156. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
157. See id. at 538-39.
158. Id. at 536 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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text of the statutes as they appear on their computers, or do they need to
continue to study the laws? Is a police officer still acting reasonably if
she bases her decisions on what she was taught in police academy but
does not actually know what the law says? In Heien, it seems likely that
the police officer may have never read the statute concerning brake lights
and that he may have just assumed that driving with only one working
brake light violated the law. Later in the opinion, Justice Roberts ex-
plained that there is no Fourth Amendment violation if the mistake of
law simply relates to the question of "whether it was reasonable for an
officer to suspect that he defendant's conduct was illegal."159 Thus, as
long as the officer has an inkling of suspicion that a person is doing
something illegal, he can circumvent the Fourth Amendment to find out.
2. Reasonable Mistakes of Law Are Inherently Different from Rea-
sonable Mistakes of Fact
In addition to using precedent as a justification for expanding the
mistake of law exception, the Court also expanded the breadth of reason-
able mistakes by combining mistake of law and mistake of fact into one
category.o6 0 The Court prefaced this notion when it explained that to be
"reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for
some mistakes."l6 1 It went on to explain that reasonable mistakes of law
and fact are equally compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion
because reasonable suspicion "arises from the combination of an of-
ficer's understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant
law."' 62 However, the ultimate effect of expanding police mistakes to
include all mistakes of law is that it causes the existence of the Fourth
Amendment to be entirely dependent on the reasonableness of the of-
ficer's understanding of the law.
There are important practical distinctions that the Court ignored
when it combined mistakes of law and fact. First, officers have always
had some leeway in making probable-cause determinations because fac-
tual scenarios are almost always somewhat ambiguous.'63 As Justice So-
tomayor pointed out, "what is generally demanded of the many factual
determinations ... is not that they always be correct, but that they always
be reasonable." 164 This leeway makes sense considering that an officer's
understanding of the facts is often a combination of quick observations
159. Id. at 539.
160. See id at 536.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 542-43 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 543 (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)).
541
DENVER LAW REVIEW
and assessments of human behavior.s In contrast, interpretation of the
law does not require human behavior observations or inquiry.'
66
Furthermore, officers are often expected to make factual determina-
tions under time pressure, especially in the context of traffic stops.167 The
Court has taken this into consideration by explaining that "[t]he calculus
of reasonableness must" take into account "the fact that police officers . .
. often [need] to make split-second judgments" in situations that are tense
and unpredictable.6 8 In contrast, officers are not under time pressure to
learn the law while on patrol duty.169 Rather, police officers should know
and understand the law before they are given a duty to enforce it. Con-
sidering the advancements in police training and technology, it is ex-
tremely unfair for the Court to pronounce that police do not have to
know every facet of the law, but citizens do.' 70 The absurdity of this ap-
proach becomes even more apparent when one considers that when a
police officer is off duty, and is driving as a citizen, he has a duty to
know every nuance of the law, but as soon as he puts on his uniform and
badge, he has no such duty. In sum, trying to figure out what the law
entails is not something that should involve spur-of-the-moment deci-
sion-making; rather, it is a function of prior training, practice, and vari-
ous forms of technology. Indeed, the notion that the law is "definite and
knowable" is at the core of our legal system.'7 '
Justice Sotomayor addressed this in her dissent by explaining that
the Court has always emphasized that the facts leading up to the search,
in combination with the law, are what provide a basis for probable
cause-"not an officer's conception of the rule of law," and certainly not
an officer's reasonable misunderstanding about the law." 72 She went on
to emphasize that there is "scarcely a peep" in the history of the Fourth
Amendment suggesting that an officer's understanding of the law is in-
tended to factor into the reasonableness metric.'73 In fact, Heien contra-
dicts the long line of precedents explaining that the principle components
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause have always been an officer's
assessment of the facts weighed against rule of law, not an officer's as-
165. Id. at 542-43.
166. Id. at 543.
167. Id.
168. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (discussing the scope of reasonableness
in the context of police stops).
169. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
170. Logan, supra note 74, at 84 (discussing how the argument that laws are too voluminous
and complex is "especially unjustified given unprecedented improvements in the educational back-
grounds of police and ready access to substantive law, including via dashboard computers").
171. Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); cf Logan, supra note 74, at 83 ("The
expectation that the law be 'definite and knowable' is no more tenable for police today than it is for
the lay public." (footnote omitted)).
172. Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 543.
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sessment of the law.174 Ultimately, the effect of combining mistakes of
law and fact into one category is that the availability of Fourth Amend-
ment protections now hinge on the reasonableness of the officer's
knowledge and understanding of the law.
B. Eliminating Discussion of the Exclusionary Remedy Will Stunt Mean-
ingful Development of the Fourth Amendment
Other Supreme Court cases that discuss police officers' mistakes in
the context of searches and seizures hold that the mistakes violate the
Fourth Amendment right; however, because the officer acted reasonably,
there is no justification for the exclusionary remedy.'7 5 In contrast, the
Heien Court discussed the police officer's legal error in the context of the
scope of the right, thereby precluding any discussion of the exclusionary
remedy. 76 Over time, this approach runs the risk of limiting any mean-
ingful development of the Fourth Amendment because, instead of decid-
ing whether the search and seizure was reasonable, the Court decides
whether it was reasonable for the officer to make a mistake about the
relevant law. As remedies fade from the Court's analyses, there will be
less of a need to litigate Fourth Amendment cases, and the doctrine will
stagnate and lose its living character.'7 7 In short, Heien demonstrates that
the Court is much more concerned with short-term implications of officer
culpability and deterrence than the long-term development of the Fourth
Amendment.
174. See, e.g., Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (explaining that an arresting
officer's state of mind does not factor into the probable-cause inquiry, "except for the facts that he
knows" (emphasis added)); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (explaining that the
principal components of probable cause are "the events which occurred leading up to the stop or
search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objec-
tively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause"); Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) ("[W]hat is generally demanded of the many factual determi-
nations that must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is not that they always be
correct, but that they always be reasonable." (emphasis added)); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) ("[T]he issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or con-
stitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established
facts is or is not violated."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (framing the question as to
whether the "facts" give rise to reasonable suspicion).
175. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009) (holding that the exclu-
sionary rule is not invoked when the officer acts in good faith but is simply negligent in making an
arrest); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule when an
officer mistakenly believed that a warrant had issued for an individual's arrest); Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340, 349 (1987) (extending the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule to cover cases in
which police carry out a search or seizure pursuant to the authority of a statute that a court later
determines violates the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (creat-
ing a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when a warrant is issued by a "detached and
neutral" judge). The only other case to hold that an officer's legal error did not violate the Fourth
Amendment right was Michigan v. DeFillippo, which held that an officer's reliance on a law that
was later invalidated for void-for-vagueness grounds did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 443
U.S. 31, 39-40 (1979).
176. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536-40.
177. Marceau, supra note 12, at 731.
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The exclusionary rule's ability to develop the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures becomes
abundantly clear when one compares the Fourth Amendment's develop-
ment before and after the exclusionary rule was automatically applied.'78
Simply put, before the exclusionary rule existed, the Court rarely ad-
dressed the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and as such, Fourth
Amendment law never evolved or developed.17 9 In contrast, when the
Court automatically applied the exclusionary rule, the content of the
Fourth Amendment was thoroughly explained.18 0 Today, the Court is
somewhere in the middle of these two extremes, which can partially be
attributed to the growing list of good-faith exceptions to the exclusionary
remedy.18' However, after Heien, the Court will likely use the good-faith
exception to narrow the scope of the Fourth Amendment right, in addi-
tion to the remedy, which will provide enough momentum to begin a
new era where the exclusionary rule is only applied in cases with flagrant
officer conduct.'82
Indeed, the Heien Court continued the trend of applying Herring
and Davis's assessment of the reasonableness of the officer's conduct
(i.e., the good-faith exception). However, instead of admitting the evi-
dence of cocaine found in Heien's car by barring the exclusionary reme-
dy, the Court justified admitting the evidence by holding that the search
did not violate Heien's Fourth Amendment right.'83 This procedurally
different way of using the good-faith exception contracts the scope of the
Fourth Amendment's protections by causing the validity of the search or
seizure to hinge on the convoluted metaquestion of whether it is reasona-
ble for a police officer to believe the search was reasonable.'84 Notably,
none of the Justices in the majority or concurring opinions discussed the
validity of the search or the exclusionary remedy. Instead, they vaguely
navigated the scope of "objectively reasonable" mistakes.'8 5 The majori-
ty opinion ambiguously stated that "[t]he limit is that 'the mistakes must
be those of reasonable men.'" 8 6 Justice Kagan's concurring opinion
made the standard slightly more lucid when she explained that a mistake
178. See id. at 731-32.
179. Id. ("If ... violations of the Fourth Amendment are understood to result in a nearly abso-
lute and automatic application of the exclusionary rule, as the Court seemed to anticipate in Katz v.
United States, then courts adjudicating criminal cases will have no choice but to carefully and pre-
cisely articulate the content of the Fourth Amendment." (footnote omitted)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 732.
182. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 19, at 615-18 ("Taken together, Hudson, Herring, and
Davis represent a fundamental reworking of the exclusionary rule.").
183. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) ("Here, by contrast, the mistake of
law relates to the antecedent question of whether it was reasonable for an officer to suspect that the
defendant's conduct was illegal. If so, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment in the first
place.").
184. See id
185. Id. (emphasis omitted).
186. Id. at 536 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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of law is only reasonable if judges would take opposite positions on what
it says. But when the contours of the Fourth Amendment right are ar-
ticulated in the context of the officer's mistake, rather than the validity of
a search or seizure, the Court has no incentive to reach the merits of the
case.'" The Court seems to have forgotten that when it first began to
meaningfully develop the Fourth Amendment, it emphasized that reme-
dies define rights and that without the exclusionary remedy police offic-
ers have no incentive to refrain from conducting unreasonable searches
and seizures.'89
C. The Implications ofAllowing Reasonable Mistakes of Substantive Law
Police should not be excused from making mistakes of law because
when police become interpreters of the law, in addition to merely enforc-
ers, it undermines our criminal justice system and disserves many of our
basic rule-of-law values. Allowing police to make mistakes of law not
only creates a perverse double standard for the well-known maxim "ig-
norance of the law is no excuse," but also deprives individuals of their
physical liberty and causes police officers to violate their own sworn
duty to enforce the law.190 Indeed, Heien v. North Carolina gave the
Court an opportunity to put legal bounds on an already discretionary law
enforcement system. Instead, the Court essentially gave police officers a
license to stop individuals based on whatever subjective criteria they see
fit. As long as police officers can point to one of the numerous ambigu-
ously worded traffic codes as a legal justification, they will no longer
violate the Fourth Amendment. This endorsement of police discretion
will not only exacerbate the problem of racially charged traffic stops, but
also will threaten judicial integrity, undermine the expectation that the
law is clear and knowable, and disincentivize legislators to make laws
that are clear and concise.
1. The Expansion of Police Discretion Will Have a Disproportion-
ate Effect on Minorities
For the last half-century, courts have played an important role in
interpreting and clarifying substantive criminal laws after they have been
codified by legislatures.191 However, allowing police officers to take over
the role of interpreting substantive criminal laws signifies "a [major]
departure from this institutional arrangement."l9 2 Indeed, allowing police
187. See id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
188. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 695.
189. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) ("If letters and private documents can
thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection
of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitu-
tion."), overruledby Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
190. Logan, supra note 74, at 70.
191. Id. at 95.
192. Id.
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officers to make mistakes of law will encourage officers to interpret laws
in ways that best serve the government's crime control interests because
the only limit on their mistakes is that they must be "mistakes . . . of rea-
sonable men."'93 This endorsement of police discretion will remove any
incentive for police officers to refrain from conducting racially charged
traffic stops because they will be able to stop an individual based on any
ambiguously worded traffic code.
There is a dire need for the Court to better address the problems that
stem from racial tension between police officers and minorities. Indeed,
there is widespread agreement that the War on Drugs has exacerbated
racial profiling in the context of traffic stops and that allegations of rac-
ism remain prevalent hroughout American streets and courtrooms.194 In
just the past few months, the deaths of Levar Jones,195 Walter Scott,196
and Samuel Dubose,197 all of whom were black men that were shot by a
white police officer during a traffic stop, have illuminated that the racial
tension between minorities and law enforcement is in dire need of being
more seriously addressed. But these scenarios provide just a sampling of
the nationwide problem. According to the Justice Department's 2012
statistics, black drivers are 31% more likely to be pulled over than white
drivers,198 more than twice as likely to be subject to police searches as
white drivers, and more than twice as likely to not be given any reason
193. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014); Logan, supra note 74, at 95.
194. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002) ("The War on Drugs ... is a new
occasion for the employment of traditional techniques of discriminating against racial minorities.");
Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
257, 257-59 (2009) ("The costs and benefits of [the] . . . 'war on drugs' [has been] fiercely debated.
... [But there is no dispute] "that this ostensibly race-neutral effort has been waged primarily against
black Americans.").
195. A white police officer stopped Levar Jones for a seatbelt violation. Jason Hanna et al.,
Video Shows Trooper Shooting Unarmed Man, South Carolina Police Say, CNN (Sept. 26, 2014,
8:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/25/justice/south-carolina-trooper-shooting/. When Jones
reached for his wallet, the officer thought he was reaching for his gun and shot him. See id.
196. A white police officer stopped Walter Scott because he had broken brake light. Dana
Ford, South Carolina Ex-Police Officer Indicted in Walter Scott Killing, CNN (Jun. 8, 2015, 5:30
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/08/us/south-carolina-slager-indictment-walter-scott/. "[A] dash
cam video ... shows the two men talking before Scott gets out of the car and runs." Id. It then shows
the police officer chasing him and then shooting him. Id
197. A white police officer stopped Samuel DuBose "because his car didn't have a front li-
cense plate." Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., The Shooting of Samuel DuBose, N.Y. TIMES (July 29,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/opinion/charles-blow-the-shooting-of-samuel-
dubose.html? r-0. His body camera shows the officer taking out his gun and shooting DuBose in his
car without any provocation. Id. The officer then lied about the stop to authorities and said he was
being "dragged by the vehicle and had to fire his weapon." Id. (quoting Officer Tensing's infor-
mation report).
198. Christopher Ingraham, You Really Can Get Pulled over for Driving While Black Federal
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for the traffic stop. 199 In light of these statistics, as long as the Court con-
tinues to expand police discretion and ignore the role that the Fourth
Amendment plays in protecting people from racial profiling, 200 discrimi-
nation is unlikely to be ameliorated.
In Heien, the majority opinion explained that "[r]easonable suspi-
cion arises from . . . an officer's understanding of the relevant facts and
his understanding of the relevant law." 20 1 Applied to the facts, Sergeant
Darisse's mistaken understanding of the brake light traffic law provided
the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop and search Heien's car.20
2
However, the Court failed to acknowledge an important aspect of the
"reasonable suspicion" that began the case. Sergeant Matt Darisse was
sitting on the side of a major interstate watching cars drive by when he
noticed that a Hispanic driver, Maynor Vasquez, looked "stiff and nerv-
ous" because he was "gripping the steering wheel at a 10 and 2 position
and looking straight ahead."20 3 In other words, Vasquez was followed for
being Hispanic and driving a beat-up car in North Carolina.
Putting aside Darisse's reliance on the brake light law that led to the
Court's mistake of law discussion, it is important to note that there are so
many traffic violations that it has become "virtually impossible for a
driver to not commit an infraction."204 As such, a police officer can fol-
low a car for a short time and almost always find a reason to pull the
205
person over. Considering that minority drivers are much more likely to
be pulled over than Caucasian drivers, it is difficult to ignore the role that
206
race plays in the process.
Before Heien was decided, the Rutherford Institute20 7 attempted to
draw the Court's attention to this problem by submitting an amicus curi-
199. LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE BEHAVIOR
DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 1, 9, 17 (2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtsslL .pdf.
200. See Sherry F. Colb, Stopping a Moving Target, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 191, 204-06
(2001) (explaining that one of the evils that the Fourth Amendment was to protect against is unbri-
dled discretion of law enforcement agents).
201. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
202. See id. at 535-36.
203. Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court Ignores the Lessons of Ferguson, SLATE (Dec. 16,
2014, 2:51 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/12/heien_v-northcarolinaas_
the-rest of the country worries about policeoverreach.html (quoting Officer Matt Darisse's
suppression hearing testimony).
204. Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 252 (2010).
205. Id.
206. Furthermore, in Whren v. United States, the Court held that a police officer's subjective
motivation for stopping an individual is irrelevant and that the only inquiry is whether there is prob-
able cause. 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996). Consequently, even if the police officer has unconstitu-
tional intentions for the stop, as long as he can conjure up a basis for probable cause based on a
traffic code, there is no Fourth Amendment violation. See id.
207. The Rutherford Institute is a non-profit conservative legal organization dedicated to the




ae brief thoroughly discussing how traffic stops disproportionately affect
discrete and insular minorities.20 8 The brief emphasized that the expan-
sion of police discretion as it relates to "mistakes of law will ... have the
effect of encouraging and increasing the number of legally baseless
searches."209 In other words, it gives officers a broader range of legal
justifications to hide racially charged motives. Unfortunately, Justice
Sotomayor was the only one to recognize this. In her dissent, she ex-
plained that expanding police discretion to include reasonable mistakes
of law "further erod[es] Fourth Amendment[] protection of civil liberties
in a context where that protection has already been worn down."2 10
2. Other Implications of Allowing Police to Make Mistakes of Sub-
stantive Law
The concept that the U.S. government is "a government of laws, and
211not of men" was first established by John Adams in 1780. Since then,
this principle has been repeated in dozens of Supreme Court decisions
and emphasized as an important part of guaranteeing all citizens equal
protection under the law.212 However, Heien turned this notion on its
head by defending the work of law enforcement officers, even if it eradi-
cates the protections of the fundamental rights embedded in the Fourth
Amendment. In effect, if the Fourth Amendment is controlled by "men"
and not by "law," it will threaten judicial integrity, undermine the expec-
tation that the law is "definite and knowable," and disincentivize legisla-
tors to make laws that are clear and concise.213
First, allowing police mistakes of law significantly undermines ju-
dicial authority because instead of interpreting and clarifying statutory
language, courts will instead feel the need to analyze whether the police
officer's interpretation of the law was reasonable.214 The problem with
allowing courts to resolve cases without interpreting the law is that most
cases that involve police mistakes of law arise in the context of low-level
offenses, like traffic codes, which are often worded in ambiguous ways
and are in desperate need of clarification.215 If each law enforcement
officer is able to interpret these laws in different, yet "reasonable," ways,
they will never be clarified, which burdens citizens and law enforcement
alike.2 16 This not only portrays the message that the "suggestion box" for
208. Brief of The Rutherford Institute, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 1-3,
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604).
209. Id. at 5.
210. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
211. Clifford W. Taylor, A Government of Laws, and Not of Men, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
199, 199 (2005) (quoting the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780).
212. Id.
213. See Logan, supra note 74, at 83, 95-98 (discussing the implications of police mistakes of
law on separation of powers).
214. Id. at 95-96.
215. See id. at 95-98.
216. See id.
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interpreting the law is always open, but also discourages police officers
from learning and applying the law in a consistent way. In essence, it
seriously undermines the foundational democratic principle that the law
must be "definite and knowable."2 17
The majority opinion attempted to address this problem by pointing
out that the objectively reasonable limit will provide enough of an incen-
tive for police officers to continue to learn the law.218 However, the Court
ignored the fact that even if a police officer knows the law extremely
well, he will still be able to use any ambiguous low-level offense to justi-
219fy his search. Moreover, the Court refused to acknowledge that police
departments are far from being neutral and detached arbitrators in the
judicial system, mostly because their primary goal is to appear to have a
robust system of crime control.220 Police departments are not condemned
for arresting too many criminals; however, they are condemned when
they appear to be too soft on criminals, which is a threat if police officers
always narrowly construe statutes.221 To make things worse, police offic-
ers often lack direct oversight because most are employed by county,
local, or municipal governments, which often have extremely decentral-
ized accountability.222 Simply put, allowing law enforcement officers to
assume the role of interpreters of the law will have the effect of usurping
judicial authority because courts will no longer be obliged to interpret
statutory language and clarify the law; they will merely need to decide if
the officer's interpretation was reasonable.223 In effect, vague laws will
become free tickets for police to circumvent Fourth Amendment protec-
tions and to search individuals at their discretion.
Validating police mistakes of law also undermines legislative ac-
countability because when courts eliminate application of the exclusion-
ary rule, legislators have little incentive to write laws that are clear and
concise.224 It is important to note that legislators and law enforcement
officials often work together to design policies that effectively bring the
guilty to punishment. Accordingly, courts are reluctant to intervene or
impose any substantive limits on this collective effort.225 By the same
token, courts' only significant tool for condemning Fourth Amendment
policies is through the application of the exclusionary rule.226 Thus, when
courts withhold its application, legislators have little incentive to make
clear laws because they are no longer sensitized to losing cases where
217. Id. at 83.
218. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
219. Logan, supra note 74, at 83.
220. Id. at 98.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 98-99.
223. See Helen, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).






evidence has been excluded. As a result, police will have an even
broader range of unclear substantive laws, which will give them more
discretion in justifying unreasonable searches.228
CONCLUSION
Heien gives officers a legal justification to stop individuals at their
discretion and to use an ambiguous law as a free ticket to circumvent
Fourth Amendment protections. It also creates a perverse double stand-
ard for the basic tenet-ignorance of the law is no excuse-by allowing
police officers to interpret laws in ways that best serve their interests, but
requiring citizens to know and follow every law, regardless of how am-
biguous it is. But what is particularly unique about Heien is that it ex-
panded the good-faith exception in both degree and application; it limited
the factual scenarios where the Court discusses the application of the
exclusionary remedy and shifted the analysis of "objectively reasonable
mistakes" from a question of remedy to a question of right. In doing so,
Heien seriously undermined the protections that the Fourth Amendment
provides individuals. Now, the availability of the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures no longer hinges
on whether the search or seizure was reasonable, as the text of the Fourth
Amendment requires. Instead, the validity of a search or seizure turns on
the convoluted metaquestion of whether it is reasonable for a police of-
ficer to believe the search was reasonable.
Katherine Sanford
227. Id. ("When courts indulge police legal misunderstandings, especially relative to textually
uncertain laws, and withhold application of the exclusionary rule, legislators, likely politically sensi-
tized to the 'loss' of the more serious cases from which the seizures emanate, have less incentive to
avoid textual imprecision." (footnote omitted)).
228. See id.
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WILLIAMS-YULEE V. FLoRIDA BAR: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS,
IMPARTIALITY, AND THE THREAT TO FREE SPEECH
ABSTRACT
Judicial elections have been controversial for many years. The de-
bate surrounding them has heightened as spending in judicial elections
has increased in recent years. Critics of judicial elections fear that the
electoral process compromises judicial impartiality and independence.
Supporters argue that such fears are overblown and that democratically
elected judiciaries are superior to ones appointed by other branches of
government.
Some states have attempted to regulate judicial elections in order to
preserve the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality. In particular,
states have sought to limit the content of judicial candidates' speech dur-
ing elections. Until recently, the Court has not favored such efforts.
However, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, the Court for the first time
upheld a state's regulation on judicial candidates' speech during an elec-
tion, holding that Florida's ban on direct financial solicitation from a
judicial candidate does not violate the First Amendment.
This Comment argues that, while preserving the appearance and re-
ality of judicial impartiality is necessary to ensure a respected and just
judiciary, the Court should not have allowed Florida's ban on direct
campaign solicitation by judicial candidates to stand. This Comment
argues that the ban violates the First Amendment and that the Court's
holding runs against long-standing principles of freedom of speech in
elections. Further, this Comment argues that states should appoint their
judiciaries. However, such reform is politically unlikely, and therefore
states should at least consider reforming their judicial recusal procedures
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial elections are not new to this country,' but they have been
the subject of criticism for over one hundred years.2 In particular, critics
have suggested that judicial elections compromise the appearance and
reality of judicial impartiality and independence by pressuring judges to
cater their rulings to please the public and their campaigns' financial
contributors.3 Further, the presence of increasing amounts of money in
judicial elections4 only makes this pressure more intense, and judges can
appear biased in favor of financial contributors when those persons or
groups appear before them in court. Prominent members of the Court
have advocated putting an end to judicial elections,6 but thus far state
1. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elec-
tions, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301,310 (2003).
2. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 791 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
3. See, e.g., id. at 789-90.
4. James J. Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections, 94 Judicature 50, 51-52
(2010).
5. White, 536 U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6. See, e.g., id. at 788-92.
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governments and bar associations have sought to limit the influence of
the electorate on the judiciary through other means.7 Most troublingly,
states have sought to limit what judges can and cannot say while cam-
paigning to maintain the ideal nature and image of the judiciary.8
Until recently, the Court has been suspect of speech restrictions in
judicial elections and has generally upheld the rights of judicial candi-
dates to engage in all forms of campaign speech.9 With its decision in
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,10 the Court for the first time upheld a
state's restriction on judicial campaign speech, specifically Florida's ban
on direct solicitation of money by judicial candidates." The Court held
that Florida's restrictions are permitted under the First Amendment to
preserve a state's compelling interest in judicial impartiality and inde-
pendence.12 This Comment will begin with an overview of the Court's
First Amendment theory and analysis and provide a brief history of judi-
cial elections. Next, this Comment will review the Court's recent deci-
sions surrounding judicial elections and provide a description of the
Court's opinion in Williams-Yulee. This Comment will then argue that,
while the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality is necessary to a
properly functioning judiciary and should be preserved, the Court should
not undermine fundamental First Amendment principles in preserving
judicial impartiality. The most effective way to preserve judicial impar-
tiality would be to end judicial elections, but this solution is unlikely in
the current political climate. Therefore, this Comment will explore alter-
native solutions, such as reforming judicial recusal procedures.
I. BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment Speech Theory and Analysis
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . ... This Amendment generally affords people the right to ex-
press their views regardless of the content of those views. 14 The right to
free speech has been considered especially important when speech is
political in nature.15 The latter proposition derives its support from one of
the principle theories offered as justification for freedom of speech: self-
7. See id. at 768-69 (majority opinion); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556
U.S. 868, 888-90 (2009).
8. See White, 536 U.S. at 768-69.
9. See id. at 776-77.
10. 135 S. Ct 1656 (2015).
11. Id at 1662.
12. Id at 1665.
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
14. See Willians-Yulee, 135 S. Ct at 1682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Police Dep't of Chi.
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
15. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (stating the First Amendment has its
"fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office").
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governance. This theory holds that freedom of speech is essential to
democracy and representative government.17 In order for democracy to
function properly, candidates and citizens must be able to speak openly
about political issues.18 First Amendment scholar Alexander Mei-
klejohn9 wrote that "[s]elf-govemment can exist only insofar as the vot-
ers acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion
to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to ex-
press."20 For this reason, Meiklejohn argued that any public speech af-
fecting the issues of self-governance could not be regulated by the gov-
21ernment.
Despite its broad language, the First Amendment does not prevent
the government from regulating any speech.22 To determine if a govern-
ment regulation of speech violates the First Amendment, the Court must
decide if the law in question regulates speech based on its content or if
the law is "content-neutral."23 If the law regulates speech based on its
content, then it is considered "presumptively invalid,"24 and the govern-
ment must meet the judicial standard of strict scrutiny to justify the regu-
lation.25
26Strict scrutiny is the most demanding standard of judicial review,
27and laws typically do not survive its application. To be upheld under
16. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 954-57
(4th ed. 2011); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 6-7 (2d ed.
2003).
17. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 954; SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 6-7.
18. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 954.
19. Alexander Meiklejohn (1872-1964) was a philosopher and a staunch advocate for free
speech. Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse ": The First Amendment Right ofAccess Opens
a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 284-85 (1995). Meiklejohn is considered to be a "seminal
figure" in First Amendment theory. Id. at 283; see also Joseph Russomanno, The "Central Mean-
ing" and Path Dependence: The Madison-Meiklejohn-Brennan Nexus, 20 COMM. L. & POL'Y 117,
128 (2015) ("Alexander Meiklejohn is the 'father of modem [F]irst [A]mendment theory."' (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 782, 782 (1986))); Robert Post, Meiklejohn 's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform
ofPublic Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1993).
20. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245,
255.
21. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-
26(1948).
22. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) ("[W]e reject the view that free-
dom of speech and association, as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'abso-
lutes,' not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail,
but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of
the First Amendment." (citation omitted)); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that
may have all the effect of force.").
23. Tumer Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FEC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994).
24. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
25. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); see also Turner, 512
U.S. at 641.
26. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 554.
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strict scrutiny, the Court must find the law necessary to achieve a com-
pelling government purpose.28 In order for the law to be "necessary," it
must be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the government's
purpose.29 The Court has frequently stated that a law must be "narrowly
tailored" to be the least restrictive means of achieving a government pur-
pose.30 In determining if a law is narrowly tailored, the Court considers
the extent to which the law is underinclusive or overinclusive. In the
context of free speech analysis, a law is underinclusive if it does not ap-
ply to all speech that is connected to the government's purpose in enact-
ing the law.32 A law is overinclusive if it applies to speech not connected
to the government's purpose in enacting the law.
Importantly, the Court has held that the First Amendment does not
protect the speech of government employees made in the scope of their
professional duties.34 In Garcetti v. Ceballos," the Court held that "when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from em-
ployer discipline."36 However, the First Amendment does protect the
speech of government employees when their speech is made "as a citi-
zen" and addresses "matters of public concern."37
B. Judicial Elections and Recent Case Law
Judicial elections have been the subject of serious debate since the
founding of this nation. In Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the
Founders chose to insulate the federal judiciary from the electorate by
having the President appoint judges for life, subject to confirmation by
the Senate.39 The Founders thought the differing roles of judges and oth-
27. Id.; see also Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing strict
scrutiny as 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
28. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973).
29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 554.
30. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991); Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481
U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
31. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 689-90.
32. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 349-51 (1949) (discussing the concept of underinclusivity generally).
33. See id at 351 (discussing overinclusivity generally).
34. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). For a discussion of the importance of this
holding, see infra Section III.B.
35. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
36. Id. at 421.
37. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
38. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672-73 (2015); Philip L. Dubois, Account-
ability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40
Sw. L.J. 31, 34-37 (1986); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One
"Best " Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
39. Dimino, supra note 1, at 306-10.
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er politicians to be essential to the functioning of the federal government,
and maintaining judicial independence and impartiality is considered
"the foundational principle-of Article III."4o Further, the Founders
thought that a judiciary independent of the voting public was essential to
the protection of minority viewpoints from a possibly tyrannical majori-
ty.41 In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton stated the following:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particu-
lar conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people them-
selves, and which, though they speedily give place to better infor-
mation, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the mean-
time, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and seri-
ous oppressions of the minor party in the community.42
However, the states were left open to determine how their judges
would be selected, and throughout the nineteenth century, many states
decided on judicial elections.43 While a majority of states have held judi-
cial elections since the early twentieth century, progressive reformers in
the 1920s and 1930s advocated for judicial appointment." In an attempt
to regulate candidate speech in judicial elections, the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) first drafted guidelines for judicial electoral conduct in
1924, and in 1972 the ABA amended its Canons of Judicial Ethics to
prohibit judicial candidates from promising certain conduct during their
time in office or from announcing their personal opinions on legal or
45political questions. Numerous states adopted the ABA's amended can-
nons, and these state laws would eventually be challenged as violations
46of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,47 a group of judicial
candidates and political organizations challenged Minnesota's adoption
40. Id. at 306.
41. Scott W. Gaylord, Unconventional Wisdom: The Roberts Court's Proper Support of
Judicial Elections, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1521, 1526. "Tyranny of the majority" is a term used to
describe the oppression of minority groups and viewpoints by a majority in a democracy. LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 1-3 (1994). Majority tyranny can arise in heterogeneous
democratic societies where the majority cannot be said to represent the interests of the entire popu-
lous. Id. at 3 ("The majority is likely to be . . . indifferent to the concerns of the minority."). "The
tyranny of the majority, according to [James] Madison, requires safeguards to protect 'one part of
the society against the injustice of the other part."' Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James
Madison)).
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 440 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987).
43. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1522; Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection
Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1261-62
(2008) (stating that by 1909 thirty-five states selected their judges by partisan election).
44. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1530; see also Geyh, supra note 43, at 1261-62.
45. Dimino, supra note 1, at 314.
46. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768-70 (2002). A clause
prohibiting judges from announcing their personal opinions on legal or political questions have been
referred to as an "announce clause." Id at 768.
47. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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of an "announce clause"48 as an unconstitutional abridgment of speech
under the First Amendment.49 The Court ruled the announce clause was
unconstitutional. It reasoned that the clause imposed a restriction on
speech based on its content and that the content in question, the political
viewpoints of candidates, is speech that is afforded the utmost protection
under the First Amendment.50
Further, the Court reasoned that Minnesota failed to meet the bur-
den of strict scrutiny, which requires that a state law or regulation abridg-
ing speech protected by the First Amendment be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.5 1 The Court held that Minnesota had a
compelling interest in maintaining the impartiality of its judiciary in ap-
52
pearance and reality. However, the Court also held that the announce
clause was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest because the clause
restricted all speech associated with the particular legal or political views
of the judicial candidates.53
Moreover, the Court held that the possibility of bias resulting from a
judge's preconceived views on legal issues does not violate a litigant's
due process right to an impartial trial.54 The Court reiterated this point by
asserting that a judicial candidate whose mind "was a complete tabula
rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication" would be unfit to serve as
a judge.55 Further, even if Minnesota had characterized its interest as
assuring litigants an "open-minded[]" judge, the announce clause would
still fail under strict scrutiny because a judge's speech during a campaign
is potentially only a small portion of his or her overall speech on political
56
issues. Finally, Justice Kennedy asserted that Minnesota could ade-
quately maintain its interest in judicial impartiality through robust
recusal standards.5 7
The majority opinion in White established that judicial elections
would be held to basically the same First Amendment standards as other
political elections58 and that a litigant's due process rights are not neces-
sarily infringed by a judge's speech during an election.59 However,
48. Id at 769-70. The "announce clause" stated "that a 'candidate for a judicial office, includ-
ing an incumbent judge,' shall not 'announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues."'
Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)). Minnesota's clause
was based on Cannon 7(B) of the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Id.; see MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1972).
49. White, 536 U.S. at 773-74.
50. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1535.
51. See White, 536 U.S. at 774-77. See generally supra Section I.A.
52. White, 536 U.S. at 775-76.
53. Id at 776.
54. Id at 782-83.
55. Id at 778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)).
56. See id at 79-80.
57. Id at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58. Dimino, supra note 1, at 318.
59. See Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1535.
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Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. 60 provided the Court with an instance
to examine the role of financial contributions in judicial elections.6 1 The
Court ruled that the due process rights of a litigant can be violated when
an adverse party who financially contributed to a judge's campaign sub-
sequently comes before that judge in a court proceeding.62
In Caperton, Justice Brent Benjamin, a West Virginia appellate
judge, refused to recuse himself from presiding over the appeal of a $50
million verdict against a corporation run by Donald Blankenship, a con-
tributor to Benjamin's judicial campaign.63 The jury verdict against the
corporation was awarded shortly before the 2004 West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals elections, and Blankenship provided more than
$500,000 to Benjamin's campaign through independent expenditures.
Further, Blankenship donated nearly $2.5 million to a political organiza-
65
tion that supported Benjamin's campaign. These contributions were
greater than the total amount spent by all of Benjamin's other supporters
on the campaign and three times what was spent by Benjamin's own
66
committee.
The Court held that there is a significant "probability of bias" where
''a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising
funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent."67 Further, the Court held that the CEO's contribu-
tions rose to the level of being "significant and disproportionate" and that
Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself violated Caperton's due pro-
cess rights to a fair trial.68 The opinion did not rule in any way against
the ability of individuals to contribute financially to judicial elections.
Rather, the opinion established that judicial impartiality could be pre-
served in extreme cases through the "probability of bias" recusal rule, as
well as through state regulations on judicial conduct.69
60. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
61. Id. at 872.
62. See Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1539.
63. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873-75.
64. Id. at 873.
65. Id.
66. See id at 873.
67. Id. at 884.
68. Id. at 872, 885.
69. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1539-40 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884); see also Caper-
ton, 556 U.S. at 889-90. The current ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge
"shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010). A
more recent provision requires judges to recuse themselves when they know a party or their attorney
donated money to their campaign, but the actual dollar amount that requires recusal is left for states
to decide. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.1 1(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010). Numerous
states adopting the Model Code have either declined to include Canon 2.11 (A)(4) or have altered the
language significantly. See AM. BAR ASs'N CPR POLCY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., COMPARISON
OF ABA MODEL JUDICIAL CODE AND STATE VARIATIONS (2015) [hereinafter ABA, COMPARISON],
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While Caperton is an illustration of the apparent harm judicial elec-
tions can cause to judicial impartiality, the Court's decision in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission 70drastically heightened many
people's fear that judicial elections inevitably erode judicial integrity in
appearance and actuality.7' In Citizens United, the Court held that the
First Amendment protects the political speech of corporations, including
independent campaign expenditures in all elections, and that Congress
and state legislatures may not censor corporate speech on the basis of its
content. Critics of the decision suggested that this ruling guaranteed
greater financial expenditures in judicial elections because states could
no longer limit corporate spending on those campaigns.73 Therefore, ju-
dicial elections could now be "conducted amid unlimited corporate
spending," further destroying the public's confidence in an impartial and
independent judiciary by suggesting that corporations could influence
judicial decision-making through massive campaign contributions.74
The combined effect of White and Citizens United created the im-
pression that he Court would continue to affirm the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech in judicial elections over a state's interest in
limiting that speech. While the Court has acknowledged that states have
an interest in preserving judicial impartiality,76 the Court has been com-
fortable with preserving that interest through the recusal process alone.
Further, the Court has downplayed the difference between judges and
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional responsibility/2_1 L.authc
heckdam.pdf.
70. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
71. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1541-43.
72. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342-44, 365.
73. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1543.
74. Id; Paul D. Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina
Experience and the Activism of the Supreme Court, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1965, 1984 (2011); see also
Vernon Valentine Palmer & John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empiri-
cal and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 1291 (2008) (presenting empirical data demonstrating that campaign contributions influenced
the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court when donors appeared before them in court); Adam
Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006,
at Al (presenting evidence that justices on the Ohio Supreme Court voted in favor of campaign
contributors seventy percent of the time).
75. In White, the Court held that the First Amendment protects judicial campaign speech.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that Minnesota's restriction
on judicial candidates announcing their views is a violation of the First Amendment). In Citizens
United, the Court held that the First Amendment protects independent expenditures by corporations
in elections. 558 U.S. at 342-44, 365. These cases show the Court's history of supporting free
speech over states' attempts to regulate speech in elections, suggesting that this Court would contin-
ue to show support for more electoral speech in future cases.
76. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1535 (summarizing the holding of White).
77. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) (holding that judicial
recusal is required when "a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent."); White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that states can "adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires,
and censure judges who violate these standards" to protect judicial integrity).
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other elected officials, arguing that both are basically afforded the same
speech rights in campaigns under the First Amendment.78
II. WILLIAMS-YULEE V. FLORIDA BAR
A. Facts
In September 2009, Williams-Yulee campaigned unsuccessfully for
a seat on the county court of Hillsborough County, Florida.79 At the onset
of her campaign, Williams-Yulee drafted and mailed a letter to the public
in which she announced her candidacy and asked for campaign contribu-
tions.80 Following the campaign, the Florida Bar brought a complaint
against Williams-Yulee alleging that her letter violated the Rules Regu-
lating the Florida Bar. 8 1 The rules require that judicial candidates abide
by the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, which includes a "ban on per-
sonal solicitation of campaign funds."82 Specifically, Canon 7C(l) states
that judicial candidates "shall not personally solicit campaign funds ...
but may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and man-
age the expenditure of funds for the candidate's campaign."83 Williams-
Yulee did not dispute that she had drafted and signed a letter asking for
campaign contributions.84 Instead, she argued that Canon 7C(l) was a
violation of the First Amendment, which protected her right to solicit
campaign contributions directly.85
B. Procedural History
The Florida Supreme Court appointed a referee to make a recom-
mendation on the case, and the referee determined in a hearing that Wil-
liams-Yulee should be found guilty.86 The Florida Supreme Court ac-
cepted the referee's determination, ruling that while Canon 7C(l) is a
restriction on speech, the canon met the demands of strict scrutiny as
required by the First Amendment.87 The United States Supreme Court
88
granted certiorari.
C. Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts authored the opinion of the Court.89 Justices
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the Chief Justice in his full opin-
78. See White, 536 U.S. at 784.
79. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1663 (2015).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1663-64.
83. Id. at 1663 (quoting FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 7C(1) (2014)).





89. Id. at 1662.
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ion, and Justice Ginsburg joined him except as to Part 11.90 The Court
affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's ruling, finding that Canon 7C(l)
satisfies the demands of strict scrutiny and is therefore permitted under
the First Amendment.91 Chief Justice Roberts began by holding that the
Court should apply strict scrutiny in this case because the Court has
"long recognized, [that] speech about public issues and the qualifications
of candidates for elected office commands the highest level of First
Amendment protection."92 Further, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that a
lesser standard of review would be "a poor fit for this case."93 He stated
that all parties admit that the Canon 7C(1) infringes on Williams-Yulee's
speech based on its content, and therefore the Court must review the law
under strict scrutiny as required by the First Amendment.94
The Court then considered if Canon 7C(1) met the demands of strict
scrutiny and concluded that it did.95 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that
the Canon was adopted to serve the state's interest in maintaining the
integrity of the judiciary-in appearance and in actuality-and that the
Court's precedents have long recognized such an end as a compelling
"state interest of the highest order."96 He then declared that, while both
parties spent time comparing Canon 7C(l) to campaign financing re-
strictions in other types of elections, such comparisons were not warrant-
ed because judges serve a different public function than other elected
officials.97 He argued that judges are not to consider their campaign sup-
porters or donors in their rulings.98 Rather, they are expected to be neu-
tral, evenhanded adjudicators.99 As a result, he concludes that judicial
elections may be regulated differently from other elections.'0
Further, the Chief Justice stated that the mere possibility of a judge
giving campaign contributors an unfair advantage in judicial proceedings
is enough to justify Florida's enactment of Canon 7C(l).' 0 He reasoned
that when judges directly solicit members of the public and the bar for
campaign money, the result is the "unavoidable appearance" that judges
might no longer perform their duties in an impartial manner.10 2 Moreo-
ver, Justice Roberts stated that such solicitation can create a fear amongst
90. Id. at 1656.
91. Id. at 1662, 1670.
92. Id. at 1665.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1664-65.
95. Id. at 1665-66.
96. Id (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)).




101. Id. at 1667-68.
102. Id. at 1667.
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lawyers and litigants that if they do not contribute to a judge's campaign,
they will suffer a disadvantage in that judge's courtroom.'0 3
Next, the Chief Justice addressed whether Canon 7C(l) is narrowly
tailored to fit Florida's compelling interest in maintaining judicial integ-
rity.104 He began by addressing Williams-Yulee's argument that Canon
7C(1) is underinclusive because it does not prohibit other potentially
compromising forms of campaign fund solicitation, such as the solicita-
tion by campaign committees and personal thank-you notes written by
judges to their financial contributors.'0 5 The Chief Justice dismissed this
argument, stating that while underinclusiveness can be problematic for a
law seeking to survive strict scrutiny, the First Amendment has no "free-
standing 'underinclusiveness limitation."'l06 Further, he held that states
are not required to eliminate all threats to their compelling interest in a
single action.'07 Justice Roberts stated that Florida reasonably concluded
that personal campaign solicitations are a greater threat to the appearance
of judicial impartiality than committee solicitations or personal thank-
you notes.ios Therefore, he held that Canon 7C(l) does not fail under
strict scrutiny for failing to prohibit other forms of judicial speech.109
The Chief Justice then addressed Williams-Yulee's argument that
Canon 7C(l) is unconstitutional because it restricts too much judicial
speech and that it is not the least restrictive means of advancing Florida's
interest."0 He concluded otherwise, asserting that Canon 7C(l)'s prohi-
bition of personal campaign solicitations by judges is a "narrow slice of
speech""' and that Florida is allowed to regulate personal campaign so-
licitations by judges in any form in which they might occur.'1 2 Finally,
his opinion considered Williams-Yulee's contention that Florida's inter-
ests would be better served through recusal procedures and campaign
finance limitations." 3 Chief Justice Roberts disagreed, asserting that such
recusal rules could shut down some jurisdictions where judges received a
large amount of contributions from lawyers and litigants. Further, he
reasoned that a "flood of postelection recusal motions" could be harmful
to the appearance of judicial impartiality and "thereby exacerbate the
very appearance problem the state is trying to solve."ll4 Justice Roberts
also expressed concern that recusal procedures could incentivize lawyers
to contribute to judicial campaigns "solely as a means to trigger [a
103. Id. at 1668.
104. Id. at 1668-72.
105. Id. at 1668.
106. Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1669.
109. Id. at 1669-70.
110. Id. at 1670.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1671.
113. Id.
114. Id at 1671-72.
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judge's] later recusal" and thereby allow for forum shopping."1 On the
subject of campaign contributions, he reasoned that a state may conclude
that small contributions can affect the appearance of judicial impartiality
just as significantly as large ones.
D. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer's short concurrence expressed his view that the scru-
tiny levels applied by the Court in various contexts should be viewed as
guidelines rather than strict rules.l17 He cited previous cases where he
voiced this position but did not provide any additional reasoning."8
E. Justice Ginsburg's Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion in response to Part 11119 of
the majority opinion to express her view that strict scrutiny should not be
applied to state actions regulating speech in judicial elections.120 She
reasoned that judges are different from politicians and that rules regulat-
ing other political elections should not be applied to judicial elections.121
She held that while recent Court decisions, such as Citizens United, have
greatly increased the potential for "monied interests . . . 'in representative
politics,"' such judgments should not apply to judicial elections because
judges are "not 'expected to be responsive to [the] concerns' of constitu-
ents." 22 Further, Justice Ginsburg argued that applying the standards of
other elections to judicial elections blurs the distinction between judges
and politicians, citing how unbridled spending in judicial elections has
"threaten[ed] both the appearance and actuality of judicial independ-
ence."1 23 She concluded that states should be allowed to balance the in-
terest of having an impartial judiciary free of improper financial influ-
ence with the constitutional interest in freedom of speech.124
115. Id. at 1672.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
118. Id. Justice Breyer's opinion reads as follows:
As I have previously said, I view this Court's doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny as
guidelines informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically ap-
plied. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. -, -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2551-
2553, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment); Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400-403, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886
(2000) (BREYER, J., concurring). On that understanding, I join the Court's opinion.
Id.
119. Part II of the majority opinion held Canon 7C(1) must survive strict scrutiny analysis if it
is to be held constitutional under the First Amendment. See id. at 1664-65 (majority opinion).
120. Id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1673-74 (second alteration in original) (first quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); then quoting McCutcheon v.
FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014)).
123. Id. at 1674-75.
124. Id. at 1675.
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F. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, authored the first dis-
sent.12 5 He began by stating that all speech is fully protected under the
First Amendment unless there is a longstanding tradition of regulating
the speech at issue and that there is no such history pertaining to judicial
campaign speech.12 6 Justice Scalia then argued that, while Florida likely
has a compelling interest in maintaining the appearance of judicial im-
partiality, Canon 7C(l) is not narrowly tailored to address Florida's in-
terest.127 He stated that Florida's definition of its interest in the "public
confidence in judicial integrity" is vague and that the Court ignores as-
pects of that interest throughout its opinion when addressing other forms
of judicial speech, such as committee solicitation and personal thank-you
notes.128
Justice Scalia moved on to conclude that Florida did not meet its
burden of demonstrating that personal solicitation by judicial candidates
significantly diminishes the public's trust in the judiciary.129 Further, he
argued that our nation's long history of judicial elections allowing per-
sonal solicitations suggests that such speech does not trouble the pub-
liC. 130 Next, Justice Scalia argued that Canon 7C(1) is vastly overinclu-
sive because the canon unnecessarily bans all personal solicitation, even
those that do not threaten the public's confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary, such as the mass mailing at issue.1 31 Further, he argued that
Canon 7C(1) fails to prohibit all personal solicitations by judicial candi-
dates, pointing out that judges are not prohibited from asking for person-
al gifts from campaign supporters.132 Justice Scalia went on to state that
the First Amendment prohibits the abridgment of speech based on its
content and that the Court's opinion violates this principle by prohibiting
personal campaign solicitations by judges but not personal solicitation by
judges for other purposes.'33 He concluded that the true motivation be-
hind Canon 7C(l) appears to be a general hostility towards judicial elec-
tions. 134
125. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1676.
127. Id. at 1676-77.
128. Id. at 1677-78 (quoting id. at 1666 (majority opinion)).
129. Id. at 1678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1678.
131. Id. at 1679.
132. Id. at 1680.
133. Id. at 1681.
134. Id. at 1681-82 ("Canon 7C(l)'s scope suggests that it has nothing to do with the appear-
ances created by judges' [sic] asking for money, and everything to do with hostility toward judicial
campaigning. How else to explain the Florida Supreme Court's decision to ban all personal appeals
for campaign funds (even when the solicitee could never appear before the candidate), but to tolerate
appeals for other kinds of funds (even when the solicitee will surely appear before the candidate)? It
should come as no surprise that the ABA, whose model rules the Florida Supreme Court followed
when framing Canon 7C(l), opposes judicial elections. . . .").
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G. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy argued that the Court's opinion is based on the
premise that "the public lacks the necessary judgment to make an in-
formed choice" in judicial elections and that judicial elections should be
regulated differently than other political elections because of the special
nature of judges.'35 While he admitted that Florida may have a compel-
ling interest in protecting the appearance and reality of judicial integrity,
Justice Kennedy argued that this interest does not trump basic First
Amendment principles.'36 He gave an example of how a qualified but
underfunded and less well-known judicial candidate could suffer a severe
disadvantage in an election and argued that the canon effectively curtails
beneficial debate in the public sphere where a candidate cannot get his
message out.13 7 Justice Kennedy also stated that the Court's opinion
greatly weakens the strict scrutiny standard by creating precedent to un-
dermine it, describing the opinion as a "guide to eviscerating strict scru-
tiny any time the Court encounters speech it dislikes." 38
H. Justice Alito's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito stated that he largely agreed with the analyses of Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice Kennedy.139 He expressed his view that, while
Florida has a compelling interest in maintaining the impartiality and in-
tegrity of the judiciary, Canon 7C(l) "is not narrowly tailored to serve
that interest." 40 Like Justice Scalia, he pointed out that the Canon re-
stricts forms of speech that do not threaten judicial integrity or the pub-
lic's perception of it.141 Further, he echoed Justice Kennedy's concern
that the majority opinion weakens strict scrutiny by providing such a
poor analysis of when a law is "narrowly tailored."1 4 2
III. ANALYSIS
In Williams-Yulee, the Court went against the trend established by
White and Citizens United by identifying an area where the scope of First
Amendment protections is not the same in judicial elections as it is in
other elections. 143 By ruling that states can prevent judicial candidates
135. Id. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1683-85.
138. Id. at 1685.




143. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010) (holding that a federal statute
barring independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the First
Amendment); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that Minneso-
ta's restriction on judicial candidates announcing their views is a violation of the First Amendment).
Williams-Yulee, however, held that Florida's restriction on direct campaign fund solicitation by
judicial candidates was not a violation of the First Amendment. 135 S. Ct. at 1666.
566 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:2
from personally soliciting campaign funds, the Court withheld a right
from judicial candidates that their legislative and executive counterparts
enjoy.'" In so ruling, the Court justified its decision primarily on the
notion that judges serve a different function than politicians and that dif-
ference allows judicial elections to be regulated differently than other
elections.145
This analysis will first argue that, ideally, judges should serve a dif-
ferent role than politicians, but judicial elections cause judges to behave
very similarly to politicians. Next, this part will consider how best to
achieve the ideals of judicial impartiality and independence by address-
ing speech restrictions and recusal procedures.14 6 This part also will ar-
gue that the Court's decision in Williams-Yulee is undesirable because
judicial impartiality should not come at the expense of fundamental First
Amendment principles. Finally, this part will suggest that the best way to
ensure judicial impartiality is to encourage states to get rid of their judi-
cial election systems and to adopt lifetime judicial appointment regimes.
144. See Lauren Garcia, Note, Curbing Corruption or Campaign Contributions? The Ambigu-
ous Prosecution of "Implicit" Quid Pro Quos Under the Federal Funds Bribery Statute, 65 Rutgers
L. Rev. 229, 230 (2012) ("American election campaigns and political platforms have historically
been privately funded; public officials have an interest in soliciting contributions in order to repre-
sent and serve their constituents.").
145. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667.
146. This Comment will not address merit selection-also known as the Missouri Plan. See
James Bopp, Jr., The Perils ofMerit Selection, 46 IND. L. REV. 87, 92 (2013). While this method of
judicial selection varies amongst the states that have adopted it, the process usually involves judicial
appointment by the state's governor from a list of candidates selected by a judicial vacancy commis-
sion. Id. After serving on the bench for a period of time, the judge's performance is evaluated by a
retention election where voters decide whether the judge should be retained. Dimino, supra note 1, at
374 n.436. Proponents of merit selection maintain that merit selection eliminates much of "the
influence of campaign contributions" in judicial elections. Bopp, supra, at 93. However, there is
evidence that retention elections have become increasingly politicized, and spending has increased in
retention elections dramatically. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1674-75 (Ginsberg, J., concur-
ring); BILLY CORRIHER, MERIT SELECTION AND RETENTION ELECTIONS KEEP JUDGES OUT OF
POLITICS 1 n.7 (2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11 /JudicialElectionsPart3-C4-2.pdf. These facts suggest that merit selection
systems, while arguably a better system than contested elections, may now suffer from some of the
same impartiality issues as contested elections, although likely to a much lesser degree.
Another potential solution that is beyond the scope of this Comment is public financing
for judicial candidates. Public financing-first adopted by North Carolina in 2002-is a system
where states offer public money to judicial candidates in order to lessen the need for solicitation of
private campaign money. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1543. While this method is a promising solution
in theory to the issues ofjudicial impartiality created judicial elections, the viability of public financ-
ing took a hit after the Court's ruling in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett. See 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011). Arizona's "matching funds" provision allowed a candi-
date to receive additional campaign money to match a privately funded candidate's fundraising when
the privately funded candidate's campaign expenditures exceeded the initial amount granted to
publicly funded candidates. Id The Court ruled the provision was unconstitutional because it im-
posed an impermissible penalty on candidates who choose to "robustly exercise[] [their] First
Amendment right[s]." Id at 2818 (third alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724,
739 (2008)). Further, the Court held Arizona's rule violated the First Amendment by incorporating
independent expenditures made by third parties in calculating if the privately funded candidate had
exceeded the public spending cap. Id. at 2819. By eliminating the option of "matching funds," the
Court took away many candidates' incentive to rely on public financing, since use of state funds
usually comes with restrictions on how the money can be used and how much private money a
candidate can raise in addition. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1543-44, 1548.
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However, such sweeping adoption of the federal system is politically
unlikely. Therefore, this part will conclude that pursuing more rigor-
ous and automatic recusal procedures may be the only politically feasible
way of solving at least some of the impartiality problems posed by judi-
cial elections.
A. Judicial Elections Compromise the Role of the Judiciary
In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts stated that
"[j]udges are not politicians," and, unlike politicians, judges are not sup-
posed to be responsive to the desires of their supporters and financial
contributors in the performance of their duties.148 Judges are to "'observe
the utmost fairness,' striving to be 'perfectly and completely independ-
ent, with nothing to influence or [control them] but God and [their] con-
science."'1 49 Recognizing the unique role of judges, the Founders were
correct to enshrine a mechanism in the Constitution to protect judicial
independence and impartiality. The proper function of society depends
on a fair and balanced judiciary, and the public must perceive the judici-
ary as being fair and balanced to honor its rulings.150 Without a properly
functioning judiciary, people may begin to lose faith in the courts as ad-
ministrators of justice and could resort to "violent, extralegal and possi-
bly criminal practices" to resolve their disputes.'5 '
What assures a fair and balanced judiciary in Article III is a judicial
appointment system where judges serve for life "during good Behaviour
[sic]." 52 Life appointment allows judges to be unconcerned with public
opinion, financial contributors, or "congressional or presidential reaction
to any particular ruling."' 3 In theory, this allows judges to apply the law
to the facts presented to them without feeling beholden to any special
interest or pressure.
The idea of perfect judicial impartiality, even in an appointment
system like that of the federal government's, is never completely attaina-
ble. Judges are human beings, and like all other human beings, they har-
bor some biases based on their personal experiences and beliefs.5 4 But
147. See infra Section III.E.
148. Williams- Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662, 1667.
149. Id. at 1667 (quoting Address of John Marshall, in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, at 616 (1830)).
150. Norman L. Greene, How Great is America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into
the Supreme Court's Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial
Elections, and Their Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 884-85
(2010).
151. Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the Problems
and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 9, 19 (2005).
152. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
153. Dimino, supra note 1, at 306.
154. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, at 6-7 (1986) (emphasizing
how legal realists believe judicial "idiosyncrasy," such as a judges political, social, and economic
views, can subconsciously affect judicial decision-making).
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this degree of impartiality is acceptable so long as a judge applies the law
based on what he or she believes the appropriate and just result should
be. What is undesirable, however, is a judge who rules not based on his
or her own understanding of the law or justice but rather in response to
outside pressures from members of the public and financial contributors
who desire a particular result regardless of what the law is or should be.
Unfortunately, the latter behavior is inevitable under a system where
voters elect judges, which in effect requires judges to behave just like
other politicians who respond to the electorate and their financial sup-
porters in the performance of their duties.'55
Few people would be impervious to the fact that they may lose their
job when they are accountable to the public and the public is dissatisfied
with their decisions. 15 Indeed, the influence of public opinion on the
decisions of an elected judge has been likened to "a crocodile in your
bathtub ... [y]ou know it's there, and you try not to think about it, but
it's hard to think about much else while you're shaving."'57 Similarly, a
judge cannot help but feel the pressure of ruling in favor of a financial
contributor to his or her campaign when that contributor appears before
them in court. 15 Even if they were able to resist that pressure, the ap-
pearance of impartiality and justice can nonetheless be diminished in the
eyes of the public.159 Thus, judicial elections create a serious problem for
states that have adopted them but nonetheless wish to preserve the impar-
tiality of their judiciary.
Some commentators have suggested that states chose judicial elec-
tions over judicial appointment systems because these states value de-
mocracy and accountability to the public over the appearance and actu-
ality of judicial impartiality and independence.'60 Indeed, accountability
155. See Dimino, supra note 1, at 348. Studies have shown that independent judicial decision-
making is compromised when judges are elected: "[J]udges, just like other politicians, tailor their
decisionmaking to the necessities of campaigns, changing their behavior in response to the expected
reaction of the electorate." Id. at 347-48; see also CHRIS W. BONNEAU, THE FEDERALIST Soc'Y, A
SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 7 (2012), http://www.fed-
soc.org/library/doclib/20120719_Bonneau2Ol2WP.pdf ("[T]he evidence is pretty clear that elected
judges are responsive to their constituencies when it comes time to make decisions on the bench.").
156. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("Elected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of
a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.").
157. Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State
Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997)
(paraphrasing the late Honorable Otto Kaus).
158. See White, 536 U.S. at 790.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 1, at 347; Matthew Schneider, Why Merit Selection of State
Court Judges Lacks Merit, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 621-22 (2010). Caleb Nelson, Professor of Law
at the University of Virginia, has summarized various contemporary and historical opinions on why
states chose judicial elections throughout the mid-1800s. Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation ofScholar-
ly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
190, 190-91 (1993). He notes that most scholars suggest the transition occurred as part of a wave of
populist support for democracy. Id.; see also White, 536 U.S. at 791 ("[B]eginning with Georgia in
1812, States began adopting systems for judicial elections. From the 1830's until the 1850's, as part
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plays an important role in the other branches of government, but to de-
mand the judiciary be accountable to the public undermines the purpose
of having an independent judiciary.' Elected judicial figures become
politicians subject to the influence of the public and can fail to fulfill
their role as a check on the other branches and protector of minority
rights from a potentially tyrannical majority.1 62
B. The Court Should Not Abridge First Amendment Principles to Achieve
Judicial Impartiality and Independence
Despite the threats to judicial independence and impartiality created
by judicial elections, a majority of states today have judicial elections in
some form or fashion.'63 In an attempt to protect the appearance and real-
ity of judicial impartiality, many states have sought to regulate judicial
speech during campaigns in an effort to eliminate some of the pressure
created by the electoral process.1"6 While the Court in White weakened
the scope of what speech states can regulate,'65 in Williams-Yulee the
Court upheld restrictions on judicial campaign speech in service of main-
taining judicial independence and impartiality.166 The Court's support of
Florida's interest in judicial impartiality in Williams-Yulee is admirable;
however, the means chosen to preserve that interest are troubling. By
prohibiting personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candi-
dates, the Court weakens the power of the First Amendment right to free
speech in an area that right is supposed to be at its most powerful.167
In Williams-Yulee, the majority justifies the abridgement of judicial
candidates' speech on the notion that judges are not like politicians, and
this difference justifies regulating judicial elections differently than other
elections.'68 In so doing, the majority implicitly emphasizes the distinc-
tion between judge, or potential judge, and candidate, suggesting that
one's status as a judge, or one's pursuit of that status, "condition[s] the
exercise of free speech" in a judicial election.'69 Indeed, the Court holds
of the Jacksonian movement toward greater popular control of public office, this trend accelerated..
. ." (citation omitted)).
161. See generally Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule ofLaw, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995) (discussing the importance of an independent judiciary
in maintaining constitutional safeguards for minority rights and the dangers an elected judiciary
poses to that role).
162. See id at 727.
163. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).
164. See Dimino, supra note 1, at 314.
165. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2002) (holding that Minneso-
ta's "announce clause" was a violation of the First Amendment).
166. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673.
167. See id. at 1682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1662 (majority opinion).
169. BRIAN K. PINAIRE, THE CONSTITUTION OF ELECTORAL SPEECH LAW: THE SUPREME
COURT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS 73 (2008) (explaining that
the judge/candidate distinction was relied upon by the dissenting justices in While). Many of the
same arguments offered by the dissent in White are offered in Williams-Yulee by the majority.
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judges to different First Amendment standards than ordinary citizens.1
7 0
Judges are currently prevented from endorsing political candidates, solic-
iting charitable contributions, and participating in certain organizations,
all of which are speech restrictions justified in the name of preserving
judicial "dignity, integrity, and impartiality."'7' While not all judicial
candidates are governmental "employees," one might argue that judicial
candidates are "similarly situated" to governmental employees and that
content-based restrictions on their speech are justified to protect judicial
impartiality.17 2
While one might consider the restrictions on judicial and govern-
ment employees' speech to be violations of the First Amendment,'73 the
fundamental issue with comparing content-based speech restrictions im-
posed on sitting judges and those imposed on judicial candidates is that
judicial candidates are candidates in an election first, and judges, or po-
tential judges, second.174 Speech restrictions of the kind addressed in
Williams-Yulee do not "restrict the speech of judges because they are
judges," but rather "regulate the content of candidate speech merely be-
cause the speakers are candidates." And while judges are not afforded
full First Amendment protection in their capacity as government em-
ployees, candidates in elections should be granted the full protective
force of the First Amendment.7 6
As mentioned previously, the First Amendment provides special
protection for political speech because of its importance to the democrat-
ic process.17 7 Candidate speech is a form of political speech and is at the
heart of the primary justification for the First Amendment: self-
governance.'78 Under the self-governance theory, candidate speech is
protected because it is essential for voters to make informed decisions on
which candidate to vote for. 79
170. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Jekyll and Hyde of First Amendment Limits on the Regulation
ofJudicial Campaign Speech, 68 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 83, 93 (2015); see also Garcetti v. Ce-
ballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that government employee speech is not protected by the
First Amendment when an employee makes a statement pursuant to his or her official duties).
171. Geyh, supra note 169, at 93; see also Rodney A. Smolla, Regulating the Speech ofJudges
and Lawyers: The First Amendment and the Soul of the Profession, 66 FLA. L. REV. 961, 971 (2014)
("Judges, of course, are government employees, and fall under the government employee rule estab-
lished in Garcetti v. Ceballos.").
172. Geyh, supra note 171, at 94-95.
173. This issue, while interesting, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
174. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1682-83 (2015) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasizing a judicial candidate's status as a candidate in an election); Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 (2002) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175. White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. See supra Section L.A.
178. See supra Section IA; see also Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002)
("A candidate's speech during an election campaign 'occupies the core of the protection afforded by
the First Amendment."' (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995))).
179. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) ("In a republic where the people are sover-
eign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential,
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Applying these principles to the facts of Williams-Yulee, the majori-
ty, in allowing states to prohibit judges from directly soliciting campaign
funds from the public, has regulated political speech that is important for
self-governance and democracy. While asking for money may not seem
particularly significant to self-governance, "[w]hen a candidate asks
someone for a campaign contribution, he tends ... also to talk about his
qualifications for office and his views on public issues.,"s Certainly,
judicial candidates have other ways of communicating their qualifica-
tions and views to voters, but a ban on direct campaign fund solicitation
eliminates one important context in which those views can be communi-
cated.'8 ' Further, restricting a judicial candidate's ability to directly solic-
it campaign funds inhibits the ability of "low profile" challengers to raise
money and prevents them from reaching the public to the same extent as
other candidates.82 The result is a "dead weight" on public debate-the
sort of weight the First Amendment is designed to prevent.1 83
While the Court in Williams-Yulee justifies the abridgement of
speech as serving the ends of judicial impartiality and independence,'84
those interests simply do not trump the importance of preserving the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech for electoral candidates. As Jus-
tice Kennedy stated in White, "restrictions on political speech are 'ex-
pressly and positively forbidden by' the First Amendment."'8 5 Simply
put, once a State has chosen to hold judicial elections, "the First
Amendment protects the candidate's right to speak and the public's ensu-
ing right to open and robust debate,"'86 and "[t]he State cannot opt for an
elected judiciary and then assert that its democracy, in order to work as
desired, compels the abridgment of speech."'87 The importance of main-
taining free discourse and open debate in elections throughout our socie-
ty is simply too great to be overcome by the interest of judicial impartial-
for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a na-
tion."), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
180. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Riley v. Nat'1 Fed'n of
the Blind ofN.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
181. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Candidates can share their
qualifications and campaign platforms with the public by giving political speeches, purchasing
advertisements on television and in newspapers, participating in debates, etc.
182. Id. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 204 (6th
Cir. 2010).
183. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's
ruling as "dead weight" tied to public debate by illustrating how "low profile" judicial challengers
are disadvantaged by restrictions on direct solicitation).
184. Id. at 1666 (majority opinion) ("We have recognized the 'vital state interest' in safeguard-
ing 'public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation's elected judges."' (quoting Caper-
ton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009))).
185. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964)).
186. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1684 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. White, 536 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ity.1' Thus, Williams-Yulee provides the wrong way of solving the prob-
lem of judicial impartiality. The decision solves that problem only mar-
ginally while undermining one of the fundamental justifications for the
First Amendment.
C. Recusal as a Speech-Protecting Option in Maintaining Judicial Im-
partiality
In her argument to the Court, Williams-Yulee suggested that Florida
could preserve its interest in judicial impartiality through recusal proce-
dures.'8 Williams-Yulee is not alone in this contention; many commen-
tators have suggested that recusal procedures offer a viable solution to
the inherent tension between judicial elections and judicial impartiali-
ty.190 In his concurring opinion in White, Justice Kennedy reasoned that
states concerned over judicial impartiality "may adopt recusal standards
more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who violate
these standards."'9' However, the Court rejected Williams-Yulee's ar-
gument, reasoning that recusal procedures could overwhelm some juris-
dictions, exacerbate concerns over the appearance of impartiality, and
incentivize lawyers to donate to judicial campaigns for the sole purpose
of triggering recusal.192
The majority opinion in Williams-Yulee is correct to hold that cur-
rent recusal procedures are inadequate protections of judicial impartiali-
ty. 193 In Caperton, the Court established that the Constitution only re-
quires judicial recusal in extreme cases where the "probability of bias" is
overwhelming.194 As previously mentioned,95 the current ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct suggests that judges should recuse themselves
when they know a party or their attorney donated money to their cam-
paign,'96 but numerous states have not adopted this provision.'97 These
facts indicate that judges are not required to recuse themselves when
confronted by campaign contributors in almost all cases. Further, the
188. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court's decision in
this case imperils the content neutrality essential both for individual speech and the election pro-
cess."); see also Carey, 614 F.3d at 204-05 ("[I]t is tempting to say that any limitation on a candi-
date's right to ask for a campaign contribution is one limitation too many.").
189. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671.
190. Genelle I. Belmas & Jason M. Shepard, Speaking from the Bench: Judicial Campaigns,
Judges'Speech, and the First Amendment, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 709, 733-35 (2010); Molly McLucas,
The Need for Effective Recusal Standards for an Elected Judiciary, 42 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 671
(2009); David K. Stott, Comment, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impar-
tiality Through Recusal Reform, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481, 481-82 (2009).
191. White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671-72.
193. See id.
194. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).
195. See sources cited supra note 69.
196. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (A)(4) (AM. BAR AS'N 2010).
197. See ABA, COMPARISON, supra note 69, at 3-16.
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most serious problem with recusal procedures as they exist now is that
the procedures ask judges to recuse themselves.
Recusals currently occur either when judges recuse themselves for
meeting one of their state's recusal conditions or when litigants file a
motion to disqualify a judge.198 In the latter scenario, the challenged
judge determines whether to accept or deny the motion.1 99 Either way,
judges end up evaluating their own impartiality. The problem with this
system is that judges are typically inclined to determine that they are not
biased and are fully capable of overseeing the litigation in an impartial
manner. 20 This method could be problematic, and studies on judicial
bias suggest that these self-determinations may not be accurate since
judges often rule in favor of their campaign contributors.201 Further, liti-
gants can be hesitant to file a motion to disqualify a judge, fearing that
the judge will take offense and disadvantage them throughout the rest of
202
the proceedings. Thus, current recusal procedures are weak shields
against the threat campaign contributions pose to judicial impartiality.
Commentators have suggested numerous revisions to the current
recusal standards in an effort to alleviate the concerns raised by cam-
203
paign contributions. In particular, states could create rules that consid-
er the dollar amount or percentage of total contributions a donor makes
to a judicial campaign, the time the donation was made, and the motiva-
tions surrounding the donor's contributions in determining when a judge
should recuse himself or herself.204 While such rules may provide some
benefit in combating contributor threats to judicial impartiality, they do
not address the underlying issue that judges evaluate themselves in
recusal proceedings.
Of course, a possible solution to this issue would be to have other
judges review recusal proceedings, but this procedure is not without its
own problems. For one, appellate judges do not typically overrule recusal
denials because judges do not like "investigating and ruling on the integ-
rity of fellow judges and [often] do not look favorably on litigants who
198. Stott, supra note 190, at 500.
199. Id.
200. See Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping Up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model
Code ofJudicial Conduct's Prohibition ofExtrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance ofBias, 19
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 480 (2006).
201. See supra note 74.
202. Sparling, supra note 200, at 480; Stott, supra note 190, at 500.
203. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
204. Belmas & Shepard, supra note 190, at 734-35 (arguing that recusal procedures should
consider the relative amount a donor contributed to a judge's campaign, "the issues they favor in
their support, and the timing of the donation"). The authors reject a bright line specifying what
amount of money creates a conflict. Id. at 734. Instead, they advocate for a reasonableness tandard
where judges must recuse themselves when "a reasonable person would believe that the total amount
spent [by the donor], the proportion of that amount in the election, and the effect of the contribution
on the election's outcome would require [the judge's] recusal." Id.
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question the integrity of the court."20 5 These sentiments likely would be
shared by lower-court judges reviewing the denied recusal motions of
their peers. And with the dockets of many jurisdictions overflowing with
cases, other judges may simply defer to the judgment of their peers for
206the sake of efficiency.
Finally, states could impose automatic judicial disqualifications un-
der certain circumstances when a party who donated to a judge's cam-
paign appears before that judge in court. States could consider the dollar
amount contributed by an individual or organization, as well as the pro-
portion of that donation in relation to the judge's total campaign expendi-
207tures, and place a defined limit on one or both. Such procedures would
eliminate the issue of having judges evaluate their own impartiality and
would not require third party judges to intervene either. One criticism of
automatic recusals offered by Justice Roberts in Williams-Yulee is that
some jurisdictions could run into problems if certain donors contribute to
numerous judges' campaigns, and a situation could arise where a court
could not try a party because every available judge would have to recuse
themselves.208 However, such situations are unlikely to occur often, and
jurisdictions could create measures to override automatic recusals in such
circumstances-perhaps by selecting the judge who benefited the least
from that individual or group's contribution.
D. The Best Way to Preserve Judicial Impartiality and Independence Is
to Advocate for Lifetime Judicial Appointment, but Politics Gets in the
Way
Even assuming that it is permissible to censor judicial speech in
some circumstances, as the Court did in Williams-Yulee, no amount of
speech abridgement will solve the underlying issues of judicial bias cre-
ated by judicial election. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the
Florida canon addresses one small area where the appearance and reality
of judicial impartiality could be compromised.209 Even if conduct rules
forbid judges from making any statements during their elections, they
would still be subject to pressure from public scrutiny of their deci-
sions.2 10 No restriction on judicial campaign speech can mitigate this
basic fact of judicial elections. Similarly, state-created recusal proce-
dures, while arguably a better approach to preserving judicial integrity
205. Stott, supra note 190, at 501.
206. See id. at 501-02.
207. These procedures are similar to those offered by Belmas & Shepard, supra note 190, and
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct A(4), supra note 69. The key to these procedures working is
that they must be automatic, not discretionary.
208. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct 1656, 1671-72 (2015).
209. See id. at 1682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (describing the effect of public pressure on elected judges).
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than restricting campaign speech,211 fail to eliminate public pressure on
judicial decision-making. Recusals can ease the burden placed on judges
when confronted with campaign contributors in their courtrooms, but the
underlying pressure of public approval still looms in the background of
any decision made by an elected judge.2 12
Having concluded that speech should not be abridged in any elec-
tion and that recusal procedures cannot fully preserve judicial impartiali-
ty and independence, the best option to preserve judicial impartiality and
independence is to advocate for the end of judicial elections and the
adoption of lifetime judicial appointments. The integrity of elections in
this country must be preserved, but the existence of judicial elections
need not be. By adopting appointment systems like that of the federal
government's, state governments can free their judiciaries from the pres-
sures of the public and financial supporters and ensure the impartiality
and independence of their judiciaries without compromising the interest
213
of free speech in elections.
The problem with advocating for states to model the federal system
of judicial appointment is that, in the current political climate, wide-
spread and sweeping reform in this direction appears to be virtually im-
possible. For one, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress can compel
states to end judicial elections. Further, judicial elections remain popular
amongst voters214 despite the fact that voters acknowledge that campaign
contributions influence judicial decision-making.2 15 Recently, activists
have aimed their reform efforts at implementing merit selection,216 and
voters have met even this movement with considerable resistance.217 In
fact, much of the legislative action in 2015 amongst states that already
employ merit selection has been aimed at either substantially reforming
merit selection or abolishing it altogether.2 18
What, then, can concerned parties do to preserve both judicial inde-
pendence and impartiality? Implementing automatic recusal rules is the
second-best option for maintaining judicial impartiality after state adop-
tion of the federal system, but implementing such measures would not be
211. See Belmas & Shepard, supra note 190, at 714.
212. See White, 536 U.S. at 789; Uelmen, supra note 157, at 1113.
213. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books ed., 1987)
(arguing that federal judges should be appointed for life "during good behavior" to keep them com-
pletely free of influence from the people and the other branches of government).
214. Press Release, Harris Interactive, Most Americans Want State Judges to Be Elected (Oct.
20, 2008), http://media.theharrispoll.com/documents/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Electing-
judges-2008-10.pdf
215. Sample et al., supra note 4, at 56.
216. For a brief discussion of merit selection, see supra note 146.
217. See Sample et al., supra note 4, at 57.
218. Bill Raftery, Review of 2015 Efforts to Change, Alter, or End Merit Selection/Commission




without its own problems. In particular, state courts may be resistant to
legislative action requiring judicial recusal in certain circumstances as a
violation of separation of powers, and courts could even strike down
recusal measures implemented by state legislatures.2 1 9 Thus, it will likely
fall upon state courts to implement additional recusal standards, and most
states have been slow to implement more stringent recusal rules post-
Caperton.220 And, as mentioned above, judicial recusal does nothing to
solve the fundamental problems judicial elections pose to judicial inde-
pendence. So long as there are judicial elections, true judicial independ-
ence cannot be achieved. However, since solving some problems is better
than solving none, maintaining judicial impartiality by way of automatic
recusal standards would be a step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION
The Williams-Yulee decision is an attempt by the Court to cure
some of the ills of judicial elections, and those ills undoubtedly need to
be remedied. However, the Court created an even bigger problem by
abridging judicial candidates' freedom of speech. While the Court may
wish to help states in their efforts to preserve judicial impartiality, once a
state has opted to hold judicial elections, it must suffer the full conse-
quences of that decision regardless of the problems those elections cre-
ate. Those states have "voluntarily taken on the risks [of] judicial bi-
as,"221 and the only way to eliminate those risks is for that state to get rid
of judicial elections.
The better way to preserve judicial impartiality and independence is
to advocate for states to model the federal system of judicial selection.
However, this solution is infeasible in the current political climate, so the
Court, the ABA, and the public should instead encourage states to im-
plement automatic recusal rules in particular situations. Automatic
recusal procedures cannot completely remedy the threats posed to judi-
cial independence by contested elections, but in a world of political se-
cond-bests, such solutions will have to do for the time being.
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